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A B S T R A C T 
The history of the Northern Rhodesia Protectorate, 
as Zambia was known before 1964, has been depicted as a 
~elativ71y benevolent process. The region 'had been sub-
Jugated , says Mulford, 'not by war but by treaties con-
cluded between white men and the Territory's unsophisti-
cated chiefs'. The struggle of 'Christianity, commerce 
and civilization versus the slave trade' had, according 
to A.J. Hanna, distinguished the earlier years. In 
Gann's view, the establishment of administration, under-
taken by 'government officials', coming 'in the mission-
ary's footsteps' promoted the 'birth of a new economy'. 
Such accounts have implied that the 'protection' of 
'northern Zambezia' compared favourably with the situation 
south of the river, where military subjugation followed 
the Ndebele and Shona 'risings', and was indeed qualita-
tively different. Moreover, this view could draw su-
pport from the statements of some Zambian nationalists. 
As late as 1959, Kenneth Kaunda, while under political 
restriction, described the Protectorate as based on 
'treaties freely entered into' between local rulers and 
Queen Victoria's 'representatives'. 
This thesis is concerned to modify this assessment 
radically in the light of extensive research into British 
South Africa Company records, Colonial Office correspond-
ence, the private papers of some B.S.A.C. agents, the 
letters and diaries of missionaries and others, coupled 
with extensive tape-recording of the testimonies of 
senior Zambians. 
After outlining the theme of the research (Chapter I), 
this 'anatomy' of the B.S.A. Company's 'conquest' pro-
ceeds to review the relation of 'the rules of the great 
game of scramble' to Rhodes's action in Central Africa 
{Chapter II), and to examine 'treaty-making' in 'northern 
Zambezia' in detail {Chapter III). 
Chapter IV is devoted to the B.S.A. Company's stra-
tegy of military conquest, with special reference to the 
defeat of the stronger kingdoms. 
The main body of the thesis (Chapter V) is concerned 
with what are seen as the major instruments by which the 
conquered territory was controlled and exploited. This 
includes an examination of the revenue, drawn from 'hut 
tax' in relation to the Company's real objectives. 
In the final chapter (VI) brief surveys are provided 
of three major consequences of this conquest: the degra-
dation of traditional rulers; the fostering of a compre-
hensive •colour bar'; and the awakening of African 
nationalism. 
It is submitted that the swift and relatively early 
triumph of Zambian nationalism cannot be accurately under-
stood without the fuller 'anatomy' of the British 'con-
quest' which this thesis offers. 
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Anatomy of a Conquest 
(a) The need to reappraise familiar terms 
1. 
Words like 'occupation', 'acquisition' or 
'annexation' have loose enough meanings in colloquial 
usage. For the purposes of this essay, the word 
'annexation' has, however, been deliberately included 
in the title because of the very specific use of it 
that appears to have been made during the deliberations 
of the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-85. 
Germany, whose meteoric rise to a dominant role in 
European international relations in the latter decades 
of the nineteenth century had so much to do with the 
'cold war' situation that led to the calling of the 
Conference, was insisting on the principle of 'effective 
occupation', by 'the Powers', of coveted tracts of 
Africa. Britain, on the other hand, wanted a loose 
term which would enable her, as the recognised leader 
in the field of colonial expansion, to 'keep others 
out' of the territories to which she laid claim without 
imposing awkward obligations upon herself. In this 
Britain was to triumph, as the resolutions of the Berlin 
Conference show. She was then free to carry out 
policies of relatively gradual annexation without 
having to be able to prove that she exercised 'strong 
and effective control'. She would declare herself 
responsible, in her various African 'spheres of influ-
ence', for the general 'protection' of her subjects 
2. 
who lived and did their business there. The words 
'protection' and 'protectorate' thus slipped in, con-
sci8usly ill-defined, to the parlance of the dynamic 
imperialism of the last quarter of the century, with 
3ritain 'avoiding any definition of the obligations 
of protectorates'. Indeed in the words of Sir Edward 
I·!alet, her chief negotiator at the Conference, "No 
attempt was made ••• to interfere with existing maxims 
of international law. Dangerous definitions had been 
avoided"; and Britain was effectively left with no 
commitments to 'protect' African chiefs and peoples 
but with a free hand to require such rulers and nations, 
faced with the reality of her military prowess, to 
undertake not to agree to the entry of representatives 
of other European powers into their territories. 
In making this distinction between 'annexation' 
and 'protectorates', Britain maintained that the latter 
provided 'a perfectly legitimate but much less complete 
form of government, exempt from any of the obligations 
imposed_ bv the_ Coofer:ee~'""et-~Un'""occupyl.n~r powers'.· 
Thus Lord Selborne carried the day not only against 
Bismarck's strong opposition but also in the face of 
sharp criticism within the British Cabinet. At the 
last, Bismarck, who liked to disclaim any interest in 
colonies, 'finally yielded, his concession marking a 
signal triumph for the principles of vague and loose 
definitions for which Great Britain stood, since it 
clearly provided her with the means of evading all the 
3. 
obligations of the third basis (i.e. "effective control") 
should she wish to do so'. 1 
This original hazy connotation of 'protection' 
and its relation to actual annexation were, as we shall 
see, to have profound consequences upon British-African 
relations in what, in the usage of the early colonial 
period, we are calling 'Northern Zambezia'. For here 
is a field of study in which the difference between 
the realities of imperialist action and later, super-
ficial but well-established assumptions about the 
meaning of 'protection' and 'protectorate' has been 
found to be a factor of special significance in the 
era of African 'nationalism'. 
A cursory glance at recorded Central African 
history over the last century might lead to the con-
elusion that here was the story of a civilised European 
power replacing uncivilised African powers and thus 
preparing the way for 'indigenous' governments to 
design nation states in keeping with the patterns of 
modern European civilisation and geared to integrate 
rapidly into the current international, economic and 
technological situation. Such a judgment would then 
pronounce the European mastery of Central Africa, 
associated with the dynamic leadership of Cecil Rhodes, 
1. See Crowe, s., 'The Berlin West African Conference, 
1884-1885' (Longmans, 1942), pp. 177-9 and 190. 
4. 
as 'a good thing' - to use the uncomplicated language 
of '1066 and All That'. This, in turn, may lead us 
to recall Sellar's and Yeatman's summary statement 
that 'the Roman Conquest (of Britain) was a Good Thing, 
since the Britons were only natives at that time', 
with its profound insight into that particular cast 
of mind
2
, which is the springboard of 'herrenvolkism'. 
The findings of a closer study contradict this 
impression and are less exhilarating. Because for 
most of the period of British Control of the region 
now called Zambia, the words 'protection' and 'pro-
tectorate' figured in official papers, there appeared 
to arise a belief that the relations between Britian 
and this region were shaped and directed by the prin-
ciples of tutelage and nurture. Though the term 
'protectorate' had been applied also to territory ac-
quired by Britain south of the Zambezi, the great 
'rebellions' of the Ndebele and Shona in 1896-7 clearly 
demonstrated that British authority over that part of 
Central Africa was effected by military conquest. 
'Northern Zambezia' did not record 'wars' on such a 
scale and so the idea grew that there was a qualitative 
difference in the way in which the British acquisition 
north of the river was accomplished. 




David Mulford, for instance, having stated that 
'in the early days of white settlement in Central 
Africa the Zambezi River had marked the beginning of 
black Africa', remarks, in the first chapter of his 
excellent book: 'Zambia: the Politics of Independence', 
that 'in the beginning Northern Rhodesia had been sub-
jugated not by war but by treaties concluded between 
white men and the Territory's unsophisticated chiefs•. 3 
This implies that what made the establishment of white 
rule possible was in fact the signing of 'treaties' 
and that the 'treaties' were therefore of major im-
portance to the British agents in their relations with 
the African peoples over whom their suzereignty was 
thus legally established by bilateral contracts. 
Treaty-making implies moreover negotiation rather than 
the duresse of superior force. 
Mulford's statement suggests further that the 
British advance north of the Zambezi - in contrast to 
what had happened south of the river - was motivated 
by a conscious desire, or at least intention, to 'pro-
tect' the native peoples from various oppressive forces 
and that (as comes out notably in the writings of 
Michael Gelfand4 ) the use of force was therefore to be 
understood as a last resort in situations where certain 
3. Mulford D., 'Zambia- the Politics of Independence' 
(Oxford 1967) pp. 1 and 4. Underlining is mine. 
4. See e.g. Gelfand, M., 'Northern Rhodesia in the 
Days of the Charter' (Oxford 1961) p. 87. 
6. 
belligerent African Kings were ill-treating their 
neighbours and proving 'recalcitrant'. 
It is true that recent historical studies of 
the region have revealed a definite change of emphasis. 
The British incursion into 'Northern Zambezia' has been 
described by writers like Rotberg as 'conquest' and 
there has appeared an explicit recognition of the need 
to see Zambian history through the eyes of her indi-
5 
genous people. Yet the position still is that the 
greater weight of historical writing is on the side of 
a relatively benevolent view of the British acquisition 
of 'Northern Zambezia' and one can ~ready detect some 
disquiet about the aims and scope of the more recent 
approach as its investigations expose more vividly the 
motives and manners of 'colonialism'; a sense of 
distress lest such exposures increase bitterness on 
racial lines and do injustice to the 'civilising 
mission' of Europe in Africa. One can detect a 
cautionary voice saying 'Enough said. Don't throw 
out the baby with the bath-water. Let's go on to more 
creative research now. Let's try to know more about 
such fascinating subjects as pre-colonial trade, move-
ments of population, etc., etc.' 
5. See Rotberg R., 'Rise of Nationalism in Central 
Africa' (Harvard 1965) pp. 11 ff., and also his 
'Political History of Tropical Africa' (Oxford 
1965) pp. 264 ff.; and Hall R., 'Zambia' (Pall 
Mall Press, 1965) e.g. pp. 80 ff.; also Keatley 
P., 'The Politics of Partnership' (Penguin~ 1963). 
' l 
7. 
The argument of this present enquiry is that 
enough has not yet been ascertained or chronicled about 
the 'colonial period' to ensure a sound understanding 
of why the situation developed as it did in Central 
Africa. For the student of history cannot decline to 
examine what the shovels of research dig up. Of 
course, he must not write history in order to increase 
bitterness any more than to generate euphoria. His 
task is always to try to understand the processes of 
human action, inter-action and reaction by which things 
come to be as they are at any given moment of time. 
It has therefore to be remembered that when 
Africans began to find their 'voice' in Central Africa, 
what they said was at once denounced by the 'autho-
rities' as the reckless outbursts of a tiny minority 
of self-seeking and power-hungry people, totally un-
representative of the 'average native'. This was a 
strong element in the official propaganda of the period 
of Roy Welensky's ascendancy. In the words of one 
Governor in 1956, 'unsophisticated' Africans were being 
'duped by rogues, crooks and self-seekers•. 6 Events 
quickly gave the lie to this 'official' assessment and 
the mid-sixties saw the swift accomplishment of con-
stitutional changes which in turn opened the way to 




economic, political and social 'revolution'. Yet 
the conflict still goes on elsewhere in Africa and the 
old assumptions of colonial apologists and chroniclers 
of 'white civilisation' are far from dead. 
The history of the region now called Zambia has 
been relatively well served in recent years by writers 
with the ability to make their researches readable. 
Richard Hall's 'Zambia' is much more than a work of 
journalism. Rotberg's 'Rise of Nationalism', despite 
the limitations of so wide a canvas, gives a picture of 
conquest and the reaction to it very different from, 
for instance, Lewis Gann's 'Birth of a Plural Society' 
and his 'History of Northern Rhodesia•; 7 and the con-
cise relevant section of his 'Political History of 
Tropical Africa' strengthens Rotberg's general thesis. 
The same quality of sympathy with the African side of 
the encounter characterises Mulford's 'Zambia: the 
Politics of Independence'; while no Slidy of the area 
and period can overlook H.A.C. Cairns' analysis of 
'British reactions to Central African Society, 1840-
1890' which he entitles 'Prelude to Imperialism•. 8 
7. Gann, L.H., 'Birth of a Plural Society' (Manchester, 
1958), and 'History of Northern Rhodesia: Early 
Days to 1953' (Chatto and Windus, 1963). 
8. Cairns H.A.C., 'Prelude to Imperialism' (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1965). 
9. 
It is, however, the work of a Zambian historian, 
Henry Meebelo in his 'Reaction to Colonialism•, 9 which, 
in its study of the country's Northern Province, takes 
this new approach furthest, and most clearly recon-
structs the picture of local reaction to foreign con-
quest without being either emotionally anti-British or, 
on the other hand, inhibited by assumptions of colonial 
benevolence. Meebelo thus demonstrates how the people 
of the province in question at no time forgot 'that 
they were a colonial people - a people relegated to 
the status of second-class citizens in their own country 
by an alien and white elite whose policies were as 
detestable and burdensome as the old traditional rule 
10 was brutal'. But though he makes numerous passing 
references to oth~r parts of the country, Meebelo is 
concerned with one province of Zambia, the impact of 
foreign intrusion on it and its peoples' increasingly 
articulate and coordinated reaction which contributed 
so significantly to the country-wide movement towards 
national sovereignty. 
The intention of the present study is to extend 
the enquiry in breadth and depth to other parts of Zambia 
9. Meebelo H., 'Reaction to Colonialism' (Manchester, 
1971). 
10. Ibid., p~ 91. Underlining is mine. 
-~ 
10. 
while reducing the period under investigation to the 
four crucial decades from the Berlin Conference of 
1884 to the transfer of authority in 1924 from the 
British South Africa Company to the Colonial Office in 
London. Extensive use has therefore been made of oral 
evidence recorded in Zambia, alongside a wide range of 
written documents, in an attempt to reconstruct impor-
tant aspects of the conquerors' actions and to make it 
11 easier to understand why 'the African recovery' so 
rapidly united previously disparate societies, in rural 
no less than in urban areas, in an explicit and irre-
sistible surge, in face of strong and determined white 
opposition, to create one nation coterminous with the 
area of British conquest. 
Historical scholarship about Zambia divides 
itself, as we have noted, into (a) traditional apologia 
for the European 'civilising mission' whose champions 
write of the whole region of Central Africa; (b) the 
radical critique which Meebelo, for instance, applies 
to a limited part of the region - a critique with which 
Rotberg, Hall, Mulford and Patrick Keatley are in funda-
mental sympathy; and (c) the dispassionate umpire role 
of writers like A.J. Wills, which is demonstrated in 
his article on Central Africa in 'Africa in the 19th 
11. See Wills A.J., 'An Introduction to the History 
of Central Africa' (Oxford 1963), title of part 
four of Chapter VIII. 
11. 
and 20th Centnries•. 12 It is hoped to show here that 
the motives and manners of the agents of the B.S.A. 
Company in our region were essentially and consistently 
those of conquerors and that the consequences of their 
intrusion upon the subsequent political, social and 
economic condition of the region have to be seen as 
the consequences of a determined, coordinated, swift, 
effective and comprehensive subjugation. If this 
view is correct, then there needs to be a major re-
appraisal of the real significance of such terms as 
'protection', 'treaty', etc. and of the legacy of 
traumatic dislocation which can then be seen as a 
major factor contributing to the herculean task in, 
for instance, the field of rural reconstruction with 
which modern Zambia is faced. 
(b) The notion of 'Protection' in the mid-twentieth 
century. 
Though, as we have stated, this enquiry is 
limiting itself to the forty years prior to 1924, it 
is important to note at the outset the considerable 
stress laid by the first spokesmen of Zambian 'nation-
alism' on the idea of 'protection'. Indeed it is 
possible to explain Mulford's mistaken assumption 
about the local significance of 'treaties of protection' 
12. Anene J., and Brown G., 'Africa in the 19th and 
20th Centuries' (Ibadan and Nelson, 1966), article 
by A.J. Wills), pp. 504-527. 
12. 
by reference to what various African political leaders 
said as they began to formulate their reasons for 
rejecting either the 'amalgamation' or, later, the 
'federation' of the three territories of Central 
Africa. For example, in their major 25-page memorandum 
on 'Federation in Central Africa•, 13 Dr Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda of Nyasaland and Mr Harry Nkumbula of Northern 
Rhodesia, declared, in May 1949, that federation 
'would mean discontinuation of the policy of deliberate 
tutelage for Africans now pursued by the Government of 
the United Kingdom' in the two northern territories. 
Moreover 'it would extend to Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia the policy of segregation and discrimination 
under which our fellow Africans in Southern Rhodesia 
now legally suffer social indignities and civil and 
political disabilities'. 
The reader of this memorandum who did not have 
first-hand knowledge of 'Northern Zambezia' would have 
assumed that there was little or no 'colour bar' there 
and that Africans were free to play their part in the 
This political and economic life of the territory. 
impression would have been reinforced for him by the 
subsequent statement that 'in Nyasaland and Northern 
13. Memorandum, 'Federation in Central Africa', 
prepared by Dr H.K. Banda and Mr H.M. Nkumbula, 
May 1949 and esp. pp. 1 (paras 1, 3), 3, 7. 
13. 
Rhodesia the declared policy is to prepare Africans 
for self-government'. This situation Banda and Nkumbula 
contrasted with the inhuman attitudes of Southern 
Rhodesian white settlers who 'have never forgotten 
that they conquered the Africans of the colony by force 
of arms'. In view of the realities of Northern Rho-
desia's all-pervasive racial discrimination, this mild 
statement must have derived in the main from the views 
of Dr Banda, long since self-exiled from Nyasaland and 
obviously not aware of the Northern Rhodesian situation. 
Yet there was further frequent reiteration of 
the theme of protection, tutelage and the leading of 
African people towards self-government, by the early 
nationalists. In 1951, Harry Nkumbula declared that 
there was 'a cold war between the British Government 
and the indigenous peoples ••• Britain is suffering from 
moral~- defeat' , he said 'because she has broken her 
. ' 14 prom1se A few months later, when some leading 
chiefs accompanied Nkumbula to a meeting with the Africa 
Bureau in London, the Bemba paramount Chitimukulu re-
ferred to David Livingstone's having prepared the way 
for British rule and said that 'the African people ••• 
welcomed him and the assurances from the British Govern-
ment which followed the treaties he made with them. 
They accepted the protection of the British Government 
14. ANC: Address delivered by the Gen. President, 
Xmas Day, 1951. Underlining is mine. 
14. 
and believed they would enjoy continuous freedom and 
there would never be interference with their protecto-
rate'. Chief Musokotwane agreed that 'Livingstone 
suggested the protection of our country by the British 
Government ••• We have known the British people to be 
people of their word', he concluded, 'and we hope they 
will keep to that•. 15 
Such statements, made when there was no en-
couragement by the territorial governments for the ex-
pression of African opinion, all appeared to assume 
that it was the fact of 'protection' that made Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland different from the Crown Colony 
across the Zambezi. Orton Chirwa of the Nyasaland 
African Congress, expressed this idea thus: 'I want 
to start from the fact that we want to remain under 
the Colonial Office. Some people think we are fools, 
but I do feel that the British Empire and the British 
Government should be proud of their Colonial Office, 
but no one has really commended us for saying so ••• As 
it was at home, under the Colonial Office, we should 
very soon, I don't know in how long, but very soon, 




ANC: Record of Public Meeting held by the Africa 
Bureau in Church House, 9th May, 1952, pp. 1-2. 
Underlining is mine. 
Ibid., p. 5. 
;J 
15. 
What Africans in Northern Rhodesia seemed to 
want was the continuing authority of Britain to safe-
guard them from domination by the policies of men like 
Godfrey Huggins, the Southern Rhodesian politician 
whose name, along with that of Roy Welensky in Northern 
Rhodesia, was increasingly associated with the demand 
for the closer association of the three territories. 
Congress leaders noted however that there was already 
a serious erosion of 'protection' of Africans especially 
in respect of 'land rights' and that it was evident 
that 'the Protectorate Government has relinquished its 
power and authority and its goodwill towards Africans 
because of the increasing political importance and 
participation of European elected members in the Govern-
ment'. The same Congress memorandum noted that 
Africans were denied the franchise on the grounds that 
they must first surrender their status as 'British 
Protected Persons' and incur the expense of applying 
. . B .. h b" t 17 for natural~sat~on as r~t~s su ]ec s. 
The idea of 'protection' subsumed the reality 
of 'treaties' and 'treaty obligations', and so it is 
important to note references by African leaders to 
such contractual relations. A confidential statement 
by Congress in 1948, signed by Robinson Nabulyato, 
recorded that in response to the suggestion of Sir 
17. RH:103/1:MSS.Brit.Emp.s.365, statement of NR 
African Congress, 3fd May, 1952. 
16. 
Stewart Gore-Browne, the specially nominated Member of 
Legislative Council for African Interests, that Africans 
should seek a 'treaty' from Britain as a safeguard 
against European domination, Congress was 'not prepared 
to do so ••• as most Treaties have proved to be "mere 
scraps of paper"'. Nonetheless, the Congress declared 
that 'Northern Rhodesia ••• is ruled on the basis of 
trusteeship, i.e •••• until the wards of Trusteeship are 
matured to be able to rule themselves•. 18 Earlier in 
the same year, the Federation of Northern Rhodesia 
African Societies had suggested that 'the misleading 
name' Northern Rhodesia Protectorate should be changed 
to 'Queen Victoria Protectorate•. 19 
Immediately after the Federation of African 
Societies had constituted itself the Northern Rhodesia 
African Congress, the Secretary, in a letter written 
to the Secretary for Native Affairs, made this signifi-
cant statement: 'As the policy of the Colonial Office 
Rule is to educate and civilize Africans and then let 
them rule themselves, it is earnestly hoped that this 
sacred promise will be fulfilled ••• As no English blood 
was shed by Africans when the English first entered in 
Northern Rhodesia, it is hoped that the Colonial Office 
will, as before, protect the interests of Northern 
Rhodesian Africans from the oppression of European 
18. NAZ - SEC/NAT/353, confidential report on Congress 
Committee meeting, 28/12/48, to deliberate the 
Federation issue. 
19. Ibid., Report of Federation of NR African Socie-








settlers', since 'African chiefs asked for and were 
graciously granted British Protection by Her Most 
Gracious Majesty the late Queen Victoria•. 20 
In September, 1951, as the threat of an imposed 
Federation was increasing rapidly, Harry Nkumbula, soon 
after his election as President of the Congress, signed 
a memorandum for presentation to the Colonial Secretary 
which repeated the view that there had been treaties 
which 'were made in the clearest understanding that 
the relations between the British Government and the 
(indigenous) Africans is one of a proctor (sic) and 
protected. The Africans sought British Protection at 
the time when various European powers scrabbed (sic) 
for Africa for economic and political reasons. The 
African chiefs could have sought protection from the 
Portuguese or the Germans or the Belgians but because 
they had a certain amount of trust and confidence in 
the British Government, they decided on British Pro-
tection. This trust and confidence of the Africans 
in the British Government have remained unshaken until 
the intentions of the officials who produced the Closer 
21 Association Report were made known'. Here was a 
rosy memory of five decades of benevolent tutelage. 
20. Ibid: Congress memorandum to SNA, 15/7/48, signed 
by George Kaluwa. Second underlinings are mine. 
21. ANC/2/4: 'The Case against the Federal Proposals' 
sgd. H.M. Nkumbula, Gen. President, and G.W.C. 
Kaluwa, Asst.Gen.Secy., 11/9/51. Underlining is 
mine. 
18. 
Seven years later, when Nkumbula was addressing 
the All Africa Peoples' Conference in Accra, he spoke 
of 'treaties' which had 'merely stated that H.M.G. had 
an obligation to train and prepare Africans of the 
Protectorate for self-government and independence•. 22 
This statement seemed to contradict the claim made in 
1955 in A.N.C.'s Official Gazette that no chiefs, other 
than Lewanika of the Lozi, 'signed any treaties of 
protection•. 23 
The birth of ZANC - the Zambia African National 
Congress - in October 1958 was regarded by the terri-
torial Government as a dangerous threat to peace by a 
group of radical extremists who had been chafing under 
Nkumbula's leadership. In less than five months ZANC 
was banned and its leaders restricted to remote corners 
of the land. It is thus interesting to note the 
reiteration by its leader, Kenneth Kaunda, of the idea 
of benevolent protection as the basis of British rule 
from the outset. In a memorandum drafted for, but not 
submitted to, 'the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Circumstances which gave rise to the making of the 
Safeguard of Elections and Public Safety Regulations, 
1959', Kaunda included these words: 'Northern Rhodesia 
is a Protectorate whose status was reached through 
treaties freely entered into between our forebears and 
representatives of Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
Britain'. Such treaties, he added, 'could not rightly 
22. ANC: Nkumbula's speech at the All Africa Peoples' 
Conference, 8/12/58. 
23. ANC: Official Gazette, (ed. K.D. Kaunda), No. 1, 
Vol.V, 18/6/55, p. 2. 
.J 
19. 
be broken by either side with impunity•. 24 Thus the 
notion of a contractual relationship and of 'protection' 
to which Mulford, as we saw above, referred, died hard. 
One more example of this appeal by Africans to 
early treaty relationships was the 'written evidence' 
submitted to the Monckton Commission in 1960 by the 
Chishinga Native Authority in the Kawambwa District. 
They cited treaties 'made between Chiefs and Her Majesty 
Queen Victoria, long since 1890, namely that they were 
to stay under Her Protection during which period the 
British Government would educate them in every walk of 
life until they were capable to manage their own affairs'. 
They had 'since lived under the pledges of these 
treaties', they said. 25 
There again there was the assumption that the 
whole pattern of British relations with the territory 
had been shaped by binding treaty obligations, now 
under threat from 'white supremac~s' from south of the 
great river. And this was reiterated in many state-
ments, from which we have cited but a few, despite the 
expressed suspicion that the treaties were of dubious 
intent, to say the least, as was revealed in the report 
24. 
25. 
RH:103/2: Undated 'Sworn Memorandum by K.D. Kaunda 
prepared for submission to the 'Ridley Commission', 
established to inquire into the situation that had 
led to the banning of ZANC. Underlining is mine. 
ANC/CEO/.A/7: memorandum of Chishinga Native Autho-
rity to Commission on the Review of the Constitution 







of the meeting in London in January 1953 between Chief 
Mpezeni III of Ngoni, Harry Nkumbula and a lawyer 
26 
called Bryden. It remains a mystery why, only three 
months after that London meeting, Nkumbula was one of 
the five signatories of a letter to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations which said, inter alia, 
'We declare that our lands and people were entrusted 
by agreement with our forebears to the Protection of 
Her Majesty's Government. Among the signatories in-
eluded in the attached copy of a petition to Her 
Majesty ••• are direct descendants and ••• legal succe-
ssors of these chiefs who were the original signatories 
of these treaties whereby our territories were en-
trusted to Her Majesty's Government ••• (Copies of some 
of these treaties are attached hereto)•. 27 
An interesting and important study requires to 
be undertaken to show why and how this assumption of 
real 'protection' developed, since African contestants 
in the verbal battles that were to culminate in the 
granting of independence to Zambia in 1964, made such 
repeated references to 'protection' as the distinguish-
ing factor in the Northern Rhodesian situation. 
26. ANC: C.391 - Note of Conference with Paramount 
Chief Mpezeni III of Ngoni on behalf of the NR 
African Congress on Tuesday 13th January 1953. 
27. ANC-CEO/OA/7: letter to Secy-General UNO signed 
by D.L. Yamba, M.L.C., P. Sokota, M.L.C., and H.M. 
Nkumbula, S.H. Chileshe, and George Kaluwa of ANC 
on behalf of people who have voluntarily placed 
themselves under the protection of the Government 
of the United Kingdom, 20/3/53. 
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'Protection', 'tutelage', 'trusteeship' and the like 
were major coins in the currency of the African people 
in their struggle to break away from the Central African 
Federation and chart their own destiny. The story of 
that struggle with its dangerous clashes between 'white 
supremacy', 'paramountcy of native interests', 'partner-
ship', etc., has been told elsewhere. Obviously signi-
ficant changes had been wrought upon the situation by 
the aftermaths of the two great European wars, more 
especially the second (1939-45), and by the increasing 
influence of liberal and humanitarian forces in Britain 
and elsewhere. Moreover in the relations of British 
colonial officers to subject African peoples, there 
was a marked amelioration in the nineteen-forties. 
Our concern here, however, is to re-examine in 
some detail the motives of the first colonial agents 
as revealed by their actions and their statements, 
along with the reactions of the African people to them. 
Then, noting the shortness of the space of years between 
the B.S.A. Company's acquisition of the region and 
Zambia's attainment of independence, we should ask how 
the processes of radical reversal were influenced by 
what was still fresh in the memories of men. 'Why', 
asked a woman missionary in the early nineteen-fifties, 
with genuine distress, 'do they not respect our flag?' 
The answer, it is suggested here, lay in the peoples' 
clear memory of how European rule began and was extended, 
.. ! \ 
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and in their great and well-nigh unanimous desire to 
bee free of it. 
Because 'protection' has, as we have noted, 
been a primary premiss of historical writing as well as 
of mid-century political campaigning, it is considered 
right to attempt to 'set the record straight' in the 
interests of greater accuracy and understanding. On 
the one hand, for instance, the 'Guide to the Public 
Archives of Zambia' claims that the history of 'the 
early development of the territory bears out the fact 
that "most of the region, unlike other parts of Africa, 
28 has never been a conquered country"'· Meebelo, on 
the other hand, places a very different emphasis. 'The 
tidal wave of belligerent nationalism in post-war 
Northern Rhodesia was the estuary of an ever-flowing 
river of African political thinking and activity which 
came running down the years, having as its source the 
inception of colonial rule'. The evidence we are now 
offering leads us to support this view and to go on to 
interpret the motives and methods of that intrusive 
regime as meriting the definitive description of it as 
'conquest' rather than as 'colonialism•. 29 
28. Graham I.M., and Halwindi B.C., 'Guide to the 
Public Archives of Zambia' Vol. I, Government 
Printer, Lusaka 1970, p. 2. 
29. Meebelo, op. cit., p. x. 
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(c) Contemporary Comments at the end of our Period. 
In our attempt to reassess how the situation 
really developed after the first B.S.A. Company incur-
sions into the region, we now take our retrospections 
a quarter of a century back from the time we have just 
glanced at above, to the years after the end of the 
First World war, when B.S.A. rule was formally re-
placed by direct rule from London. From one point of 
view, Gann's picture of the Company's efforts, during 
the brief post-war boom, to accelerate white immigra-
tion, merits note. The setting aside of about 
2,500,000 acres of land for settlement by ex-service-
men, free to eligible candidates, even though it partly 
failed, must be seen, however, from the standpoint of 
the indigenous communities as well. Similarly, while 
agreeing that the Chartered Government had perhaps 
'proved a flop' in its commercial undertakings and 
that there were reasons why the B.S.A.C. was ready to 
cede its administrative authority over the territory, 
it is most important to note, on the other hand, how 
the African people were faring in the post-war years. 30 
Moreover, as Gann points out, the settlement finally 
accepted by the Company and the Imperial Government, 
though bitterly resented by some of the Company's re-
presentatives, was in fact 'a brilliant bargain' as 
far as the Directors were concerned. The B.S.A. 
30. See Gann, 'History', op. cit., pp. 180 ff. 
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Company was about to begin to reap the fruits of its 
spurious claims to 'mineral rights' in the area of the 
Lamba people where the Northern Rhodesian Copper Belt 
31 was suddenly to appear. 
We shall look later at the record of rural 
dislocation and depopulation in the decades of B.S.A. 
rule. Now, however, the comments of various mission-
ary bodies in 1922 offer a picture of the post-war 
situation. In a letter to the Under Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, for example, the London Office 
of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa stated 
that it could not but 'regard the position of the 
natives and the attitude of the Directors of the 
British South Africa Company with grave anxiety'. 
It then quoted the comment of the Anglican bishop in 
the territory, Alston May, that "the enormous powers 
that the B.S.A. have exercised are in the case of this 
country based upon the flimsiest foundation ••• ! have 
always understood that they simply marched through the 
land and announced that they had taken it over". The 
Bishop had then added that he was "not saying that this 
may not have been the right thing to do with a view to 
driving the slave-traders, and keeping the Germans, out". 32 
31. Ibid: p. 191. 
32. PRO: C0/417-691, letter of June, 1922. 
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Though, two years earlier, the Colonial Office 
had told the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society in London that it had 'always considered that 
the interests of the natives were never in doubt one 
way or another•,
33 
the Northern Rhodesian General 
Missionary Conference was taking an increasingly 
serious view of the social, moral and economic con-
sequences of three decades of white rule. This con-
cern found its chief spokesmen in Bishop May and Rev. 
John Fell of the Methodist Mission, whose statements 
were 'heartily endorsed' by the Conference. With this 
support, May called on the Administrator, for instance, 
to ensure 'fair and adequate representation of native 
interests at the Privy Council enquiry' which was ex-
pected to follow the publication of Lord Buxton's 
Report on land rights in the territory. The ignoring 
of 'native interests' was emphasised at the Conference 
by Frank Melland, himself a Native Commissioner of the 
B.S.A. Company, when he said: 'In all the East Central 
African protectorates ••• ! do not know of any law pro-
mulgated by us for the natives. All our laws here, for 
example, are either for the whites, for the relations 
between white and black, , or for the government and 
33. Ibid: - 656, L.S. Amery to A-S ~nd A.P. Society, 
4/2/20. 
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taxation of the black: not one for the blacks them-
34 
selves'. 
The Conference was perturbed by the injustices 
that had been perpetrated in the apportionment of land. 
In Fell's words, it had created a situation whereby 
'the average white holding will be 4,250 acres each' 
while 'the unalienated land is 175,840,000 acres which 
gives about 176 acres per native ••• The time to safe-
guard the Native', said Fell, 'is now. Many have 
been bought off their old lands. Those still living 
in their old haunts may at any time be dispossessed 
through alienation'. He then cited Lord Buxton's view 
based on what was, as we can now know, the untenable 
notion that 'in Northern Rhodesia there was no conquest', 
for Buxton had observed that 'a claim might be put 
forward that the unalienated lands ••• belong ••• to 
neither of them (i.e. the Crown or the Company) but to 
the natives'. Yet, in North-eastern Rhodesia already, 
through alienation, '6,495,000 acres or nearly a tenth 
of the whole were in the hands of 400 whites', namely, 
the North Charterlands Concession and other alienated 
settlements. The Conference noted further that 'much 
34. Conf.Br.Miss.Socys.1211, papers of 1922 G.M. Con-
ference at Kafue. See also Melland F.H., 'In 
Witch-bound Africa' (Cass 1923) pp. 106 ff.; and 
esp. p. 307 for his speech to the G.M. Conference, 
1922. Melland was widely regarded as an ex-
ceptionally liberal and humanitarian administrator 
and was co-author, with Rev. T. Cullen Young of 
the Livingstonia Mission, of 'African Dilemma' 
(Lutterworth, 1937). The Administrator at that 
time was Sir Drurnmond Chaplin. 
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of the unalienated land is unsuitable for cultivation, 
other areas are in the tsetse fly belt, and, judging 
from the history of similar peoples, the population is 
likely to double itself in the next 25 years'. More-
over, 'we know of no case where a native has purchased 
land and been granted full title to it in his own right'. 
Fell concluded that 'a deliberate attempt is being made 
to impoverish the natives, to make the conditions of 
their life unbearable and to make even life itself for 
both man and beast precarious'. The Conference there-
fore affirmed that the white rulers 'must not make the 
aborigines into landless serfs. If we can secure to 
the native ••• his right to land ownership we shall 
probably save him from real disaster. If we fail ••• 
we betray our trust to the African people who are under 
our protection•. 35 
The above quotations confirm that, as early as 
1922, the assumption of 'protection' as the role of a 
foreign authority established without conquest, was 
clearly in the minds of the assembled missionaries not 
less than of Lord Buxton. Yet it was not only in the 
specific matter of land apportionment that the Conference 
gave expression to both a strange contradiction of the 
35. Ibid: and note Lord Buxton's 'Second Report of 
the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies to consider certain questions re-
lating to Rhodesia (Cmd.1471: 1921). 
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principle of tutelage and a disturbing similarity to 
the pattern of government in Southern Rhodesia. The 
refusal to allow any effective 'rights' of land owner-
ship to the indigenous peoples was paralleled by, and 
inextricably related to, the policy and methods of 
'native taxation'. This was the subject of a special 
study by Bishop May, whose protests had been prompted 
by the Administration's decision in 1919, whereby the 
tax was doubled 'to be precise, for the 5/- tax was 
substituted a 10/- poll tax levied on all adult males 
and on every wife except one of polygamists'. May 
apparently carried out extensive enquiries and re-
ceived reports from numerous missionaries before making 
his speech to the Conference. 
The Bishop began with two concessionary comments: 
'(a) the hardship of the high tax is felt less in some 
districts, e.g. those bordering on the Belgian Congo, 
than in others; (b) the Government must have money to 
administer the country'. But, he asserted, the sharp 
increase in taxation 'seriously aggravated a very bad 
situation'. For, he declared, 'communications received 
from a number of Missions in North-eastern Rhodesia 
showed that at any given time a very high percentage 
of the able-bodied male population (from 50% to 75%) 
is absent from the villages to work outside the Terri-
tory or far away from their homes, in some instances 
hardly one able-bodied man remaining'. The doubled 
. ~ 
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tax, which was criticised not only by missionaries but 
by 'all the District Officials responsible for the 
collection of the tax, one of whom resigned his position 
rather than collect it', was bound to accelerate this 
depopulation. The Conference took note of the grave 
consequences of this process upon 'the normal life' 
of the villages, of increased 'immorality' among girls, 
'very many separations and divorces' and 'an increased 
rate of mortality'. Furthermore, 'the old men, women 
and children can hardly do more than raise enough food 
for bare existence' and 'any improvements in mtheods 
of cultivation is out of the question'. Meanwhile 
those patently baleful effects of 'the injustice and 
oppression' of taxing people 'to force them to work ••• 
for the commercial benefit of the white man', were 
accompanied by 'the high cost of calico and other 
"kaffir truck" at the stores'. As the birthrate fell 
and family ties were loosened and the care of children 
devolved 'upon the lone mother or grandmother', ·~ 
exodes amenent la mis~re dans le pays', as one French 
. . t 36 m1ss1onary wro e. 
Individual missionaries can also be quoted as 
concerned critics of the situation. Referring to a 
36. Papers of Gen.Miss.Conference, 17-23/7/22, Kafue, 
p. 81 'Native Taxation in N.E. Rhodesia' by the 
Right Rev. Bishop May. 
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proposal for a 'mid-Africa Conference', one London 
Missionary Society agent wrote that 'of all the countries 
to be invited ••• we ••• especially in the North-east are 
the worst governed and the most poverty stricken ••• Let 
us reflect upon the tens of thousands of pounds taken 
from our local natives in taxation with no adequate 
return beyond keeping the peace ••• There is little hope 
of the B.S.A. Co. doing anything for native education 
in these parts that they are not compelled or shamed 
into doing•. 37 This was a comment sadly in line with 
an entry in the diary of the French White Fathers 
Mission in the north made over twenty years before, 
that 'the first objective of the colonisers is to fill 
their own pockets - as for improving the lot of the 
indigenes that is the business of poor missionary folk 
who do not know the value of gold'. In 1922, Bishop 
Guilleme of the White Fathers commented as follows on 
the situation of the Ngoni in the Eastern Province: 
'The Chief Mpeseni has for his people a so small reserve 
that obliged to cultivate, since so many years the same 
land, the soil is so exhausted that the natives are in 
the impossibility to get sufficient foodstuffs for 
their actual needs. The natives of the Vulwe valley 
37. CCWM: Central African Letters, Box 20, letter of 




who have been and who will be removed from their land 
have to go to a hilly and poor country where it will 
be for them to get sufficient food for the present and 
impossible in a few years. The consequences of so 
drastic measure if it were not stop will be in my opinion: 
(1) to make the native malcontent. 
(2) the natives will be obliged to occupy places 
full of tsetse fly where cattle cannot live. 
The result will be that the only wealth of the 
Ngoni will be lost. 
(3) the country will become poor even for the 
settlers who require labour and produce from 
th t . ' 38 e na ~ves • 
The personal observations of an individual ad-
ministrator reinforce this view with an interesting 
comparison of missionaries and government agents. 
'Mission and Boma', Theodore Williams wrote in 1919, 
'get very different aspects of their one and the same 
raw material', meaning the African population, 'quite 
apart from the difference of our policies. Theirs is 
to give and teach; ours is to take and to compel. 
For there is no denying that in exacting 10/- from 
every able-bodied man we take more from the country 
than we put into it. Still the native does not dis-
tinguish consciously between our policies yet - all 
38. W.F.: Nyasa, 1895-1906 (Diaries), entry for, 
apparently, 1899; and PRO: CO 417/691, Guilleme 






he knows is that we are all white men, and one lot 
seems to be here for no conceivable reason ••• and the 
39 other lot is here to enjoy the delights of tyranny'. 
Williams was saying here what had been asserted in a 
letter to the 'Livingstone Mail' a few months previously, 
namely that the Chartered Company's 'sole aim is to 
exploit the natives and to enlarge the pockets of their 
40 
shareholders'. 
Meanwhile, the rule of 'the White Bwana' con-
tinued to be exercised by drastic methods. One vet-
erinary officer who sojourned briefly in the territory 
in the last years of B.S.A.C. rule, told, for instance, 
how as a matter of course, he worked his will upon a 
village headman in the Chilanga district. When asked 
why he did not obey the officer's order5 ,the headman 
had replied that "They were no good". 'So I showed 
him with a sjambok they were really excellent and he 
finally agreed with me. From that time, my path was 
strewn with roses•. 41 At the same period, an official 
reply of the Colonial Office to a question in the House 
of Commons on Northern Rhodesia stated that 'native 
39. RH:Mss.Afr.s.781: letter of Theordore Williams, 
Solwezi, to mother, 16/10/19. 
40. 'Livingstone Mail' 11/4/19, letter by 'Freedom 
Hop er'. 
41. RH:Mss.Afr.s.350 - 'Impressions and Experiences 
of Northern Rhodesia', Arthur Wakefield, 4/4/24, 
p. 25. 
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Tax' was expected to yield £90,000 in 1923 but that 'no 
direct expenditure is incurred by the British South 
Africa Company upon native education•. 42 
42. RH.Mss.Brit.Emp.s.22 (G.164) (Anti-Slavery Society) 










THE BERLIN CONFERENCE AND RHODES'S DREAM 
(a) Africa in late nineteenth century European politics 
'Cold war' is a relatively recent name for an 
ancient international phenomenon, that state of affairs 
when nations are in grave tension with one another and 
manoevring, under threat of 'hot war', in the hope of 
averting open conflict without surrendering their as-
pirations. The turgid second half of the nineteenth 
century witnessed a sharpening of the rivalries of 
certain European nations and, as we can see so clearly 
in retrospect, adumbrated the devastating conflagrations 
of the present century. How the European 'cold war' 
of the latter nineteenth century related to Central 
Africa has been told by numerous historians. 1 What 
concerns us here is to recall why European politicians 
and their imperial agents behaved as they did in 
Africa, and how their behaviour impinged upon the 
'native peoples' of the territories which they coveted 
in the region which we are studying. 
'My map of Africa lies in Europe', said Count 
Otto van Bismarck in 1884. 'Here lies Russia, here lies 
France, and we are in the middle; that is my map of 
Africa•. For him, what made Africa important was its 
1. E.g. Rotberg 'Rise', op.cit., p. 11 ff.; Hanna 
A.J., 'Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-eastern 
Rhodesia' (Oxford, 1956), pp. 106 ff.; Hall 
'Zambia', op.cit., pp. 51-53 and 54 ff.; Gann 
'History', op.cit., pp. 49 ff., and 'Birth' op. 
cit., pp. 44 ff.; Wills op.cit., pp. 120 ff. 
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role as an arena for the mounting industrial and po-
litical rivalries of Europe. The potential riches 
of the various tracts of the vast central region of 
the African continent were vital pawns on the tense 
chessboard of European politics. 2 The century that 
had begun with the rise and fall of Napoleon Bonaparte 
and which had brought to birth in its middle decades a 
jig-saw pattern of new sovereign states, witnessed in 
its last quarter the dynamic ascendancy of Germany 
under 'the Iron Chancellor' and the consequent escalation 
of 'big power' politics closely related to the urgent 
quest for new sources of raw materials and new markets 
for the sophisticated wares of the major industrialised 
nations. Contemporary commentators rightly spoke of 
'the scramble' for Africa. 
In the mid-twentieth century the birth of new 
independent nations in Africa was to highlight the corn-
plex historical relation between colonial power and 
missionary enterprise and so bring a sharp critique to 
bear upon missionary motives. Only sixty years earlier, 
however, historical understanding of the motives and 
methods of European 'imperialism' in Africa had been 
confounded by the synchronisation of the various thrusts 
into the heart of Africa that is sometimes called 'the 
scramble' with the impressive series of missionary 
2. Langer W.L., 'European Alliances and Alignments' 






incursions that followed the death of David Livingstone. 
The missionary-explorer's vision of Christianity and 
'legitimate commerce' combining to effect a civilising 
mission in Africa had, as has been widely recognised, 
the effect of leading many humanitarian people in 
Britain and other parts of Europe, as well as a number 
of pioneer missionaries in the region of modern Zambia, 
to believe that the objective of Cecil Rhodes, on the 
one hand, and Livingstone's successors on the other, were 
in harmony. 
Contemporary judgment, at the start of our period, 
was also profoundly affected by the prevalent belief 
that 'imperialism' was synonymous with the spread of 
'civilisation', which in turn could be understood as 
almost another name for 'Christianity'; the word 
'Christendom' signifying, as it were, a secular reali-
sation of the Gospel in the social, economic and po-
litical structures of Europe. As Cairns says, 'The un-
willingness to attempt a divorce between Christianity 
and the nineteenth century west partially reflected a 
belief in the social benefits of Christianity and the 
thesis that the rewards of prosperity and power flowed 
from fidelity to the Christian religion ••• The neat fit 
between Christianity and the progressive west, in con-
junction with the absence of secular progress in non-
western countries, ••• gave the missionary tangible proof 
of ••• the social value of Christianity, and made it 
37. 
difficult and almost contradictory for him to isolate 
his message from his culture•. 3 
This was the notion that has survived, however 
distorted, in the repeated claims of the Rhodesian 
'rebel leader', Ian Smith, in the period from 1965, 
to be the champion of Christian civilisation in Africa. 
His 'unilateral declaration of independence' in November 
1965 was, Smith asserted, 'a refusal by Rhodesians to 
sell their birthright' and a blow struck 'for the pre-
servation of justice, civilisation and Christianity•. 4 
This merger, in the minds of many, of Christian missions 
and the expansionist programme of Rhodes's Company which 
flowered in the doctrine and practice of 'white su-
premacy', was further epitomised in the title 'Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute' for the major social and anthro-
pological research bureau in Central Africa. It is 
not possible to review the history of Central Africa 
without taking note of the idea that 'colonialism' was 
a consequence of missionary enterprise. 
The mainspring of the thrust in central Africa, 
however, was the European 'cold war' situation that was 
dangerously intensified in consequence of Bismarck's 
unification of Germany and his resounding defeat of 
France in 1870. In the years that followed, the major 
3. Cairns, op.cit., p. 200. 
4. Extract from broadcast by Ian Smith, Rhodesian 
'rebel' Prime Minister, November 11th 1965; and 
see 'Africa Digfft' Vol. XIII, no. 3, p. 51. 
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European powers were engaged on the greatly increased 
production of armaments and ships; the Suez Canal, 
opened in 1869, was giving much easier access to the 
Indian Ocean and the east coast of Africa; Britain 
established her first naval base in the eastern Medi-
terranean on the island of Cyprus; and in 1876 the 
Belgian King, Leopold II, called an international con-
ference at Brussels to legitimise the birth of the 
'International African Association' which in turn enabled 
him to turn his attention vigorously towards the Congo. 
/ 
By 1885 he was recognised as sovereign of 'l'Etat 
Independant du Congo' and lost no time in turning it 
into his 'domaine priv~'. A year earlier, Germany had 
annexed a large tract of south-west Africa and acquired 
suzerainty over territory in both East and West Africa. 
A contemporary chronicler of the 'Partition of 
Africa' has summarised what happened at this period thus: 
'Following the example of Germany, the other great 
powers of Europe made a rush upon Africa. Inextricable 
difficulties were sure to arise unless some rules were 
laid down on which the great game of scramble was to be 
conducted ••• curiously enough, the proposal for an 
International Conference to consider the whole question 
of the Congo came from Portugal herself. France en-
dorsed the proposal which was cordially taken up by 
Bismarck ••• This was in June 1884 and a month later Lord 
Granville gave in his adhesion on behalf of Great 
Britain'. This led to the calling of the Berlin West 
39. 
Africa Conference with the primary purpose of finding a 
modus vivendi for the relations of the European powers 
in the exploitation of the Congo Basin. 'It was also 
agreed to make some arrangements with reference to the 
Niger, and to fix the conditions under which new annex-
ations would be recognised as valid by other powers'. 
The participants in the Conference were the governments 
of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Britain, 
Italy, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Norway, 
Turkey, along with the Presidents of France and the 
United States and, interestingly enough, the Sultan of 
Zanzibar. 
The title 'West African Conference' reminds us 
that the original focus, on Portuguese initiative, was 
on the Congo region stretching eastwards from the At-
lantic Ocean and the region north and north-west of it. 
But the scope of the agreements reached went far further, 
for 'the General Act of the Conference enacted freedom 
of trade to all nations within the region watered by 
the Congo and its affluents, including the coast of the 
Atlantic from 2°30'N. latitude to 8°S. latitude. The 
Free Trade Zone was further prolonged on the north to 
the East Coast at 5°N. latitude and down the coast to 
the mouth of the Zambezi; up the Zambezi to five miles 
above the mouth of the Shire and onwards along the 
water-parting between the Zambezi and the Congo'. 
Though the Conference provided that 'this eastern ex-
tension ••• was only to be effective if agreed to by the 
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sovereign states (i.e. European nations) having juris-
diction in the regions included therein', the way was 
clearly open for thrusts of 'the scramble' to be made 
throughout a virtually unlimited area of middle Africa. 
Moreover, as Rotberg says, the Conference, for trading 
purposes, specifically 'included in the "conventional 
basin" of the Congo lands lying as far from the mouth 
of the Congo as southern Somalia and northern Mozam-
bique', thus confirming the vast ambitions and self-
confidence of the 'scramblers•. 5 
In reality, this agreement of the nations parti-
cipating in the Berlin Conference, could not but lead 
to an acceleration of 'the scramble'. From the European 
standpoint this formula 'facilitated the peaceful settle-
ment of the subsequent territorial controversies', as 
claimed by the Cambridge Modern History. For Africa, 
it meant a new era of powerful exploiting, and the 
coming of 'the brigands' as Basil Davidson has called 
the agents of the great Powers, determined to outwit 
and outpace one another. There was little love lost 
between them. What they had done was to recognise 
that the 'rush upon Africa' was of interest to them all 
and so they had devised, as a means of checking one 
another's claims, 'the important rule which was to guide 
5. Keltie J., 'The Partition of Africa' (Stanford, 
1895), pp. 207, 209. Keltie was the Assistant 
Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society; and 
Rotberg 'Political History', op.cit., p. 245. 
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••• the great game ••• Occupation of the Coast of Africa, 
in order to be valid, must be effective•. 6 Immediately 
this 'rule' was extended to cover the whole region for 
which the 'scramblers' were competing. Their occupation 
and annexation could, however, only be shown to be 
'effective' by some documentary 'proof' which rivals 
should recognise as 'valid'. 
Over seventy years _later the discovery of a 
reliable record of how such validity was established so 
shocked African nationalist leaders in Angola that they 
told neighbouring nationalist movements of it as proof 
of how their rights had been denied. According to an 
English Baptist missionary in Angola, 'The following is 
the true history of how one treaty was made with a native 
King. In 1884 a copy of "Le Mouvement Geographique" 
fell into my hands and in it was a letter that was said 
to have been sent by Dom Pedro V, King of Congo, to the 
King of Portugal. In it the former acknowledged the 
latter as his liege lord and used every expression of 
fealty, loyalty and submission. I remember that the 
letter was, at the time, put forward as a proof of the 
righteousness of the Portuguese claim to the Congo; 
and it certainly helped them in gaining a part of what 
is now called Portuguese Congo. Having occasion to 
6. Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge, reprinted 1969) 
Vol. XII, p. 659; Davidson B., 'The African 
Awakening' (Jonathan Cape 1955), p. 60; Keltie 
op.cit., p. 210. 
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speak with the King about that time, I asked him if he 
had written the said letter and I gave him a translation 
of it. The old man was sitting in a high back, embossed, 
leather chair, and rising from it he said "My brother, 
the King of Portugal, sent me this chair and I sent a 
letter thanking him for this gift, and that is the only 
letter I ever signed my mark to or ordered to be sent". 
He had signed away his country in saying thank you for 
a chair. Attached to the letter were the names of the 
head Portuguese Roman Catholic priest, a Portuguese 
trader and a French trader as witnesses to the King's 
mark. Shortly after reading this letter, I met Mr 
Dumas and told him that I had just seen the said letter. 
I reminded him of its date and asked, "Why was not I 
requested to sign this letter, for all the other white 
men in Sao Salvador signed it, and I was here on that 
date? Am I not a white man?" Mr Dumas answered, 
"We did not ask you to witness the King's mark because 
we felt sure you would not do it until the King thoroughly 
understood the real purport of the letter". I thanked 
Mr Dumas for his estimate of my character and gave him 
my view of the manner in which they had deceived and 
defrauded the King. The King thought he was saying: 
Thank you for a few presents sent him by a brother 
sovereign; but he was signing away his territory to 
another power ••• They have every reason to hate white 
men for robbing them of their country and reducing them 
to slavery'. The letter, according to Holden Roberto, 
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leader of the Angola People's Liberation Front, was shown 
by Portugal to the Berlin Conference in 1885. The con-
temporary comment of Henry Morton Stanley was that the 
'scramble for Africa' reminded him of how his 'black 
followers used to rush with gleaming knives for slaught-
7 
ered game'. 
We shall be examining later on the matter of 
'treaties' of the B.S.A. Company and others in respect 
of various kingdoms of 'northern Zambezia'. Our con-
cern now is to emphasise that validating documents in 
support of claims to vast tracts of Africa were of real 
significance to the 'scrambling' powers in respect of 
international relations in Europe and that there alone 
is where their value must be placed. For the African 
peoples their significance could not be more than that 
of 'honour among thieves'. Nor can such 'treaties' 
be regarded as in any way restraining ambitions or 
humanising the process of annexation. Rather, as we 
shall see, the collection of such documents was, at 
least as far as British agents were concerned, prose-
cuted with unseemly haste and with a specific objective. 
In the words of Joseph Thomson to a friend, in 1889: 
'I'm off to the Zambesi to do for that region what I 
7. Macpherson F., 'Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: the 
Times and the Man', (Oxford 1974), p. 246, quoting 
ANC: unreferenced letter, in French, to Harry 
Nkumbula from Holden Roberto, 15/9/57, which 
quoted words of Rev. J. Weeks. 
accomplished on the Niger - that is, secure it from 
8 other people'. 
44. 
At this point it is desirable to note something 
of the antecedents of the major protagonists in the 
British drive north of the Zambezi, remembering that 
the demarcation of what were to be the separate 'pro-
tectorates' of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia does not 
justify us in ignoring the eastern region in our study. 
For Sir Henry Hamilton Johnston, appointed Her Majesty's 
Consul for Mozambique in 1888 and three years later 
'Commissioner and Consul-General to the Territories under 
British influence to the north of the Zambesi•. 9 was 
concerned with much more than the area of modern Malawi. 
The handful of determined men who made the annexation 
of 'northern Zambezia' a reality, despite their personal 
disputes, shared attitudes which merit our notice before 
we begin to look at the operation of their plan in 
detail and from the point of view of their victims. 
Cecil John Rhodes must head this list of pro-
tagonists. His life and work have been extensively 
described by a number of biographers and historians, 
and it is not our task here to review the many facets 
of his dynamic character. Perhaps, however, Terence 
Ranger's summary of him is most worthy of quotation: 
8. Thomson J.B. 'Joseph Thomson - African Explorer' 
(Sampson Law Marston 1896), p. 245, quoting Thorn-
son's letter to a Mr McKie, Christmas 1889. 
9. FO 84/2113: FO to Johnston, 14/2/1891. 
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'Rhodes was above all a great gambler - the sending of 
the ill-prepared and ill-led Pioneer Column (north from 
Kimberley) in 1890 was a gamble; the concentration on 
the push to the sea despite the threat of Ndebele action 
in the rear was a gamble; so supremely was the Jameson 
Raid of 1895. And so was Rhodes's failure to build up 
a Native Department to control and conciliate the 
African peoples of Rhodesia ••• an unsuccessful gamble 
for which the price was paid in 1896', in the great 
revolts of the Ndebele and Shona. 10 
Ranger's allusions are, as we see, to the situ-
ation south of the Zambezi, in which, as the British 
High Commissioner at the Cape, Lord Milner, said: 'The 
blacks have been scandalously used•. 11 What is signi-
ficant for us is that 'northern Zambezia' was, at that 
same time, falling under the power of the same men, 
fired by the inspiration of Rhodes, a man of fabulous 
wealth and limitless ambition; that Zambian history at 
the end of the nineteenth century cannot be understood 
without taking into account the history of Rhodesia 
south of the river; and that indeed we misread Zambian 
history if, as Wills and Gann do, we see the B.S.A. 
10. Ranger T.O. 'Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7' 
(Heinemann, 1967), p. 53; and note impo~tant bio-
graphies of Rhodes, Williams B., 'Cecil Rhodes' 
(Constable 1921, revised 1958); Gross F., 'Rhodes 
of Africa' (Cassell, 1956); Millin S.G., 'Rhodes' 
(Chatto and Windus, 1952); Michell 1. 'Life and 
Times of Cecil John Rhodes' (Arnold, 1910); etc., etc. 
11. Headlam c. (ed.), 'The Milner Papers' (Cassell, 
London 1931), Vol. I, pp. 105-8. 
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Company's northward thurst as following 'in the mission-
12 ary's footsteps'. Of course, the missionaries played 
a part, consciously or unconsciously, in the impact of 
Europe on Africa. But whether or not they had arrived 
on the scene, the 'cold war' urges of the 'scramble' and 
the whetted appetites of Rhodes and his band of bold 
adventurers would as certainly have thrust across the 
Zambezi as they were determined to subjugate the lands 
of the Shona and the Ndebele. Indeed as Keatley says, 
though with particular reference to the 1890 Pioneers, 
the whole drive into central Africa began not primarily 
as 'a venture of Britain as an imperial power but 
essentially as a private venture undertaken through 
South African initiative', with Rhodes as 'the instiga-
tor and the man who paid the bills•. 13 And here the 
personal comment of one of his associates, three years 
before Rhodes's death, adumbrates the unfolding saga of 
immaturity and impulsiveness that brought so much of 
Africa under the control of men who were far more gam-
blers than statesmen. At dinner with Rhodes, Leander 
Starr Jameson and Willoughby, that friend was 'more 
struck than ever by their undeviating schoolboyishness, 
Rhodes ••• as much as the rest of them, though of course 
12. Gann, 'Birth', op.cit., p. 44, and see his Chap. 
II and III and Wills, op.cit., Chaps IV,V,VI. 
13. Keatley, op.cit., p. 27. 
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he is a schoolboy of genius ••• they want somebody to ••• 
see that they do not get into mischief•. 14 
David Livingstone's travels and his recording 
of sundry scientific data certainly proved informative 
to the 'colonisers' but the evidence all points to the 
conclusion that with or without missionaries on the 
scene, Rhodes's men would have come to conquer. 
Moreover the behaviour of Livingstone and indeed of many 
of his followers was very different from that of Rhodes's 
agents. He was 'Chilele-pa-Maba', he who would sleep 
in the marshes, a man who 'learned to forget colour' 
15 and to whom 'our race' meant the human race. His 
bearing among Africans had none of the arrogance and 
harshness of the tax collectors and labour recruiters 
who worked the will of the British South Africa Company 
upon northern Zambezia. 
Cecil Rhodes's last speech to shareholders of 
the Chartered Company, in 1899, contained remarks which, 
when considered with reference to the bloodshed of the 
Ndebele and Shona 'rebellions', reveal that he remained 
an 'adventurer' to the end. In an attack on the 'Little 
England' policy which he associated with the name of 
John Morley, a leading English Liberal, he declared 
14. PLG-BSA 3/8: Sidney Low to Gell, 11/3/99. 
15. 'Chilele-pa-Maba', nickname given to Livingstone 
in the Luunda language of Zambia's Luapula Province, 
from testimony of Aaron Mwenya and William Kawandami 
to Machperson, May 1973; and see Keatley, op.cit., 
pp. 121 ff. 
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that Britain 'whatever party may be in power, will in-
sist on the support of Imperial expansion'. The motive 
of exploitation for profit demanded this, for 'I have 
said in simple language that the duty of our people is 
to occupy and administer new territories and to work up 
their wealth - to work up the raw products by manufactur-
ing them, and then distribute them throughout the world'. 
And this, to his mind, was essentially the role of 
Britain. 'I went to Egypt', he said, 'and saw there 
eight millions of people governed by one man, Lord 
Cromer. Be it civil administration, be it defence, 
be it irrigation, be it justice, he has to attend to 
all and ••• with all is equally competent. You read 
your histories of your Ramases, of your Memnon and many 
others, but forget that there is a simple Englishman 
there greater than them all'. Moreover, Rhodes saw 
extra-territorial expansion by Britain as an essential 
safeguard against internal revolution. 'To save the 
40 million inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a 
bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire 
new lands to settle surplus population, to provide new 
16 markets ••• The Empire ••• is a bread and butter game'. 
16. Vindex 'Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and 
Speeches, 1881-1900' (Chapman and Hall 1900), 
pp. 739-741; and Mazrui A.A. 'On Heroes and 
Uhuru-Worhsip' (Longmans 1967), p. 125, ~uoting 
Rhodes. 
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The resolutions of the Berlin Conference in-
evitably applied a straightjacket to the ambitions of 
men like Rhodes. The record of his life reveals his 
impatience with the British Government's insistence on 
the niceties of international relations and its con-
sequent persistent dampening of imperialist ardour, 
which can be traced directly to the concordat at Berlin. 
When the conquest of Central Africa was already well ad-
vanced, the chagrin of Rhodes's successors was typified 
by the words of Lewis Michell: 'National gratitude to 
a Chartered Company that does empire work is not only 
non-existent but, in lieu of it, there seems to exist 
bitter hostility•. 17 
It would be more accurate, however, to endorse 
the assessment by Crowe of the significance of the Con-
ference as having been exaggerated; 'for when the re-
gulations are studied it can be seen that they all 
failed ••• Free trade was to be established ••• Actually 
highly monopolistic systems of trade were set up ••• The 
centre of Africa was to be internationalised. It be-
came Belgian. Lofty ideals and philanthropic intentions 
were loudly enunciated ••• Only the vaguest resolutions 
were passed concerning the internal slave trade ••• ; 
whilst the basin of the Congo ••• became, as everyone 
17. PLG-BSA 3/171, L. Michell to P.L. Gell ref. the 
BSAC's 'concessions' from Lewanika, 16/8/07. 
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knows, the scene of some of the worst brutalities of 
colonial history'. Moreover, there was a stipulation 
'that the Conventional Basin of the Congo, a huge area 
which, besides the Congo Free State, comprised parts of 
French Equatorial Africa, of German Cameroons, of Portu-
guese Angola, of the future British colony of Rhodesia, 
of Italian Somaliland and of territories of the Sultan 
of Zanzibar ••• should be neutralised in time of war•, 18 
but this was completely forgotten when the great con-
flagration of 1914 began. 
Among the ostensibly humanitarian provisions of 
the Conference was Article 6 of the General Act which 
bound all signatories 'to watch over the preservation of 
the native tribes and to care for the improvement of 
their moral and material well-being, and to help in 
suppressing slavery and especially the Slave Trade'. 
In addition, after pledging to 'protect and favour all 
religions without distinction of creed or nation', the 
Powers undertook the positive promotion of the work of 
all agencies 'which aim at instructing the natives and 
bringing home to them the blessings of civilisation'. 
Therefore 'missionaries, scientists and explorers, with 
their followers, property and collections, shall like-
wise be the objects of especial protection•. 19 
18. Crowe, op.cit., pp. 3-4. 
19. BM-SP: 1885, LV, pp. 304 ff. 
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Yet even the leader of the British team at the 
Conference gave expression right away to his awareness 
that the Powers were likely to be blamed: 'Whilst the 
interests of commerce have been carefully studied, those 
of the natives have not received sufficient consideration, 
and ••• the welfare of the blacks may have been subordinated 
to the commercial wants of the Whites'. Malet was 
therefore at pains to stress that a great boon would 
be conferred upon the continent's indigenous peoples in 
so far as 'the slave-gang is doomed•. 20 
The real significance of the Conference for our 
study seems then to lie in two main consequences; 
firstly, the virtual carte-blanche which it gave to 
the imperialist subjugation of vast tracts of Africa, 
and, secondly, the requirement that the nations engaged 
in the 'scramble for Africa' must satisfy each other 
that they could produce proof of occupation of the 
territories they claimed to have acquired. The carte-
blanche was worded thus, in the General Act's Article 35: 
'The Signatory Powers ••• recognise the obligation to 
ensure the establishment of authority in the regions 
occupied by them, ••• sufficient to protect existing 
rights and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of 
21 transit under the conditions agreed upon'. This 
20. Ibid: folio 123, Sir Edward Malet to Earl Gran-
ville, 22/2/85. 
21. Ibid: General Act, Article 35. 
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mutual recognition of a 'right' to 'protect' expansion-
ist interests may indeed be seen as offering the primary 
meaning of the word 'protection', as well as setting 
the stage for a round of tense rivalries over regions 
coveted by more than one Power. 
The second consequence of the Conference upon 
imperialist action north of the Zambezi, as elsewhere, 
was to make it necessary for the men in the field to 
provide their headquarters, as a matter of urgency, 
with documents for transmission to the British Govern-
ment to legitimise their claims in the eyes of the 
rival Powers. It is most important to realise that 
this was why 'treaties' were made and that there is 
every reason to believe that, without the 'cold war' 
in Europe and the stipulations of the Berlin Conference, 
no 'treaties' would have been either sought or cited. 
Moreover, it seems reasonable to believe that 
the vagueness of phraseology, for which Britain in par-
ticular had striven at the Conference, was reflected in 
the case of this particular matter of documentation. 
The Act itself could scarcely have been less demanding, 
as is shown in its Article 34,to wit: that 'any Power 
which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land 
on the coasts of the African continent outside of its 
present possessions, or which, being hitherto without 
such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the 
Power which assumes a protectorate there, shall accompany 
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the respective act with a notification thereof, addressed 
to the other Signatory Powers ••• to enable them, if need 
be, to make good any claims of their own•. 22 
Notification, however, in practice required 
some supporting documentation. It could not be enough 
to say simply: 'We have taken control of territory X'. 
The urgency of staking rival claims, which may have 
developed faster even than the various signatories anti-
cipated, meant that some form of documentary attestation 
of such claims had to be devised. The anxiety of the 
Powers in this respect is illustrated by Lord Salis-
bury's assertion, a few months before the 'treaty-making' 
expeditions of Harry Johnston, Joseph Thomson and Alfred 
Sharpe, that German aspirations for territory 'between 
Lat. 1°s. and 11°S.' must be resisted on the ground that 
'the country was already occupied by Englishmen'. For, 
said Salisbury, 'there were English Missions and sta-
tions of the African Lakes Company upon Lake Nyassa and 
Lake Tanganyika and along the Stevenson Road ••• and the 
rights acquired by these settlements could not be 
justly set aside by a far vaguer claim•. 23 Indeed 
Alfred Sharpe proclaimed a British Protectorate over 
Northern Zambezia in May 1890 before most of the treaties 




Ibid: Article 34. The underlinings are mine. 
BM-SP: 1890, LI, C.6043, June 1890. 
Baxter T.W., 'The Concessions of Northern Rhodesia' 
in Occasional Papers of the Archives of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, i. (1963), p. 40. 
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a device to avoid open confrontation between the verbal 
claims of rival Powers. 
As we shall see, Sir Harry Johnston stated that, 
in scrutinising 'treaties' and 'concessions' submitted 
by British agents in northern Zambezia, his endorsement 
was given on condition that 'the said claims' would 
conform with the provisions of the General Act of the 
Berlin Conference in respect of 'the conventional free 
trade area' in which the territories concerned lay and 
of the import and manufacture of arms and ammunition. 
But such 'limitations', as Johnston called them, were 
to mean little in a situation distinguished by aggressive 
monopolistic enterprise and by the repeated use of 
military methods of establishing control. Indeed 
Johnston, in referring explicitly to 'these exclusive 
claims acquired by the British South Africa Company in 
Central Africa', expressed the view that the Berlin 
regulations regarding free trade would not apply 'since 
none of the independent African chiefs who have bestowed 
these special privileges on the B.S.A.C. in return for 
considerable payments were signatories of the General 
Act of the Berlin Conference, so they can be held in 
no way bound by it•. 25 
25. MSA: Report to NR Governor, July 1932 by Mr Justice 
Maugham (Colonial No. 73) of North Charterland Con-
cession Inquiry, Appendix, Item 10, despatch by 
Sir H.H. Johnston on B.S.A. Co. claims (undated 
but around 1891). Underlinings are mine. 
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In this and other ways, as we shall see, the 
verbiage of the Berlin Conference was set at naught as 
the rush upon Africa accelerated. But since it was 
for their mutual satisfaction that the Powers devised 
the formula of 'treaties' and 'concessions' we ought 
now to examine the documents whereby Johnston and the 
B.S.A. Company claimed to have secured their suzerainty. 
(b) The British South Africa Company takes the field 
Like Harry Johnston, Frederick Lugard was one 
of Britain's most widely travelled agents of imperial 
expansion in Africa. In his long life, he was closely 
associated with military action on the continent over a 
period of thirty years and saw service in East, West and 
Central Africa. In 1893, at the age of thitty-five, 
he addressed the Royal Geographical Society in London 
on 'Treaty-making in Africa'. The validation of 
'treaties' in respect of Central Africa was still fresh 
in the minds of those concerned, and indeed the Geo-
graphical Society had recently learned from Joseph 
Thomson himself of his journey'to Lake Bangweolo and 
the Unexplored Region of British Central Africa•. 26 
Lugard's remarks thus merit extensive quotation, es-
pecially in view of what we shall be reviewing of the 
methods of annexation adopted in Northern Zambezia. 
26. Geographical Journal Vol. I no. 1, Jan.-June, 1893, 
Lugard, pp. 53 ff.; and Vol I. no 2, Feb. 1893, 
Thomson, pp. 97 ff. 
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After making reference to the African formula 
of 'blood-brotherhood' as 'the most solemn and binding 
of contracts', he made this statement: 'Since there 
are different methods of treaty-making - I have known a 
valuable possession purchased by the present of an old 
pair of boots - I am anxious to explain to geographers 
the proper procedure followed by responsible and duly-
accredited diplomats in that Continent'. He then set 
out the steps that should be followed, and the reasons 
for them. 'To a savage, the most precious tHngs in 
this world or the next are his spear and his arms of 
war: more precious than his own skin ••• His oath is 
sworn on these, the gods of his existence. I fancy 
the inference is that if he turns traitor his own arms 
shall turn against him. Then my pet rifle is held 
aloft over my head' - a significant symbol when we re-
call David Livingstone's comment about the terror caused 
by guns in Africa - 'and my interpreter stands forward 
and repeats my pledge. That I will be a friend to 
these people; that my men shall not molest them; that 
if crops are stolen or wrong done I will make good; 
that if enemies attack him near my camp I will help him; 
that he shall look on the British Company as "his big 
brother" whom he has to obey but who have not come to 
eat up his land or oust him from his place ••• Then he 
produces his primest sheep or goat or ox ••• Then I put 
down on paper what was the pith of the contract between 
us: that is a treaty as I consider it ••• The treaties 
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thus made by the representative of a company acting 
under Royal Charter are submitted at once for approval 
to Her Majesty's Government through the Foreign Office. 
It is obvious that it is only by an abuse of language 
that such action can be described as filibustering•. 27 
Thus was the British public told of the methods 
of imperialism in Africa. It is therefore no less 
important for us to note what was being done in Southern 
Rhodesia at the time of the northern thrusts. In 1888, 
just after the Colonial Office had affirmed its rejection 
of 'the proposal to take a Chief living north of the 
Zambesi under protection ••• for obvious reasons•, 28 the 
'Cape Times' made a notable comment on the 'concession' 
acquired by Charles Rudd on behalf of Cecil Rhodes from 
King Lobengula of the Ndebele. 
'Mr Rudd and his friends do not desire to hurry 
the pace. A rush of mines would simply alarm a chief 
who has too reasonable cause for suspecting the white 
man and fearing him even when he brings gifts ••• Colo-
nisation by freebooting is what the natives dread. 
Nor would the dread be lessened were they only aware of 
the persistency with which that sort of colonisation is 
advocated in the chief city of South Africa and in a 
quarter where the influence is acknowledged of the con-
troller of the Colonial Government•. 29 We have here, 
27. Ibid: Vol. I no. 1, Lugard, pp. 53-54. 
28. PRO-CO 879/29, no. 358, CO to FO, 24/9/88. 
29. 'Cape Times', 24/11/88. Underlinings are mine. 
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along with a tentative humanitarian hope, the twin facts 
of the tremendous urge to surge forward for the exploit-
ation of Africa's wealth and the benevolent support for 
it of the Imperial Government; factors which were to 
shape events in the subsequent decades as the surge 
went north across the Zambezi. 
The 'Cape Argus', recognising that Rhodes's 
Concession was 'an event in South African history the 
full magnitude of which it is difficult to realise at 
first hearing', hoped that the B.S.A. Company's approach 
to the exploitation of 'mining resources developed by 
the peaceable process of electing a white committee 
rather than by measures of rapine and musket', -as for 
instance in Swaziland- would mean respect for Lobengula's 
authority 'so as not to lead to the demoralisation of 
the native races'. The 'Argus' dreamed of 'mining 
development in Matabeleland' as being 'as it were, the 
K. ' b . ' 30 1ng s own us1ness • 
Only four months later, the missionary who had 
acted as interpreter at the signing of the Rudd Con-
cession, was reporting a bitter reaction among the 
Ndebele against what they had discovered to be the real 
provisions of the Concession, during which he was given 
his'full share of abuse for hiding, so it was said, from 
30. 'Cape Argus', 24/11/88. Underlinings are mine. 
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31 the Chief the meaning of the agreement'. The Company 
had offered £100 per month, a thousand Martini rifles 
and a hundred thousand rounds of ammunition in return 
for 'the complete and exclusive charge over the metals 
and minerals situated and contained' in his kingdom 
'with full power to do all things they may deem nece-
ssary to win and procure the same and to hold, collect 
and enjoy the profits and revenues, if any, derivable 
from the said metals and minerals•. 32 But Lobengula 
was deeply offended and protested, in a letter to Queen 
Victoria, that when he had 'demanded a copy of the docu-
ment', he discovered that he'had signed away the mineral 
rights of my whole Kingdom to Rudd'. He and his indunas 
th f d . t d th c . . •t t• t 33 ere ore repu 1a e e oncess1on 1n 1 s en 1re y. 
Cecil Rhodes at once defended the integrity of his agents, 
Rudd and Maquire,
34 
and, a month later, the Colonial 
Office told the B.S.A. Company that the Queen would 
soon be asked to grant the Royal Charter which Rhodes 
35 urgently wanted. The British Government, though it 
knew that Lobengula was charging Rhodes's men with per-
fidy, virtually ignored the King's protest choosing in-
stead to move quickly to bring the B.S.A. Company to 
birth. 
31. PRO-CO 879/29, no. 372, Rev. Charles D. Helm, London 
Missionary Society to Asst. Comm., Bulawayo, 15/3/89. 
32. Ibid: no. 358, .textLof Rudd Concession, 1888. 
Underlining is mine. 
33. Ibid: no. 372, Lobengula to Queen Victoria, 23/4/89. 
34. Ibid: Rhodes to CO 21/6/89. 
35. Ibid: CO to 'Exploring Company' (Later B.S.A.C.), 
10/7/89. 
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Within a few months, as Robinson, Gallagher and 
Denny have said, the Foreign Secretary 'was doing all he 
could by diplomacy to satisfy Rhodes's insistent claims 
in northern Zambezia'. For 'his wealth, his charter, 
his premiership (of the Cape) enabled Rhodes to exhort, 
cajole and brow-beat Salisbury•. 36 The protagonists 
of expansion and conquest were delighted. Harry John-
ston, who was not disposed to like Rhodes, recalled in 
a personal letter to him three years later, how Rhodes's 
wealth had tipped the scales of history in British 
Central Africa. 'When the Government, though wishing 
to save this country from the Portuguese, yet had not 
a penny to spend on it, you stepped forward and said, 
"Make the extension of British supremacy and I will 
find the money"; and within a week ••• new instructions 
were drawn up for me at the Foreign Office•. 37 
Five years had now passed since the international 
Conference at Berlin. The progress of imperialist 
development in Central Africa was accelerating; and 
Rhodes's plans for crossing the Zambezi were shaping 
simultaneously with the tightening of his hold to the 
south of the river. The thorny issues of defining 
boundaries between the territories acquired by the con-
tending Powers had still to be faced but those five 
years had further enhanced the prestige and 'legitimacy' 
of British colonial expansion. It was therefore signi-
ficant that the Africa Order in Council of 1889 should 
36. Robinson R., Gallagher J., Denny A., 'Africa and 
the Victorians' (Macmillan 1961), p. 246. 
37. PRO-FO 2/55, Johnston to Rhodes, 8/10/93. 
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have enunciated both the scope of British designs in 
Africa and the policy whereby 'British subjects' were 
to be treated differently from 'natives' and 'foreigners' 
in the territories under British 'jurisdiction'. 'The 
limits of this Order shall be the continent of Africa', 
the preamble to the Order-in-Council declared. But 
while the word 'native' was to connote 'a native or 
subject of any country within the limits of this Order, 
not being a British subject nor the subject of any non-
African power', the status of 'British subject' was ex-
tended to persons 'enjoying Her Majesty's protection 
and includes, by virtue of 39 and 40 Victoria, c 46, 
subjects of the several Princes and States in India in 
alliance with Her Majesty, residing and being in the 
parts of Africa mentioned in this Order•. 38 As the 
Central African situation unfolded, these formulae were 
to be of grave import in the matter of, for instance, 
the granting of franchise and of the authenticity of 
reputedly contractual relations between the Crown and 
various African states as,specifically, in the dealings 
of the B.S.A. Company with the Lozi Kingdom of Lewanika 
and with the kings from whom 'concessions' were allegedly 
acquired in the north-eastern districts of Zambia. For, 
as we shall see, the word 'alliance' was to be used on 
various occasions in reference to such 'treaties and 
'concessions'. 
38. BM-SP: 32/3, extract from 'London Gazette', 
22/10/89, 'Africa Order in Council'. Under-
lining is mine. 
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The most striking feature of this Order-in-
Council is that, on a strictly unilateral basis, it 
proclaimed the 'legality' of British jurisdiction, 'in 
so far as by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or other 
lawful means, Her Majesty has power or authority in 
relation to such persons and matters, that is to say, 
1. British subjects as herein defined; 
2. The property and personal proprietary rights and 
obligations of British subjects within the local 
jurisdiction; 
3. Foreigners as herein defined who submit themselves 
to a Court in accordance with the provisions of 
this Order; 
4. Foreigners, as herein defined, with respect to 
whom any State, King, Chief or Government, whose 
subjects, or under whose protection, they are, 
has by any treaty as herein defined, or other-
wise, agreed with Her Majesty for, or consented 
to, the exercise of power or authority by Her 
Majesty'. 
The flexibility of interpretation allowed under 
such a clause is further illustrated by the definition 
of a 'foreigner' as 'a person, whether a native or 
subject of Africa or not, who is not a British subject 
as herein defined', while 'treaty' was understood to 
'include any convention, agreement or arrangement made 
by or on behalf of Her Majesty with any State, or 
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Government, King, Chief, people or tribe, and any re-
gulation applied thereto•. 39 
When, over sixty years later, the Northern 
Rhodesia African National Congress made an attempt to 
obtain legal clarification of the 'treaties' and 'con-
cessions' which were cited as the bases of the B.S.A. 
Company's right to rule and to own the country's mineral 
resources, it was advised that, under the Foreign Juris-
diction Act of 1894, the jurisdiction of the British 
Government was final whether established 'by treaty, 
capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance or any other 
lawful means' and that therefore: 'It matters not how 
the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by 
conquest, it may be by concession following a treaty ••• 
In all cases the result is the same', namely that, as 
regards any native inhabitant of such territories, 'Such 
rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail 
him nothing', and 'even if in a Treaty of Cession it 
is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy 
certain rights, that does not give a title to these 
inhabitants to enforce these stipulations'. The 
A.N.C.'s legal adviser feared therefore that no case 
could be made for the exclusion of Northern Rhodesia 
39. Ibid: p. 3, para. 10, and p.2 (definitions). 
Underlining is mine. 
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from the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 40 
In this way the carte-blanche given by the Berlin Con-
ference had been appropriated by Britain and extended 
ad lib. 
The nations that 'scrambled' for Africa thus 
safeguarded themselves - for Britain was not acting 
less morally than her rivals- from any 'legal' res-
ponsibility to allow their interests at any time to be 
subordinated to those of the indigenous peoples con-
cerned. The Zulu rising of 1888 and the subsequent 
banishment of Dinizulu to imprisonment on St. Helena 
had followed 'the alienation from Zululand in 1886 of 
nearly half the country ••• forcibly effected by Sir 
Arthur Havelock'. In the strength of such 'legal' 
powers as she was appropriating to herself, Britain 
refused to allow an inquiry into the causes of the 
. . 41 r1s1ng. But it was still necessary to gather in 
as fast as possible documentary evidence to support 
British claims upon Central Africa against the am-
bitions of her European rivals. 
40. ANC: Notes of Conference with Paramount Chief 
Mpezeni III of Ngoni on behalf of the NR African 
Congress on Tuesday, 13th January, 1953 (with Mr 
A.L. Bryden of Messrs. A.L. Bryden and Williams, 
Solicitors, 53 Victoria Street, LONDON, S.W.1). 
The lawyer cited inter alia the case of Chief 
Sekgoma of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1910 
and of Sobhuzu II of Swaziland, 1926. 
41. PR0-879/29: Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Pro-
tection Society to CO, 28/3/90. 
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On 29th October 1889 the Great Seal of the 
United Kingdom was affixed to the Charter of the British 
South Africa Company and the deed hailed in London as 
'an outward and visible sign of the colonizing genius 
42 of the Anglo-Saxon race'. At the same time, the role 
of missionaries, and especially of the Scottish mission-
aries in the Shire Highlands, was seen as auguring 
happy cooperation in the two-pronged advance of 'civi-
lisation' and Christianity into middle Africa. 'The 
missionaries ••• are politically powerful because they 
have behind them the whole religious world besides the 
nearly unbroken Scotch vote', said the 'Economist'. 
'They ask for protection for themselves and their de-
pendents ••• the missionaries approve, for the modern 
companies, unlike the old ones, make friends with the 
teachers of religion; the merchants are delighted ••• , 
and the adventurers precipitate themselves upon the new 
lands with an avidity of which the world sees daily 
evidence in the proceedings of the Stock Exchange•. 43 
The 'Spectator', however, sought to temper the 
euphoria with realism. 'The fairest portions' of the 
territory that the B.S.A. Company was acquiring were 
'possessed by a powerful and warlike tribe ••• whose 
fighting force is well organised on the Zulu model and 
42. 'Pall Mall Gazette', 1/11/89. 
43. 'Economist', 26/10/89. 
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consists of 15,000 soldiers'. However careful and 
kind the Company's agents might be, 'that cannot prevent 
the struggle which must always take place before a 
fighting race is finally compelled to adapt itself to 
the benevolent despotism of the white man ••• The Company 
will win in the end', but this might well involve assist-
ance from London or the Cape and could lead 'the tax-
payer' to abandon the Company system of increasing the 
Empire. What would follow would be, however, not a 
change of heart but the quest for 'some equally thin 
disguise for rapidly and lightheartedly annexing the 
44 unappropriated portions of the globe'. 
Count Otto van Bismarck might like to declare 
himself a "no colonies" man. But, said the 'Liverpool 
Courier', 'Whether this be a genuine feeling or a little 
pleasant pretence ••• British ministers have no option 
but to assist in facilitating, protecting and directing 
45 the enterprises of the Queen's subjects in foreign parts'. 
The subsequent decades were to unfold a strange tale of 
ambivalence and vacillation on the part of the Foreign 
and Colonial Secretaries. But the men who moved, armed, 
into northern Zambezia had reason for confidence that 
Her Majesty's Government was fundamentally behind them. 
44. 'Spectator', 10/10/89, comment entitled 'British 
Zambesiland'. Underlinings are mine. 
45. 'L~verpool Courier', 16/10/89. Underlining is 
mine. 
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Yet there had been no lack of adverse comment 
when the Charter was debated in the House of Commons. 
'Are we to believe', asked one M.P., 'that ••• it is in 
the power of the Crown as a matter of personal prero-
gative to give away great continents?' The clause 
stipulating that the Charter was to be recognised 'by 
the Government and by all British naval and military 
officers and Consuls' meant that, with 'control, only 
stopping short of actual sovereignty, over a territory 
now declared partly under British protection and partly 
under British influence ••• (and) a monopoly of all the 
minerals', the new Company would have authority 'to 
declare war on native tribes and to call in to their 
aid any of Her Majesty's forces ••• The Charter is to be 
most favourably construed to the best advantage ••• not 
of the native tribes but of the Company ••• Why did they 
(H.M.G.) want to grant this Charter at a time when no-
body is in London and when Parliament is not sitting? 
••• This is one of the grossest jokes that ever came 
46 
before the House'. 
46. RH:Mss.Afr.s.70(14) Hansard Debate 3/9/89, quoting 
Sir G. Campbell and Sir John Swinburne. 
CHAPTER III 
'THIS KEY OF AFRICA' 
68. 
(a) Treaty-making starts with 'Mandala' and Johnston 
The Royal Charter granted to Rhodes and his 
'Exploring Company' was of mutual benefit to grantor 
and grantee. A major thrust in Central Africa was 
going to be undertaken, in actuality on behalf of the 
British Government, to forestall Portuguese, German and 
Belgian colonial aspirations, and the British tax-payer 
was not to bear the cost of it. The Company, on its 
part, was given a free hand to operate a virtually 
monopolistic commercial programme and to ensure that 
the territories to be exploited were brought effective-
ly under its own direct control. 
But the 'Company system' entailed the quest 
for shareholders and the need to give them a rosy vision 
of compounding dividends. The goodwill of major bodies 
of public opinion was highly desirable, and this is 
well-illustrated by the statement to its shareholders 
made by the Company in its first report, for the years 
1889-1892. 'At the time the founders of the British 
South Africa Company had under their consideration the 
steps to be taken for obtaining the Royal Charter', 
said the Directors, 'the country north of the Zambesi 
and the work of civilisation which was being carried 
on there by the Scotch missions and the African Lakes 
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Company were brought to their notice, with a view to 
seeing what steps could be taken to prevent this im-
portant "Key of Africa" from falling into the hands of 
a foreign power'. The shareholders then learned of the 
exploits of Captain Maguire against the slave-traders 
and of the 'treaty-making' journeys of Joseph Thomson 
1 and Alfred Sharpe. Clearly the acquisition of the 
territories north of the Zambezi was far from being an 
afterthought or a reluctant addendum to the operations 
to the south. The area of modern Zambia was rather 
seen as a key to the expansion and consolidation of 
British power, an area in which the strategy of swift 
advance, the out-witting of rivals and the effective 
'policing' of captured kingdoms would operate as in the 
land of the Ndebele and the Shona. The architect of 
the whole unitary plan dreamed of linking the Cape not 
just to Leopold's Congo but to Cairo and the Mediterr-
anean, and indeed it is worth remarking that the develop-
ment of the northward thrust might have been even more 
determined if Cecil Rhodes had not died prematurely in 
1902. 
At the time of the first exercise in 'treaty-
making' the disposition of states in northern Zambezia 
1. BSAC Report, 1889-92, p. 32; and note RH:MSS.Afr. 
s.74, BSA Mise. Papers, Cawston to Rhodes, 6/2/90: 
'It is essential for us to be active in all matters 
relating to the slavery, drink and arms questions. 
There is a large section of the public at home 
who look at these matters'. 
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was roughly thus: in the south-west the Lozi Kingdom, 
reorganised and extended after the rout, by Lozi leaders 
and their allies, of their Kololo conquerors in 1864; 
with,north of that Kingdom, the Luvale, Lunda and 
Kaonde states, and in the west central region the Ila 
or Shukulumbwe chiefdoms. The Zambezi valley east-
wards from Livingstone and the Plateau above it were 
the lands of the Tonga, Toka, Leya and related loosely 
organised groups. The Lenje occupied the region 
around modern Lusaka and Kabwe while the land of the 
Lamba was where the Copperbelt was to appear in the 
1920s. The largest state in the Luapula area was the 
Luunda Kingdom of Kazembe, with smaller states and 
chiefdoms such as the Aushi, Unga and others to the 
south and east of it; while the Tabwa, Lungu and 
Mambwe fringed the southern reaches of Lake Tanganyika. 
The extensive Bemba Kingdom occupied the largest part 
of what is Zambia's northern province, flanked to the 
north-east and south-east by Mwanga, Iwa, Senga, Bisa 
and numerous small groupings who ~nhabited the region 
between Isoka and the Ngonde and Tumbuka kingdoms of 
modern Malawi. In the east of the territory, around 
the lower escarpment area of the Luangwa river, the 
Ngoni kingdom of Mpezeni was outstandingly the most 
powerful and was surrounded by such peoples as the 
southern Tumbuka, the Chewa, Ambo, Kunda, Nsenga, Lala 
and Soli, with the warrior Chikunda people occupying 
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the banks of the Zambezi between Tongaland and the con-
fluence of the Zambezi and the Luangwa rivers. 2 
Early in 1890 Rhodes and his Board were urging 
that 'Consul Johnston's concessions should be included 
in the British sphere of influence' along with the Lozi 
Kingdom of Lewanika so that 'continuous connections to 
Nyassa and Tanganyika be secured'. The Colonial 
Office endorsed this plea on the ground that Portugal 
might well press her claim to the territory 'between 
the Lower Zambesi and Lake Nyassa'; while the High 
Commissioner in Cape Town, Sir Henry Loch, stressed the 
need to maintain a line of communication with the East 
3 Africa Company. Meanwhile, to give reality to his 
plans, Rhodes acquired, by deed of cession dated 23rd 
December 1889, but without the knowledge or approval of 
King Lewanika, the whole of what was called the 'Ware 
Concession', from Harry Ware, an experienced explorer 
and prospector. As in the case of Lobengula, the 
B.S.A. Company had to overcome rivals in order to secure 
this gain. Moreover the move into 'Barotseland', like 
the incursions into the Kingdoms of Lobengula and 
Mpezeni, involved buying 'concessions' from previous 
claimants which in themselves were suspect. The French 
missionary at Lewanika's court, Francois Coillard, 
2. See Map, Appendix A. 
3. PR0-879/29, no. 392, to CO ref. Rhodes's proposals 
7/4/90; eo to FO, 12/4/90 and HC to eo, 21/4/90. 
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always ready to think the best of white men in Africa, 
admitted that the Lozi had 'feared a trap' when Harry 
Ware came to buy the 'right' to dig for gold, though 
they were 'fascinated by the considerable presents of 
Martini-Henry rifles, of ammunition, blankets and gar-
4 
ments' which Ware had brought. 
This acquisition of the Ware Concession con-
stituted the B.S.A. Company's first actual holding of 
'title' north of the Zambezi. Ware claimed to have 
won from Lewanika in June, 1889, 'the sole and absolute 
right to dig, mine and quarry for precious stones, gold, 
silver and all other minerals and metals whatever', 
plus rights to wood, water, building land, grazing areas, 
railways and free access throughout Lozi territory, for 
a period of twenty years. The purchase by Rhodes was 
very expensive but, as he told the Duke of Abercorn, 
a director of his Company, 'as the Concession gave the 
whole of the minerals of the Kingdom, I did not con-
sider it excessive' as 'it would have interfered with 
the sphere and scope of our Charter'. The purchase 
also'broke the Portuguese plan of extending from East 
to West Coast. If you will look at the map', Rhodes 
added, 'you will see that Barutse (sic) extends as far 
4. Ibid: HC to eo, sending copy of 'deed of 
21/4/90, and Admin. (Shippard) to HC ref. 
of counter-claim of one Julian; 15/4/90; 
Coillard F., 'On the Threshold of Central 





5 as the Congo State'. 
While Rhodes was establishing his foothold 
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north of the river, a swift journey towards the Nyasa-
Tanganyika plateau region was being made by Harry John-
ston who had assumed his post as Her Majesty's Consul 
for Mozambique in November 1888. The African exploits 
of Johnston have received scholarly attention elsewhere. 6 
Here it is enough to remember that, in his previous 
assignment in the Niger delta, he had received a ruling 
from the Foreign Office that 'when a merchant differs 
from a native chief as to their respective rights, the 
7 native chief is to be deported'. He thus came to 
Central Africa already instructed in the means whereby 
'protection' was to be guaranteed to British activities 
in Africa by adequate measures to effect the conquest 
and coercion of her princes and peoples. However 
'tired' Rhodes might feel 'of this mapping out of Africa 
at Berlin', neither he nor Johnston could have had any 
doubts of Lord Salisbury's sympathy with the view ex-
pressed by Rhodes: 'Private enterprise has given us 
India. Why should it not give us South and Central 
Africa?• 8 
5. MSA: Report Vol. II, Text of Ware Concession, 27/6/89, 
pp. 3-4; and Rhodes to Abercorn, 31/3/90, p. 7. 
6. See Oliver R., 'Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble 
for Africa' (Chatto and Windus, 1957); Hanna, op.cit.; 
and relevant sections of Rotberg's 'Political His-
tory of Tropical Africa' op.cit.; also Sir H.H. John-
ston's own 'British Central Africa', (Methuen, 1898). 
7. Oliver, op.cit., p. 118, quoting Salisbury on John-
ston's despatch re deportation of Ja Ja to West Indies. 
8. Vindex, op.cit., pp. 225 and 194, quoting Rhodes 
in 1885. 
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1889 was a year of feverish activity on the 
part of the agents of the rival imperialist Powers. 
Henry Morton Stanley, for instance, met a number of 
chiefs and rulers as he moved eastwards after the 're-
lief' of Emin Pasha, and thereafter 'unashamedly inflated 
these visits into treaty-making ceremonies writing down 
his version of what had been agreed' so that Britain 
used them in negotiations with Germany about the final 
carving up of East Africa. What was now happening in 
northern Zambezia must be understood in this context. 
As he moved into northern Zambezia as successor to the 
exhausted Consul O'Neill, Johnston saw his terms of 
reference in retrospect, thus: 'that in those districts 
admittedly beyond Portuguese jurisdiction I should take 
measures to secure the country from abrupt seizure by 
other European powers by concluding treaties of friend-
ship with the native chiefs in which they bound them-
selves not to transfer their governing rights to any 
European Power without the consent of Her Majesty's 
Government'. His fortuitous meeting with Rhodes 
earlier in the year and the transmission to London of 
the news of Rhodes's offer to underwrite the development 
of administration in the area by a grant of £10,000 per 
year, led the British Government to assent readily to 
an attempt to secure for her 'a reasonable amount of 
political influence over those countries of Central 
Africa not claimed by Germany, Portugal or the Congo 
Free State'. The overt pressure of Rhodes to forestall 
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Portuguese, German or Belgian incursions into northern 
Zambezia was thus rendered, in Johnston's mild language, 
as a plan to undertake the filling-in of blank spaces 
on the map! Moreover, 'The form of Treaty ••• was not 
altered, as it was not intended to proclaim any Protecto-
rate if more indirect means of political supremacy could 
be attained'. 9 
The presence of already well-established white 
missionary settlements in the area of modern Malawi 
affected both Johnston's mode of operation in the be-
ginning and the development of his administration in 
the territory. We shall see further on how he and his 
officers were to encounter sharp missionary criticism. 
At the outset, however, he was certainly regarded as 
an instrument in the surgical healing of Africa's 
'open sore', as David Livingstone had called the slave 
trade. Details were now being constantly supplied by 
missionaries of the horrors and sufferings of slavery. 
For instance, the head of the Scots Blantyre Mission 
wrote that 'The Arab slave trade is making frightful 
progress. Caravans of Arabs are pouring in for trade? 
No ! Hardly a bale of cloth goes up country from the 
east coast; it is guns and powder ••• It is simply 
9. See Hall R., 'Stanley', op. ci t., p. 328; Johnston, 
op.cit., p. 81; and note, for important studies 
of the Northern Rhodesia 'treaties'and 'concessions' 
(a) Baxter 'Concessions', op.cit.; and (b) Krishna-
murthy B., 'The Thomson Treaties and Johnston's 
Certificate of Claim', article in African Social 
Research, No. 8, Dec. 1969, University of Zambia. 
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slau~hter, and slaughter of thousands, and the deso-
lation of the fairest lands ••• where the natives were at 
peace, where industry and thrift and happiness ruled. 
Where, to go through one village you might start in 
the early morning and not pass out of it till the sun 
was half-way down, journeying straight on; and these 
are now desolate ••• it is ruthless massacre of the most 
barbarous type'. This report had found support in the 
despatches to the Foreign Office of Consul O'Neill who, 
in 1887, had recorded 'the remarkable growth of Arab 
power during the past three years ••• and ••• the bloodshed 
and ruin and desolation that has been the direct result 
of that growth'; the movement of caravans, which had 
formerly been mainly towards the Congo Free State, now 
'threatening to devastate the well-populated districts 
10 round the North end of Lake Nyassa'. The fact of 
Portuguese connivance with and frequent participation 
in this trade and the belief that Johnston was the 
spearhead of a British act of liberation won for his 
enterprises the initial wholehearted support of mission-
aries who hailed him as protector of their settlements 
and promoter of their programmes of expanding evange-
listic and educational work. 
The missionaries in the Shire Highlands were 
obviously looking for a mode of rule different from the 
10. Jack J.W., 'Daybreak in Livingstonia' (Oliphant, 
Anderson and Ferrier, 1901), p. 207; and PRO-FO 
84/1846, O'Neill to Salisbury No. 57, Africa, 
31/10/87. 
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Portuguese. For them, 'the principle of Portuguese 
annexation' was that 'a native chief for certain imme-
diate advantages, such as cloth or goods or upon certain 
representations not recorded, hands over the sovereignty 
of his land to a European power and that European power 
uses such treaties against others who may desire to 
enter the land•. 11 Having received details of a treaty-
signing ceremony at Mudi between the Acting Consul, 
Buchanan, and the chiefs of Sochi and Ndirande, they de-
clared happily that 'now the country is British -
Magololo' (sic Makololo). Johnston followed this by 
securing 'Mponda's signature, Jumbe's and all the im-
portant signatures along the Lake' and planting 'sta-
tions along the Lake and the Tanganyika Road - the 
latter being strategical points of "occupation" as 
against German advance•. 12 Johnston came thus among 
the missionaries as the representative of '"a meteor 
flag which for a thousand years had braved the battle 
and the breeze" associated with trained soldiers, 
mighty war vessels and the roar of guns' and foreshadow-
13 ing doom to the dealers in slaves. 
Johnston's personal account goes on to tell 
how he moved swiftly to the north end of the Lake where 
11. 'Life and Work((Blantyre), December 1888- (perio-
dical publication of Blantyre Mission) - by 
courtesy of Professor George Shepperson, Edin-
burgh. 
12. Ibid: Sept. and Oct. 1889. 
13. Jack op.cit., p. 208. 
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'only one week was occupied at Karonga in making peace 
with the Arabs, securing North Nyassa by treaty, choos-
ing this harbour for the African Lakes Corporation and 
arranging my caravan for Tanganyika'. His haste, with 
£2,000 received personally from Rhodes to defray expenses, 
was clearly due to his desire to get as fast as possible 
up the east shore of Lake Tanganyika. However he was 
prevented by ill-health but Alfred J. Swann of the 
London Missionary Society came to his relief. 'Mr 
Swann's expedition', Johnston recalled, 'was entirely 
successful'. Treaties were made and the British flag 
was planted at the extreme north end of Lake Tanganyika, 
However, copies of those treaties arrived in London too 
late to be taken into consideration at the signing of. 
the Anglo-German Convention of July, 1890, the con-
clusion of which had been accelerated by the accession 
of the new German Chancellor, von Caprivi, who favoured 
better relations with Britain. 
Swann's account of this cooperation with John-
ston, catches the whimsical glamour of the high noon of 
imperialism. 'Johnston', he recalled, 'was scrupu-
lously attired and at home on a donkey. I felt that 
this calm and polite servant of the Crown would have 
annexed half a continent to the Empire before luncheon, 
making the owners feel they ought to reward him hand-
somely for the trouble of signing his name to the trans-
fer'. But, apart from noting that they 'decided it 
was best for treaties to be made directly with the Crown', 
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Swann offered no clue as to the provisions of such 
'treaties'. When Swann remarked that Johnston had 
'left flags and treaties' but nothing by which to pro-
tect the people in case of attack, the Consul replied, 
"Yes, that is true; you will probably be appealed to 
and it will be annoying because you cannot defend them". 
Johnston was aware of the magnitude of what was being 
imposed upon these lands yet apparently unconcerned with 
regard to the ability to fulfil the promises allegedly 
made on behalf of the Crown. Nor was there any hint 
that such treaties 'made directly with the Crown' would 
offer the peoples of the Kingdoms involved the status 
of 'British Subject', as was granted to the citizens 
of the Indian states that entered into treaty relation-
ships with Britain. 
Moreover the men who went on the 'treaty-
making' expeditions tended to present a picture of 
their activities for 'home consumption' that was both 
romantic and inconsequential, as though they were deal-
ing with beings of another type than their own. John-
ston's brother, in his biography of the Queen's Co-
mmissioner, told how, as Sharpe moved through northern 
Zambezia, 'Nearly all the chiefs were ready to "take 
hold of the White Queen's leg" as they termed their 
acceptance of a Protectorate but they regarded the act 
of signing a treaty with a cross as dangerous "medi-
cine"•.14 
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The African Lakes Company may be said to have 
been the first 'treaty-making' body in what was soon to 
be called North-eastern Rhodesia and indeed in northern 
Zambezia. In a book recounting his exploits on behalf 
of the A.L.C., one of its founders, Fred Moir, made a 
brief mention, without dates, of 'a number of chiefs' 
having 'signed formal treaties with the Company, asking 
to be taken under British protection'. One of our 
oldest informants, Nansala Manyeta of Chief Mailo's 
area in Serenji district, recounted vividly a visit by 
Moir (presumably Fred but possibly his brother John) 
to Nansala's village. The headman went into hiding 
but Moir insisted on seeing him, assured him that he 
came in peace and gave him a flag 'the first to be 
brought here by a white man'. As Joseph Thomson called 
the little lake Lushibashi by Moir's name, it seems 
likely that Moir made that visit not later than mid-
1890. There are however still extant various texts 
of what are obviously more than mere 'concessions' of 
14. Johnston, op.cit., pp. 94 and 95; note that John-
ston erroneously mentioned the African Lakes trad-
ing agency as a 'Corporation', while in fact it 
was the African Lakes Company until its liquidation 
in 1893 and the creation in its place of the African 
Lakes Corporation; and see Maxwell Stamp Association 
Report, Vol. I p. 6 (footnote 124 below) for refer-
ence to Rhodes's grant of £2,000 to Johnston; and 
Swann's account in his 'Fighting the Slave-Hunters 
in Central Africa' (Cass 1910 and 1969) pp. 191-a. 
Also Johnston A. 'Life and Letters of Sir Harry 
Johnston' (Jonathan Cape, 1929) p. 134. 
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mineral or other such 'rights' in Central Africa. The 
missionaries in the Shire Highlands were shocked by what 
the A.L.C. was doing in this respect. 'The question 
is not yet settled', they protested, 'whether a native 
chief from whom land has been bought is able to hand 
over the sovereignty of that purchased land along with 
his own'. 15 
The most amazing of those 'claims' is probably 
the 'treaty' between the Lakes Company, represented by 
John Nicoll, and 'Mwinimambwe, ruling Chief of the 
District or County of Mambwe' which was allegedly 'signed' 
on 26th August 1885 at Chirundamusi. This was the 
ruler who had received James Stewart of the Living-
stonia Mission in 1879 and responded to Stewart's su-
ggestion of his allowing 'the English to settle in his 
country' by saying that 'he would welcome them and that 
they and he would have the country between them'. 
Nicoll's document stated briefly that the Chief 'in 
recognition of the benefits conferred ••• by the African 
Lakes Company Limited and the British Missionaries ••• 
and in consideration of the payment made to me this day 
in goods and merchandise' made the following contract: 
'I for myself my heirs and successors whomsoever do 
hereby in the presence of my people cede transfer assign 
15. Moir F.L.M. 'After Livingstone' (Hodder and ~ught­
on, n.d.), p. 179; RI: Nansala Manyeta, Serenje, 
15/10/73; Geographical Journal Vol.I No. 2, Feb. 
1893, pp. 97 ff., article by Joseph Thomson 'To 
Lake Bangweolo and the Unexplored Region of British 
Central Africa'; 'Life and Work', December 1888. 
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and make over absolutely and for all time coming ••• all 
my sovereign rights and right of jurisdiction over my 
people and country' to the African Lakes Company. 
Mwinimambwe then bound himself and his successors 'for 
all time coming not to enter into any treaties or ne-
gotiations at~riance with the spirit of this deed 
without the consent in writing of the African Lakes 
C L . •t d' 16 ompany ~m~ e • 
This document bore the form of 'unconditional 
surrender', suggesting that it was either extracted 
from Mwinimambwe at the point of a gun or indeed not 
extracted at all but produced by the A.L.C. in support 
of its plan to capture the well-worn trade route of the 
Tanganyika Plateau for its own wares from Britain. But 
it was placed in the Consul's office alongside Nicoll's 
'Deed of Sale' of 16th August 1890 whereby he purchased 
from 'Mangwe Kafola, Paramount Chief of the Mambwe Country 
all and whole' an area bounded 'on the north by a line 
0 running east and west at 8 15' East Longitude; on the 
south a line running East and West at 9°30' South La-
titude; and on the west a range of the Losongo Moun-
tains or Eastern Limits of the Country of Ulungu'; to 
wit, the whole of the same Mambwe kingdom. Then, on 
18th September 1893, Johnston duly sanctioned both 
16. NLS 7904 Folio 48: Free Church of Scotland -
'Report of Journey of Exploration, September to 
December 1879' from J. Stewart to the Church's 
Foreign Secretary; NAZ-BS-1/103; and note that 
'Mwinimambwe' meant simply 'owner or chief of 
Mambwe country'. Underlining is mine. 
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these 'treaties' by the issue of a Certificate of Claim, 
in which however he made no mention of a 'treaty' with 
'Nangwe, Mwinyi Mambwe' which, as we shall see, he 
claimed to have concluded personally eight months pre-
viously. Ten days later the area thus acquired was 
transferred to the B.S.A. Company and registered in 
Blantyre. The present Senior Chief Nsokolo states 
however that there is no record at his court of any such 
'treaties' or 'concessions'; that Mandala (the African 
Lakes Company) did not establish a station in his king-
dom; and that had any such surrender been sought and 
understood it would have been rejected. Moreover, the 
memory of the event would certainly have been retained 
. . t 17 by Nsokolo's counc1llors and subJec s. 
In the same year as Nicholl's 'treaty' with 
Mwinimambwe - the year of the Berlin Conference - the 
African Lakes Company's director, John Moir, had told 
the Acting Consul that he had persuaded many chiefs in 
the region of Malawi to request a British Protectorate, 
failing which they would seek the protection of his 
Company. Documents to support this action were sent 
17. Ibid: and RI/Senior Chief Nsokolo and others, 
21/8/75; and note that Nsokolo has been the royal 
title of Mambwe chiefs for generations and no 
trace can be found of the name Mangwe Kafola in 
the royal line; and see Willis R.G. 'The Fipa 
and Related Peoples of South-West Tanzania and 
North East Zambia', Ethnographic Survey of Africa, 
East Central Africa, Part XV (International 
African Institute 1966), pp. 47-48. 
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to London and Moir claimed to have another thirty-three 
such petitions for submission to the Foreign Secretary. 
But, as in the case of Lobengula and the Rudd Concession 
and, as we will see, in cases of 'treaties' in the area 
of Zambia, the Kololo chiefs concerned complained that 
they had not been told what they were required to sign. 
Those Kololo were survivors of Livingstone's 'Makololo' 
who had settled in the region and apparently established 
18 
authority over the local people. At this time, 
Johnston's dislike and contempt for the A.L.C. was grow-
ing rather than diminishing and in the year in which he 
sanctioned its Mambwe claim, he described it as managed 
by 'the riff-raff of Glasgow' who 'devote the whole of 
their talents to the cheating of all men, white, black 
19 and yellow'. 
The A.L.C. managed to secure the signature of 
a Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Westminster, Alfred 
Sharpe, to their engagement with one 'Ngorwi Kito' near 
Mbala at the south end of Lake Tanganyika, their base 
of operations. Ngorwi Kito was alleged to have autho-
rity to cede to them 'the whole territory', its min-
erals and mining rights, game preserves, taxes, tolls, 
duties 'and privileges of whatever sort and kind' in 
Urungu (sic), the country of the Lungu people. The 
18. PRO-FO 84/1702, despatches to Foreign Office, No. 8 
Africa, 9/8/85 and No. 1 Africa 17/9/85; and see 
Hanna op.cit., pp. 82-87. 
19. Ibid: FO 2/54, Johnston to Percy Anderson, FO, 
21/1/93. 
relevant document was dated 30th December 1890, John 
Nicholl acting again for the Company. 20 
Very soon afterwards, in January 1891, the 
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A.L.C., once more through Nicholl, procured a 'deed of 
sale' from the paramount chief of the Mwanga whose capi-
tal was in what was to be the southernmost tract of 
modern Tanzania. The king, Chikanamulilo, was stated 
to have ceded, as in the case of Ngorwi Kito, and in 
return for £50 worth of trade goods, 'all mineral mining 
rights, game preserves taxes tolls and duties and 
privileges of whatever sort and kind' pertaining to 'a 
strip of land ten miles in width and about fifty-five 
miles in length following the course of the Stevenson 
Road and having five miles of its width on either side 
of the said road'. The Stevenson Road was the highway 
which it was planned to construct between the north end 
of Lake Nyasa and the south end of Lake Tanganyika with 
capital provided by James Stevenson, a Glasgow merchant, 
who was Convener of a Sub-Committee of the Free Church 
of Scotland's Foreign Mission Committee, the body 
charged with oversight of the work of the Livingstonia 
Mission in the Lake Nyasa region. Work on the road 
had been started in 1880 though by 1895 Johnston spoke 
of it as having 'very little existence except on paper•. 21 
20. MSA: File 24. Underlining is mine. 
21. Jack, op.cit., p. 169; and Hanna, op. cit., p. 
46. 
86. 
The Chikanamulilo 'deed of sale' transferred 
the land to the Company 'absolutely and for all time 
coming'. The deed was executed at Mkoma, the tradi-
tional capital of the Mwanga King. It was witnessed 
by two strangers to the area, 'Matope (Native of Ban-
22 dawe)' on the shore of Lake Malawi, and Alfred Sharpe. 
When Johnston sanctioned these claims, he declared that 
he did so on behalf of the British Government by the 
authority vested in him to 'grant to all claimants whose 
titles shall be proved to be true and just a Certificate 
to that effect' which would be then 'a voucher for the 
legality of the Claim'. The only significant condi-
tion attached to the claims was that villages were not 
to be 'disturbed or removed' without his written con-
sent and that the proprietor, being the A.L.C., could 
legally forbid the making of new villages or plantations 
on his 'estate•. 23 Johnston apparently accepted with-
out question the declaration on the Chikanamalira (sic) 
Deed of Sale, signed by Sharpe, again in his capacity 
as 'Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Westminster', 
that he (Sharpe) had 'truly and honestly translated the 
terms of this transfer to the said Chikanamalira in the 
22. NAZ-BS-1/103, 'Deed of Sale', Mkoma, 15/1/91; 
and note that the Mwanga people have generally and 
in my view erroneously been referred to, in English, 
as 'Namwanga' or 'Inamwanga'. The original 
community of this Kingdom was believed to have 
lived near the 'holy' lake called Mwanga and so 
been known as 'Awina-Mwanga', people of Mwanga. 
23. Ibid: underlining is mine. 
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Kiswahili language and that he has signed the said trans-
24 
fer in the full understanding of its purpose'. The 
Mangwe Kafola (Mambwe) Deed had borne a similar attesta-
tion signed by Stewart Burton and Adam McCulloch, pre-
sumably A.L.C. employees. Nor was Johnston concerned 
to establish whether Mwinimambwe (owner of Mambwe-land) 
or Mangwe Kafola, 'Paramount Chief of the Mambwe Country' 
was, as he stated in the Certificate of Claim 'the sole 
and rightful owner of the land'. Instead, he confused 
the issue by speaking of 'the two ruling chiefs of the 
25 two sections of the Mambwe people'. 
The next batch of 'treaties' in chronological 
order was the collection made by Johnston himself, and 
mentioned above, on his dash across the Nyasa-Tanganyika 
plateau, Though, according to Baxter, there were copies 
of twenty-four such 'treaties' sent by him to the Foreign 
26 Office in February 1890, Johnston made the briefest 
general reference to them, which we quoted above, in 
his monumental 'British Central Africa•. 27 To that we 
can add his summary statement to the Foreign Office 
that he had 'now secured by treaty all country from 
South end of Tanganyika to River Ruo on Shire and West 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid: e.g. 'Certificate of Claim on the Mangwe 
Kafola 'Deed', 18/9/93, and cf. MSA, copy of this 
'Certificate of Claim'. 
26. Baxter, op.cit., p. 26. 
27. Johnston, op.cit., p. 81. 
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to River Longwa (sic Luangwa) ••• I made treaties along 
the South end of the Lake (Tanganyika) to the south 
west to the north of Cameron Bay ••• I then penetrated 
inland westward to within a short distance of Lake 
Moero (sic) and also southward to near the Kazembe's 
Kingdom'. This journey of Johnston's was mentioned in 
letters of L.M.S. missionaries at the south end of the 
Lake to whom Johnston's objective clearly was 'to fore-
stall any delegates from other European governments ••• 
thus paving the way for the Chartered Company that is 
28 being formed'. 
The texts of those treaties do not appear to 
be extant, but the list of chiefs which Baxter has re-
produced has some interesting inclusions. There is, 
for instance, Mkoma who presumably was the Chikanamu-
lilo of Nicholl's 'Deed of Sale' of 15th January 1891. 
However, the Deed made no reference to the Treaty which 
the Commissioner himself had claimed to procure four-
teen months earlier, on 18th November 1889, nor did 
Johnston refer to his own 'treaty' when certifying the 
A.L.C. claim on Mwanga territory !29 There is also 
reference to Undi from whom the Consul obtained a 
'treaty' on 22nd September 1889, chronologically the 
second in his list and presumably executed as he moved 
north through Chewa country in the hinterland of Lake 
28. Baxter, op.cit., p. 26; and CCWM,C.Africa Letters, 
Box 7: D.P. Jones, Fwambo, 13/12/88. 
29. Baxter, op.cit., p. 26. 
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Malawi. The same chief, Paramount of the Chewa, was 
included in region 4(a) of the map of Johnston's Certi-
ficate of Claim, against the date 15th April, 1891. 
Thirdly, the Baxter list includes a treaty between 
Johnston and the correctly-titled ruler of the Lungu, 
Tafuna, dated 29th November, 1889. By geographical 
location as well as by title, this Tafuna must have been 
the Lungu King, with his capital of Isoko a few miles 
from Mbala (Abercorn). Yet the A.L.C. submitted, and 
had approved by Johnston, a deed dated thirteen months 
later which did not cite the Johnston 'treaty'. If 
Ngorwi Kito had authority over 'the whole territory' 
30 of the Lungu, he must have been no other than Tafuna. 
This catalogue of contradictions then reveals 
the Johnston 'treaty' of 15th December 1889, noted above, 
with one called 'Nangwe, Mwinyi Mambwe', procured as the 
Consul was moving eastwards again towards the 'mixed 
tribes' of the northward reaches of the Isoka district. 
'Mwinyi Mambwe' cannot have been other than the 'Mwini-
mambwe' whose absolute surrender of all sovereign rights 
to the African Lakes Company Johnston was to endorse 
four years later in the issue of a Certificate of Claim, 
without reference to his own 'treaty' with the Mambwe; 
30. Ibid: and MSA File 24, which includes a copy of 
the map of 15/4/91. See Appendix~a-., and note 
that, on Johnston's map, nos. 1,2,3, were used for 
areas later marked K.E.F; no. 4 for B; no.4(a) 
'for L; no. 5 for A. 
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and •Nangwe' suggests a typical mishearing of the name 
'Mangwe' as in the 'Mangwe Kafola' Deed of August, 1890. 
Kera, with whom he claimed to have contracted on the 
previous day, was also a Mambwe chief but inferior to 
the 'Mwinimambwe' and therefore highly unlikely to have 
been either willing or permitted to make a 'treaty' 
with a foreign power. 
Moreover, four of the twenty-four Johnston 
'treaties' bear the names of rulers in the region of 
modern Tanzania, namely 'Mwinyi Tshinga' (4th November); 
Mkoma of the Mwanga who was presumably Chikanamulilo 
from whom the A.L.C. were to claim the 'concession' of 
January 1891 (18th November); 'Chiefs of Ukukwe' (19th 
November); and 'Chief Wakinga' (16th December). 
Similarly Zowa and Msangawari (10th and 16th November) 
were presumably rulers near Lake Malawi. A further 
query arises in respect of the 'Watambo-Nuwandia'. If 
Johnston's 'treaty' was made with the Tambo and the 
Wandia on one and the same day, it must refer to the 
Tambo and Wandia groups near Chitipa (Fort Hill) about 
fifty miles ESE of Mwenzo and forty miles from the 
other Tambo area near Isoka. However, in the Tambo 
country near Isoka, the area of Chief Katyetye, there 
is a memory of a 'Muzungu' or white man coming to break 
the Bemba-Arab alliance and end their wars, though no 
record has been heard of any treaty-making. 
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Finally the last but one treaty in the John-
ston list was made with 'Kazembe' on 4th January 1890, 
two weeks after he claimed to have procured some such 
arrangement with the 'Chiefs of Watambo-Nuwandia'. 
Though his despatch to the Foreign Office, quoted above, 
mentioned that his journeying had taken him 'southward 
to near the Kazembe's Kingdom', there can be no reason 
to assume that the 'Kazembe' with whom his treaty was 
reputedly made was the famous Luunda King on the Luapula. 
Even at his relatively fast pace of travel, Johnston on 
a donkey, but with walking carriers, could scarcely 
have turned back from Tambo-Wandia country so swiftly 
to the Luapula; nor would he have been able to snatch 
a 'treaty' quickly from one of the strongest kings of 
the whole region of northern Zambezia. Indeed he did 
not claim to have been more than 'near the Kazembe's 
kingdom;' moveover, he attributed a 'treaty' with Kazembe 
.of the Luunda to Sharpe in his omnibus Certificate of 
Claim of 25th September 1893. 31 Since 'Kazembe' is 
a name used very widely in the area of Zambia, this man 
Johnston claimed to have engaged by 'treaty' must have 
been some other personage. There is no 'paramount' 
of that name in the north-eastern regions of the terri-
tory. 
31. Baxter, op.cit., pp. 26 and 28-33; and RID/Richard 
Mtambo, Court President, Mwenwisi, Isoka, 19/7/75. 
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Johnston's volumes on 'British Central Africa' 
suggest to the reader a meticulous care for detail. 
The above survey of the first rounds of his work of 
procuring and also of cataloguing 'treaties' indicates, 
on the contrary, an astonishing casualness which may 
well have to be explained by the fact that the 'treaty-
making' business had no real significance for the local 
princes and peoples. They were being brought into sub-
jugation anyway. What mattered was, as we noted 
earlier, to provide Her Majesty's Government with enough 
paper on the 'treaties' to enable her to assert her 
claims against the rivalry of Germany, Portugal and 
the Congo Free State. Indeed, six months after the 
date of the last of these Johnston treaties, London was 
able to use them to block German penetration south of 
the interlacustrine belt when a boundary was fixed as 
part of the portmanteau Anglo-German agreement of 1st 
July 1890. 
(b) Joseph Thomson and Alfred Sharpe as collectors 
of treaties. 
The review of the 'treaties' of Joseph Thomson 
and Alfred Sharpe to which we now turn offers further 
proof of casual inaccuracy. Robert Rotberg has pro-
vided us with a major study of Joseph Thomsen's African 
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exploits, showing him to have been an impetuous and 
immature person. A member of the Royal Geographical 
Society described him to George Cawston, a B.S.A. 
Company Director, as 'quick-blooded, generous, good-
32 natured and frank to a fault', and Thomsen's writings 
strengthen this view. He had a profound devotion to 
the memory of David Livingstone and in 1893 proposed 
that the large tract north of the Zambezi which he had 
traversed three years earlier should be called 'Living-
stonia'. For him, Central Africa held 'the sacred 
spot where Livingstone closed his great career, leaving 
his heart in the land where all his thoughts and aspi-
rations were centred'. Moreover he expressed great 
admiration for the Scots missionaries in the Shire 
Highlands who, he said, 'unaided by Maxim guns or govern-
ment support and armed only with moral weapons ••• wielded 
a powerful influence which embraced a hundred chiefs and 
extended all over Nyasaland as far as the distant shores 
of Tanganyika•. 33 
Thomsen's first journey in the area of Africa 
which concerns us here was made in 1879-80. It took 
him via Mwanga and Mambwe country to the southern end 
32. See Rotber9 R., 'Joseph Thomson and the Exploration 
of Africa' (Chatto and Windus 1971); and RH-MSS. 
Afr.s.74 BSA Miscell.Papers 1890; J. Bolton, to 
G. Cawston, 1/3/90. 
33. Thomson J., article in Geographical Journal Vol.I 
1893, pp. 97-121; 'To Lake Bangweolo and the Un-
explored Region of British Central Africa'. 
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of Lake Tanganyika where he wrongly assumed that Tafuna 
was the name of a raider of the 'Mazitu' (Ngoni) or 
'Watuta' and not the chief of the raided Lungu. 34 He 
does not appear to have been concerned with 'treaties' 
on this earlier journey. However, during his service 
with the National African Company (later called the 
Royal Niger Company) in the mid-eighties, Thomson ob-
tained signatures of local princes to treaties which, 
Rotberg says, 'gave Britain reasonably good paper rights 
to a large portion of what became Northern Nigeria•. 35 
It was to his Nigerian exploits that he referred, as we 
saw earlier, when he accepted the invitation to go on 
his second mid-African pilgrimage in the employment of 
the B.S.A. Company. 
According to the biography of him by his brother, 
Thomson was enlisted by Rhodes 'for his past achieve-
ments as an explorer, and the notable success of his 
humane methods in dealing with savage races'. Indeed 
in his own chronicle, Thomson reiterated his conviction 
that, in his brother's words, 'the courage of patience 
smoothed the way even where the situation bristled with 
provocation to bloodshed•. 36 Thomsen's own description 
34. Thomson J., 'To the Central African Lakes and Back' 
'Sampson Low, Marston, 1881), Vol.I, p. 317; and 
note that 'Mazitu' and 'Watuta' were local names 
for the Ngoni. See also Barnes (f/note 57 below) p.9. 
35. Rotberg 'Political History', op.cit., p. 242. 
36. Thomson J.B., op.cit., pp. 247 and 255. 
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of the Luangwa valley between the kingdoms of Mpezeni 
and Mwase, included this vivid passage: 'With startling 
suddenness the hitherto silent wilderness quivers over 
many a near and distant mile with the warning cry which 
calls the men to arms and sends the women and children 
to the woods for shelter ••• An accidental shot, an arrow 
slipped from the drawn bow, and nothing can stop blood-
shed. On the other hand, a little coolness, a little 
confident patience, a little more time for the effer-
vescence of the mad passion aroused, and peace ensues 
with equal certainty•. 37 
Thomson's record of his explorations in 
northern Zambezia in 1890 makes no mention of treaty-
making. The only reference to the relation of Rhodes's 
Company to his journey appears in these words: 'In the 
beginning of 1890, the British South Africa Company, in 
pursuance of the splendid enterprise which has marked 
its short but brilliant history, offered me an opportu-
nity of visiting Lake Bangweolo and the neighbouring 
regions'. Thereafter the article is a description of 
places and peoples as he moved through 'Wa-Nyasa' to 
'Kiwende', the country of a Bisa chief called 'Kabwire', 
thence to Katara's area, •Kwakatara', at the foot of 
the Muchinga mountains, and on, by the foothills of the 
37. Geographical Journal, op.cit., Vol.I, no. 2, Feb. 
1893, article by Thomson, p. 103. 
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'Lokinga Range' and the 'Vimbe Hills' to 'Lusiwazi', 
which he called 'Moir's Lake', in honour of the founder 
of the African Lakes Company. Then, on 21st September, 
1890, the party reached 'Nansara, a female Biza Chief', 
at whose village small-pox attacked them. After 
hunting for Chitambo's village where Livingstone was 
reputed to have died and which, Thomson claimed, was 
not in 'Ilala', as generally believed, but in 'Kalinde', 
the party moved by the'River Moengashe' to 'Kalonga, 
the village of the principal chief of Iramba; then, in 
the direction of the Kafue River, to 'Kwa-Kavoi', by 
'Pa-Mkwemba' to the 'Kalera Hills' with the 'Irumi Hills' 
to the south. On 4th November, they reached 'the 
village of the important Iramba (sic Lamba) chief, 
Mshiri', hoping to move on to 'Mashukulumbe (sic, the 
Ila area~, by way of Manica'. Thomson was by then, 
however, very ill, and so the party began the return 
journey via 'Urenje' and over the 'Lunsefwa' (sic) 
river, and through Mpezeni's kingdom to Kasungu where 
38 they arrived at the very end of the year. 
Despite the hazards of his travels, however, 
Thomson, like Johnston, moved across northern Zambezia 
with unceremonious haste. Johnston had recorded 
38. Ibid:; and see p.80 above. 'Manica' probably 
was a mishearing of the local words for 'plains' 
and not as Hall suggests (p. 84) a confusion with 
'Manicaland'. 
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procuring 'treaties' at one stage at the rate of one 
per day and once, on 4th November 1889, two in one day. 
Thomson moved no more slowly, claiming to have covered 
over a dozen kingdoms and chiefdoms in a little over 
two months. His list, however, is full of mistaken 
names and names of persons whose identity cannot be 
established, and, as Hall says, 'the concessions ob-
tained by Thomson were a ludicrous confusion ••• In re-
turn for trade goods, men who could neither read nor 
write and whose very existence in most cases seems quite 
forgotten, handed over most extensive rights•. 39 Hall 
cites Professor Doke's statement to the effect that the 
visit of Thomson, Grant and Wilson is clearly remember-
ed by Lamba people, especially because the smallpox, 
which had struck Thomsen's caravan, continued to plague 
the area for some time afterwards. 
In his study of the Thomson Treaties, Krishna-
murthy cites verbatim evidence collected from a nephew 
of the Lamba chief, Mushili, who is number ten in the 
Thomson list. The evidence was as follows:-
' ••• These white men came with their book and 
they asked Mushili to put his thumb print in the pre-
sence of the following ••• Musopelo, Kanamina and Mukwemba 
and myself, Mwebela, and told the chief to look after 
that book very carefully. They used black stuff. 
39. Hall, op.cit., p. 84. 
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That black stuff was on something so that thumb print 
was put against that one and then on the paper. I do 
not remember them making any cross on the paper. 
'There was not a meeting of all the people 
of the village. They said, "As all the chiefs have run 
away from us, and you are the only one we have found 
who has not run away from us, so we want you to accept 
us by putting this mark on the book, and we recognise 
you as the only chief here ••• " 1 
'The mpundus, they were interpreting. They 
did not talk about land. They did not talk about 
iyela (metals). I know what was talked about and 
this, I am definite, was not talked about. If they 
did talk about it I should have known'. Interviews 
conducted more recently both with holders of chieftain-
ships named, however inaccurately, in the Thomson 
list and with people well versed in local history 
give reason for some suspicion that the original list 
may, in part at least, have been made simply as a result 
of questioning some ruler or other persons, somewhere 
in 'northern Zambezia', as to which chiefs ruled where. 
The inaccuracies that characterise Thomson's list may 
indicate that the questioning of informants, who had 
not full knowledge of more distant kingdoms and rulers, 
and the rough jotting down of names, were not subjected 
to confirmation by actual or properly conducted meetings 
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with the persons listed. For example, 'Tshitambo' 
or Chitambo (no. 5) was not a 'paramount chief'. And, 
while the 'officia~ list puts the date of the Chitambo 
'treaty' as 4th October 1890, Thomsen's brother states 
categorically that the caravan, with a great sense.of 
relief, reached Chitambo on 29th November soon after the 
outbreak of smallpox which, he says, struck them at 
Nansara. Again, there is notable inconsistency in the 
use of titles. No explanation is offered for calling 
Kalonga (no. 7) and Simesi (no. 8) 'sultans' while other 
rulers are called 'chiefs'. Nor does Thomson indicate 
why Katara (no. 3) and Nansara (no. 4) are described 
as 'independent' chiefs. 
Thpmson must have been especially confused 
about chieftaincy among the Lamba. While, as we have 
seen, his article in the Geographical Journal called 
Kalonga 'the principal chief of Iramba', the list, 
quoted by Baxter, gives 'Kalenga', 'Simesi' and 'Mkwemba' 
as chiefs of eastern, western and central 'Iramba' 
respectively, while 'Mshiri' is called 'paramount chief' 
of southern Iramba. Meanwhile, another 'Mshiri' appears 
as number 6 in the list with the impossible title of 
'paramount chief of the B-a-usi (sic) country Llala 
(sic) E. of the Luapula and of Kawende on the west side 
of the Luapula', i.e. in Leopold's Congo. In the same 
way, the description of Nansara as 'chieftainess of the 
Lobisa country of Mbalala' reveals a serious error in 
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identity, since 'Lobisa' obviously means 'the country 
of the Bisa' while 'Mbalala' means 'the Lala people'. 
The Bisa and the Lala were not at any time under one 
ruler. Moreover, according to Hall 'Nansara' was 
'merely a village headwoman ••• pushed forward by the 
people because they did not want to disclose the real 
chief'. 
Two other mysterious items in the Thomson 
list merit note. Firstly, he claimed to have made 
treaties with 'Tshavira (Shaibila) of South-Eastern 
Ilala and 'Tshavira, Chief of Western Senga' on one and 
the same day, 25th November, 1890 (nos. 13 and 14). 
The present Shaibila, however, asserts (a) that the 
Senga of Mboroma were formerly tributary to his fore-
bears and (b) that Mkwemba (Thomsen's no. 9) was in 
fact another name for Shaibila. But he declares 
emphatically that there was no such visit to his court 
by Thomson and that, if the chief of that period, only 
84 years ago, had in fact made a 'treaty' and granted 
'Concessions' 'in the presence of the headmen and people', 
to a white man, leading a large caravan, this would 
certainly have been remembered. Joseph Thomson himself 
said his caravan consisted of '55 Makua and 98 Atonga' 
along with Wilson and Grant. Shaibila's people did 
not consider they had been fraudulently denied the sums 
of money promised in the Thomson document simply be-
cause they did not know of the existence of such a 
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'treaty'. Again, his last 'treaty' was allegedly made 
with 'Chevia and Miembe, Chiefs of Senga' who were to be 
paid 'jointly ••• goods to the value of £25'. No expla-
nation is offered of the phenomenon of co-chieftainship. 
Like all Thomsen's documents, this one stated that the 
deal was made in the presence of headmen and people. 
Finally, though Thomson described each 'treaty' 
as 'a treaty or alliance made between the said chief and 
people and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty Queen 
Victoria', on only two cases did he make an explicit 
commitment to 'protection'. 'Kambwiri, Paramount Chief 
of Kiwende' was assured that the Company undertook 'to 
protect the said King and people from all outside inter-
ference or attacks' and held its servants 'responsible 
for any ill-treatment of the King's native subjects' -
a formula similar to that found in Sharpe's 'treaties' 
with Kazembe and Nsama. More specifically, Thomson 
allegedly promised Chipepo of the Lenje (no. 11) relief 
'from the tyranny of the Portuguese Half-caste ivory and 
slave hunters who keep them in constant fear of lives 
and property'. This 'treaty', dated after the caravan 
was stricken by smallpox and Thomson himself was serious-
ly ill, gave no indication how such 'protection' would 
be afforded to the Lenje; in contrast to Sharpe's 
promise to provide Kazembe and Nsama with 'a Resident' 
and 'an escort of British Police'. The memory of senior 
men in Chipepo's area is, however, very different. 
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The first man who visited them, they say, asked to see 
the chief, Mwashi by name. The chief and his council 
feared the approach of an armed stranger with about 100 
armed porters, and so they agreed that the chief must 
hide. The white man was displeased and so, at last, 
Muchinga, the chief's son, went out to meet him. The 
stranger said he had brought a gift, which was a bundle 
of cloth. The chief, however, did not wish to receive 
it. The stranger and his party then left, and some 
years passed before another white man came and planted 
a flag on the large ant-hill outside the royal enclosure. 
There was, the witnesses declare, no mention whatsoever 
of any agreement or 'treaty' nor was there any money or 
its equivalent in trade goods offered by the white man. 
Moreover, at that time, Chipepo's people did not regard 
the Portuguese-Mbunda traders as enemies, as all their 
dealings were conducted respectfully with the chief who 
sold them ivory and slaves. Those slaves were convicts 
and prisoners taken in local border fighting with neigh-
bours. There was no desire to abandon the ivory trade 
in favour of some relationship with the new white tra-
vellers who were beginning to appear in the land. 40 
40. MSA Report Vol. II, pp. 132-145; Krishnamurthy 
op.cit., pp. 588-601 and esp, p. 593; Thomson J., 
article, op.cit.; Hall, op.cit., p. 84; RI/Chief 
Shaibila of the Lala, 24/7/75; MSA Vol II p~. 151 
ff., FO to eo, 23/7/94; and RI/Chief Chipepo and 
Councillors, 14/10/75. 
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We should nevertheless look further at the 
texts of some of Thomsen's fourteen documents, which 
were all, along with one of Sharpe's, accorded the 
approval of Johnston as Her Majesty's Commissioner and 
Consul-General on 25th September, 1893. In this 
Certificate of Claim, Johnston summarised the 'rights 
and privileges' obtained for the British South Africa 
Company thus:-
'1. The sole right "to search, prospect, exploit, 
dig for and keep all minerals and metals"; 
2. The sole right "to construct, improve, equip, 
manage and control all kinds of public utility"; 
3. The "absolute and exclusive possession of all 
commercial privileges of whatsoever kind"; 
4. The right "to do all such things as are inci-
dental or conducive to the exercise, attain-
ment and protection of all or any rights, 
powers and concessions granted"'. 41 
Though the Certificate of Claim included quotation marks 
as shown here, the texts of the various 'treaties' in 
fact varied. Moreover, though Johnston's wording 
implied that he was endorsing 'claims' to various lands 
and properties 'conceded by local rulers,' all that the 
Thomson documents included, as their first clause, was 
the ruler's commitment 'to accept the British flag and 
to place himself irrevocably under the Protectorate of 
41. Baxter, op.cit., p. 31. 
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Great Britain'. Similarly all the agreements contained 
a pledge on the ruler's part 'not to enter into any 
treaty or alliance with any other person Company or 
state•. 42 
The payment which Thomson claimed to have off-
erect these rulers was variable, the largest amount being 
£60 worth of trade goods with a promise of £50 per annum 
when the commercial properties began to yield profit to 
the Company. The lowest amount was £10 worth of trade 
goods for 'the Independent Female Chief Nansara' who was 
alleged to be 'content to leave the question of future 
compensation in the hands of the Company'. To only 
four rulers was £50 worth of goods or more offered while 
six were to receive £20 worth and two £10. If in fact 
these amounts were handed over, the total bill for the 
'treaties' was £415 furnished in the form of 'trade 
goods' of whose value Thomson and his partners, James 
Grant and Charles Wilson, were the sole assessors. 
Two other notable features of Thomson's 
'treaties' are the inclusion of longitudinal and lati-
tudinal positions of the kingdoms and chiefdoms con-
cerned; and the names of interpreters. To have accu-
rately measured the bounds of each area, Thomson would 
have required time, which his recorded schedule clearly 
42. MSA Report (Moor House, London EC2, 1967) 'History 
of the Mineral Rights of Northern Rhodesia', Vol. 
II - texts of Thomson Treaties, pp. 132-145. 
105. 
did not allow. To read them off an inevitably inaccu-
rate map of what he called 'unexplored regions' would 
be proof of an amazing casualness in relation to lands 
which the Company hoped to exploit. Yet, according to 
Rotberg, he did not even carry a sextant on his travels. 
Meanwhile in dealing with rulers whose names he obviously 
misheard and some of whose names are untraceable, he 
used the services of a foreign interpreter, Jumah 
Abubakr, whose competence in the variety of languages 
. 43 
1nvolved must be open to doubt. As has been indi-
cated by the scholars who have examined those documents, 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that no demand 
was laid upon Thomson to do his work accurately and to 
ensure that authentic contracts had been fully under-
stood before acceptance; that indeed the whole opera-
tion was spurious in execution as in concept. Yet H.M. 
Commissioner prepared the Certificate of Claim in duly 
legalistic language after having 'inquired' into the 
claims concerned. This included, as Roland Oliver has 
pointed out, 'one document purporting to convey 140,000 
acres for a consideration of £2.13.0., distributed among 
four persons who were not in any sense the chiefs of 
the district'. Johnston however certified that he had 
'ascertained ••• that the granters of the said rights and 
privileges were the sole and only rightful owners of the 
land'. He wrote elsewhere, however, that 'the tenure 
43. Ibid: and Rotberg 'Joseph Thomson', op.cit., p. 287. 
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of the land was in reality tribal {and) ••• theoretically 
44 
the chief has no right to alienate the land'. 
There are two other sets of documents relating 
to the region once called North-Eastern Rhodesia which 
remain to be noted: the 'treaties' of Alfred Sharpe 
and the so-called Wiese Concessions in the areas of the 
Ngoni and their neighbours in the large region around 
the confluence of the Zambezi and Luangwa Rivers. 
Sharpe, like Thomson, had some years of experience in 
Central Africa before he began to busy himself with 
'treaty-making', and had fought at Karonga in Northern 
Malawi in 1887 against the 'Arab' Mlozi and his allies. 
Johnston had recently appointed Sharpe as his vice-
consul and it was with this title that he began his 
journey westwards. In Johnston's view, Sharpe empha-
tically deserved 'the main credit of having secured all 
this portion of our new dependency to the British Flag'. 
Indeed he described Thomson's documents as 'absurdly 
worded' and regarded his efforts as having merely 
'supplemented' Sharpe's work. With a small force, 
'scarcely exceeding fifteen or twenty men and by weight 
of his personal influence alone' Sharpe had 'secured' 
those territories •to British interests•. 45 
44. Baxter, op.cit., pp. 31-33; MSA Report Vol. II, 
pp. 128-131; Oliver R., op.cit., p. 222; Baxter, 
op.cit., p. 32; and Johnston op.cit., p. 113. 
45. Johnston op.cit., p. 90; Hall, op.cit., p. 84; 
and Baxter, op.cit., pp. 28-33. 
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In point of time Thomson and Sharpe virtually 
continued the Commissioner's own operations, as John-
ston's twenty-fourth 'treaty' was dated 7th January 
1890, and Thomsen's first 'treaty' was dated 15th Sep-
tember 1890, two weeks before the first in Sharpe's list. 
The six Sharpe documents cited in Johnston's ~ertifi-
cate of Claim of 25th September 1893 cover the period 
30th September 1890 to 17th July 1891. To these we 
have to add his 'treaty' with 'Mwapi, Chief of the 
Lukusasi country', dated 12th May 1890, which Johnston 
grouped with Thomsen's fourteen documents; and a later 
'treaty' with Mkula in the Lake Mweru area in November 
1892. 46 
Sharpe's attitude to the 'treaties' made in 
1890-91 was revealed by the fact that, in May 1890, 
before any except the Johnston 'treaties' had been se-
cured, he declared a British Protectorate over the area 
west of the Luangwa which the Foreign Office apparently 
did not disallow. His first 'treaty' made no reference 
to the 'protection' of Mwapi and his people, though it 
47 was obtained in the same month. The 'treaty' with 
'the Council of Kazembe branch of the Lunda people', 
dated 30th September 1890, did however declare that 
'this covenant shall be treated in the light of a 
treaty of alliance between the said nation and the 
46. For Sharpe's 'treaties' see MSA Report, op.cit., 
Vol. II p. 131 (Mwapi), and Baxter, op.cit., p. 29. 
47. Ibid. 
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Government of Her Britannic Majesty'. It further 
pledged that the British South Africa Company would be 
held responsible 'for any ill-treatment or interference 
with any other of the King's native subjects'; and that 
a Resident would be appointed at the royal capital. 
This official would 'protect the King and nation from 
attack' and 'under the King's supervision and authority, 
aid and assist in the establishment and propagation of 
the Christian religion, and the education and civili-
sation of the native subjects of the King by the estab-
lishment maintenance and endowment of such churches, 
schools and trading stations as may be from time to 
time mutually agreed upon by the King and the Resident'. 
The reference to Christianity was an interesting in-
elusion since missionary work did not begin near to 
Kazembe for another decade. 48 
Sharpe's 'treaty' with Nsama of the Tabwa, 
made two and a half months later, committed the Crown 
and the B.S.A. Company in almost identical terms to 
those of the Kazembe document. It made the serious 
error, however, of calling Nsama 'Paramount Chief or 
King of the Awemba (Babemba) people', a strange blunder 
48. MSA files: texts of Sharpe's 'treaty' with Kazembe; 
and note that the London Missionary Society op~ned 
a station at Mbe~hi, not far from the royal capital 
in:J1900. Underlining is mine. 
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in view of the widespread and dread reputation of Chiti-
mukulu, the Bemba King, well-known as an ally of the 
Arab slave-masters with whom Sharpe had fought three 
years earlier. In his account of the Nyasa-Tanganyika 
Expedition of 1889-90, Harry Johnston explained that 
only lack of time prevented him from visiting 'Ketimkuru 
(sic) the Wa-Wemba King'. But, he said 'I had reason 
to believe, from a message transmitted to me from him, 
through an Ulungu chief to the South of Tanganyika, that 
I should have been well received and ••• found it not very 
difficult to enter into a pact with him to cease raiding 
the native tribes under our protection'. Meanwhile, 
Sharpe promised to pay both these princes '£25 per 
49 annum in perpetuity', in cash or trading goods. 
The other four agreements in this group were 
reputedly concluded between 17th and 24th July 1891 
and like the brief document concerning Mwapi, were all 
concerned with 'exclusive mining rights'. They in-
eluded the right to keep all minerals extracted, and 
'absolutely and exclusively all timber wood and water 
rights (except what are required for native purposes)' 
as well as 'all commercial and manufacturing privileges 
and all agricultural rights'; the only caveat being 
that 'it must be clearly understood by the Company that 
49. Ibid: text of Nsama treaty, 15/12/90; and RH: 
MSS.Afr.s.84 Johnston's Report on the Nyasa-
Tanganyika Expedition 1889-90, p. 27. 
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ample land must be reserved for native villages and 
gardens'. It is probably the case that the 'agree-
ments' with Muliro of Sengaland, Chuzumba, Paramount 
Chief of Tembo, and Endole of Sangawo, were in fact 
African Lakes acquisitions, merely witnessed in some 
cases by Sharpe. The situation is however confused 
by obvious inaccuracies in the list mentioned by John-
ston to the Foreign Office in October 1893 thus: 15 
by Thomson and Grant, 3 by Sharpe and 2 by Stevenson of 
the African Lakes Company. The name of one James 
Meldrum appears on the Muliro Document as well; and 
Chuzumba, Koza and Endole were all promised 5% of all 
minerals and metals extracted, though the Company ex-
pressed a preference for 'a yearly sum of £30 in lieu'. 
Those chiefdoms were all in the Luangwa Valley region. 
There is also mention of a treaty with Undi of the 
Chewa, which we noted above, and 'Likangui', both in 
50 April 1891, presumably secured by Sharpe. 
The record of correspondence between London 
and Central Africa over the validity of the 'treaties' 
and 'concessions' that were required by both the Foreign 
50. Ibid: texts of agreements with Gndole, 17/7/91, 
Koza, 20/7/91, and ChuzumbP (or Tshuzumbo) 21/7/91 
and Muliro 24/7/91; and note Johnston's lengthy 
statement (MSA Report Vol. II pp. 153-178) of 
14/10/93 listing the treaties, inaccurately. The 
dates of the Undi and Likangui documents were 
15®4/91 and 22/4/91, respectively. 
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Office and Rhodes's Company is a long and complicated 
one, which has been usefully collated in the second 
volume of the 'History of the Mineral Rights of Northern 
Rhodesia' prepared for the Government of Zambia by 
Maxwell Stamp Associates of London. What is crucial 
for our enquiry is the means by which highly suspect 
'agreements' were given legitimacy by Johnston in his 
capacity as Her Majesty's Commissioner. His Certifi-
cate of Claim, noted above, and his lengthy despatch 
of October 1893 give the most explicit expression to 
this validation, applying conditions whose subsequent 
history we shall review later, which were to have no 
meaning for the African peoples concerned except in so 
far as they underlined the monopolistic power of the 
British South Africa Company. Moreover, Johnston's 
report to the Foreign Office of his rejection of certain 
African Lakes Company claims in the West Nyasa region, 
because the chiefs concerned 'were not aware at the 
time what they were granting', makes his action in vali-
dating the A.L.C., Thomson and Sharpe documents in north-
eastern Zambia all the more reprehensible. 51 
A year earlier Johnston had assured the Lib-
eral Foreign Secretary, Lord Rosebery, 'that the chiefs 
with whom Treaties were made by Messrs Thomson and Grant 
51. MSA Report, Vol. II, Johnston's Despatch of 14/10/93, 
Chap. IV, pp. 172 ff., and p. 169 on 'West Nyasa'; 
and Baxter. op.cit., pp. 30-31. 
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were quite aware of what they were giving to the Company, 
and on one occasion, at any rate, a subsequent pros-
pector was refused any right to mine by the native 
Chief, on the plea that he had already sold that right 
to "Shati' s people" (Mr Sharpe' s "people") ! In addi-
tion, 'I have seen most of the Treaties ••• and in all 
that I have seen a fair sum - in some cases, a very large 
sum - has been paid down for the granting of the Con-
cession and an annual payment secured to the Chief 
(when the Concession shall be put in force) which 
might be regarded as a percentage on the value of the 
minerals worked'. A number of the Treaties had been 
sent to him 'by the Manager of the Lakes Company in 
whose hands they had been left by Mr Sharpe, Mr Thomson 
and Mr Wilson. Some of these are concluded in the name 
of the British South Africa Company, others in the joint 
hames of the British South Africa Company and the African 
Lakes Company'. 
From our review so far it will be clear that 
Johnston's assurances were significantly at variance 
with the texts of the 'treaties'. His statement about 
payments was a case in point since, excluding any pay-
ments made by himself for his original twenty-four 
contracts, what Thomson, Sharpe and the Lakes Company 
put down cannot have exceeded seven or eight hundred 
pounds. Johnston's reckoning of between £6,000 and 
£7,000 spent by the B.S.A. Company, by 1891, in securing 
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the greater of the claims detailed, must have included 
those payments to princes and chiefs along with the 
cost of porters and the salaries of the 'treaty'-makers, 
but he did record the amounts reputedly disbursed to 
chiefs. It is worth noting that fifty-nine years 
later, the Attorney-General told the Northern Rhodesia 
Legislative Council, in reply to the question of an 
African member, that those treaties 'were freely nego-
tiated and there can be no doubt at all that both 
parties knew precisely what they were doing•. 52 
The correspondence further reveals some con-
cern in the London office of the B.S.A. Company about 
delay in the depositing of the 'treaties' with the 
Foreign Office. A reply to Cawston, the Company's 
most active director in London, confirmed that there 
had been a search for relevant documents in the Foreign 
Office and that they had not been seen by the senior 
staff there until March 1893. 'It was Johnston's 
opinion', the Foreign Office told Cawston, 'that the 
only conflicting claims were those of Wiese ••• If you 
are able to clear them out of the way, you will appar-
ently have a clear field. There are three sets of 
Treaties', the letter went on, 'those of Thomson, Wilson 
52. MSA Report Vol. II, pp. 146-7, Johnston to Rosebery, 
18/10/92; Maugham Report, Appendix, Item 10: 
Johnston's 'Report on B.S.A. Company's Claims' 
(undated but probably late 1891), and N.R. Han-
sard, Vol. 88, cols. 1660-1666, 28/2/56. 
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and Sharpe. The latter confer some powers of inter-
ference in administration ••• Thomson's and Wilson's 
Treaties give no power of government or administration 
and the Barotse Treaties, which form a fourth group, 
distinctly preclude their exercise. Those of Thomson 
and Wilson accept the British Protectorate which is not 
at present offered' - despite Sharpe's proclamation of 
May 1890. 'All the Treaties use the Queen's name with-
out authorisation'. Over a year later, however, the 
Foreign Office was still seeking guidance from the 
Colonial Office as to how the documents should be inter-
t d d th . . b . . t . 1 d 
5 3 pre e an e1r var1ous am 1gu1 1es reso ve • 
Despite the protracted debate on the legality 
of what had been done in northern Zambezia, Johnston's 
authority and freedom of action were not in any signi-
ficant way circumscribed, and his argumentation, how-
ever devious, carried the day. This is well illustra-
ted by his statement that 'Chief Nkula (sic), the recog-
nised ruler of Itawa and Uwemba (Lobemba) countries, 
and the successor of Nsama over a portion of his terri-
tories, recently ceded the whole of his countries to 
the Queen in order to check the aggression of the Arabs. 
Nkula's predecessor Nsama (a chief first made known to 
us by the writings of Livingstone and who was visited 
53. MSA Report Vol. II, pp. 150-152, FO to Cawston, 
28/3/93 and FO to CO, 23/7/94. Presumably 
'treaties' attributed to Wilson were included by 
Johnston in the Thomson list. 
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by Mr Sharpe in 1890) had, however, previously sold to 
the B.S.A. Company the exclusive right to mine, etc. 
over the whole of his territories. Nkula's cession to 
Her Majesty therefore', Johnston went on, 'should be 
limited by this previous and perfectly valid concession 
to the B.S.A. Company'. Johnston well knew that neither 
Nsama nor Mkula was ruler of the Bemba. Therefore this 
statement of his strengthens the impression that neither 
Rhodes's men nor he were concerned to safeguard their 
actions against serious scrutiny from London because 
they had reason to be sure that no such scrutiny would 
be applied. Instead, the confidential correspondence 
of the Colonial Office contains a strange communication 
from the Foreign Office in 1894 which picked out the 
Nsama 'treaty' for special mention and formally accorded 
it the status of 'a Treaty of Alliance with Her Majesty's 
Government•. 54 
The crucial issue for us is to examine the 
extent to which 'treaties', 'concessions', 'mineral 
rights', etc. had significance for the local rulers and 
peoples and effectively shaped their relations with the 
'protectors'. We have seen that, not only Her Majesty's 
Commissioner but the Foreign Office also, knew that 
such 'absurdly worded' documents as those associated with 
Joseph Thomson went extravagantly ultra vires in claiming 
to be 'treaties of alliance'. Yet there is no record, 
54. Maugham Report, Appendix Item 10, Johnston's 
Report on BSAC Claims (undated; and MSA: FO 
(Percy Anderson) to CO, 23/7/94. Underlining 
is mine. 
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written or oral, of any action by Johnston or anyone 
else to visit the rulers concerned and correct the grave 
abuses thus committed. 
(c) Wiese, Mpezeni and the B.S.A.C. 
We now come to the large and well-populated 
region now forming the bulk of Zambia's eastern province 
and lying north of the boundary with Mozambique, west 
of the Malawi border beyond Lilongwe and Mchinji and 
enclosing the confluence of the Luangwa River with the 
Zambezi. The Ngoni kingdom of Mpezeni lay in this 
region and it is noteworthy that in 1897 Johnston, on 
the eve of the war with Mpezeni, described that kingdom 
to the Foreign Office as 'healthy and auriferous•. 55 
The history of the B.S.A. Company's 'rights' over this 
region was thoroughly reviewed by Mr Justice Maugham in 
a special Report to the Northern Rhodesian Government, 
dated July 1932, and Maxwell Stamp Associates drew 
heavily on Maugham's material in preparing their Report 
on the basis of which the Government of Zambia rejected 
the mineral rights of the B.S.A. Company in October 
1964. 56 A brief scholarly account of this phase in 
Ngoni history has been provided by Barnes in his 'Poli-
tics in a Changing Society•. 57 
55. PRO-FO, 2/127, Johnston to FO, 6/2/97. 
56. Report of an Inquiry into the North Charterland 
Concession (Mr Justice Maugham) July 1932 (Colo-
nial No. 73); MSA Report Vols. I and II, rele-
vant sections; and 'Africa Digest' Vol XII, no. 
3, December 1964, p. 73. 
57. Barnes, J.A., 'Politics in a Changing Society', 
(Manchester, 1966), pp. 73-78. 
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The Anglo-Portuguese boundary in the lower 
Zambezi region was not defined until June 1891, after 
over fifteen years of bad relations during which the 
local peoples fell prey to the intrusions of a number 
of determined adventurers, and Portuguese encouragement 
of the traffic in slaves further aggravated their plight. 
Maugham's inquiry was primarily concerned with a dis-
pute over the claim of the North Charterland Company 
for compensation in respect of land set aside for Native 
Reserves, and not with the justice of the B.S.A. Company's 
acquisition of 'the tract' and their lease of it to the 
N.C.C. But his researches revealed that the first 
'concessions' there were those claimed by a German pros-
pector called Carl Wiese who had apparently established 
a relationship with King Mpezeni in or before 1885, 
in the interests of his associates in Mozambique. 
British anger was aroused because Mpezeni refused to 
make any agreement with Sharpe in 1891 or to allow the 
British flag on his soil. Moreover, Joseph Thomson 
had passed through the Ngoni Kingdom on his return to 
Lake Malawi in early 1891 and his biographer described 
Mpezeni as 'an arbitrary and blood-thirsty savage' 
adding that 'his attitude to the British visitors was 
not amliorated by the fact that he had at his ear, as 
58 adviser, a man in the pay of the Portuguese'. 
58. Maugham Report, p. 5, para. 15; and Thomson J.B., 
op.cit., pp. 258 ff. 
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At the outset, therefore, Johnston was anxious 
to warn the Foreign Office against Wiese, especially 
since the prospector seemed ready to trade his loyalty 
among the rival European Powers. In a despatch, dated 
31st March 1892, Johnston said that 'Mr Sharpe's journey 
brought to him many proofs that Wiese was little else 
than a slave trader. His bands of armed Zambesi natives 
raided the country right and left and the people thus 
captured were made to work on Wiese's plantations ••• 
This much I have learned from native sources, that Mr 
Wiese on several occasions ordered native Chiefs under 
his control to make their mark at the foot of certain 
documents and that he never explained what these docu-
ments meant, and that he never gave any presents in 
return for the Concessions granted'. The Commissioner 
then went on to ask for 'a legal opinion from the 
Foreign Office as to whether I am compelled - anywhere 
in British Central Africa - to recognise or allow claims 
to monopolise in trade or "exploitation". Can Mr 
Wiese, for instance be allowed to maintain his sole 
right to trade in india-rubber along the banks of the 
River Loangwa?' Since, a year and a half later, John-
ston was to attest the legality of the Thomson, Sharpe 
and A.L.C. documents which we have reviewed, with their 
claims upon 'exclusive mining' and other comprehensive 
'rights', we either have to conclude that he was con-
cealing from London t~e real significance of his 
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colleagues' exploitative appropriations or that, in the 
interim, he received Foreign Office sanction, officially 
or otherwise, for his action on behalf of the A.L.C. 
59 and above all of Rhodes's Company. 
That, however, was not all that Johnston had 
to tell the Foreign Secretary. No Wiese documents had 
been shown to him and 'no dates are given. Con se-
quently', he wrote, 'I cannot decide whether they are 
prior or subsequent to Treaties concluded ••• by the same 
Chiefs or by those Chiefs' overlords with the British 
Government (through Mr Sharpe who made two journeys 
through Wiese's country) or with the British South 
Africa Company represented by Messrs Thomson and Grant 
who traversed ground, claimed by Wiese, in 1890 and 
60 concluded many agreements'. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that Thomson's list does not include any names 
which seem likely to have associations with the region 
east of the Luangwa and in the vicinity of Mpezeni's 
Kingdom. 
Johnston did not name Mpezeni at this point, 
yet it was clear to Maugham that 'Mpeseni', the Angoni 
Chief was 'de facto paramount in the tract' and that he 
had 'refused to entertain the suggestion of a treaty'. 
59. Ibid: Appendix Item 7, Johnston to Salisbury, 
31/3/92. Underlinings are mine. 
60. Ibid. 
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Maugham did not therefore doubt that Johnston and the 
Foreign Office rightly rejected Wiese's claim to 'the 
tract', as it was called, and that Johnston's attitude 
was reinforced by the texts of Wiese's spurious con-
cessions which he transmitted to London. 61 However, 
as a new way of acquiring 'the tract' began to develop 
in the thinking of the B.S.A. Company, it became nece-
ssary to imply that Mpezeni was no more than an invading 
brigand and that therefore 'treaties' with chiefs who 
had been ousted by him or were his neighbours could give 
legitimacy to Rhodes's claim to the whole region. 62 
Wiese's 'concession' from Mpezeni was dated 
14th April 1891. Six years later, Johnston was insist-
ing that when the Anglo-Portuguese Convention of June 
1891 placed Mpezeni's kingdom within the British sphere 
and Portugal withdrew her Resident and her flag, 'Wiese 
quarrelled with Mpezeni and left to try and bounce the 
British Government into a recognition of his wholly-
unfounded claims. The Foreign Office did not recognise 
them but', said Johnston, 'advised the B.S.A. to come to 
terms with Wiese'. Yet in 1894, when urging London to 
ignore the claims of Wiese and the so-called 'Oceana 
Company', the Commissioner described it as 'simply a 
collection of stockjobbers and speculators'. Thomsen's 
treaties, though 'most absurdly worded', were incor-
porated, Johnston stated, in a settlement based on 'the 
61. Maugham Report, p. 4, para. 12. and p. 5, para. 15. 
62. Ibid: Appendix Item 35: Johnston's Memo 'on the 
Mpezeni question', 6/2/97. 
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protection of native rights, protection of government 
rights and prevention of monopolies ••• We must' he asser-
ted, 'think of the rights of the natives in tropical 
Africa where they will always form the bulk of the 
population•. 63 
The plot now thickened fast, according to 
Johnston's own account. 'A group of capitalists bought 
up Wiese's supposititious claims and received from the 
B.S.A. Company a concession of mining and other rights 
north of the Zambezi which included Mpezeni's country 
in its scope. The B.S.A. Company would base its right 
to grant this concession on its recognised Treaties 
with Undi, Mwase Kazungu and - (I forget the names) the 
indigenous and partially dispossessed Chiefs of Mpezeni's 
64 country'. What then took place was summarised by 
Maugham in this important passage of his Report: 'The 
Mozambique Gold, Land and Concessions Company Ltd. was 
incorporated on the 18th February 1893 by the London 
Firm of Messrs. Bewick and Moreing for the purpose of 
acquiring from Mr Wiese for the consideration of £1,500 
and certain shares the whole of the Wiese Concessions. 
The Mozambique Company duly acquired the concessions ••• 
Mr Moreing ••• called at the Foreign Office and there had 
an interview with the then Permanent Secretary and 
63. Ibid: and MSA, Johnston's Memorandum (to FO), 
17/10/94. Underlining is mine. 
64. Maugham Report, Appendix Item 35, Johnston's memo 
on 'the Mpeseni Question', 6/2/79. Underlinings 
are mine. 
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showed him the concessions. It was observed that they 
were not registered with the Commissioner of Nyasaland. 
Mr Moreing accordingly sent Colonel Warton promptly to 
Nyasaland and had the concessions registered with (but 
not ratified by) the Commissioner. Mr Moreing returned 
to the Foreign Office with the concessions as registered 
in April or May 1894 ••• according to his recollection no 
question was raised at that time in any way as to the 
validity of the concessions ••• Negotiations were then 
opened on behalf of the Mozambique Company with the 
British South Africa Company. On the 8th May, 1895, 
the British South Africa Company wrote a letter ••• re-
cording the agreement which had been reached ••• that the 
basis of the transaction was the surrender to the 
British South Africa Company of all Wiese's right, title 
and interest within the British sphere. For this con-
sideration, the British South Africa Company purported 
to grant to the Mozambique Company the right to locate 
a block of land not exceeding 10,000 square miles having 
the boundaries of the tract as previously set out ••• 
There were certain conditions and the rights of the 
natives were to be respected ••• This letter ••• is alleged 
to be the root of the title of the North Charterland 
Company ••• The letter imposed upon the Mozambique Company 
an obligation to form a new company, the North Charter-
land Exploration Company Ltd., with a capital of 
£1,000,000 in £1 shares, of which 300,000 fully paid 
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shares were to be provided for the British South Africa 
65 Company'. 
In this way, the rejected Wiese claims became 
the basis of a vast appropriation of territory; a vir-
tually dummy company in London was used to cloud the 
area, as it were, between the spurious concessions them-
selves and the monopolistic action of Rhodes's Company; 
a new company, subordinate to the B.S.A.C., was brought 
to birth to do the pioneering in the field; and Mpezeni 
and his neighbours, totally excluded from those nego-
tiations and operations, were in a short space of time 
to feel the impact of military subjugation and disposs-
ession. Moreover Her Majesty's Government were clearly 
party to all this and Johnston did not have to fear 
their displeasure, should the details of collusion and 
perfidy reach the Foreign Secretary's desk. 
Our last concern at the moment with the docu-
mentary aspect of the annexation of 'the tract' should 
be to consider what in fact was the substance of Wiese's 
claims. Johnston, as we saw above, sent a summary of 
those twelve acquisitions to London at the time when it 
seemed to serve his purpose to use them as evidence 
against, and not in favour of, the validity of Wiese's 
undertakings, and when, incidentally, he specifically 
described the British agreement with Undi of September 
1889 as a 'treaty with Her Majesty'. In his lengthy 
65. Maugham Report, p. 6, paras 17, 18 and 19. 
Underlinings are mine. 
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report on the 'settlement of land claims in British 
Central Africa', of October 1893, he spoke vaguely of 
'a variety of treaties concluded on behalf of the 
African Lakes Company with Undi and other Chiefs of 
Maravi', 66 but gave no dates. 
The 'concessions' listed by Johnston as corn-
prising Wiese's claims can be summarised as ceding to 
Carl Wiese, as an individual prospector, a 99-year 
tenure of 'rights' to exploit minerals, timber and rubber 
in a dozen kingdoms or chiefdoms; promising in return 
the payment of royalties at 1% to the rulers concerned. 
Wiese apparently made no offer to extend 'protection' 
to them. The list of names submitted by Johnston re-
veals however that, though the names of some of the 
rulers are obscure, the areamvered by their territories 
was a large one. The details were as follows: 
(1) 'M'Pesene Jery (sic)' dated 14th April 1891; 
(2) 'Chigaga Pire, Chief of Maravia' - undated; 
(3) 'Unde, Chief of the Northern Maravi Nation', 
signed by Unde and 18 others - undated; 
(4) 'Nyachifanghu Wula, Chieftainess of the Senga', 
signed by her and 5 Headmen - undated; 
(5) 'Satcherima Miti, Independent Chief of Senga', 
signed by him and 4 Headmen - undated; 
(6) 'Lundo Nyango, Paramount Chief of the Senga', 
signed by him, 10 'relations' and 13 Headmen -
undated; 
66. Ibid: Appendix Item 7; Johnston to Salisbury, 
31/3/92, enclosure of list of 12 Wiese claims and 
note as the Undi 'treaty'; and Baxter, op.cit., 
38-39; MSA Report Vol. II, p. 171. 
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(7) 'Said Nyendwa, Paramount Chief of Wambo-N'gomia, 
signed by him, 5 'relations' and 10 Headmen -
undated; 
(8) 'Chipore, known also as Ngonna, Sovereign of Wiza', 
with 37 signatures - undated; 
(9) 'Sandue, Paramount Chief of Kunda tribe', 




'Marama, Paramount Chief of the Kunda Nation', 
signed by him and 10 others - undated; 
'Jumba, Paramount Chief of MUIZA tribe', 
signed by him, 10 Headmen and 4 others -
undated; 
'Sopa Muandza', signed by him and 5 others-
undated. 67 
Here again, the casualness and confusion of 
recording names of princes and kingdoms suggests that 
Wiese, like Thomson and his colleagues, did not have 
reason to be concerned to be accurate because the re-
action of the African rulers was irrelevant to what he 
was doing. Moreover, no one in Lisbon or London was 
likely to want to verify who in fact, between numbers 
2 and 3, ruled over 'Maravi' or 'Maravia'; whether 
'Senga' was one or three as suggested by numbers 4, 5 
and 6 in the list; who really ruled the Kunda people, 
'Sandue' or 'Marama'; or how Wiese distinguished 'Wiza' 
(number 8) from 'Muiza' (number 11), though in fact 
67. Ibid. 
126. 
'Muiza' simply means a member of the Wiza, Biza or Bisa 
nation. 
Our review has now reached the year 1891. 
Cecil Rhodes had then held the premiership of the Cape 
for a year. In February, the Foreign Office had form-
ally announced the extension of the operations of the 
B.S.A. Company under the Charter to 'the territory under 
British influence north of the Zambezi and south of the 
territories of the Congo Free State and the German 
sphere' but not including Nyasaland. This Memorandum 
had promised the sanctioning of the 'treaties made on 
behalf of the Company' as long as 'no provisions in them 
will be confirmed which may conflict with the prohibi-
tion against monopolies contained in the Charter'; 
and the Foreign Office undertook also to examine further 
the titles to claims originally secured by the Lakes 
68 Company and by Wiese. But, as we saw earlier, John-
ston made the explicit assertion that the 'exclusive 
claims' of Rhodes's Company were exempt from the rul-
ing of the Berlin Conference's General Act against mono-
polies, since 'none of the independent African chiefs' 
concerned 'were signatories of the General Act ••• so 
they can be held in no way bound by it'; and the 
Foreign Secretary did not demur at this cynical mis-
reading of the unequal situation whereby those rulers 




had been involved, whether really or fictitiously, in 
the 'treaty-making' exercise.
69 
This complex exercise in documentary validation 
which we have been studying gave, at this time, an adum-
bration of what would be a crucial issue, fifteen years 
later, namely, the legality in African customary law of 
a ruler's title to land 'ownership'. Maugham remarked 
that, in addition to the fact that 'Mpeseni did not 
understand many of the words' in Wiese's 'concession', 
'he had no right on behalf of his tribe to grant the 
rights alleged to be disposed of'. 70 As we shall note 
later, the B.S.A. Company used this argument about cor-
porate tenure in 1906, as a reason for invalidating the 
payment of a % of mineral royalties to local rulers. 71 
This was with reference to Johnston's inclusion, in his 
Certificate of Claim, of a commitment to such payments. 72 
Once again it is obvious that the case that was 
being argued was not concerned with 'protecting' the 
interests of the weaker parties to the 'treaties' and 
'concessions' but with the consolidation of the 'legality' 
of imperial action in the eyes of the British public 
and in the context of international European politics. 
69. See p. 54 above. Underlining is mine. 
70. Maugham Report, p. 5, para 15. 
71. PRO-CO 879/91 no. 802 - p. 103, BSA to CO, 18/5/06. 
72. Baxter, op.cit., p. 30. 
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The victory of the Liberals in 1892, after over five 
years of Tory rule in Britain, was bound to increase the 
moral scrutiny of colonial policies. But for a long 
time to come, the final verdict would favour the white 
invaders, as is underlined in the citation by Maugham's 
Report of 1932 of the judgment of Lord Haldane in the 
famous Swaziland case of 1926. 
Haldane's pronouncement was as follows: "Land 
belongs to the community and not to the individual. 
The title of the native community generally takes the 
form of a usufructuary right, a mere qualification of 
a burden on the radical or final title of whoever is 
sovereign. Obviously such a usufructuary right, 
however difficult to get rid of by ordinary methods of 
conveyancing, may be extinguished by the action of a 
paramount power which assumes possession or entire con-
trol of the land". 
73 With this premiss, Maugham's own 
observation on the realities of the colonial period in 
northern Zambezia gains in significance: 'The develop-
ment of the system was gradual but before long the 
Protectorate began to be administered in a way differing 
little from that which would be adopted in the case of 
1 t . t ' 74 a comp e e sovere1gn y • In the eyes of 'the indi-
genous peoples' this could not mean other than that from 
73. 
74. 
Maugham Report, p. 4, para 9. 
mine. 
Underlining is 
Ibid: p. 8, para 22. Underlining is mine. 
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a position of marked material superiority, the conquer-
ors were consolidating their brigandage; and their 
chagrin could not but be aggravated by the fact that, 
under the Africa Order-in-Council, the rulers and 
peoples who were, when it was so desired, declared to 
be related to the British Crown by 'treaty' and 'alli-
ance', were treated as vanquished and voiceless. 
Meanwhile, back in England, the semblance of 
legality was insistently laid over the operations of 
Rhodes's men. In answer to the query of a concerned 
enquirer, George Cawston, as the Company's most active 
Director in London, explained that 'the principle which 
has guided the British Government has always been that 
the land belongs to the native Chief ••• All our rights 
to land and minerals have always been obtained from 
the native chiefs and these grants or concessions have 
been approved by Her Majesty's Government'. The facts 
of history are, nevertheless, that the whole business 
of mustering documents in support of effective occupa-
tion required great haste as much on the part of the 
British Government as of the 'treaty-makers' in the 
field. For, as Baxter reminds us, as early as Feb-
ruary 1891, the Foreign Office memorandum, which form-
ally extended the sphere of 'British influence' north 
of the Zambezi, stated that 'the Treaties made on be-
half of the Company in the Chartered Territory will 
be sanctioned on the condition that no provisions in 
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them will be confirmed which may conflict with the 
prohibition against monopolies contained in the Charter, 
and with the stipulations of the Act of Berlin'. 
Clearly it was the sanction and not the caveat that 
counted, as the B.S.A. Company moved in to carry out 
the untrammelled exercise of 'exclusive rights' over 
. t t d . 75 1 s vas new oma1n. 
It fell to Sir Harry Johnston to give legiti-
macy to the nJ}:hern Zambezian 'treaties' at a time when 
London had its definite reservations about the motives 
and practices of Cecil Rhodes. It is fitting there-
fore to conclude this section by quoting Johnston on 
one of his own treaty-making expeditions and on how he 
presented 'treaty-making' to his British readers. 
Describing an encounter with 'Ededama' near the Cross 
River in eastern Nigeria, he wrote: 'I said I had come 
on a mission of friendliness from a great white Queen 
(and) ••• I should like to "make a book with them", I 
added, to take home to the Woman Chief ••• I extracted a 
Treaty form from my despatch case and three or four 
persons of preeminence (or so it seemed) crowded into 
the canoe to make crossings on it with my ink ••• After 
crosses had been splodged on the treaty form and I had 
made my present of cloth and beads, my crew was ••• ready 
to resu~e paddling'. The operation had, according to 
75. RH-MSS.Afr.s.76-BSA Miscell. 1891-94, G. Cawston 
to E. Davis, 28/1/93; and Baxter, op.cit., p. 28, 
citing Command Paper C.7637 p. 3 of February 1891. 
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his record, taken a short time. A man not knowing the 
local language or having time to study the local poli-
tical system had left a few gifts and gone. Yet John-
ston had this to say on 'treaty-making' in Central 
Africa:- 'One feels ••• that to readers of a new gener-
ation this treaty-making must seem a farce ••• In Central 
and West Africa, though the natives might not be able 
to read or write, they had a very clear idea what re-
sulted from making a treaty. They memorized the terms 
though they could not read. If one proceeded to inter-
fere in the conditions of a tribe without the treaty 
right to do so, there was sure to be a fight ••• I am sure 
we were right ••• to consult with the native tribes and 
rulers as to whether they wished us to preside over 
I 
their affairs in Northern Zambezia and Nyasaland. A 
much later apologist for the 'treaty-making' exercise 
has implied that the 'treaties' were endangered, not by 
any failure on the part of Her Majesty's representatives 
but by cultural differences and the conscious dishonesty 
of the African rulers concerned. 'Since', says Hanna, 
'the tidy European concept of sovereignty has no counter-
part in tribal customary law, it is probable that no 
amount of interpreting could have made the chiefs, with 
their profoundly different cultural background anj mode 
of thought, appreciate the precise significance of what 
they were doing, nevertheless it is hard to believe 
that they com~letely failed to realise that the general 
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effect of their action was to bind them to submit to 
the Queen's authority ••• But the sanctity of treaties 
was no part of their creed and it is unlikely that they 
ever intended to be a hair's breadth more submissive 
than necessity or at least prudence might require'. 
The material before us, however, rejects the whole basis 
of such a judgment and must place upon the men who 
claimed to represent Queen Victoria the guilt of having 
abused the concept of 'treaties' and their 'sanctity' 
with cynical and deliberate perfidy in order to prepare 
the way for their military subjugation of the terri-
t . d 76 or1es concerne • 
(d) 'A Bag of Gold with a Small Hole' 
Before concluding our review of the paper 
documentation mustered to attest the B.S.A. Company's 
annexations, we should look briefly again at the Lozi 
Kingdom of Lewanika and its neighbours to the south, 
the east and the north. It may be because there was 
no armed clash with the Lozi that Rotberg describes the 
conquest north of the Za~bezi as 'diplomatic' as well 
as 'military'. As we have seen, London was anxious 
that Rhodes should move circumspectly in his thrust 
into Lewanika's area. There are thus special features 
of the British action in the western region of Zambia 
which distinguish it from what happened elsewhere, and 
96. Johnston H.H., 'The Story of my Life' (Chatto and 
Windus 1923), pp. 209 and 277. Underlinings are 
mine; and Hanna, op.cit., p. 194. 
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continued to influence developments in 'Barotseland' 
right up to the coming of Zambian Independence. The 
danger of using the word 'diplomatic' is that it may 
give the impression that the two negotiating parties 
were equally able to shape the future. The facts of 
thirty~four years of B.S.A.C.-Lozi relations suggest 
instead that what took place there was conquest by 
stealth, in contrast to the overt military subjugation 
of other areas; that it was largely because of the 
attitude of the British Government that the Company's 
rule was imposed on the Lozi less roughly and with more 
concessionary features than elsewhere. As the major 
research undertaken by Maxwell Stamp Associates confirmed, 
the issue of the relationship of the Lozi state to 
Rhodes's Company and to the British Government continued 
unresolved well beyond the upper limit of our period of 
study. 
The original 'Concession' had ~een obtained 
in June 1890. But twenty years later, on one of the 
many occasions when the Lozi king protested against the 
machinations of the Company, a man called Mwanza, listed 
as an 'interpreter' at a meeting between the King's 
Council and the Resident Commissioner from Salisbury, 
expressed grave doubts about the meaning of Clause 42 
of the draft Order in respect of the amalgamation of 
North-western and North-eastern Rhodesia, the section 
dealing with the right to sell land. 'It is like a 
bag of gold which has a small hole', said Mwanza. 
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'First a few grains are lost and then eventually all 
is lost ••• if portions of our country are sold, it will 
77 soon all be gone'. 
Despite Lord Haldane's judgment, cited above, 
with its implication that land tenure in Africa was so 
vague as to be valueless, it is suggested that the im-
portance of land to the whole story of the African 
renaissance of the latter twentieth century cannot be 
exaggerated. What makes the relationship between the 
B.S.A. Company and the Lozi so significant is that 
'Barotseland' was the threshold to the coveted wealth 
of the north. 
As we noted earlier, the Rudd Concession from 
the Ndebele king, Lo~engula, had immediately brought 
charges of dishonest dealing upon the B.S.A. Company. 
Indeed, in 1892, large-scale military movements by 
Lobengula beyond the Shangani River had been inter-
preted by Rhodes's advisers 'as a sort of demonstra-
tion against any further encroachment westwards by the 
Europeans•. 78 • The study of Rhodesian history, even 
from official sources, shows that the years that followed 
the Rudd Concession were increasingly troublous until 
desperate war and brutal defeat in 1896 and 1897 set 
77. PRO-CO 879/64 no. 948, p. 1~0 ff., RC to HC 5/12/10, 
encl. record of meeting at ~Livingstone with Lozi 
king Lewanika and Council. 
78. PRO-CO 879/36 no 426, p. 68, F.W. Colenbrander 
to B.S.A., 30/3/92. 
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~- the stage for the smouldering racial antipathies 
that are coming to a head in the 1970's. The names 
of Mtassa, Ng'omo, Mpondera and many others recall the 
79 
first surges of African resistance. 
Without drawing upon the evidence of African 
witnesses, it has been demonstrated that the conquest 
of the Ndebele and Shona was effected by deceit no less 
than by the gun. At the time when the B.S.A. Company 
was purchasing the Lippert Concession - for £30,000 
and a large number of shares - it was known to men like 
the ex-missionary turned administrator, J.S. Moffat, 
that Lippert had won the Concession from Lobengula by 
protesting his personal enmity to Rhodes, while it had 
already been agreed between him and Rhodes that he would 
promptly sell out to him. Whereas the Rudd Concession 
was limited to mineral rights, Lippert claimed to have 
secured permission to sell land to white settlers. 
'Matabili' Thompson was also worried by this barely 
disguised perfidy. 'I discussed it with Rhodes', he 
recorded later, 'and he said to me, "Why raise the 
question of the validity of Lippert's thing? The 
Government have accepted it as bona fide. Why do you 
want to say anything about it, raising unnecessary 
bother?"' To the Company, said Thompson, 'nine-tenths 
is possession. I on that point have much to say, i.e. 
79. See PRO-CO 879, relevant folios; and especially 
Ranger, op.cit. 
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the actual cause that brought about war (in 1896) and 
I have no axe to grind'. The B.S.A. Company exploited 
their purchase of the Lippert Concession fully in the 
following decades. Yet in 1918 the Privy Council's 
Judicial Committee pronounced it as valueless as a title 
deed to land which the Company had claimed as 'one of 
the mainstays' of its land rights south of the Zambezi. 80 
King Khama of the Tswana had no less reason 
for bitterness over his dealings with concession-hunters. 
'It is the old story', wrote J.S. Moffat in 1887, 'on 
the one side it is stated that (Frank) Johnston claims 
the sole right to prospect in Khama•s country; on the 
other side, it would appear that Khama is quite unaware 
of having conceded such powers ••• The person who acted 
as Johnson's interpreter is a young man of no character 
and almost entirely uneducated'. Missionaries were 
w~rking in Botswana and some had the confidence of the 
King and so Moffat was annoyed that 'persons who come 
seeking concessions should so systematically avoid the 
missionaries•, as Johnson's agent had done; for mission-
aries, though not hostile to 'such opening up of the 
country ••• object to any device the result of which would 
be to alienate the land, and they have reason to sus-
pect ••• that gold mining is a mere blind and that~ 
80. PRO-CO 417, 557, letter of 'Matabili' Thompson, 
14/3/14, The Lippert Concession of 1891 was 
acquired by Rhodes in 1892. The brackets are 
mine. Also Gann 'History of Southern Rhodesia' 
(Chatto and Windus, 1965), pp. 105-6,and foot-
note 1 on p. 106. 
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ultimate object is to get hold of the land'. This was 
strengthened by the fact that in mid-1892 Rhodes was at 
loggerheads with the Bechuanaland Exploring Company 
over the issue of the frontier between the kingdoms of 
Lobengula and Khama, and was asserting that "the terri-
tory situated between that latitude (22°5) and the 
Zambesi will be found to be under Lo Bengula" - a case 
of commercial rivals using their potential African 
enemies in support of their own plans of expansion. 
For in a year!:.s time the first Ndebele war would break 
81 out against the rule of Rhodes's Company. 
The role of missionaries in the political 
turmoils of the decades of imperial advance has not yet 
been adequately chronicled so as to provide a documented 
reconstruction of theirv~ying activities over Southern 
and Central Africa. But all that we are reviewing 
he.re indicates that some of them weDe convinced that 
the formulae of acquisition that Rhodes and Johnson 
used were dishonest. Frederick Arnot of the Plymouth 
Brethren spent a few years in the early eighties in Lozi 
country. He was aware of Lobengula's efforts, by way 
of 'presents of shields and spears and by inviting 
Liwanika (sic) to become his "blood-brother"' to per-
suade the Lozi to join the Ndebele 'in resisting the 
invading white man'. He tried to urge Lewanika rather 
81. BM: Parliamentary Papers Vol. LXXV 1888, (C. 
5524), p. 45 - Moffat to Dep.Comm., Vryburg, 
5/11/87; and PR0-879/36, no. 426, Bechuanaland 
Exploration Co. to CO, 25/5/92. Underlining is 
mine. 
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to ally himself with Khama; but he became deeply per-
turbed by what Rhodes's men were doing. 82 
When, therefore, Arnot moved north in 1886 
to the region called Katanga, he made it his business 
to urge King Msidi of Bunkeya never to sign any 'pieces 
of paper which', as Gann says, 'would assuredly rob him 
83 of his country'. But it was well-known to the 
'scramblers' that Msidi's kingdom of Yeke or Nyamwezi 
and a large region round it was rich in ore, and David 
Livingstone's journals, for example, contained many 
references to the copper trade as he traversed the 
country around the Luapula and Lake Mweru. 'Living-
stone said the copper mines there were the richest in 
the world', George Cawston told Rhodes, 'and I believe 
there is also gold'. It is therefore not surprising 
that the region should have witnessed one of the more 
dangerous examples of 'Big Power' competition. Early 
in 1890 the B.S.A.C. Directors toyed with the idea of 
offering to buy 'Garenganse', as they called Katanga, 
from the Belgian king, believing that, since it was 
'costing him £80,000 per annum', he might be willing to 
sell. Alternatively they might rent it from him; 
either arrangement enabling them to push a railway from 
82. Arnot F.s., 'Missionary Travels in Central Africa• 
('Echoes of Service•, Bath, 1914) p. 22. 
83. Gann, op.cit., pp. 63-4. 
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the Zambezi to Ujiji. This was urgent, in George 
Cawston's view, 'since Germany's only object in wanting 
to carry their line across Nyasaland to the Congo is to 
be able to acquire Katanga•. 84 
The situation however developed otherwise. 
The Anglo-German agreement of July 1890, with its em-
phases on mutual accommodation involving Heligoland, 
Zanzibar, the Caprivi Zipfel or 'strip' and notional 
navigation on the Zambezi, established a general front-
ier along the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau and terminated 
85 the threat of a German thrust to Katanga. But at 
the same time it became clear that Leopold II, far from 
wanting to shed the burden of Katanga, was anxious •to 
extend his boundaries to the south' and wanted a S-mile 
belt from Lake Bangweolo to Lake Nyasa•. The tension 
was then neightened by the B.S.A.C. men's awareness 
that, in terms of the agreements reached at Berlin in 
1885, France had a 'right of preemption on the Congo' 
and could enter the race for the valuable Bangweulu-
Nyasa tract. Moreover, someone had circulated one of 
Harry Johnston's maps on which Msidi's kingdom was 
marked as British, which embarrassed the Foreign Office. 
84. RH:MSS.Afr.s.74: Cawston to Rhodes, 4/3/90 and 
6/2/90; see also refs. to Katanga copper in 
Livingstone's 'Last Journals' (Murray 1874), Vol. 
II, pp. 193-4 (1872) and Debenham F. 'The Way to 
Ilala' (Longmans)1955), pp. 194,259,269,301. 
85. See Gann, op.cit., Chap. I, part III, PP• 49 ff.; 
Hanna op.cit., pp. 157-160; and Hall, op.cit., 
Chap. 3, Part v, pp. 80 ff., for studies of the 
Zaire Pedicle situation in 1890-91. 
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Johnston had said of this map that it included 'a little 
piece of territory which in some maps is given to the 
king of the Belgians •• ethe country of Katanga. It is 
really rightly ours, by treaty with the native ruler 
and by the work of the missionaries and traders. No 
Belgian ever has set foot there, so it is monstrous for 
Leopold the Wily to lay claim to it and so eat into the 
head of our new province ••• you must not let him over-
86 reach us without protest'. 
The 'scramblers' were thus finding their hands 
seriously tied by the delays due to manoevres between 
European capitals and moreover a senior Foreign Office 
official had declared that their Charter did not give 
the B.S.A. Company 'any power over the Zambezi'. But 
in May 1891 Joseph Thomson received a cable from Rhodes 
which demanded immediate action: 'You seem to have had 
the plagues of Egypt', Rhodes said, in reference to the 
smallpox that had attacked Thomsen's caravan in the 
Serenje district. 'I want you to get Msiri's (sic). 
I mean Katanga. The king of the Belgians has already 
floated a company for it, presumably because he does not 
possess it. Next time you arrive there no doubt Arnot 
will be there so matters will be all right' - presumably 
based on Thomson's reputation for cordial relations with 
86. RH.MSS.Afr.s.74, Cawston to Rhodes, 20/6/90; 
Johnston A,, op.cit., pp. 133-4, quoting H.H. 
Johnston to w. Stead, August 1890. Under-
lining is mine. 
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missionaries. 'You must go and get Katanga. If you 
87 are too seedy, send Sharpe with Grant•. 
Here was the voice of the man who 'called the 
tune' because he 'paid the piper, the man who controlled 
a gold and diamond empire worth more than £20,000,000 
by the time he was 37 in 1890. Thus, though Sharpe 
was responsible to Johnston, Rhodes demanded his ser-
vices too if Thomson•s health did not improve. Sharpe 
had in fact already visited Msidi at least once, but 
had been firmly rebuffed by the King, though Gouldsbury 
and Sheane stated that ' a few days after Sharpe left, 
Msiri (sic) signed the· treaties and sent them after him 
but they never arrived at their destination', because 
'Capt. Stairs intercepted the letter and kept it'. 
Thomson therefore set off for Bunkeya but his health 
broke again. What followed must be understood in terms 
of its impact upon the African rulers and peoples over 
a very wide region of Central Africa. The events at 
Msidi's palace were recounted by the Irish doctor who 
accompanied the Canadian soldier Captain William Stairs, 
now in mercenary service with King Leopold, in the final 
confrontation with the Nyamwezi king. It is also right 
to record Frederick Arnot•s observation that 'The amount 
of quietness and peace that reigns' in Msidi's country, 
'is remarkable ••• (Msidi) is sharp and severe in his 
87. Ibid: Cawston to Rhodes, 29/10/90,qg6ting Sir 
Robert Herbert, FO; and Thomson J.B., op.cit. 
p. 269. 
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government, though I see or hear nothing in the way of 
torture or cruelty inflicted by his orders ••• He received 
me very warmly and, seeing that I was very tired, sent 
one of his wifes to cook a dish of rice and honey for 
me ••• I have no suspicion of his friendship•. 88 
Dr Moloney recorded that the action led by 
Stairs was a further attempt to validate the Belgian 
king's 'paper-ownership' of Katanga. 'We proposed to 
secure the country', he said, 'either with or without 
Msiri's leave ••• for other~es ••• had turned towards 
this desirable and derelict territory, those namely of 
Mr Cecil Rhodes'. Thus the 'race for Bunkeia' began. 
Quoting the stipulation of the Berlin Conference that 
European nations annexing parts of Africa must 'possess 
the outward signs of treaties, the national flag, and a 
sufficient police•, Moloney then recounted a 'long 
palaver•,on 17th December 1891, between Stairs and the 
King in which 'Msiri was given plainly to understand 
that his monstrous cruelties could no longer be tol-
erated ••• that the missionaries must not be molested ••• 
and that anyone who tried to detain them would be shot 
without ceremony'. Under such threats, Msiri, having 
first said that he would accept only 'the Engreza 
(English) flag', now 'professed his readiness' to allow 
88. Gouldsbury and Sheane 'The Great Plateau of North-
ern Rhodesia ' (Arnold 1911), p. 29; and Arnot, 
F.S., 'Garanganze' (Hawkins 1889), pp. 193 and 212. 
Underlining is mine. Note that Stairs had served 
with Henry Morton Stanley on the Emin Pasha Ex-
pedition of 1887-9. 
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the ~elgian colours to be raised on his territory. On 
the next day 'Capt. Bodson drew up his little band in 
line' after 'leaving the Marquis (de Beauchamps) with 
instructions to attack directly the signal was given ••• 
two shots from his revolver'. In the brief clash that 
followed both Msiri and Bodson were killed. "Doctor", 
Bodson whispered to Moloney, "I don't mind dying now 
that I have killed Msiri". Thereafter, according to 
the missionary, Dan Crawford, 'The severed head of Msidi 
was publicly paraded to show his people who were their 
masters now'. Harry Johnston's view, however, was 
that Msidi had been •a persistent slave trader ••• hated 
by the people over whom he ruled (who) rallied to the 
Belgian authorities after his death. 89 
The brief period of the swift thrusts of the 
European 'scramblers' into tracts of central Africa un-
appropriated by their rivals was now over. The various 
arbitrarily bounded territories were defended in the 
political manoeuvrings of the Powers by fences strung 
with 'treaty' papers. Around the area of modern Zambia 
the ring was all but complete by the end of 1891. 
The weakest links in the chain of the fence were those 
dividing what is now Zambia's north-western province 
89. Moloney J.A., 'With Captain Stairs to Katanga' 
(Sampson Low, Marston, 1893), pp. 6 ff., 179,183 
ff., 192; Crawford o., 'Thinking Black' (Morgan 
and Scott), pp. 300 ff.; Johnston H.H., op.cit., 
p. 89. Underlining and words in brackets are mine. 
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from Angola and, to a lesser extent, from the Congo 
Free State. Tensions were to develop in that section 
as Portugal, recovering from the debility in which 
Livingstone had found her outposts, as a result of the 
thrusts of her European rivals, began to prod sporadi-
cally beyond the eastern limits of Angola. However, 
Cecil Rhodes had said, as we saw earlier, that the 
90 Barotse state extended as far as Leopold's Congo. 
Colonial Office correspondence reveals that the British 
Government vacillated for years over the depth and 
breadth of control by British agents over the Lozi 
'empire' which it was politic to countenance. 91 But 
London was ready to endorse the frontiers which the 
Company wished to.claim on the western reaches of the 
I 'sphere of influence. It was therefore on this basis 
that the modus vivendi agreement was made with Portugal 
in June 1893, which stated that both nations repudiated 
•any rights of whatever nature which the subjects of 
the one may claim to have acquired in such territories, 
subsequently to 11th June 1891, either by means of 
Treaties with the natives or any other title•. 92 Apart 
90. See p. 72 
91. See PRO:CO 879 series of files for our period. 
92. BM/SP CIX, 1893-94, (C.7032) - 'Agreement between 
Great Britain and Portugal relative to spheres of 
influence north of the Zambesi', June 1893. 
145. 
from minor adjustments consequent upon the final deli-
neation of boundaries, the map of modern Zambia was thus 
outlined by her subjugators. 
Three aspects of the process of international 
legitimisation of Britain's acquisition of northern 
Zambezia remain which require a brief comment before 
we proceed to examine the arrival of 'Chartered's' 
agents in the territory. The first of these is the 
matter of the cost of the annexation to Rhodes's Corn-
pany; the second, the reaction of H.M.G. to the work 
of the 'treaty-makers'; and thirdly, the mood of Rhodes 
and his men around 1891-92. 
It is e~tremely difficult to assess in firm 
figures the amount of money spent by 1895 as capital 
outlay in securing the B.S.A. Company's documents of 
acquisition and the related 'concessions' which it was 
effectively to control. No single tabulation of such 
amounts appears to have been set down during the decades 
of correspondence involving the Commissioner, the 
Company and the British Government. The figures that 
appeared in print seem to have been as follows: Purchase 
of Ware Concession (Lozi) £9,000; Rhodes's grant to 
Johnston, 1889, £2,000; payment to Thomson, including 
extras, approximately £3,100; 93 purchase of Thomson, 
Sharpe and A.L.C. 'concessions' from chiefs, £800; 
93. Rotberg 'Joseph Thomson•, op.cit., p. 280, gives 
the cost to the B.S.A.C. of Thomson's journey as 
£3,094.2.2d. 
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purchase, per Mozambique Gold, Land and Concessions 
Co., of Wiese's 'concessions', £1,500; purchase by 
B.S.A. Co of A.L.C. concessions, £15,000, which makes 
a total of £31,400. Johnston told the Foreign Office 
in 1893 that he reckoned that the B.S.A.C. had spent 
'a sum of between 6,0001 and 7,000l ••• in securing the 
greater part of the claims ••• and ••• not far off 15,000 
in obtaining the cession of similar claims on the part 
of the African Lakes Company'; that is to say, about 
£22,000 excluding the transactions with the Lozi. If 
this figure for the purchase of the A.L.C. Concessions 
is correct, the Lakes Company must have made an extra-
vagant profit out of 'rights' won so cheaply and held 
for so short a time. 
But, in his 1897 memorandum 'on the Mpezeni 
question', Johnston had this to say: 'I hear the 
B.S.A. Company received 75,0001. in cash and a number 
of shares in the North Charterland Company then con-
stituted (i.e. in 1895). Well, from 1889 onwards, 
whenever Mr Rhodes spent a penny on British Central 
Africa, Makanjira Fund and everything else, he care-
fully booked it to the B.S.A. Company, not to his 
private purse. According to their own accounts, the 
B.S.A. Company spent thus, from first to last, 85,000 1. 
on the British Central Africa Protectorate. They were 
repaid subsequently 100,000 1. by the Imperial Govern-
ment for what they had spent on the British Central 
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Africa Protectorate' - namely , Rhodes's grant towards 
police and administrative costs - 'and from this North 
Charterland Company they regain 75,000 1., therefore 
Mr Rhodes has lost nothing and the B.S.A. Company very 
94 little so far on the North Zambezian enterprises'. 
That memorandum of Johnston's was very out-
spoken, as shown by his later statement that 'Mpezeni 
has ceded nothing to anybody, but even setting him aside 
as a robber without rights, the real Chiefs of the 
country have not ceded to the British South Africa 
Company their governing rights•. 95 Johnston's ani-
mosity to Rhodes was reciprocal and of long standing and 
may have added point to his remarks. 96 Yet he had 
stated clearly a few years earlier, as we have noted, 
in defence of the 'concessions' and 'treaties' that the 
B.S.A. Company had procured them 'in exchange for con-
siderable payments•. In another confidential despatch 
also mentioned above, he had affirmed that in obtaining 
the •treaties', 'a fair sum- in some cases a very large 
sum - has been paid down ••• and an annual payment secured 
94. MSA Report Vol. II, p. 175, end o~ Chap. 3 of John-
stonis 'Report on Settlement of Land Claims' (pp. 
153-178) 14/10/93; Maugham Report, Appendix Item 35; 
Johnston's Memo, on 'the Mpezeni question', 6/2/97. 
Brackets and underlining are mine. The Makanjira 
Fund was a special fund, to which Rhodes contributed, 
to meet the cost of Johnston's war with Makanjira 
and other Yao chiefs who organised an attack on 
Fort Maquire in Malawi in 1894. See Johnston, 
op.cit., p. 121. 
95. MSA~~eport Vol. II, pp. 153-178. 
96. See, e.g. Hanna op.cit., pp. 249-64 on Johnston's 
relations with Rhodes; MSA Report Vol. II, pp.82-95; 
and Johnston A., op.cit., pp. 142-6 giving an account 
of Johnston's quarrel with Rhodes in which Johnston 
'refused to be made a catspaw' and Rhodes retorted, 
"I will smash you,- Johnston, for this"'• 
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to the Chief (when the Concession shall be put into 
force) which might' - by some strange logic - 'be re-
garded as a percentage on the value of minerals worked 
••• (which) varies from £1,000 to £10 according to the 
extent of the country and its probable value from a 
mineralogical point of view'. Johnston's statement 
must arouse doubts about his honesty, for in a footnote 
he said that Lewanika had been promised £2,000 a year, 
thereby seemingly excluding him from the list of annual 
payments ranging from £1,000 to £10. Moreover, his 
statement, by speaking of very large sums involved im-
plied that a number of payments were in the upper area 
of this wide range. Yet, as we have seen, no •treaty' 
in north-eastern .Rhodesia gave a figure higher than 
97 £50 p.a. 
The British Government appears to have been 
unconcerned to obtain a certified total of~penditure 
with details to indicate how much in fact was paid to 
the various African rulers concerned; and so, by their 
leave, 290,000 square miles came under 'Company rule'. 
The reaction of Her Majesty's Government to the whole 
undertaking in Central Africa was, as we have gathered, 
fundamentally favourable, and this applies equally to 
its attitude to events south of the Zambezi as north 
97. Maugham Report: Appendix Item 10, Johnston's 
Report on B.S.A. Claims, {undated, around late 
1891); and see p.ll~ above; also MSA Report 
Vol. II p. 147, Johnston to Rosebery, 18/10/92 
and see p. 54 above. 
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of it. The news that Rhodes's forces had 'utterly 
defeated' the Ndebele in the end of 1893 led the High 
Commissioner in the Cape to state that 'the great success 
of the Company• had 'modified' his views; and to pro-
pose that 'Mashonaland and Matabeleland should be treated ••• 
98 as one country under the Administration of the Company'. 
This evoked a sympathetic response in London despite a 
missionary's protest against 'the indiscriminate killing 
of unnumbered Ndebele, including wounded, by British 
agents' and his forlorn hope that 'the British public 
will know how to deal with cruelty and treachery of white 
men as well as with the same qualities in black'. The 
Ndebele situation, Willoughby wrote, was full of people 
'for ever thirsting to be at the throats of the "niggers"'• 
But the High Commissioner was quick to assure the Co-
lonial Secretary that the seizing of about 230,000 head 
of cattle by the Company - over five-sxths of the total 
owned by the Ndebele - was appropriate since the cattle 
were Lobengula's personal property, and he merited 
'punishment•; 99 and it was at a banquet in Cape Town 
to celebrate the smashing of the Ndebele that Dr Jame-
son announced the Directors' enthusiastic decision to 
100 call the territory 'Rhodesia'. 
98. PR0:879/39 no. 454: BSAC to CO, 2/11/93; HC to 
eo, 11/12/93. 
99. Ibid: letter of Rev. w.c. Willoughby, Palapye 
Bamangwato, 16/10/93; and HC to CO, 28/12/93; 
Ranger, op.cit., pp. 105-113; and see also 'Stan-
dard and Diggers' News', Johannesburg, letter by 
'Mercator', 12/8/93 and by 'Onlooker' 26/8/93. 
100. Keatley, op.cit., p. 159. 
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It was then also, however, that African anger 
and hatred were becoming articulate against 'the blood-
stained white men who had slain scores of thousands of 
Zulus and their Matabele relations'. The scale of 
those unequal conflicts between the latest of European 
artillery and the inferior weapons of African armies 
has in recent years won the attention of scholars. 
For us, it is obviously very important to recall what 
was happening to the south when the push northwards was 
beginning and to realise that the seizure of the Ndebele 
and Shona countries was bringing in its train a wave of 
violence and hatred. 101 Her Majesty's Government, 
despite murmurs of disquiet about the extremism of 
B.S.A.C. conduct, ·was smiling upon the northward push, 
strengthened by the opinion of the Law Officers to the 
Foreign Office. By that formal opinion, approval was 
urged to Rhodes's plan on the grounds that 'the first 
section of the Charter ran as follows: "The principal 
field of the operations of the British South Africa 
Company shall be the region of South Africa lying imme-
diately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to 
the north and west of the South African Republic, and 
to the west of the Portuguese dominions"; that the 
101. Shepperson G., and Price T., 'Independent African' 
(Edinburgh 1958) p. 76, quoting from MSS of Joseph 
Booth 'Zulu Call', p. 4; and see Ranger, op.cit., 
pp. 92-100 and indeed the whole book; and inter 
alia, PR0:879/36, no. 426, numerous items. 
151. 
word "immediately" did not occur in the Petition; that 
it might therefore be presumed that it was inserted 
with a definite object; that section 3 on the same 
page authorised the Company ••• "to acquire by any con-
cession, etc." ••• "all or any rights" etc •••• "in Africa"; 
that the words "in Africa" were underlined as being 
important in that consideration of the case•. 102 
That verbal web appears to have been meant to 
say that the Company should be encouraged to go ahead. 
It is true that, three years later, the Foreign Office 
was still showing reluctance to give final approval to 
the Sharpe and Thomson 'treaties•. 103 But the Colonial 
Office was answering the complaint of the Anti-Slavery 
and Aborigines Protection Society against the B.S.A. 
Company's ~radulent procurement' of the Lochner Con-
cession from Lewanika in 1890, by referring the matter 
to the Foreign Office, while, on the other hand it was 
arguing that the Concession had not in fact granted Her 
Majesty's protection to Lewanika but had merely been 
dealing with the relationship of the Lozi kingdom to 
Rhodes's Company. This was in contradiction to the 
Colonial Secretary's statement to the Foreign Office in 
1891 that 'Lewanika should be assured that he is under 
102. PR0:879/35 no. 414 - Law Officers to FO, 25/3/91; 
and see RH:MSS.Afr.s.71 for BSA Charter of 
Incorporation. 
103. MSA Report Vol. II, pp. 151-2, FO to CO, 23/7/94. 
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the protection of Her Majesty•. 104 The Foreign Office 
then actually drafted a reply, which the Colonial Ofiice 
however disapproved, to the effect that no agreement 
with Lewanika had been submitted by the Company to the 
105 Foreign Secretary. 
While this prevarication and procrastination 
went on~ the Lozi had reason to reckon with the signi-
ficance of B.S.A.e. action south of the Zambezi. Be-
cause of their long-standing hostility towards the 
Ndebele, news of the breaking of Lobengula's military 
prowess must have brought a measure of relief. In 
1893, the High Commissioner in Cape Town had reported 
the first defeat of the Ndebele to Coillard as good 
news for the surrounding countries and their prospects 
of 'peace and prosperity•. But it would be simplistic 
to assume that the Lozi were elated by these defeats. 
While Portuguese action against 'rebels' in Angola was 
increasing in ferocity, Lewanika's nation had reason to 
dread the advance of white military power north of the 
Zambezi as betokening the grave curtailment of their 
106 sovereignty. 
104. PRO:eo 879/40 no. 461: CO to FO, 29/3/94 re A.S. 
and A.P. Socy's allegation; and 879/35 no. 414, 
eo to FO, 3/8/91. 
105. Ibid: FO draft letter and eo to FO, 9/7/94. 
106. PRO:eo 879/40 no. 461, HC to Coillard, 7/12/93; 
and 879/47 no. 517, p. 560 re Portuguese w. 
Africa situation and concern over Portuguese 
military incursions into Lozi kingdom, Feb.-
April, 1897. 
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A few months later, while Rhodes had made it 
clear that he would delay sending his promised represent-
ative to Lewanika until it was decided whether Barotse-
land should be ruled from Zomba or from Bulawayo, the 
Foreign Office announced that the Company could now 
undertake 'the direct administration of the portion of 
107 the British sphere north of the Zambesi'. An Order 
in Council entitled 'Northern Zambezia' was then drafted 
for the Foreign Office with the objective 'simply to 
add the northern territory to the southern, so that the 
northern will be under the general government of the 
Administrator and judicially under the jurisdiction of 
the High Court of Matabeleland•. 108 For a few years, 
therefore, Dr Leander Starr Jameson, Administrator in 
Matabeleland - so recently blamed by the 'Standard and 
Diggers' News' of Johannesburg for 'his rash and crimi-
nal attack' on the Ndebele - held sway as far as the 
frontier with Portuguese West Africa, the Congo Free 
State, German East Africa along the Nyasa-Tanganyika 
plateau and down the western boundary of the Nyasaland 
Protectorate, as proclaimed in May 1891. The pace was 
now set and so it is not surprising to note that, under 
107. Ibid: FO to eo, 2/7/94 and 21/2/95. 
108. MSA Report Vol. II, pp. 95-97, covering letter 
to and draft of the Order in Council, 14/12/95. 
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the terms of the North-western Rhodesia Order in Council, 
less than a decade later, the Colonial Secretary could 
'include within the limits of the Order any parts of 
Africa north of the Zambesi•. 109 
The mid-nineties were indeed a time of turmoil 
and terror. 'The Angel of Death', wrote one 'Onlooker', 
'hovers over Mashonaland ••• pointing the finger of scorn 
at the arch-plotters of the tragedy and all their agents 
and abetters from London to Cape Town and ••• to Mashona-
land•.110 To Rhodes's men, however, a dream was being 
fulfilled that, as the Duke of Fife said, 'thousands 
of our countrymen who are too crowded here' - in Britain -
'will take advantage of the enormous space, the health-
ful climate and the immense resources which this terri-
111 
tory offers to those who will go in and possess the land'. 
This enthusiasm had been engendered in Britain by pro-
phecies, such as that of the London 'Times' in 1889, 
that all would go well in northern Zambezia under 'a 
powerful corporation, well-supplied with capital, well-
sustained by enterprise and determination, and not un-
mindful of the duties which English philanthropy owes 
109. 'Standard and Diggers' News' 27/10/93; Parl. 
Papers, 896 LVIII, (C.8254), Johnston's report on 
BSA for period 1/4/95-31/3/96; MSA: CO to HC 
(Viscount Milner) 5/8/04, ref. Clause f(i) of NWR 
Order in Council. Underlining is mine. 
110. 'Standard and Diggers' News', op.cit., 26/8/93, 
letter by 'Onlooker'. 
111. RH:MSS.Afr.s.72 BSA Reports to Shareholders - Duke 
of Fife's speech, to Third Annual Meeting, 19/12/93. 
Underlining is mine. 
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to the natives of Central Africa•. 112 Jameson, re-
porting to the shareholders in January 1895, told them 
that the Ndebele were now 'thankful the past regime is 
over and thoroughly grateful for the protection of the 
~ 
civilized government' of theCompany; and that, 'as Mr 
Rhodes told you, our revenue is now practically balan-
113 cing our expenditure'. 
The emphasis of the B.S.A. Company's propa-
ganda was insistently upon the benefits of its 'civi-
lising mission'. As Cawston expounded it to 'The 
Imperial Institute', there had first been four hundred 
years of the Portuguese presence in Africa, fierce re-
sistance to it and its latter period of 'ruin and de-
cay'; then four hundred months between Livingstone's 
first journey to the Zambezi and the Berlin Conference; 
four hundred significant weeks following the discovery 
of diamonds and gold in South Africa; and now four 
hundred glorious days of B.S.A.C. enterprise, from 
28th October 1889 to 3rd December 1890 with '400 miles 
of road cut, 400 miles of telegraph laid and 126 miles 
114 
of railway commenced, completed and opened for traffic'. 
112. London 'Times' 29/5/89. 
113. RH:MSS.Afr.s.72 -Fourth Ordinary General Meeting, 
18/1/95 - speech by Dr Jameson, p. 22. 
114. Ibid: s.76 -Lecture by G. Cawston, BSA Director, 
30/11/93. 
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But Cecil Rhodes, himself, with the bluntness 
of a man made confident by the power of his purse, talked 
more with the voice of a military commander than of a 
public relations officer. To him the Anti-Slavery and 
Aborigines Protection Society, which was watching affairs 
in 'Rhodesia' with increasing concern, was 'the Abori-
gines' Destruction Society•. In the same way, he re-
acted angrily to the Rev. John Mackenzie's criticism 
of the Company's conduct and to his assertion 'that 
this is not a white man's country but a black man's 
country'. On 'native affairs•, Rhodes was described 
by one of his chroniclers as steering 'a middle course 
between the extremes•, namely 'the Dutch view that ex-
eludes natives from the Lord's Supper' and the extreme 
English view that would give Africans 'electoral privi-
leges for which they are quite unprepared'. Rhodes 
defined his policy thus: 'Either you have to receive 
them on an equal footing as citizens or you have to 
call them a subject race. Well, I have made up my mind 
that there must be class legislation, that there must 
be Pass Laws and Peace Preservation Acts, and that we 
have got to treat natives when they are in a state of 
barbarism, in a different way from ourselves•. 115 
Cecil Rhodes made enemies, and incurred the dis-
pleasure of the British Government on various occasions, 
115. Vindex op. cit., pp. 349,118,365-6. Mackenzie, 
who had worked with Joseph Chamberlain on the 
Humanitarian South Africa Committee in 1889, was 
Rhodes's predecessor as HM Commissioner for Bechu-
analand (1884-1891). In 1862 he had worked for 
the London Missionary Society among the Mangwato 
in Shoshong. 
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most notably in the infamous 'Jameson Raid' of 1896. 
But his colleagues and agents held him as a hero and 
saw his greatness in his monarchical conquest of Central 
Africa and ownership of its soil. Thus when he died, 
'The Rhodesia Review' sought to immortalise him in verse: 
'It is his will that he look forth 
Across the lands he won -
The granite of the ancient north, 
Great spaces washed with sun. 
There shall he, patient, make his seat 
And there awaits a people's feet 
In the paths that he prepared. 
There, till the vision he foresaw 
Splendid and whole arise 
And unimagined empires draw 
To council neath his skies, 
The immense and brooding spirit still 
Shall quicken and control 
Living, he was the land, and dead 116 His soul shall be her soul'. 
116. 'Rhodesian Review' (ed. P. Lindley, 30 Fleet St., 
London) August 1905, p. 3. Rhodes was buried on 
the Matopo Hills where he had met Ndebele leaders 
towards the end of the second Ndebele war, in 
August 1896 - Ranger, op.cit., pp. 243 ff. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REALITIES OF CONQUEST 
(a} A further note on fundamental misconceptions 
Two non-sequiturs have significantly affected 
the recording of Zambian history. The first is, as we 
saw at the outset, that, since in point of time a number 
of Christian mission stations appeared north of the 
Zambezi before colonial administrative posts were es-
tablished, the entry of the agents of Rhodes and of 
Johnston was a logical development of missionary en-
terprise and in spiritual affinity with it. We have 
tried to show from documented sources that Rhodes and 
his partners had another purpose and another impetus 
to which they would certainly have responded even if 
Livingstone and his successors had never appeared on 
the scene. 
The second non-sequitur is that, because 
Johnston and Rhodes worked so vigorously and swiftly to 
produce a bundle of 'treaties' purporting to cover the 
whole of northern Zambezia and because the word 'pro-
tectorate' was early prominent in the parlance of their 
business, the work of treaty-making would be followed 
by a programme of 'protection'. But we have seen what 
the major original connotation of 'protection• and 
'protectorate'was, and so we now have to review, not a 
process of philanthropic action, but the conquest and 
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systematic subjugation of the kingdoms and peoples of 
the territory. The 'treaty-making' journeys were vital 
in so far as they armed Her Majesty's Government with 
the means of asserting her claim to northern Zambezia 
and so allowed Rhodes's Company to develop its strategy 
of occupation with minimal risk of conflict on African 
soil with agents of other Powers. Moreover, whereas 
Thomson described his 1890 expedition as a venture into 
an 'unexplored region', the strategy that followed was 
facilitated by a better knowledge of the terrain and 
its inhabitants, gained by the men who had moved through 
it, greeting some of the chiefs and presenting them 
with blankets and other small gifts. 
The historical reconstruction of the period 
thus helps us to grasp the significance of the words of 
a contemporary chronicler: 'Mr Rhodes, with Dr Jame-
son, visited England in the end of 1894 and succeeded 
in securing still further concessions confirming the 
supremacy of himself and the Company. Among other 
things, he decided to take over the direct administra-
tion of the Company's extensive territories north of 
the Zambesi. 
1 enterprise'. 
The Company is thus unfettered in its 
1. Keltie J.s., op.cit., p. 437. This statement 
was published in 1895. Underlinings are mine. 
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It would be worthwhile to seek historical 
parallels for the Zambian situation during the decades 
of B.S.A.C. rule in various examples of conquest at 
different moments of history and in different parts of 
the world. Should this be done, it would be seen that 
most conquerors are ready, and indeed anxious, to sub-
jugate without bloodshed where subjugation can be effect-
ively attained that way; but that the distinguishing 
feature of foreign conquest is to be found in the de-
termination to exploit the human and natural resources 
of the subjugated region for the greatest benefit of 
the foreign masters. Therefore, as was suggested at 
the start of this review, we have before us now histo-
rical data which make it easier to understand both the 
determination with which 'white suprernacists' struggled 
to hold Zambia as a profitable sector of a great domi-
nion, and, no less, that counter-determination which 
finally proved the stronger whereby indigenous 'nation-
alists' won their independence and proclaimed their 
sovereignty. 
It would, however, be a grave contradiction 
of the facts of history even to imply that before the 
colonial conquerors came, 'everything in the garden was 
lovely'. History is not a series of clean breaks and 
fresh starts but rather the unending entail of sowing 
and harvesting, of action and reaction. It is there-
fore right to look at least briefly at certain aspects 
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of the situation in northern Zambezia at the moment of 
the coming of the conquerors from Europe. Cairns, in 
his 'Prelude to Imperialism', has given us an invaluable 
and comprehensive study of 'British reactions to Central 
African Society' covering the fifty years preceding the 
granting of a Royal Charter to the British South Africa 
Company. 2 What we now have to do here is to recon-
struct a picture of how conditions were north of the 
Zambezi when Rhodes's thrust began to gain momentum. 
In our preliminary review of the processes of 
'legitimisation' of British action in Central Africa, 
consequent upon mounting international tension in 
Europe, the 'scramble for Africa' and the Berlin Con-
ference, we have had to use written documentary sources 
deriving from either London or the centres of British 
enterprise in central and southern Africa. But our 
major concern here is with the peoples upon whom the 
impact of annexation fell and so we have now to turn 
increasingly to Zambian sources. In doing so, we have 
to reckon with the influence of the bias found in the 
bulk of European documents, whereby it is hard for the 
student of the situation to see it other than through 
European eyes, be they the eyes of colonial agents, 
missionaries, anthropologists, hunters or sight-seers. 
We also have to be aware of the bias that readily affects 
the testimony of people who have been the victims of 
pressures of superior material power and who have, in 
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consequence, underlined in their memories, not only the 
harshness of the rule imposed upon them, but also the 
rosier aspects of their own situation before that eo-
ercive rule began. Nonetheless, it is suggested that 
Central Africa has been much more seriously affected 
by the former than by the latter bias. 'Pride of race', 
wrote the Principal of the Barotse National School, 
'makes the Britisher socially blind ••• I have listened to 
a Director of Native Education trying to impress a native 
chief with the announcement that the Governor of the 
territory had been educated at Eton and he himself at 
Winchester.• 3 
In seeking to focus the Zambian situation at 
the turn of the century, as it were from the other side, 
there is another important point to note, namely, the 
difference between 'pacification' .and peace. While 
the latter condition should be understood as almost a 
synonym for prosperity, or at least for well-being, 
'pacification', in the history of empires down the ages, 
has meant the subduing of one group by another and the 
maintaining of subjugation by superior force adequate 
to overcome 'rebellion'. Again, peace connotes a situ-
ation in which the people participate in the processes 
of development willingly: whereas under 'pacification' 
there are generally few, if any, channels for the self-
expression of the group that has been brought into 
3. RH:MSS.Afr.s.707, P.F. Holland, typescript (1933) 
•analysis of the functions of education and their 
produce in "synthetic gentlemen"'• 
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submission. In conditions of genuine peace, people 
are ready to respect each other's rights and liberties. 
But 'pacification' usually imposes a diminution of rights 
if not a denial of them, and a significant curtailment 
of liberty. These observations are pertinent to our 
study of B.S.A.C. rule in northern Zambezia. 
There are still in Zambia a number of persons, 
and, indeed, groups of people, who can either recall 
from their own experiences memories of life at the end 
of the nieteenth century or record faithfully the remin-
iscences and comments of their fdrbears about pre-colo-
nial days. Often such persons will be unable to spe-
cify the months and years when recalling events and 
encounters; but they have kept their memories fresh 
through, and perhaps in part at least on account of, 
the multitudinous upheavals of this century. The 
testimony of such persons varies, of course, from co-
mmunity to community and from· district to district. 
But it is important to set their local records of the 
conditions of life, as they knew or heard of them, 
alongside the statements of foreigners. For the mo-
ment, while we must be conversant with the statements, 
for instance, of Francois Coillard and his colleagues 
about the Lozi, the missionaries of the London Mission-
ary Society in the southern region of Lake Tanganyika, 
the White Fathers in the northern province, and a host 
of other Christian agents as well as hunters, traders 
and Company officials, it is vital to take into account 
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the testimonies of Zambians about conditions of peace 
or conflict, poverty or prosperity, industry and trade 
in as many parts of the country as possible. 
The general picture of conditions in the imme-
diately pre-colonial period is one of widespread local 
4 
conflicts interrupting the life of close-knit societies. 
In consequence there appeared the regular phenomenon of 
people grouping together when raiding bands from else-
where came to seize food, animals and sometimes people, 
and then separating into family settlements when the 
external trouble passed. There had thus developed a 
situation whereby people's interest and conversation 
dwelt to a great extent upon the doings of their neigh-
bours while they were quick to use any chance to live 
less close to them. With relatively ample land for 
the size of the population, in most parts of Zambia, 
there was little occasion for litigation over land 
rights and usage. The word •usufructuary', as we saw 
above, was used significantly in Lord Haldane's opinion 
on the Swaziland case of 1926. In its correct conno-
tation it can rightly be used to describe the general 
pattern of communal economy in pre-colonial Zambia, 
whereby people shared the 'right to use and profits of 
4. E.g. the Mambwe-Ngoni clashes, 1890; the Mwanga-
Bemba battle in 1877; Ovumbundu raiding around the 
Kafue, 1878; Bemga-Ngoni war of 1887; the Ila-
Lozi wars of 1870 and 1888; Lovale-Lozi war, 1892; 
the wide-ranging raiding of the Chikunda along the 
middle region of the Zambezi, etc., etc. 
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of property belonging to another without damage to it 
5 or waste•. To deduce, from such an economic system, 
that land did not matter much to the people would be 
manifestly wrong when considering the life of agrarian 
societies anywhere in the world. 
The widespread pattern of what European commen-
tators have generally called 'tribal war' has to be 
understood in terms of the rivalries of the stronger 
nations of the region and the consequences, upon smaller 
nations and groups, of their struggle for hegemony. 
In such situations, guns and gunpowder were sought where-
ever they might be found. Thus, from around a hundred 
interviews with groups and individuals throughout Zambia 
with whom pre-colonial conditions were discussed, it is 
clear that 'there was not real peace in the land'. 
This is the response of a large number of representa-
tives of smaller groups or nations, whereas within a 
larger state it was apparently easier for peace to pre-
vail. However, from all parts of the country the pie-
ture appears of communities closely-knit in respect of, 
for instance, tributary relations to kings and chiefs, 
marriage and birth customs, and the detection and pun-
ishment of crime. Moreover, the great body of 'lore' 
associated with the training of the young confirms the 
picture of structured societies; and pre-colonial 
s. See p.128above; and H.C. Wyld's 'Universal Dict-
ionary of the English language' for definition of 
'usufructuary'. 
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societies had a clear sense of what made life fruitful 
and pleasant. "A good village" said an old man of the 
Tumbuka people, "is where the headman and the elders are 
respected by all; and where they too have consideration 
for all, even the children. It is only a good village 
where the young respect their parents and where no one 
tries to harm another. If there is even one person 
who belittles others or works harm, then the village is 
spoiled". Perhaps even more significant is the testi-
mony, drawn from many parts of the country that 'in the 
old days marriage was sound and lasting ••• because before 
the couple married they had to receive instruction ••• 
from those who ••• had experience in married life'. This 
type of evidence confirms the picture of community life 
maintaining, despite external stresses and internal 
strains, a fundamental order and cohesion. It is far 
from that notion of the chaos of savagery in Africa 
that was purveyed, for a variety of motives, to the 
6 British public at the turn of the century. 
It thus seems sound to assume that, at the 
time of the European intrusion, Zambian societies were 
6. Young T.C., 'Notes on the Customs and Folk-lore of 
the Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples! (Livingstonia 1931), 
p. 9; and for other early sympathetic studies of 
African life and social philosophy, see Smith E.W., 
'The Secret··of the African• (S.C.M. Press, 1929); 
Young T.c., 'African Ways and Wisdom (U.S.C.L. 
1937); and also P. Tempels 'Bantu Philosophy', 
(Presence Africaine 1952); Mbiti J.S. 'African 
Religion and Philosophy' (Heinemann 1969); and 
RI/Yaphet Mugara, 22/12/66 and many others. 
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not decimated by the conflicts which persistently inter-
rupted the rhythm of life. Obviously the degree of 
centralisation of authority varied greatly, as is shown 
vividly by contrasting, for example, the Lozi government 
under King Lewanika with the Tonga groups of the Gwembe 
valley; the militarised regime of the Ngoni with their 
weaker neighbours; the Bemba of Chitimukulu with the 
Mwanga, Mambwe and Lungu among whom heads of families 
played such important roles; the kingdom of Kazembe 
with the little chiefdoms in the area between his Luunda 
state and the Zaire Pedicle;. and the kingdoms of the 
Luvale and southern Lunda with the Ila-Kaonde groups. 
But nonetheless the picture is of a number of states of 
different degrees of strength and internal authority; 
and this is borne out by the fact that, despite the 
casualness and confusion of the data of the 'treaty-
makers', the African Lakes Company, Sir Harry Johnston, 
Joseph Thomson, Alfred Sharpe and indeed earl Wiese, 
all attempted to authenticate their transactions by 
citing the names of 'kings', 'paramount chiefs' and 
'chiefs'. 
Pre-colonial African trade is now receiving 
the attention of scholars and it is becoming clear that, 
at least along certain important routes, there was a 
movement of various types of merchandise, some of which 
involved the region of Zambia in trade with the sea-
boards of east and west Africa. In this trans-conti-
nental traffic, certain regions of modern Zambia appear 
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to have played significant roles, such as 'Urenje' north 
of the middle reaches of the Zambezi; and there were 
Yao and Bisa caravans, carrying copper and ivory, link-
ing Kazembe's kingdom to the Indian 6cean, well into 
7 the second half of last century. 
The 'trade' of the region which, however, 
especially attracted the attention of explorers, mission-
aries and others and which appeared in official state-
ments from the proceedings of the Berlin Conference to 
the despatches and memoranda of B.S.A.C. agents in 
northern Zambezia, was 'the slave trade'. David 
Livingstone regarded it as 'the open sore of Africa' 
and four months before his death he recorded his prayer 
for its abolition. 'If the Good Lord above ••• permits 
me to put a stop to the enormous evils of this inland 
S~e Trade, l shall bless His name with all my heart•. 8 
Horror at the slave-trade, renounced a few decades 
earlier by Britain and other European countries, in-
creased greatly in response to Livingstone's call for 
7. See Gray R. and Birmingham D. (eds.) 'Pre-Colonial 
African Trade - Essays on Trade in Central and East-
ern Africa before 1900' (Oxford 1970), and esp. 
Chaps. 10, pp. 202-230 and 11 pp. 231-242; and 
Renault F. 'Lavigerie, l'esclavage Africaine et 
l'Earope' (De Boccard, Paris 1971), Rome I, p. 11. 
Note that 'Urenje' which may have been the country 
of the Lenje, had diminished in importance consi-
derably by the end of the century. 
8. Macnair J.I. 'Livingstone the Liberator' (Collins 1940), 
p. 352 quoting a letter of Livingstone to his brother; 
and see, e.g., his description of a slave caravan in 
Tabwa country as he moved WSW to Lake Mweru in 1867, 
'Last Journals', ed. H. Waller (Murray 1874), Vol I, 
pp. 239-40. 
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international action to end the traffic in human beings. 
Early missionaries and agents of imperial expansion 
north of the Zambezi added their own accounts to what 
Livingstone had said about the ravages of slavery and so 
it quickly began to be regarded in Europe as the dis-
tinguishing feature of 'savagery' in Africa. 9 
Sir Harry Johnston, however, was less convinced, 
and his utterances did not always support his official 
despatches on the subject. In 1894 he reported that 
while 'the great Makua race which occupies the bulk of 
the country between Nyasaland and the east coast does 
not go in, to any great extent, for slavery ••• the worst 
sinners are the Awemba, the Angoni, the Yaos and the 
Black Portuguese. The Arabs and the Wanyamwezi do a 
great deal of harm in the north and it may certainly 
be said ••• that the Arabs are the backbone of the Slave 
Trade. If the Arabs were entirely expelled from Cent-
ral Africa, the Wanyamwezi and other native races would 
soon be reduced to a condition of law and order'. He 
went on significantly: 'The Arab represents in their 
eyes a kind of rival civilisation to that of the white 
man ••• which is of a much easier nature for the native 
mind to accept and assimilate'. Johnston kept the 
Foreign Office informed of his operations against 
9. See, e.g. pp, 75-76 above. 
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slave-traders and Salisbury responded by conveying the 
Queen's congratulations. 10 
In his earlier report of the Nyasa-Tanganyika 
Expedition of 1889-90, he had compared the Ngoni to the 
East African Masai as 'devastators' and declared that 
'the utmost misdeeds of the Arabs have not occasioned 
one-hundredth part of the misery and bloodshed and de-
solation' wrought by them. Yet the assessment of the 
Ngoni given in a major study of the 'mfecane' (the time 
of conflict and dispersion in the Zulu empire in the 
1820's) and its consequences, describes the Ngoni in-
trustions north of the Zambezi as 'a terrible disaster 
for the peoples of East-Central Africa ••• (which) com-
bined with the effects of the expanding Arab Slave 
Trade to bring a long era of peaceful existence to a 
violent end. Almost every people in the whole vast 
area between Lake Bangweulu and the Indian Ocean was 
affected'. 'The Arabs', Johnston said, 'have had little 
wars in Konde' - northern Malawi - 'where they tried to 
conquer the land and failed and were not in so doing 
wickeder than we have been in many of our acquirements 
of territory. They have squabbled and fought and be-
come friends again with the Alungu. We have to re-
member', Johnston urged, 'that the Arabs are in Central 
10. BM-SP, 1894, LVII (C.7504) Report by Commissioner 
Johnston on First three years of British Central 
Africa, 31/3/94, p. 773~ and 1896, LVIII (C.7925) 
Johnston's despatch on 'operations against slave 
traders' 13/11/95; with Foreign Secretary's 
message of congratulation, 14/2/96. 
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Africa both as wandering merchants and as settlers, 
rulers and colonists and we have got to deal with them 
as they are ••• The real way to combat the Slave Trade ••• 
is not to quarrel with the Arabs ••• but to get the Arabs 
to join you ••• in subduing and taming irrational and 
blood-thirsty wild beasts ••• like the Angoni, Zulus, the 
Wa-Wemba (sic) ••• and all the hundred and one races of 
negro robbers'. The Ngoni, however, Johnston said, 'dis-
courage the Slave Trade and are not very partial to the 
Swahili traders•, which, as we saw above, was contra-
dieted by what he was to report in 1894 and 1897. The 
B.S.A. Company, in its report to shareholders, quoted 
Thomsen's description of the Ngoni as "most industrious 
••• willing to turn their hand to anything" and that he 
knew of "no other place in Africa so thoroughly well 
supplied with eager, industrious men as yet unspoiled 
11 by gin and a too-paternal government". 
Johnston's view, expressed in 1894,, that 
'the presence of Arabs is incompatible with the intro-
duction of European civilisation and, sooner or later, 
the Arabs must go from Central Africa ••• (because) they 
are adventurers of the worst type', suggests that 
11. RH.MSS.Afr.s.84 - Johnston's Report on Nyasa-Tanga-
nyika Expedition 1889-90, pp. 36 ff. Underlining 
is mine. Also 'The Zulu Aftermath' (Longmans 
1966), pp. 83 and 3-8; Maugham Report, Appendix 
Item 35, Johnston on 'the Mpezeni question, 6/2/97; 
and PRO:CO 468, BSA Report to Shareholders, 
29/11/92, p. 37. 
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imperial strategy, rather than a discovery of the evil 
of Arab behaviour, was guiding his thinking. For now, 
he claimed, 'the salvation of Central Africa will be 
found in the introduction of the Indian trader and agri-
culturist ••• so that he may fill up the gap between the 
two extremes', namely, the white master and the African 
labourer. 12 
Johnston's initial sympathy with the colonising 
and commercial motives of the Arabs was supported by 
Alfred Swann, the L.M.S. missionary pioneer who joined 
the B.S.A.P. Administration in 1894. Though the title 
of Swann•s book, 'Fighting the Slave Hunters in Central 
Africa', suggests that the author was a convinced cru-
sader, his correspondence with mission headquarters 
reveals a far from hostile attitude to Arabs and their 
presence in Central Africa. Indeed, in his book, 
having declared that he held 'no brief either for Congo 
State officials or Arabs', he described 'the wealthy 
Arabs' as 'courteous, sensible adventurers, so far as 
the common rules of life are concerned, ever ready to 
assist white men•. 13 His missionary colleagues were 
generally anti-Arab and saw them as ruthless exploiters; 14 
12. BM/Parl~Papers 1894, LVII (C.7504) 31/3/94, op.cit. 
13. Swann A.J. 'Fighting the Slave Hunters of Central 
Africa' (Cass 1910) p. 245, and note Norman Bennett•s 
excellent introduction to it, pp. VII-XLVII (second 
edition 1969) op.cit., p. 61. 
14. E.g. CCWM, Celfrican Letters, Box 7, Dr ~omory 
30/5/87; D.P. Jones, 26/2/88; Box 8, R.S.Wright, 
4/3/90; A. Carson (Secy.) 9/12/92, blaming 
Swann's 'policy of trying to keep in with the Arabs'. 
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but Swann reported with sympathy what Tip-pi-Tip (sic) 
asked him personally: "How did you get India? Was it 
not by force? ••• What would you say if Arabs went and 
denied your rights? Things you continually do are an 
abomination to us". In his anger against Henry M. 
Stanley's 'gross' aims and 'detestable' actions Swann 
made himself an unofficial peace-maker with the infur-
iated Arabs. While enjoying 'the promised protection 
of my friend Mohamed bin Khaffan', Swann~s angered 
by news of British praise for Stanley and his contract 
with Hamed bin Muhamed (alias Tippo Tib); for such a 
deal could not 'erase the track of blood made by white 
men' or 'open hearts to listen to the white man's story 
of Jesus who loves ·Peace and Goodwill•. 15 
A considerable number of Zambian sources 
present a view of the Arabs which portrays them first 
and foremost as traders. Inasmuch as it was their 
custom to call first at the court of the king or chief, 
who was of course the keeper of all ivory belonging to 
his state, the Arab traders are specifically regarded 
as 'not coming with war'. Over large tracts of the 
country and at many periods of time, it seems that they 
conducted their dealings with local rulers formally and 
with a recognition of reciprocity. Having come with 
merchandise of various kinds, they exchanged their goods 
for ivory and the local rulers then supplied them with 
15. Ibid: Box, 8, A. Swann, 20/6/90, 31/8/91 and 
Jan. 1892. 
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press-ganged porters to carry the ivory away. 
The brutality and agony of the experiences of 
those enslaved carriers seems to have made relatively 
little mark on the local communities or by way of be-
reaving families in the villages because, from the testi-
mony of numerous Zambian informants, the rulers gener-
ally provided as porters persons who were either pri-
soners-of-war or convicts, people who were already 
virtual slaves in the status of outlaws and likely to 
be forgotten quickly. Informants acknowledged the 
cruelty of slave-porterage but did not regard the Arabs 
as having generally 'made war' upon local communities. 
While Arab traders were known over wide tracts of the 
north and east of the territory as Balungwana, in the 
central and southern regions the name Banasala is still 
most often used. Among the African groups who took 
an active part in rounding up slaves in the Luangwa-
Zambezi confluence area, local testimony speaks of the 
Achawa (Yao) and the Baluya. In the western and north-
western regions of modern Zambia Mambari, as either 
partners or employees of the Portuguese, were the main 
slave agents, while west of Zurnbo the Chikunda appear 
to have developed slave-raiding under the leadership of 
Afro-Portuguese living on the southern banks of the 
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16 Zambezi. Joseph Thomsen's comment on the extent and 
conduct of the slave-trade merits quotation here: 'In 
the interior', he said, 'slavery goes on unchecked ••• 
Yet, through the wide area of country I traversed (in 
1890), I saw hardly any signs of its existence and of 
its atrocities witnessed practically none'. On the 
major routes of the traffic, he added, 'the main object 
is to get at a very cheap rate, carriers for ivory who 
will practically entail no expense for feeding and 
clothing ••• The traffic in slaves alone would never 
repay the traders, the main value ••• simply being that 
they act as unpaid carriers•. 17 
Of course, there was obviously not one pattern 
of conduct on the part of the Arab traders and their 
agents. There must have been numerous instances when, 
in Johnston's phraseology, they 'squabbled' with local 
rulers and communities and much worse; when their 
agents, perhaps in order to bring to the required number 
gangs of slaves depleted by hunger, disease or death, 
16. RI with e.g. Soli Chief Shikabeta of Rufunsa and 
others, 2-5/9/74; Zebron Smmbwa, Serenje, 16/10/73; 
Yakobe Lusuma, Serenje 16/10/73; Nansala Manyeta, 
Mailo, Serenje, 15/10/73; Simon Ngulube, Mbuluma, 
4/9/74; Albino Ngulube, and others, Zarupango, 
Ka~ndwe, 4/9/74; Dixon Kabunda, Kamushimi Mponda, 
Daniel Mwape, Mayengo and the Chief at Mukupa 
Katandula, 24-27/11/74; Verishoni Tembo's group, 
Chipata, 4/3/75; Sam Banda, Chadiza, 8/3/75; 
Kuyenda Phiri, Katete, 12/3/75; Senior Chief Nya-
mphande, Petauke, 15/3/75; Nyathande Chirwa, 
Petauke, 17/3/75; People of Sitambuli, Petauke, 
19/3/75; etc., etc. 
17. Thomson J., op.cit., Vol. II, p. 274. 
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raided villages and left scenes of havoc and mourning 
behind. Moreover, there are records extant of armed 
encounters between Arabs and local rulers such as the 
situation which Livingstone found in Tabwa country in 
August, 1867, when the Arab Hamees seriously clashed 
with Nsama. 18 And missionaries' reports from the 
Luangwa and Shire regions give a horrific picture of 
what happened when local rulers participated actively 
in rounding up me~ women and children as slaves and 
selling them into the slave-masters' yokes. Along the 
borders of Angola and Mozambique, Portuguese agents 
were also heavily committed to the traffic in human 
beings, despite the ending of official Portuguese trad-
ing in slaves in te78. It is clear, therefore, that 
the stability and prosperity of many of the states of 
northern Zambezia was being gravely damaged by this 
traffic at the time of the implementation of Rhodes's 
northward thrust; and there must have been not a few 
inhabitants of the region of modern Zambia who were 
transported to Brazil and to Persia, never to return. 
Moreover, the recorded prices paid for slaves in Malawi 
in the 1880s indicate a very low regard for human life, 
on the part of the traders: 'a strong young man was 
valued at 40 yards of calico', 'a young unmarried school 
girl' at 56 yards; 'a young mother', at 36 plus 4 yards 
18. 'Livingstone's Last Journals', Vol. II, op.cit., 
pp. 208 ff. 
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for her child; 'an elderly man or woman' at 4 and •a 
19 toothless old man' at only 2 yards. 
On the general question of the degree of tran-
quility or disturbance in the various parts of northern 
Zambezia around 1890 local testimony and, for example, 
missionary reports do not seem to be significantly at 
variance. Around Niamkolo on Lake Tanganyika, the 
country of the Lungu was described by an L.M.S. mission 
doctor as 'lovely' with 'beautiful water, plenty food, 
cattle in abundance, milk both goats' and cows' ~ 
20 nauseam and charming scenery'. But a few years 
earlier, Alexander Carson of the same mission had passed 
through the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau on his way from 
Quilimane to Niamkolo, and had described villages as 
'filthy' with gardens of 'cassava, beans and tobacco' 
close to the village stockades. The situation was 
aggravated by the intermittent and stealthy attacks of 
Bemba raiders in league with the forces of 'the Arab 
Mlozi' who was based at Karonga at the north end of 
Lake Malawi. 21 
19. See Gray and Birmingham, op.cit., p. 177; and NLS 
7905 Folios 3-9, 'The Livingstonia Mission', by 
J.C. White, Mission Committee Convener, Glasgow, 
18/1/86; and missionary reports, such as 'Twenty 
Years' Review of the Livingstonia Mission' 1895 
(NLS, 7905 Folio 85); correspondence of the L.M.S. 
missionaries (CCWM, C.Af. letters and reports for 
period); diaries of Arthur Baldwin, 1890 ff. (MMS); 
Coillard F., op.cit., relevant references; etc., etc. 
20. CCWM, C.Afr. letters, 1878-89, Dr Tomory, Niamkolo 
30/5/87 (Box 7). 
21. Ibid: 1880-86, Box 3 - A. Carson 'Journey from 
Quilimane to Niamkolo', 4/7/86. 
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As the writings of Alfred Swann show, mission-
aries in the north were very concerned about the possi-
bility of a large-scale conflict, 'a second Soudan War', 
being provoked by the activities of 'the Anglo-Belgian 
Anti-Slavery party' and Cardinal Lavigerie of the White 
Fathers Mission. 'Some madmen seem to be pressing into 
Africa', wrote Dr Mather from Niamkolo at the end of 
1892, 'with an absurd idea that the slave-trade is to 
22 be stopped by force'. The southern end of Lake 
Tanganyika and the north end of Lake Malawi, linked by 
the consequently disturbed corridor, thus presented a 
situation very similar to that of the region of central 
Malawi where major clashes between Yao and other agents 
of the 'Arabs' and the armed forces of 'anti-slavery' 
were increasing in frequency and ferocity at the same 
period. 23 
Yet other contemporary records speak of rural 
prosperity. The German Moravians who began work in 
1890 in the Ngonde kingdom and the Nyakyusa country 
north-west of it, in the hilly region at the northern 
end of Lake Malawi, described villages as making 'a 
pleasant impression. If culture be defined as the con-
quest of nature and its subjugation to the service of 
22. Ibid: 1890-92, Box 8, A.J. Swann, Jan. 1892; 
and Dr Mather, 2/11/92. 
23. E.g. BM/Parl. Papers 1896, LVIII, (C.7925} John-
ston to Salisbury on 'operations against slave 
raiders', 13/11/95, 15/11/95, 3/1/96, and 24/1/96 
enclosing a report by A.J. Swann, now in John-
ston's service. 
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man, these tribes have attained a considerable degree 
of civilisation ••• Often the villages are open and one 
may walk through banana plantations beside the houses 
for half an hour or more ••• Special attention is paid to 
the sheds for the cattle ••• (which) are well smoked out 
to rid them of mosquitoes and other insect pests'. The 
"sultans" of the region generally were, the Moravians 
reported, 'respectable, peace-loving men possessed of 
good sense in matters pertaining to their rule•. 24 
Similarly, Joseph Thomsen's biography gives his impression 
of Mpezeni's country as 'interesting in the extreme ••• 
in its charmingly picturesque variety ••• a teeming popu-
lation, and the appearance on every hand of vast flocks 
and herds•. 25 Thomson himself also described villages 
of the northern country above Lake Malawi as clean and 
well-swept, 'their domestic utensils, pots, etc. were 
kept scrupulously washed and free of dirt', the houses 
'worked prettily with rounded bricks and daubed syme-
trically with spots, the tout ensemble ••• worthy of a 
26 place in any nobleman's garden'. Further westwards 
in Mambwe country, 'Huts were being rethatched and re-
paired and a general air of industry pervaded and the 
natives could hardly spare sufficient time to come and 
24. Hamilton J.T., 'Twenty Years of Pioneer Missions 
in Nyasaland - a History of Moravian Missions in 
German East Africa' (S.P.G. 1912), pp. 31-33. 
25. Thomson J.B., op.cit., p. 258. 
26. Thomson J., op.cit., Vol. II, p. 271. 
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and stare at us. The people of Mambwe', Thomson noted, 
'employed a wonderful variety of materials for the pur-
poses of clothing'. This he contrasted sharply with 
the condition of the Nyika people not far away whose 
'huddled' houses, with cattle 'brought within the stock-
ade' and with the 'filth ••• never removed', because of 
'the almost constant state of warfare'. Johnston's 
report of his 1889-90 expedition corroborates this 
picture when he described how he 'hurried on' to the 
south end of Lake Tanganyika by way of 'the pleasant 
lands of Wunyamwanga (sic) and Mambwe•. 27 
In .summary, it is clear that where war swept 
across the country, life in villages was poor and un-
stable. The north-western regions, where the Lunda, 
Ndembu, Luvale and other related peoples lived, appear 
28 to have presented such an aspect. But, whether sta-
bility belonged to a strong kingdom that did not fear 
attack or to small family clusters whose home-lands lay 
beyond the routes of raiding armies, when people were 
able to live without fear of war, life prospered. 
Indeed, this is an axiom of human life anywhere in the 
world. In northern Zambia, therefore, as the forces 
of British imperial expansion moved in, they encount-
ered varying patterns of peace and of conflict in the 
27. Ibid: PP• 302 and 284; and RH:MSS.Afr.s.84 -
Johnston's Report. 
28. See Turner w.v. 'Schism and Continuity in an 
African Society - a Study of Ndembu Village Life' 
(Manchester 1957) Chap. 1, pp. 1-33. 
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vast tract they had wrested from the equally covetous 
appetites of Germany, Portugal and the Belgian king. 
(b) The first Missionaries - Successors of David Living-
stone 
The annals of Christian missionary enterprise 
north of the Zambezi are fairly voluminous, and it is 
not our concern here to recount the story of the plant-
ing of mission stations, the beginning of village schools 
and of medical work, nor to trace the development of 
missions through the earlier period of 'spheres of in-
fluence' into the years that witnessed both rivalries 
and movements towards cooperation through such bodies 
th G 1 M. . c f 29 as e enera ~ss~onary on erence. We shall have 
occasion later to note the reactions of some individual 
missionaries and of some missionary bodies to the B.S.A. 
Company's rule. But, for the moment, we have to try to 
assess, in a summary way, the first impact of such 
agencies and their early relations with local communi-
ties, and to note their chronological relation to the 
establishment of what B.S.A.C. men often called 'civi-
lised government'. 
29. See Taylor J.V. and Lehmann D.A., ~Christians of 
the Copperbelt' (S.C.M. Press 1961) esp. Chap. 1 
pp. 1-27 'The Converging Forces'; Bolink, £., 
'Towards Church Union in Zambia ' (Wever Franeker, 
Holland, 1967), an excellently researched and com-
prehensive study of Christian churches in Zambia 
from the pioneer period; Rotbert R.I., 'Christian 
Missions and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia' 
(Princeton 1965), which includes an extensive 
bibliography and useful chronological table; and 
Snelson P.D., 'Educational Development in Northern 
Rhodesia 1883-1945' (NeczamLusaka 1974), esp. 
pp. 4-84. 
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The appearance of missionaries north of the 
Zambezi can be said to have been a direct continuation 
of Livingstone's endeavours. The Universities' Mission 
to Central Africa, born from his address to the Uni-
versity of Cambridge in 1857, sent its first missionaries 
to the Shire Highlands in 1861. Fourteen years later 
and two years after his death, the Free Church of Scot-
land founded the Livingstonia Mission at Cape Maclear 
on Lake Malawi in 1875, and a year later the Blantyre 
mission field of the Established Church of Scotland was 
opened in the Shire Highlands, Then in 1878 Francois 
Coillard , of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society 
of various Reformed Churches of Europe, made a brief 
visit to the Zambezi from Lesotho. Another three years 
later, agents of Livingstone's own organisation, the 
London Missionary Society, came down Lake Tanganyika to 
the estuary of the River Lofu where they established a 
foothold in 1883. Frederick Arnot, a Plymouth Brother, 
having settled at Lewanika's capital at Lealui in 1882, 
started a small school for children of the Lozi court 
in 1883. Meanwhile, Jesuit missionaries visited Le-
wanika briefly in 1881 and 1883, a year before Coillard 
came to open his first station at Sisheke on the Zambezi. 
In the year of the Berlin Conference, the 
L.M.S. moved to Niamkolo on Lake Tanganyika and the next 
decade saw the expansion of their work, parallel to the 
P.E.M.S. expansion in the south. Meanwhile, the 
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Primitive Methodists appeared in Lozi territory, seeking 
Lewanika's permission to settle in Ila country. The 
Roman Catholic White Fathers of the Algerian mission of 
Cardinal Lavigerie founded Mambwe Mission on the Nyasa-
Tanganyika plateau in 1891, followed by Kayambi in 1895 
and Chilubula and Chilonga in 1899. At last in 1893, 
the Primitive Methodists began to live among the Ila, 
while the Scots Free Church missionaries moved up the 
Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau in late 1894, from the ill-
fated site at Chirenje in Ibanda, to open Mwenzo Mission 
among the Mwanga, where the African Lakes Company already 
had a post. Then, as more stations were sited by the 
missions already established, South African agents of 
the Dutch Reformed Church of the Orange Free State open-
ed a station at Magwero in Mpezeni's country in the 
last year of the century. 
In January of the year of his death, Living-
stone had the experience of finding a local ruler and 
his people near Lake Bangweulu barring themselves into 
their stockade at his approach. In his diary he jotted 
these words: 
30 'The terror guns have inspired is extreme'. 
As the trade in ivory and slaves increased across 
northern Zambezia, the flow of guns and gunpowder also 
increased and indeed Gann, referring to events in Katanga 
\ 
in 1891, says that when 'the old condottiere', Msidi, 
30. Livingstone's Last Journals, op.cit., Vol. II, 
p. 263, entry for 10/1/73. 
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'was killed in a scuffle ••• his gunpowder kingdom quickly 
disintegrated•. 31 But the appearance of the most 
modern firearms in the possession of almost all the white 
men who arrived in the region should not be overlooked 
in any attempt to assess how black-white relations de-
veloped in the years of 'the scramble'. It was a fact 
that a notable number of missionaries wanted to see 
British rule imposed to enable their work to develop 
under its protection and that some of them were ready 
to support the 'pacification' of areas of turbulence to 
this end. It was also a fact that many, if not most 
of them, carried guns. One such, in the Luapula dis-
trict, was known as 'Chengamasase' because he seemed 
to have an endless supply of bullets. It is therefore 
understandable that, in a number of cases, 'People did 
not view the European missionary as being different 
from the Boma admiristrator. They thought they were 
32 the same and had the same aims of ruling the country'. 
Missionaries, working under pressure to erect 
buildings in which to live and from which to start their 
evangelism, often had little time for the painstaking 
work of learning local modes of thought and speech. 
All the early missionary chronicles tell of the severe 
31. Gann, op.cit., p. 64. 
32. RI/William Kawandami and Aaron Mwenya, Mbereshi, 
9/5/73, including reference to the nickname of 
Adam Purvis, pioneer L.M.S. missionary at Mbereshi. 
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incidence of malaria and other diseases and of a high 
death-rate. In situations in which they were received 
constantly with suspicion by people who were therefore 
loth to respond to calls for labour, many of them be-
came angry quickly and mutual confidence and respect 
were hard to cultivate. It may have been the case that 
most of them, when they arrived in the country, had 
little or no idea of the long history of brutality that 
had characterised the activities of white men in Africa. 
Nor perhaps would they expect the people among whom they 
sought to settle - people who seemed materially so 
deficient and so different from themselves in the out-
ward expressions of social morality - to be aware of 
the unsavoury reputation of white men in distant parts 
of the continent. In consequence, the early annals of 
numerous missions make sad reading in terms of human 
relations, the local people and the foreign agents of 
the churches being equally tempted to make generalised 
judgments upon each other on racial grounds. 
Francois Coillard's massive book about his 
experiences and labours in the Lozi kingdom reveals a 
consistently low view of local life and behaviour. 
Chroniclers of the Paris Mission have recorded that 
Coillard described Sisheke, where his colleague Jean-
mairet founded a station in 1885, as 'le bourbier du 
I 
desespoir' the slough of despond. And Coillard told 
a meeting in Exeter Hall in 1898 that there was 'a mal-
ediction upon the land of Africa', expanding his idea 
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thus: 'They themselves when they speak of their own 
joy, say that their hearts are white, but when they 
speak of their sorrow, they say that their hearts are 
black. Yes 1 Black like their skins and thus they 
carry with them the symbol of sorrow from the cradle 
33 even unto the grave•. This note of revulsion is even 
more dominant in the diaries of Arthur Baldwin of the 
Primitive Methodists, who found himself quarrelling 
with people who, for example, could not understand why 
he refused to buy food from them 'on the Lord's Day'. 
One entry, in 1891, reads thus: 'Had a long chat with 
Mr Goy ••• when he was telling me about the great immo-
rality of the people'. Coillard told him, Baldwin 
recorded, that 'people here don't marry, the men take 
women and cast them off at will - the whole country is 
a cesspool of immorality•. In the dreary months of 
waiting for Lewanika's permission to enter the country 
of the Shukulumbwe or Ila, Baldwin's daily experiences 
continued to be bitter. 'I have never met with lying 
so flagrant•, he wrote, 'so odious and so hideous as 
here ••• You can catch a boy red-handed in a deed and he 
will ••• avow with oaths that he wasn't doing it ••• I many 
times think they will need to be ruled with a rod of 
33. See Coillard 6p.cit., and note, e.g. pp. 159,161, 
442,551 and many other passages; R. Blanc, J. 
Blocher, E. Kruger 'Histoire des Mission Protest-
antes' (Edition Le Phare, 1970) pp. 93-124; and 
'News from Barotseland', no. 2, 1898, p. 14. 
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iron before a change is effected'. A few months before 
leaving Lozi territory to open a station near the Kafue, 
he made this jotting: 'I have heard Mr Coillard say he 
has never preached a single sermon on "Love'' since 
coming into the country, for this side of the people's 
nature is so dead that an appeal to it at present would 
be useless•. 34 
In the north, where Commissioner Johnston in 
1892 gave permission to the Lakes Company to sell guns 
and ammunition to the White Fathers in view of Bemba 
raiding, the Bemba chief Mwamba reported that the Arabs 
were warning his people against the sorcery of the 
Europeans. The general atmosphere of suspicion was 
worsened by missionary antipathies, which died hard. 
As late as 1923, a Native Commissioner in the Chilanga 
area blamed the Roman Catholic Jesuits, Wesleyan Metho-
dists, Seventh Day Adventist and Dutch Reformed mission-
aries for opening village schools 'in rivalry with one 
another and. hawking the word of God in competition' to 
such an extent that 'this method of proselytising has 
to stop or schools will be closed'. 
In 1892 the White Fathers, shocked at seeing 
an English missionary passing with 'une tente speciale' 
under which 'il abrite son serail de negresses' were 
angered by the Englishman's question as to 'combien 
nous avons de femmes'. The early antipathy between Pro-
testant and Roman Catholic missionaries appears constantly 
34. MMS: Baldwin Diaries, 22/2/91, 1/4/91, 8/3/92, 
18/5/92, 5/3/93. 
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in their letters and reports. Swann of the L.M.S. 
believed that Cardinal Lavigerie's crusade against the 
slave trade was an 'idiotic plan' designed to hoodwink 
Protestants 'by posing as the champion of anti-slavery, 
all the while obtaining means and an army of practical, 
zealous, cunning Jesuits whom he has insinuated into 
every open channel thro' this continent ••• to tear up 
every Protestant mooring'. On their part, the White 
Fathers claimed that Johnston's administration found the 
Scots missionaries 'bien encombrants', called the Mwenzo 
missionaries 'nos voisins et adversaires', and were to 
urge later that 'les ministres de l'erreur ••• les pro-
testants' should not be allowed into Bemba country. 
The White Fathers had earlier recorded, with disapproval 
the passage of a great British caravan, with five or 
six white men and many armed soldiers who were accom-
panied by some Protestant missionaries going towards 
Lake Mweru. But in common with other missionaries they 
were given to generalised judgments on traits of cruelty 
in local character, while their houses, in which all 
manner of white men were received as guests, were closed 
to all forms of social intercourse with local people, 
as was indeed the case with most missionary dwellings. 35 
35. RH:MSS.Afr.s.781, letter of T.R. Williams, 13/7/23; 
WF: Nyasa Diaries I, 7/12/92, p. 296; April 1893, 
p. 298; August 1893, p. 314; Mambwe Diaries, 
25/8/92; and Swann to Thompson, 10/7/91, quoted 
in Norman Bennet's 'new introduction' (1967) 
p. xxxix, to Swann, op.cit.; WF: Kayambi 1896-
1905, 13/2/97; Nyasa Diaries 1895-1906, II p. 
118, undated but in 1902; Mambwe Diaries, 23/1/94. 
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This fact of history has to be noted in order to re-
construct situations in which the development of reci-
procal relations of friendship and trust was severely 
hampered. The subsequent history of missionary acti-
vity presents a varied pattern of success and failure. 
Undoubtedly, however, this factor of reciprocal aversion 
made it difficult for missionaries, despite the demands 
of the 'ministry of reconciliation• upon them, to be 
interpreters, let alone spokesmen, of African unhappi-
ness and resentment in race of the oppressive rule of 
Rhodes's Company. 
Alexander Carson of the L.M.S. formed the 
opinion in 1886 that white men were welcome on the Nyasa-
Tanganyika plateau for 'Happily as yet the white man is 
associated with justice and mercy'; and he hoped that 
'distant may be the time when one shall degrade his re-
putation ••• before these children of nature'. But 
after a German had been murdered 'by Penza's people' in 
1889, the missionaries at Fwambo found 'a large number 
of Penza men' very suspicious lest they had 'sent for 
"war from Tanganyika and Nyasa"'; namely, soldiers and 
guns to avenge the death. 'When we assured them that 
we had done nothing of the kind, they left ••• dancing 
and shouting vigorously, 'Tuli ana ya Muzungu - We are 
children of the white man"'• The L.M.S. situation 
was meanwhile complicated by the persistent ill-feeling 
between some of the staff of British origin and the 
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Jamaicans, Mr and Mrs Hemans, who had been sent to the 
Tanganyika field with the idea that people of African 
stock might significantly promote the growth of the 
mission. The Hemanses, however, believed that they 
were treated unfairly: they had been accommodated on 
board the 'Oriental', which took the missionary party 
to Zanzibar, in 'the 2nd class compartment ••• not better 
than a pigs' sty' while their white colleagues travelled 
first-class. In their work in the field they were con-
scious of jealousy directed against them because the 
Lungu people 'know we are of their race ••• say we are 
relatives ••• and their hearts tell them to come to us in 
preference'. Two years later, Hemans reported that the 
Bemba chief Ponde had invited him to work among his 
people but added: "I do not want to see the white man 
••• I want the one of my own colour ••• he will be my 
friend". About the same time, an English missionary 
remarked that 'the people are delighted at our settling 
among them. They think white men, however situated, 
must be a protection to them. Besides they see in our 
advent the prospect of calico and beads. As to the 
message we bear, one nowhere meets with natives who 
are anxious to hear it•.
36 
36. CCWM: C.Afr. letters, Box 3, 1880-86, A. Carson's 
Report, 4/7/86; Box 7, 1878-89, Hones, Fwambo, 
18/11/89, and Hemans, 1/12/88; Box 8, 1890-92, 
Hemans, Niamkolo, 6/1/92; Hemans, 8/10/94 and 
Jones, Fwambo, 25/10/94. 
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During this period, as we noted, Scots mission-
aries were now established in Malawi and moving west-
wards into Zambia. The Livingstonia Mission leader, 
Dr Robert Laws, met Rhodes at the Cape in 1894 and 
thereafter arrangements were made for 'grants' of land 
to the mission, in view of '20 years• service and an 
expenditure of £90,000 ••• for the advancement of the 
country and especially of its native inhabitants'. 
Nine years earlier, however, there had been clashes 
between some of the staff, notably Dr William Elmslie, 
and agents of the A.L.C. Elmslie was angered by the 
rudeness of Stevenson and Stuart to the Ngoni 'Prime 
Minister and his councillors' and their crude attempts 
to secure 'treaties' thereby. By 1895, Alexander Dewar, 
the founder of Mwenzo Mission, was complaining that 
'the Administration not only does nothing for us but 
weakened our influence and lowered the prestige of the 
Government'. However Laws, in expressing reluctance 
to move into Chitimukulu's country in view of the power 
and number of the Bemba remarked that he 'should not be 
at all surprised though the Maxim guns of the B.S.A.c. 
d t th i b b . 1 ' 37 yet put an en o e r ar arous m~sru e • Initially, 
as we noted with reference to other districts, Dewar 
37. NLS: 7876, Laws to Major Forbes, 24/8/95; Elm-
slie to Smith, Foreign Mission Secretary, Edin-
burgh, 20/8/85; 7878, Folio 30, Dewar to Smith, 
12/1/95; Folio 281, Laws to Smith, 4/10/95. 
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found the Mwanga people •uncooperative and needing 
constant supervision• as he attempted to establish him-
self at Mwenzo. 38 
'When the missionaries came, they were kind ••• 
very good people. Whenever they met Africans, they 
welcomed them and lived together peacefully ••• and the 
people demanded that they should learn the local lan-
guages ••• And when you entered the stores of Mandala' -
the African Lakes Company - 'even there you were well 
received'. This was the memory of men in Isoka dis-
trict who were young at that time. It was 'when other 
companies began to arrive that things turned very bad•. 39 
Their account of the beginnings of Mwenzo Mission is 
reinforced by the statement of a man who accompanied 
Dewar to Scotland in the first years of this century, 
Benjamin Kanyungulu Sikombe. 'It was like this', he 
recalled in 1954. 'Before Europeans came ••• there ex-
isted soothsayers who used to foretell that there would 
arrive in the country certain people from the north. 
They appealed to the people to welcome these strangers 
••• one day a certain European arrived at Mwenzo ••• Rev. 
Alexander Dewar ••• After he had rested for some days, 
the villagers started constructing a pole and dagga 
shelter for him near the village ••• Every evening, when 
38. Livingstonia Papers (by courtesy of Professor 
Shepperson, Edinburgh) - Dewar, Mwenzo, 17/9/94. 
39. RI/Simon Singoyi and Philemon Silwimba, Chiwanda, 
Isoka, 26/4/71, recalling the beginnings of Mwenzo. 
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people had returned from their fields, he visited the 
village to chat with the people and introduce the word 
of God to them. In turn, the villagers told him of 
their traditional beliefs and customs'. Sikombe's 
long statement included the memory of how 'if there was 
a funeral in the village, Dewar would be present himself 
40 mourning with the people'. 
From the outset, of course, missionaries knew 
that they were going to be involved in dangerous and 
delicate situations. The 'Instructions to Lake Nyassa 
Mission Party', issued in 1875 by the Free Church of 
Scotland make this very clear, and were fairly compre-
hensive. For instance, wages for native porters and 
labourers were to 'be fixed at first at the very lowest 
amount for which porterage can be obtained' because it 
would be 'simply impossible to develope (sic) an indus-
trial settlement with high rates for passing into and 
out of the country'. Therefore 'about sixpence a-day 
ought to be amply sufficient'. The missionaries were 
urged 'to gain the confidence of the natives by letting 
it be widely known what your real objects are ••• the 
grand leading object of your Mission, which is the en-
lightenment of their minds, the salvation of their souls 
and ••• the elevation of their character and the improve-
ment of their general condition, individual and social'. 
But they were expressly warned, in reference to dealings 
40. B.K. Sikombe, written statement given to me, 
18/10/54. Sikombe would be aged about 30 when 
Dewar arrived. 
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with the slave trade of a rule which was 'absolute and 
to be scrupulously observed ••• that active interference 
by force initiated on you side is in no case ••• to be 
resorted to ••• the only case in which fire-arms can be 
justifiably used will be in self defence or in case of 
actual attack ••• but under all circumstances ••• it will 
be better to try the effect of conciliation, forbearance 
and patient endurance to the uttermost ••• Livingstone's 
journals will be found to supply some excellent examples 
of what is here indicated ••• remember that simple acts 
of kindness and courtesy are never thrown away, even on 
41 a savage people'. 
Very soon after establishing their first sta-
tions, however, missionaries found themselves involved 
in matters which were referred to as 'civil jurisdiction'. 
Allegations of brutality, involving execution by firing 
squad - which led reputedly to a declaration of war 
against the Mission by a chief related to the victim -
house burning and flogging, brought the Blantyre Mission 
under serious censure in 1880. 42 The L.M.S. Mission 
at the south end of Lake Tanganyika also suffered from 
charges of flogging, with one missionary sometimes 
blaming another, which undoubtedly generated suspicion 
41. NLS, 7904, Folios 1-2. 
42. Ibid: Folios 55-69 'The Blantyre Missionaries: 
Discreditable Disclosures', Alexander Chirnside, 
F.R.G.S. (Ridgway, 1880); and 71-84, 'A Reply', 
Alexander Riddell (Blackwood, 1880). 
43 
in the minds of the local communities. Baldwin's 
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diaries from the Lozi and Ila areas meanwhile tell of 
numerous occasions on which blows were exchanged with 
'insolent' people who had been recruited as labourers; 
of news, in 1891, that 'Setunda with his troops was 
starting out again for Sesheke ••• with the intention of 
murdering the missionaries, carrying off their wives 
and all their goods'; of the thrashing of himself and 
another white man for having entered the courtyard of 
the Lozi Queen unbidden, 'intending to become masters 
of the country'; and of an order from Lewanika to his 
headman 'to stop all the boys from working for the 
Missionaries•. It was in that time of troubles that 
Baldwin, by way of diversion, 'had a long read at Gen-
44 
eral Booth's "Darkest England'''• 
Baldwin's senior companion, Henry Buckenham, 
had a fight one day in 1893 with a dagga-smoker and 
•taught the urchin a lesson'. But, said Baldwin, 
'There is no justice in this country and an appeal to 
Lewanika would avail us nothing ••• This country is a 
British Protectorate but we might as well be living on 
the moon for all the protection we have ••• The King's 
43. CCWM: C.Afr. letters 1890-92, Box 8, Hemans, 6/1/92; 
1903-04, Box 12, Ernest Clark, Feb. 1904, against 
Hemans in long-protracted case; and Secretary, 
Kambole, 7/12/29 ref. charges of flogging during 
building of stone church at Niamkolo. 
44. MMS Baldwin Diaries, 19/2/91, 11/4/91, 28/4/91, 
23/5/92, 16/7/92. 
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Likhombura (sic) ••• - his household - are bitter against 
us and are constantly urging him to allow them to pounce 
on us ••• They hate us and the gospel ••• They want traders 
and mechanics, not missionaries'. The tense situation 
in which the Methodist agents were trying to establish 
themselves was aggravated by the problem of language. 
As Buckenham and Baldwin at last moved into Ila country, 
Baldwin recounted a bitter clash with labourers who 
showed 'insolence' by eating outside his door. But, 
he wrote, 'I could not understand their Seshukulumbwe'. 
Yet in a typical crisis, he gave 'liberty to our boys' 
to beat a suspected thief with a sjambok and administered 
a number of such thrashings himself. 45 What concerns 
us here is not to attempt to adjudge whether justice lay 
on the side of the missionaries or the people who 
clashed with them. What matters is that, when the 
B.S.A.C. came in to seize control of the territory, 
white-black relations already existing were far from 
h d t . 46 appy an coopera ~ve. 
In retrospect the attitudes of missionaries 
to the intrusion of European 'power', no less than to 
45. Ibid: 28/2/93, 3/3/93, 8/2/94, 9/2/94, 6/5/95, 
28/5/95; and note the Lozi name for the Ila, 
Mashukulumbwe (language Sishukulumbwe), in refer-
ence to their habit of wearing their hair bound 
in a long conical shape and held by clay. 
46. See Johnston J., 'Reality versus Romance in South 
Central Africa' (Cass 1893), (and new edition 
1969); PEMS -Journal des Mission Evangeliques, 
1885, p. 167. 
the problems of their own relation to the indigenous 
political and social systems of the region, may seem 
ambivalent. Undoubtedly, however, the behaviour of 
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most missionaries was influenced by their belief that, 
as agents of the Christian Gospel, they should not en-
gage in 'political' activity. Coillard was described 
by Edwin Smith of the Primitive Methodists as 'a man 
who dreaded interfering with political matters'. And, 
in the L.M.S. field in 1890 there was heated controversy 
over Alfred Swann's involvement in Johnston's 'treaty-
making' endeavours; Carson the Secretary asserting 
that 'during the existence of our Missions in Central 
Africa, the Arabs, European travellers and the natives 
have been persistently told that we have no connection 
with politics ••• it is largely due to this that we are 
being tolerated by the Arabs•. 47 
There is available a large amount of comment 
concerning the missionary pioneers. Here it must suffice 
to note that it proved very difficult for reciprocal 
relations to be established between foreign church 
agents and their African 'parishioners', and that while 
suspicion and~prehension still existed on both sides, 
the irruption of the forces of imperialist annexation 
took place. So we conclude this sketchy comment with 
47. MMS: Papers of Rev. Edwin Smith, Box 4; Notes by 
Smith on 'Barotse Country'; and CCWM, C.Afr. 
letters, Box 8, Carson to Wardlaw Thomson, London 
2/8/90. 
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words from the Blantyre Mission which recalled Living-
stone's observation about the 'terror' of guns. A 
letter in the mission news-sheet, 'Life and Work', in 
late 1893, describing the battle between Johnston's 
troops and the people of Chief Mkanda over their resist-
ance to tax collection, spoke of a 'scene of horrible 
grandeur ••• Natives rushing from their burning houses, 
the wail of distressed and flying women, the flames of 
burning huts shooting into the sky with clouds of smoke 
and crack of rifle•. 48 Missionaries throughout north-
ern Zambezia were to be witnesses of the stragegy of 
'effective occupation'. 
(c) 'Champagne Bottles'- The Day of the Maxim Gun and 
Martini Rifle. 
As is the case with many types of human endea-
vour, the enterprise of the imperialists developed its 
own cryptic slang. Thus in the early personal corres-
pondence of B.S.A.C. men, the guns which they were im-
parting into Central Africa were referred to as 'cham-
49 pagne bottles'. Here was a commercial company not 
simply advising its agents each to carry a gun for self-
defence and hunting. Instead it was equipping itself 
with the latest types of powerful war weapons in readi-
ness for an expected and seemingly planned round of 
48. 'Life and Work', op.cit., November, 1893, letter 
by 'Pro Bono Publico'. 
49. PLG: BSA 3/43, sundry references. 
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military encounters necessary to guarantee unhampered 
control by the Company of a huge part of the great 
continent. It seems right to assume, moreover, that 
Rhodes must have been aware that his grand design might 
entail clashes, not only with African rulers, but with 
soldiers of other European nations. 
The dream of a vast British African domain 
stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo was not 
Cecil Rhodes's original idea. Harry Johnston may have 
been the first to use the phrase 'Cape to Cairo' in 
1888, but there is reason to believe that Dr Jose 
Lacerda had predicted, in 1796, that Britain's future 
aim would be to establish one huge empire from Egypt to 
the Cape. Indeed Lacerda's famous journey across what 
are now the Northern and Luapula provinces of Zambia 
may be understood as an attempt to forestall that 
50 British plan. Subsequent decades had witnessed the 
degeneration of Portuguese power but the idea of claim-
ing the whole region from Loanda on the Angolan coast 
to Beira in Mozambique died hard in Portuguese imperial 
circles. Thus as late as 1890, Lisbon applied to the 
Pope 'for (confidential) Spiritual Jurisdiction across 
the Continent north of the Zambezi from the Atlantic 
to the Indian Ocean•. But, George Cawston of the 
B.S.A.C. told the Foreign Office, 'I am happy to say 
SO. Johnston, Sir H.H. 'Britain Across the Seas -
AFRICA' (National Society's Depository - undated) 
p. 182, footnote. 
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that I think I have been the means of blocking this•. 51 
The Africa Order-in-Council, as we noted above, certainly 
seemed deliberately to avoid placing any limits upon 
Britain's imminent expansion in the continent. 52 
The events and actions we have reviewed so 
far all demonstrate a determined plan of subjugations 
effected not haphazardly but strategically. Rhodes 
may have been 'a gambler' in the ways in which he tack-
led given crises. But the grand imperial design of 
which he was the protagonist was clearly based upon a 
simple yet thorough strategy which, it would appear, 
was modified latterly by the successes or failures of 
its first phases, but nonetheless retained its primary 
and consistent purpose. And perhaps that purpose could 
be defined thus: simultaneously to consolidate the 
southern conquests and bring northern Zambezia under 
Company control, in order to enable the swiftest poss-
ible exploitation of its mineral and other resources 
without the interference of other European nations. 
Certainly after the furore caused by the 'Jameson Raid' 
and in the course of an exchange of bitter telegrams 
between himself and the B.S.A.C.'s London office, Rhodes 
declared that, in view of the crisis and Britain's 
apparent fear of angering Paul Kruger and the Trans-
vaal Republic, despite the 'extremely strong' support 
51. RH:MSS.Afr.s.74 BSA Mise. Papers, Cawston to Sir 
Robert Herbert, 3/4/90. 
52. See pp. 60 ff. above. 
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of Rhodesia's white population for Jameson, he now in-
tended to devote his energies •to the development of 
the north'. Thus 'Johnston's immediate strategy was 
to create what he called a "protective line of treaties" 
around the perimeter ••• to secure the whole area against 
53 incursions and counter-claims by any foreign power'. 
Now the huge region of northern Zambezia had to be 
filled in with effective centres of power without which 
its human and mineral resources could not be brought 
into the service of the Company, whose territory had 
been increased by 1t million acres when the African 
Lakes Company was liquidated in August 1893 and all its 
'estates' taken over by Rhodes's Company. 
In his two major books on Northern Rhodesia, 
Gann's description of the occupation of both North-
Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia suggests a gentle 
process, and though he contrasts the 'police' element 
in the North-West, as an extension of the system to the 
south of the Zambezi, with the less 'civil' regime in 
the North-East, he concludes that 'the Company's rule 
was ••• profoundly unmilitary in character•. 54 The 
siting of 'camps', 'posts' or 'forts' and the dates 
of their establishment suggest, however, that they had 
the dual purpose of placing a British military preserve 
53. RH:MSS.Afr.s.81: Extracts from BSAC Board Meetings -
Cable from Rhodes, Cape Town, to Board, 9/1/96; 
MSA: File no. 35, undated and unsigned memorandum 
on 'NR Treaties, excluding Lewanika Concession'. 
54. Gann 'History' op.cit., pp. 94-99 and esp. p. 98; 
and 'Birth' op.cit., Chap III, pp. 44-59. 
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near to the as yet ill-defined borders with the terri-
tories annexed by King Leopold and by Germany, as well 
as those held by Portugal, and of signifying military 
readiness to 'tame' the local populations. 
Dr Moloney's account of the clash between 
Captain Stairs and King Msidi in Katanga, noted above, 
made it plain that the area around Lake Mweru and the 
Luapula was crucial to Anglo-Belgian competition for 
the rich copper deposits of that region, however par-
tially they were then known. Thus, when Alfred Sharpe 
had recovered strength after his fruitless attempts to 
obtain a 'treaty' from Msidi, he returned in 1890 to 
Chiengi at the north-east corner of Lake Mweru and 
planted the Union Jack there, leaving Captain Crawshay 
to establish what was called Fort Rhodesia. This was 
before the murder of Msidi. Crawshay was, Johnston 
reported, 'to protect the Company's interests' and he 
was clearly trusted by the Commissioner. In the area 
he was nicknamed Kamukwamba, because he was associated 
with 2-yard lengths of calico which served as currency 
55 when British agents wanted to purchase food, etc. 
Sharpe's 'treaty' with Nsama must have been obtained 
at the time when he put the flag at the court of Chief 
Puta with whom, however, he recorded no •treaty'. The 
SS. NRJ No. VI, Vol. II, 1955, PP• 67-77 and esp. P• 68; 
article on Chiengi by Mr Justice J.B. Thomson; 
MSA, Johnston to Rosebery (No. 40, C.Afr. confi-
dential) 18/10/92; and NAZ: Kawambwa District 
Notebook, KSG 3/1, Vol. 3, p. 225. 
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local memory of Sharpe's visit to the Tabwa kingdom is 
that the white men 'first reported to the Chief and pre-
sented him with white beads. They gave these as gifts 
and wrote down the Chief's name'. That was all. 
'What followed after this was to snatch the country 
56 from the chiefs'. 
Two years later, and after the Belgian seizure 
of Katanga had been recognised by Britain, Sharpe moved 
Fort Rhodesia to the Kalungwishi River, some forty miles 
south of Chiengi and five from the Lake, while placing 
another post fairly close to the border with the Congo 
Free State above Mweru wa Ntipa, the great marsh to the 
east of the Lake. These two posts enabled armed British 
agents to keep watch over both the capital of King 
Kazembe and the Congo border, at a point not far from 
where the German, Belgian and British 'spheres of in-
fluence' met. Choma, the post above the marsh,was 
also on the trade route from the Tanganyika plateau to 
Mweru and Katanga. Moreover now that King Leopold had 
annexed Katanga, it was important to Sharpe that the 
powerful King Kazembe should be kept under discreet 
surveillance, since the earlier peaceful trading re-
lations of the Luunda with the Yeke or Nyamwezi of Msidi 
had recently changed to enmity. From the outset of 
56. RI/Mukupa Katandula, 27/11/74. 
British 'administration' Kazembe had given refuge to 
'immigrants fleeing from the British in the north'. 
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In a situation in which money and men were not yet ade-
quate to enforce British authority, bluff, aided by a 
show of modern weapons, had to be used. The first two 
officials at Kalungwishi died and were buried there; 
and, said 'Chiana' Harrington, 'Rumour had it they had 
been poisoned by the natives•. 57 
At the same time, one of the B.S.A.C. diree-
tors, the Duke of Abercorn, was honoured by the estab-
lishment of Fort Abercorn in Tafuna's kingdom of Lungu 
on the high land above the southern end of Lake Tanga-
nyika,ne~ to the L.M.s. mission station at Kawimbe, now 
three years old, and close to the frontier fixed in 1890 
between German Tanganyika and the British sphere. The 
man who opened the Fort was Hugh Marshal!. In that 
same year the B.S.A. Company had purchased £20,000 of 
shares in the Lakes Company and Sharpe had proclaimed a 
British Protectorate over northern Zambezia. 58 'Trea-
ties• therefore mattered even less than before but the 
B.S.A. Company's stake in the A.L.C. trade route along 
57. NRJ No. VI, Vol. III, op.cit., P• 69; (unnison I. 
'The Luapula Peoples of Northern Rhodesia '(Man-
chester 1959) pp. 42-43; and NRJ No. III Vol II 
1954, H.T. Harrington 'The Taming of North-Eastern 
Rhodesia', p. 9. Note: Choma station was manned 
initially by Cecil Worringham, nickbamed Chapala-
~· The men who opened Kalungwishi were Kidd 
TKalindo, the little rat trap) and Bainbridge 
(Pemberani, meaning 'wait'). 
58. Baxter op.cit., pp. 25 and 40. 
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the so-called Stevenson Road now needed to be safe-
guarded. The liquidation of the Lakes Company in 
August 1893 made it essential to have arms and ammuni-
tion concentrated on that crucial border, especially 
since Swann's dealings with the Arabs were not prosper-
ing and, as Carson wrote from the L.M.S. station at 
Fwarnbo, there were ominous signs of 'a decreasing res-
pect for the interests of the white men on the part of 
the Awemba ••• largely due to their imperfect knowledge 
of us and probably to the prejudice created in their 
ignorant minds by crafty Arabs'. Before their military 
operations against the Bemba began, the B.S.A. Company 
had a close cluster of forts in the Tanganyika plateau 
region as follows: Chiengi (1890), Kalungwishi (1892), 
Abercorn and Choma (1893), Fife and Kaputa (1894), 
Katwe and Sumbu (1895), Mirongo (1896), and Milima and 
Nyala (1898). The proximity to one another of those 
posts, especially around the south end of Lake Tanga-
nyika, must be seen as of primarily military importance 
at a time of extended lines of communcations and a mini-
mal supply of personnel. In the eyes of the local 
people, the establishment of such forts was certainly 
f f . t t• t 
59 proo o an 1n en ~on o conquer. 
The situation around Niamkolo on the lake 
shore and the Lungu capital at Isoko, near Mbala, was 
59. CCWM: C.Afr. letters, Swann, 10/2/92, Mather, 
Niamkolo, 2/11/92, Carson, Fwambo, 9/12/92, 16/3/93 
and 5/5/93; and NRJ Vol. VI, No. 3, 1965, pp. 
293 ff., article by w.v. Brelsford on 'Abandoned 
Bomas: a Consolidated List•. 
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further complicated by Alfred Swann's claim, which he 
eventually put in writing in 1904, that, while he was 
'the principal agent' of the L.M.S. in the area, 'the 
principal Alungu chiefs', in gratitude 'for 10 years 
protection from the raids of the Awemba and support 
during repeated famines, ••• spontaneously offered me the 
whole of their country ••• from Kituta to the Lovu river, 
embracing the whole of the south coast of the Lake'. 
Moreover 'the Committee allowed me to accept it on be-
half of the Society, and at that time there was no sign 
of the British Government or the B.S.A. Co extending 
their sphere of influence so far north'. The chiefs, 
he argued, had full right to make over the land and the 
Society, which had spent around £15,000 on its work in 
the region 'had a perfect right to accept'. Though 
generally loyal to Johnston, his new master, Swann was 
very angry at the action of the Commissioner and Sharpe 
in cutting their estate to a small fraction of the ori-
ginal 'grant'. Swann's reference to the 'protection' 
given by the L.M.S. to the Lungu recalls his early des-
cription of them in 1893 as hemmed in and harried by 
both Bemba and Arab raiders, when 'the one swopped down 
from the hills like fish-eagles, as the Walungu termed 
it; and the other rushed along both sides of the river 
completing the work of ruin•. 60 
Ibid: Swann to L.M.s., London (from Kota Kota), 1/8/04; 
and Swann, op.cit., p. 89. 
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It was, however, the coming clash between the 
Europeans at the north end of Lake Malawi and the 'Arab' 
Mlozi and his Bemba allies that was to dominate the 
situation along the whole length of the Plateau. The 
Lakes Company's post at Ikawa had been fortified as a 
'boma! ,in 1894 and called after another B.S.A. Co. 
director, the Duke of Fife. 61 The official in charge 
was John Bell. Alexander Dewar of the Livingstonia 
Mission established his station at Mwenzo, a few miles 
west of Ikawa and his journey to this site of the burial 
grove of the Mwanga hero-chief, Musyani, was made the 
occasion of a display along the road of the skulls of 
victims of the Bemba. When the actual 'war' with Mlozi 
took place in November 1895, there were fortified posts 
at Fife, Abercorn, Choma and, not far from it, Kaputa. 
In the next three years, small posts were erected at 
Sumbu on Lake Tanganyika in 1895; at Chinunda NNW of 
the modern Chipata sited so that the Company could watch 
the hunters in 'the tract'; in the Mkushi district at 
Fort Elwes, which was probably built in anticipation of 
war with the Ngoni; and at Mirongo in the Isoka district 
in 1897 to control the turbulent situation following 
the defeat of Mlozi. It was also in 1897 that the 
long-awaited Resident took up his post near the court 
of Lewanika, in fulfilment of the promise of the Lochner 
61. NRJ Vol. VI, 1965, p. 302; Rotberg 'Rise' op.cit., 
p. 20. 
62 Concession seven years earlier. 
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The 'Mlozi war' has been described in detail 
elsewhere, but we shauld note that Johnston, in his 
memoirs of Central Africa, added that the final conflict 
was provoked by Mlozi's flogging of a missionary called 
Stevens and his breach of the 1891 treaty. What is 
significant here is that the overall strategy of Rhodes 
and Johnston - despite the deep animosity between them -
demanded action by a very small force equipped, however, 
with vastly superior weapons, at a time when the south-
ern Africa scene was one of general and worsening con-
flict. Not only was Mozambique in turmoil with rumours 
of the killing of 'all Portuguese inhabitants at Zumbo', 
as reported by Johnston. But the Tswana, Ngwaketse, 
Khatla and Kwena peoples were all protesting against 
63 B.S.A.C. misrule. Moreover, only two years had 
passed since the crushing of the vtient Ndebele up-
rising of 1893; and after the alleged death of Lobengula 
a deliberate land scramble took place in which the 
Ndebele were ousted from all the good land which, ace-
ording to promise, had been forfeited to every white man 
62. NLS, 7879 Folio 16, Dewar to Smith, Edinburgh 
9/1/96; CCWM C.Afr. letters, Box 7, D.P. Jones, 
Fwambo, 26/2/88; NRJ Vol. VI, 1965, pp. 303-6 
and Phillipson D.W., 'National Monuments of Zambia' 
(Zambian Information Services 1972) p. 38. 
63. Hanna, op.cit., pp. 221-2 and Johnston H.H. op.cit., 
p. 135; PRO: 879/40, no. 484, Johnston to FO re 
Zumbo, 22/4/95; 879/44 no. 498, Khama to HC, 
9/7/95; Bakwena Chief to CO, 17/9/95; Bangwaketse 
to HMG, 31/7/95; Bakhatla to HMG, 27/7/95. 
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who would take up arms against them; while in southern 
Malawi Johnston's forces were engaged in a series of 
wars against Yao and other chiefs. Anglo-Boer re-
lations were meanwhile ultimately embittered by the 
'Jameson Raid' of December 1895, and, in his determin-
ation to push a railway line through to the Indian 
Ocean coast of Mozambique, Rhodes was reported to be 
arming the workers on the railway and 'contemplating a 
coup de main' against the Portuguese. 64 
As the military plans of the Company unfolded, 
ill-feeling arose between its officials and various 
missionaries. Dewar of Mwenzo told the Edinburgh se-
cretary of his Mission that 'things are conducted 
wretchedly which of course is not to be wondered at when 
we consider the men who make up the Administration'. 
It 'more properly might be called Maladministration'. 
Sharpe, for his part, was furious at the reported attempt 
of Govan Robertson of the L.M.S. to release slaves and 
warned him thus: 'If I hear of you or your people mixing 
yourselves up again with these slavery questions, I 
shall consider it my duty to cause your removal from 
the District'. 'Almost every war we have had', he had 
written earlier, had been caused by the releasing of 
slaves. Yet Johnston was describing his round of 
64. RH:MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22(G159) (undate~ letter of u.H. 
Harris to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society; and PRO 879/47, no. 517, eo to BSA 
warning again~Rhodes's possible coup de main, 
7/3/96. 
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violent clashes in central Malawi as '9perations against 
slave-traders', and sent London a specimen certificate 
of manumission. The scale of the war is well illustra-
ted by Major Edwards's account of the destruction of 
Makanjira's town, which was in fact a group of large 
villages in a valley twelve miles long, which contained 
'about 8,000 huts' and 'probably much more' than 25,000 
people. 'The 17th and 18th November were employed', he 
wrote, 'in destroying all the huts•. In face of such 
enormous conflagrations, the shock felt by the mission-
aries concerned was roused in the main by the way in 
which the British forces scored their victories. Here 
again it must be sadly realised that the technique of 
provocation to battle, followed by overwhelming victory 
by force of vastly superior arms, followed in turn by 
the wholesale burning of houses, grain-stores and fields 
was the pattern of imperialist action over vast tracts 
of Africa as the 'scramble' took effect. 65 
It may be true that 'Johnston faced "an initial 
weakness in military and financial power which made it 
necessary to destroy rather than to preserve"', and that 
therefore '"The ultimate reckoning had to be accomplished 
by force against an indigenous structure too weakened 
65. NLS, 7878, Folio 30, Dewar to Smith, 12/1/95; 
Folio 134, Sharpe to Govan Robertson, 18/3/95 and 
12/1/95; BM/Parl. Papers 1896 LVIII (C.7925) 
Johnston to FO, 13/11/95 and p. 399, certificate 
of manumission in respect of a woman called 
Kavitendo, dated 26/10/89; and (C.8013), Major 
Edwards's report, 27/12/95. 
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66 
or too dangerous to survive the shock of conquest"'• 
To the more observant missionaries, Johnston and Rhodes 
and their coadjutors were revealing what Elmslie of the 
Livingstonia Mission called their 'intention to make a 
cause for war'. Indeed Johnston had deliberately sent 
the cattle and other spoil, seized after Mlozi's defeat, 
through Ngoni country 'in order to provoke them to steal 
and so provide a cause for war•. 67 And in such battles 
as they provoked, the Europeans used the latest weapons 
at their disposal, with the result that village after 
village went up in flames. Thus 'Life and Work' comm-
ented: 'When one sees native bullets - bits of slag 
and filed iron or ironstone - and compares them with 
our modern lead bullets or compares the flintlock and 
rapid precise firing of civilized troops, one feels 
how very righteous must be the punishment ••• before we 
take such weapons into our hands to war with heathen 
bowstrings and unavailing luck. Honour and glory are 
misplaced terms altogether in such a connection•. 68 
The dual role of Cecil Rhodes, assumed as we 
have seen with the full sanction of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, was further aggravating the situation. Fear was 
66. Prof. T. Ranger's article on 'African Reactions in 
East and Central Africa', in Gann L.H. and Duignan 
P., 'Colonialism in Africa 1870-90'. (Cambridge 1969) 
pp. 294 ff., quoting on p. 299 Stokes E. 'European 
Administration and African Political Systems 1891-
1897' (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Conference, 
Lusaka, 1963). 
67. NLS, 7879, Folio 76, Elmslie to Mission Secretary, 
9/11/96; with ref. to Johnston's clash with the 
Central Ngoni. 




growing, as the Blantyre missionaries said, about that 
'Napoleon of South Africa', for 'It is very difficult 
to separate between loyalty to a real government and 
false subservience to a private interest when both are 
represented by the same individual'. Four years 
earlier, in the year when the Charter came into opera-
tion, the same Mission warned that 'a Chartered Company 
in the capacity of ruler is an old spectre rehabited. 
The same spectre in India plundered the Nabob's treasures, 
this same lean spectre here must fill the pockets of 
its shareholders with money from the African ••• a Char-
tered Company is not a government and never can be'. 
Then, with startling frankness, 'Life and Work' had 
made the prophecy that 'the horrors that loom in the 
near future of prison, flogging, deportation and taxa-
tion, the horrors of irresponsible oppression of chiefs 
and people, are the advent of a new slavery'. What 
Captain Stairs had accomplished for King Leopold in 
Katanga simply endorsed those baleful realities. 'Here 
is an expedition which was sent out by a commercial 
company to secure rights in a country in which not a 
single member of the Company had ever set foot or 
possessed any claims whatsoever. The chief of the 
country is murdered ••• and his kingdom is now held by an 
armed force in the name of the gold company ••• And the 
expedition will be described as "successful"•. 69 
69. Ibid: March 1894, October 1890, June 1892. 
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Nothing, however, wasmppening to cause a re-
vision of the Company's strategy. The situation south 
of the Zambezi was rapidly worsening and the tragic 
story of the Ndebele and Shona 'rebellions' of 1896-97 
once again demonstrated an utterly unequal confrontation 
followed by harsh humiliations. There was meanwhile 
increasing evidence of 'forced labour', as shown in the 
report of Sir Richard Martin, Deputy Commissioner in 
70 
Salisbury. In addition, the Company was forcibly 
disarming the people of Chief Chiquaqua who had said 
that the Shona would surrender weapons if the Government 
would call in weapons in the possession of white men. 
To ensure Chiquaqua's submission, Martin reported that 
'Lord Grey is anxious that they should be harrassed and 
their crops destroyed'. If the Shona resisted then, 
said Martin 'I intend to place a gun in the fort and try 
the effect of shelling his kraal at night•.
71 
(d) The Downfall of the Greater Kings 
Rhodes's annual grant of £9,000 to £10,000 
towards the 'policing' of the British Central Africa 
Protectorate - abruptly terminated by him in pique in 
September 1893 - had undoubtedly enabled the increasing 
70. PRO 879/47 no. 517, Martin's Report on Matabele-
land Cattle Regulations; BM/Parl. Papers, 1897, 
LXII, (C.8547} Report on 'Native Administration' 
of the BSAC, July 1897; and BSA to eo, 24/3/97 
rejecting 'forced labour• allegations. 
71. PRO: 879/47 no. 517, Martin to eo, 6/2/97. 
Underlining is mine. 
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number of small 'bomas' or 'forts' to be well-stocked 
with modern weapons. Inevitably, too, the word passed 
swiftly that the white man's methods of war which had 
crushed the Zulus and now smashed the Ndebele and the 
Shona - and for which East and West Africa also offered 
parallels - were likely to be applied again if resistance 
was offered to his mastery of the kingdoms of northern 
Zambezi a. It is significant also that the official 
report on the Ndebele war of 1896 drew the conclusion 
that 'the primary ••• cause ••• was the fact that the Nation 
as a whole had never been thoroughly subdued' and that 
'in the general excitement caused by the rush for gold 
••• the Native question was belittled•. 72 The conclu-
sion was, it seems, that the Company must strike hard 
and decisively in order to guarantee that scale of 
'pacification' necessary for the swift implementation 
of its programme of commercial mining and exploitation. 
The potential riches of the soil of Africa were not in 
doubt. 
For northern Zambezia this meant that 'recalci-
trant' rulers must be swiftly subjugated, and the de-
feat of Mpezeni's Ngoni, the Bemba chiefs and Kazembe 
of the Luunda in February 1898, March and April 1899 and 
October 1899 respectively was to create a situation in 
which the submission of the lesser kings and chiefs 
72. BM/Parl. Papers 1897, LXII, op.cit., Martin's 
Report, folio 571. Underlining is mine. 
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would be assured. There had, of course, been the ex-
pected preliminary flurry of apprehension in London 
over the 'development' of the northern territories. 
The Foreign Secretary did not wish to prevent such 
expansion as long as 'it can be done with reasonable 
prospect of avoiding such collisions with the Chiefs as 
are likely to bring about another war with the Natives 
which it is of paramount importance to avoid or, at all 
events, to defer in the present state of affairs in 
73 
Africa generally'. But Mpezeni had been in consulta-
tion with the northern Ngoni of Mwambera and this could 
be interpreted as 'subversive•. 
Johnston's brother and biographer sought to 
give glamour to his exploits, telling for instance how 
Alfred Swann recalled his first meeting with the Commi-
ssioner 'riding on a donkey with a sailor's straw hat 
on his head' and how even in battle he carried 'his be-
loved white umbrella' since he feared sunstroke more 
than enemy bullets. The romantic record went on to 
tell how 'the ever-victorious little army of the Pro-
tectorate usually fell upon each enemy separately with 
Napoleonic strategy', for 'my brother's method was to 
get in the first blow, never to await a declared enemy. 
And he forced each chief to declare his disposition un-
equivocally. He would send him a bullet and some salt, 
73. PRO 879/52, FO to CO, 10/11/97. 
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that was all ••• If the bullet came back, it brought the 
defiant message, "Bring me your war". And the sender 
of it got what he asked for sooner and harder than he 
had ever expected'. The Mlozi war, under Johnston's 
brother's pen, was given its own colourful presentation. 
When it was all over, 'his brother came to Harry ••• and 
thanked him for giving Mlozi nsuch a beautiful hanging", 
for, so it was said, 'Harry, between announcing the 
sentence and carrying it out, entertained Mlozi to a 
74 banquet with champagne'. 
The realities of the war against Mpezeni's 
Ngoni were far from romantic, as Barnes's important 
and scholarly account shows. 
75 
The missionaries in 
nearby Malawi were speaking in 1896 of Mpezeni as 'the 
bogie man of the Protectorate'. By the beginning of 
1898 they were speaking of the conflict as 'the most 
serious war that has yet been undertaken' but they were 
far from clear about what had caused it. There was 'a 
sad tale ••• about a white man, a representative of the 
Chartered Company, having assaulted the old King and 
having, in spite of the King's efforts on his behalf, 
been killed by the enraged warriors'. By April, they 
declared the general feeling 'that the cause of the war 
76 
was altogether an unjustifiable one'. Colonel Colin 
74. Johnston A., op.cit., pp. 130, 136-7, and 150-1. 
75. Barnes, op.cit., pp. 85-96. 
76. 'Life and Work', August 1896; January and April 
1898. 
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Harding of the Barotseland Native Police, writing many 
years later, said that 'a highly strung official mis-
taking an ordinary native dance for an act of hostility 
towards the Administration' had led to the despatch of 
a company of B.C.A. rifles 'to quell this rebellion'. 
Though the request for troops was cancelled by 'the 
hectic official', he was ignored, 'a pitched battle 
ensued' and, though the Europeans suffered no casual-
ties, many Ngoni were killed. Harding then asked whim-
sically why 'the first thing we do after subduing a 
native enemy is to deprive him of his means of living 
77 and his country of its most valuable product•. 
The Maugham Report of 1932, to which we have 
referred above, gives another version, to the effect 
that the trouble started with the pioneer party of the 
North Charterland Exploration Company, led by Colonel 
Warton and accompanied by Carl Wiese, entering the 
country armed but initially well-received by the King. 
Not long afterwards, however, 'by some misunderstanding 
of his position, Col. Warton endeavoured to impose a 
hut tax and to exercise administrative powers'. Mpezeni 
resented this interference in the life and government 
of his country and so, said Maugham, 'the trouble came 
to a head in December 1897 when the Angoni rose !a 
rebellion'. His account goes on, in the language of 
Sir Henry Newbolt's poetic romances of imperialism, to 
77. Harding c., 'Far Bugles', (Sirnpkin Marshall, 1933), 
p. 82. 
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tell how Colonel Manning, Acting Commissioner in Nyasa-
land, believed it urgent to rel~e 'the beleaguered white 
men'. Mpezeni's son, Nsingu, was then promptly charged 
before a summary court martial with 'raiding in British 
t •t ' d shot.
78 err1 ory an 
This was not, however, defensive military 
action by the British. Warton had written over a year 
earlier to Major Forbes that 'the absolute concensus of 
opinion, including that of Carl Wiese, de Sulla Panchecho, 
the Fathers of the Jesuit Mission and ••• everyone capable 
of forming a sound opinion ••• is that safety (for the 
N.C.E.C.) depends upon his (Mpezeni's) being convinced 
that there is sufficient force available, if necessary, 
to compel him to submit'. Three months later, Johnston 
had written to the Foreign Office that he had 'no object-
ion to the B.S.A. Co. sending two Maxims and a suffici-
ent number of rifles ••• for eventual use against Mpeseni'. 
The leader of the Dutch Reformed Mission, Andrew Murray, 
was advised by Rhodes not to start work among the Ngoni 
in view of the likelihood of war. When the conflict 
came, Johnston wanted to be sure that either Major 
Forbes or Major Edwards would be in command and that 
79 the B.S.A. Company would pay all expenses. 
78. MSA: Maugham Report, op.cit., p. 7, para 21. 
Underlinings are mine. 
79. Ibid: Appendix Item 28, Warton to Forbes, 2/4/96, 
and Item 31, Kohnston to FO, 14/7/96; and Gann 
'History, op.cit., p. 112. Phrases in brackets 
are mine. The Maxim Automatic gun was invented 
by Sir Hirarn Maxim (1840-1916). 
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It had been, said Maugham, 'a remarkably well-
managed little war' prosecuted with 'courage and deci-
sion' on the part of the vastly outnumbered white soldi-
ers and their army of about seven hundred troops, in-
eluding Sikhs and Africans, very well equipped with 
Martini rifles and with seven Maxim guns. There was 
no chivalry, however, but rather a high degree of puni-
tive excess. 'By the 6th February, the Angoni were 
broken up into small bodies of fugitives. A number of 
their cattle were seized and many of their kraals des-
troyed'. Official records indicated that, as had 
happened at the end of the Ndebele rising five years 
earlier, a very large number of the cattle of the Ngoni 
was 'captured'. The N.C.E.C.'s chairman, Frederick 
Young, condemned the 'harsh treatment of the natives 
and excesses in the looting of cattle which apparently 
was acquired and disposed of in the personal interests 
of the British Central Administration officers ·engaged 
in this mission'. This commandeering of large numbers 
of cattle very adversely affected local agriculture, 
Young said. According to Hall, this 'loot' of cattle 
enabled the B.S.A.C. to 'derive a considerable profit 
80 from the "rebellion" after covering all expenses'. 
After a period of recrimination, in which organs of 
public opinion in Britain were involved, it appears 
that a number of the captured cattle was returned to 
80. Ibid: para 21; N.C.E.C. Chairman to FO, 4/8/99; 
and Hall op.cit., p. 90. Underlinings are mine. 
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the Ngoni. But where there had been around 20,000 head 
of cattle, the official figure for the end of March 1900 
was 1,224. Rhodes's personal correspondence includes 
the following statements: 'We have at Mpeseni's 16,000 
head of cattle' and 'I have agreed to bring down 1,000, 
redistribute 5,000 among the natives and make arrange-
ments for herding the balance'. The Ndebele war, less 
than two years previously, had enabled the Company to 
appropriate thousands of cattle 'by right of conquest'; 
one witness stating that 'conquest, according to all 
native customs, gave the right to capture all the cattle 
of chiefs and people together'. Barnes does not exa-
ggerate when he sums up the violent confrontation by 
saying that 'thus ended the Ngoni war and with it the 
Ngoni state•. Meanwhile, Scottish missionaries were 
further shocked by the report of a N.C.E.C. agent that 
'one of the stipulations of the peace was that Mpezeni's 
men were to carry the loads of that company for a year ••• 
a state of matters too perilously near a form of slavery 
81 
or serfdom to be accepted without protest'. 
Ngoni testimony confirms a corporate memory 
of first perfidy and then destruction. 'Why did 
Nsingu dislike the white men?' 'He did not want them to 
81. RH.MSS.Afr.s.228 Index to Rhodes's Letters, extracts 
from letters of 17/3/98 and 16/6/98; BM/Parl.Papers, 
1897, LXII, folio 615, testimony of J.M. Orpen, May 
1897; Barnes, op.cit., pp. 93-96; and c.of s. 
Overseas Council, Invantory 13, 'Aurora', 1/6/98. 
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occupy the land ••• When they first approached his father 
they came in peace ••• they never sought any treaties ••• in 
any case, our chiefs did not know how to write ••• For 
example, when Wiese first arrived he had to approach the 
chief and make friendship ••• They exchanged gifts, Mpezeni 
gave Wiese some magic charms and Wiese gave him some 
yards of calico. This is what Nsingu didn't want•. 82 
The arrival of 'traders' who demanded the carriage of 
heavy goods, paying 'nothing but salt and white calico', 
sharply worsened the situation. 'These were the very 
men who declared war on Mpezeni and defeated him near 
the hills of Lwangeni ••• until Nsingu was forced to flee ••• 
pursued by Indian soldiers, Sikhs ••• until they appre-
hended him in the Nsatwe hills. From there he was 
83 taken and murdered'. Local testimony further claimed 
that Wiese had an associate, whom the people called 
'Chapalapata• and who was regarded as closely involved 
in the plan to conquer the Ngoni. 'Chapalapata' was 
the nickname of a B.S.A.C. collector, F.C. Worringham, 
who had opened the fort at Choma, near the Mweru wa Ntipa 
marsh, in 1893 and the Chinunda Boma in the eastern 
province in 1896. Chinunda was about 25 miles NNW of 
the modern Chipata (Fort Jameson). 'Worringham was 
charged with keeping an eye on the ••• concession compa-
nies', according to Brelsford, and had 'Trooper Middleton 
82. RI/Chief Mpezeni and Nduna Nikazio Jere, 5/3/75. 
83. RI/Headman Kuyenda Phiri, 12/3/75. 
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and thirty Askari plus three Maxim guns' with him. 84 
The name 'Chapalapata' probably meant 'the scraper' or 
'the one who grazes the skin'. When the Europeans 
began shooting, a man called Kaposile was killed at 
once. Thus, though Mpezeni himself was afraid of war, 
'the elders of the village advised Nsingu to fight', 
especially since the first attack took the royal village 
by surprise. When Nsingu was killed, some witnesses 
maintain his body was not seen and 'no one has ever 
seen his grave'. Then the seizure of cattle began. 
'This was the end of freedom ••• the beginning of perpe-
85 tual slavery'. 
The importance to us of missionary criticism 
of the imperialist incursion is perhaps chiefly that the 
serious strictures of white men who were basically in 
favour of the establishment of British rule reveals their 
awareness of the adverse impact of British action on 
local societies and on local feelings. The Blantyre 
periodical had commented on the earlier defeat of the 
Ngoni chief, Chikusi, in the end of 1896, that 'it is 
a great deal for us to say that we think it justified. 
Still, to have six feet of noble savage somehow tried by 
84. NRJ Vol. VI, no. 3, 1965, pp. 293 ff., Brelsford, 
op.cit. 
85. RI/Verishoni Tembo, Nikazio Tembo, Chitamukutwa Soko, 
Wilson Mhlanga, 4/3/75. Note: 'Chapalapata' 
could also mean: one who shudders in anger, as 
if in rigor mortis; and see footnote 57 above. 
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Court Martial and shot brings sad reflection in upon our 
soul. Could that noble savage not have been laid hold 
of by the influence of a superior civilisation with 
faith in its commission to rule the world?' The mission-
aries had welcomed Rhodes's resignation from the Board 
of the B.S.A. Company after the scandal of the Jameson 
Raid. They had seen it significantly as 'bad for the 
Company but good for the peace of Africa' for 'Rhodes 
had been the incarnation of what a large constituency 
felt but could not express, a Pharoahism, a Napoleonite, 
and that spirit is only exorcised, having rent poor 
Africa sore•. 86 
In January 1897, 'Life and Work' clutched at 
the hope that the administration would be 'strong enough 
NOT TO BREAK UP STRONG NATIVE POWERS'; though an earlier 
report that the beating of drums in villages, an imme-
morial part of African life, was forbidden suggested 
rather a determination to make 'white rule' felt by 
everybody. Hopefully, the missionaries looked forward 
'soon to be listening to sweet music in Central Africa -
not the harsh grating of the Maxim gun, not the crackle 
of burning huts, not the groan of dying men, all hideous 
noises to our ears, but the gold waltz and the rubber 
gavotte and the ivory fugure'. David Livingstone's 
86. 'Life and Work', op.cit., November, September and 
December, 1896. 
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dream of the combined advance of commerce and Christian 
civilisation was still fresh in their minds, and they 
saw the Trans-Continental Telegraph project - 'long 
nervestrings communicating with finger-tips on the Afri-
can keyboard' - as a glorious idea which 'no one but 
Mr Rhodes ••• would have set ••• afoot•. 87 
Johnston's correspondence with the Foreign 
Office revealed a less romantic and more cynical view 
of the situation in the region o'f the Ngoni kingdom.- .. 
Mpezeni had, in 1889, agreed to Wiese's plan for a 
Portuguese Resident to live at his court and fly the 
Portuguese flag over the Residency. The King had, 
however, 'absolutely refused to make any treaty'. 
What brought his kingdom under British rule was the 
Anglo-Portuguese Convention, whereupon the Foreign 
Office, while refusing to recognise Wiese's 'treaties', 
'advised the B.S.A. to come to terms with Wiese'. 
Warton's quarrel with Mpezeni had arisen because the 
N.C.E.C. agent had ordered the King to stop slave-radi-
ing and 'that his people must pay a hut tax to the 
whites ••• As to slave-raiding, Col. Warton was right, 
but as to the imposition of a hut tax he was absolutely 
wrong ••• Now,' Johnston added, 'Mpezeni has ceded nothing 
to anybody, but, even setting him aside as a robber 
without rights, the real chiefs of the country have not 
87. Ibid: January 1897. 
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ceded to the B.S.A. Company their governing rights•. 
What decided the issue seems to have been, in Johnston's 
words, that 'his country is exceptionally healthy ••• and 
is very auriferous (and) it lies on the direct route 
overland from British South Africa to Tanganyika'. 
Therefore if he blocked the N.C.E.C. plan to conquer 
hirn,'After the defeat and dispersal of Mpezeni's forces, 
the indigenous chiefs ••• will be restored•. 88 
There had been a characteristic flutter of 
concern thereafter at the Foreign Office. 'H. M. G. 
are most anxious to avoid another native war', the 
Foreign Office told the B.S.A. Company and were dis-
turbed to learn that the N.C.E.C. had 'maintained friend-
ly relations with him (Mpezeni) by witholding from his 
knowledge their connection with the B.S.A. Company and 
their British nationality, as it is said that he would 
be opposed to anything British'. To strengthen the de-
ception, 'the representative of the North Charterland 
Company has passed himself off to Mpezeni as brother 
89 
of the German, Wiese'. Though London repudiated in 
advance any responsibility for the consequences of pre-
cipitate action by N.C.E.C. agents, the Foreign Office 
had known for some time, by Johnston's despatch of July 
1896, noted above, that the Commissioner was far from 
opposed to military action. For, said Johnston, 'Mpeseni 
88. Maugham Report, Appendix Item 35, Johnston 'on the 
Mpezeni question', 6/2/97. Underlinings are mine. 
89. Ibid: Item 36, FO to BSAC, 7/4/97. 
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is such a scourge to the indigenous populations of the 
Company's sphere that he must one day be dealt with'. 
But if supported by other Ngoni chiefs, Mpezeni might 
muster 'at least 50,000 warriors' to pit against British 
forces. Moreover he was 'intimately allied with the 
Matabele•.
90 
What the B.S.A. Company told its share-
holders in 1898 was that 'the depradations of the Angoni 
••• have for some years caused considerable trouble both 
in the Company's territories and in the British Central 
Africa Protectorate. In December last a rising of this 
tribe took place and representatives of the Company were 
for some weeks in serious danger'. However, 'latest 
reports ••• state that the Angoni have been completely 
routed, that Mpeseni has surrendered himself and that 
91 all danger is at an end'. 
The kingdom of the Bemba in the north was 
obviously another hindrance to the B.S.A. Company's 
strategy and here again, as confirmed by the diaries 
of the White Fathers, plans for subduing the Bemba were 
made well in advance of the actual confrontations. 
In December 1896, just a year after the execution of 
Mlozi at Karonga, the Fathers at Kayambi recorded their 
amazement at the visit of a British agent to Mwalule, 
the burial place of the Bemba kings, in the company of 
an Arab, Mohammed. This man, who had been so recently 
90. Ibid: Item 31, Johnston to FO, 14/7/96. 
91. RH:MSS.Afr.s.72: BSAC Reports and Accounts for 
1897, pp. 26-27. 
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•ennemi battu, ruin: et bless~' of the British now 
appeared as their confidant. A few months previously 
Jock Law of the B.S.A. Company had stated that 'Britain 
could not make war this year'. The White Fathers re-
corded their concern over developments in view of their 
own good relations with the senior Bemba chief, Mwamba, 
and believed that B.S.A.C. men were collaborating close-
ly with the Scots mission at Mwenzo, 'nos voisins et 
d . ' 92 a versa~res • 
A detailed account of the British subjugation 
of the Bemba has been provided by Dr Andrew Roberts in 
his scholarly 'History of the Bemba', which he has 
strengthened by the use of a considerable amount of 
Zambian oral testimony. Meebelo's study of the North-
ern Province from 1893 to 1939, which we noted earlier, 
is likewise of great value to our knowledge of the 
93 European conquest. What the White Fathers' diaries 
notably add to the record is their concern that the 
behaviour of certain white men could make Africans 
believe that all Europeans were alike. The talkative 
Spencer from Ikawa (whom they called Pincer) visited 
the area with an African concubine, a freed slave from 
Bisa country. 'Ces extravagances et l'inconduite d'un 
92. WF: Kayambi Diary, 17/12/96; Mambwe Diary, 6/7/96, 
3/7/96; Kayambi, 13/2/97. Jock Law, Assistant 
at Ikawa, was brother of Andrew Law, the Collector 
at Abercorn. 
93. Roberts A.D. (Longmans 1973), and esp. Chap. 8, 
pp. 255-284; Meebelo, op,cit., and esp. pp. 34-71. 
See also Hanna op.cit., p. 219. 
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trop grand nombre d'Anglais ne font gue mieux ressortir 
la difference qui existe entre nous et eux', the Fathers 
complained. Though they gave the local information de-
manded by Hugh Marshall and Lawrence Wallace, they noted 
sadly that, since the B.S.A.C. men were determined to 
secure the submission of Mwamba, war was imminent and 
that 'this war will probably be an exhausting affair 
as far as we are concerned'. The earlier comment of a 
L.M.S. missionary at Fwambo on the situation on the 
frontier of the Bemba kingdom is worth adding here: 
'There has always been, among European residents in the 
Tanganyika Districts a somewhat exaggerated idea of the 
dangerous qualities of the Awemba ••• so far as any attack 
on Europeans is concerned ••• During the ten or twelve 
years we have been in contact with the Awemba, they have 
never yet made any attempt to injure us or our interests. 
On one occasion only has a load of European goods been 
stolen from a Mambwe man carrying it and on that occa-
sion, a tusk of ivory was immediately sent by the Awemba 
chiefs - unsolicited - as compensation. In fact their 
motto may be said to be: "We don't want to trouble you; 
we don't want you to trouble us; but leave us alone in 
our country and don't interfere in the little differences 
we have with our coloured (sic) neighbours"•.
94 
94. WF: Kayambi, 2/4/97, 16/6/97; andNLS 7906, ~io 
150, 'The British Central Africa Gazette, 12/10/94, 
extract from article of Rev. Mr Thomas on 'The 
Awemba Country'. 
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Harry Johnston had told the Liberal Foreign 
Secretary in 1893 that '"subjugation" is an ugly word 
to use in connection with British enterprise in Central 
Africa. We do not come here necessarily to subjugate: 
we come to protect and instruct•. African rulers and 
states were left to their own devices, he said as long 
as they did not attack British posts or 'natives under 
our immediate administration•. 95 But that was written 
to a Liberal politician and at a time when Johnston and 
his collaborators were not ready to carry out their 
strategy of subjugation. 
The change of pace in British action can be 
traced directly to the appointment of Major Patrick 
Forbes as the B.S.A.C.'s Deputy Administrator for 
northern Zambezia in June 1895 and his extensive tour 
of the Nyasa-Tanganyika region a few months later. 
Though temporarily resident at Zomba, Forbes was res-
ponsible, not to Johnston but to Leander starr Jameson 
who was Administrator in chief of all the Company's 
Central African annexations, and whose activities in 
those closing years of the century were earning him 
increasing notoriety. 
Thus the testimony of the White Fathers' 
diaries is endorsed by British agents in the field, 
namely that, even before the defeat of Mlozi, B.S.A.C. 
plans were in hand for a military confrontation with 
95. PRO: F0/55-No.SGC.A., Johnston to Rosebery, 17/10/93. 
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the Bemba. This is evidenced by a letter to Johnston 
from the explorer, Poulett Weatherle~ in October, 1895, 
who spoke of 'rumours of war, tackling the Awemba, etc.' 
and considered that 'if fighting is regarded as a nece-
ssity, a lesson and a severe one might be struck at the 
root of all Awemba troubles, i.e. Kitiamkulu (sic)•. 96 
The situation in the Bemba kingdom was complicated, 
however by the activities of a White Father, Joseph 
Dupont, who had taken over the leadership of his mission 
in mid-1895.
97 
In the rough parlance of 'Chirupula' 
Stephenson, this helped to precipitate a sharp encounter 
between the White Fathers and the Company in which 'the 
Man-of-God's politics were upset by the Man-of-War Major 
Forbes'. Stephenson wrote this as part of a memorial 
leaflet which he issued at the time of the death of the 
B.S.A. pioneer, Hector Croad, in 1949. What happened 
at Mwamba's capital in November 1898, accor~ing to 
Stephenson, was that the 'capture' of Dupont by Charles 
McKinnon, the B.S.A. Collector from Ikawa, was signifi-
cant as a check to French colonial ambitions, of which 
the Fathers were unofficial agents. As the Fashoda 
crisis had arisen at the same time, Franco-British re-
lations were tense and European 'cold war' politics 
96. 
97. 
RH:MSS:Afr.s.228, Weatherley to Johnston, 11/10/95. 
A 
For the role of Dupont, see also Pineau H., 'Eveque 
Roi des Brigands - M. Dupont, Premier Vicaire 
Apostolique du Nyassa, 1850-19301 {n.p. Montreal). 
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thus continued to impinge on Central Africa. 98 
It is also clear that dissensions within the 
Bemba kingdom offered the British a chance to strike 
swiftly and decisively. There would certainly, it 
seems, have been a battle in Mwamba's domain if the 
presence of Dupont at the capital had not allowed 
McKinnon and his combined force from Ikawa and Mirongo 
to effect 'pacification'. But the news of the defeat 
of Mwamba's rival, Ponde, by the British in March 1899 
and the destruction, by a force led by Andrew Law of 
Abercorn and 'Chiana' Harrington from Kalungwishi, of 
the capital of Chief Mumpolokoso immediately afterwards, 
signalled the fragmentation of African resistance in 
the north. Moreover, the military programme had in-
volved also the first round of the battle with King 
Kazembe of the Luunda and was completed when a second 
assault was made upon his capital before which Kazembe 
himself fled across the Luapula in October 1899. 
Like Mpezeni and indeed like Mlozi, the north-
ern rulers indicated, at various times before the final 
clashes, that they wished to live at peace with the 
98. RH:MSS.Afr.s.833{4), papers of G. Hughes Chamberlain, 
including J.E. Stephenson's 'The Chirupula Gazette 
No. 26, 6/4/49', with a memorial article on Hector 
Croad, '1865 or 1869-1949'. Note: Croad's nick-
name was Chenda-na~nseko, lit. he who walks with 
laughter, but which, I was told, meant the reverse 
in fact; RI/Benjamin Mpande, Kalwa, Serenje, 
19/10/73. 
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white invaders. The war initiative was, however, taken 
in each case by the Company's men, who seemed, as we 
shall see on various occasions further on, to be united 
in the conviction that severe 'chastisement' was required 
to prove their hegemony. Robert 'Bobo' Young summed 
this up when he declared: 'Our punishments err on the 
soft side and the natives do not fear them'. Moreover, 
since the Company's Directors were clearly anxious to 
get hold of as much of northern Zambezia as possible at 
the minimum cost, the chance of meeting the expenses 
of these 'little scraps', as Young called them, from the 
99 ivory captured, added impetus to the military campaign. 
In view of the note of frankness in what he recorded 
of the battles which we have noted above, Young's account 
merits some quotation here; revealing as it does the 
zest of the B.S.A. Company men for opportunities to 
display the great superiority of their weapons. 
Mwamba, for instance, had been brought to his 
knees by reports of how Young and 'the army of Mirongo', 
the Boma at which he lived, had defeated the Senga 
Arabs in an encounter in which 'the general in command 
got shot through both thighs and died on his way back'. 
Young's 'ever victorious' army with its Nordenfeldt had 
also chased Mwamba's son westwards across the River 
Chambeshi, the Company having taken sides in a succession 
99. NRJ 86. II, Vol. II, 1953, PP• 65-71, 'Bobo Young 
Relates His Exploits', esp. p. 70. 
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dispute over one of the lesser Bemba chieftainships. 
Thereafter Chief Ponde who 'seemed to be looking for 
trouble', was shown the power of the Nordenfeldt 'at 
practice on some grain-stores'. Charles McKinnon of 
Ikawa forbade Ponde to enter Mwamba's country after 
Mwamba's death. When Ponde rejected this order, he 
was ambushed and the B.S.A.C. troops, having looted his 
village, put the houses to fire until 'Ponde's village 
was reduced to ashes•. 100 
'Bobo' Young also recounted the clash with 
King Kazembe, a chronicle that supplemented the written 
memories of 'Chiana' Harrington, Collector at Kalungwishi, 
entitled 'The Taming of North-eastern Rhodesia'. In 
that encounter, the Company was vigorously supported by 
Alfred Sharpe from Nyasaland 'with a company of Sikhs 
and a company of Nyasaland armed forces'; a further 
indication of a concerted strategy of conquest. The 
plan was accelerated when Harrington heard from Nasoro 
bin Suliman, an Arab leader captured by him, that 'those 
Arabs, dissatisfied with the rule of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar, had decided to form a Mohammedan Kingdom' 
. d K t . 101 1n the Luapula an a anga reg1on. 
While there is no doubt about the burning of 
the 'towns' of Ponde and Mumpolokoso by the British, it 
is less clear what happened when Kazembe's large musumba 
100. Ibid: 66-70. 
101. Ibid: No. III, Vol. II, 1954, pp. 9-12. 
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was eventually overrun. Alfred Sharpe's report to the 
102 Foreign Office did not mention the burning of the town, 
but Robert Codrington's report to the Chief Secretary 
in Salisbury stated that when the force of 13 Sikhs, 
60 askari, Lieut, Barclay and 'one seven-pounder' gun, 
commanded by Captain Margesson, reached Kazembe's, it 
was 'only to find that he had set fire to his town and 
fled with his people across the Luapula ••• The stockade 
which was found ••• to be 1877 yards in circumference and 
contained 1709 huts or a population of not less than 
5,000 people was entirely deserted'. Sharpe, however, 
gave the population of the town as about 20,000. 103 
Codrington who succeeded Forbes as Deputy 
Administrator in May 1898 after serving under Johnston, 
had decided that it was 'advisable to make a display of 
a well-organised and equipped force which has never be-
fore been seen in this part of Africa and to strike if 
d . . bl • 104 necessary a ec~s~ve ow • He considered that the 
Administration had treated Kazembe with forbearance 
with the result that 'he considered himself to be formi-
dable'. He therefore made what he regarded as 'per-
fectly reasonable' demands upon Kazembe, that he should 
'demolish his stockade ••• come in person to see me at 
102. PLG: BSA 8/22, Sharpe's despatch to FO, 19/12/99. 
103. Ibid: 8/13, Codrington to CS, Salisbury, 29/10/99; 
and 8/22, Sharpe to FO, 29/12/99. 
104. Ibid: 8/14, letter of Codrington, 6/10/99. 
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Kalungwishi and ••• make compensation for the seven men 
recently killed by his orders'. When the King refused, 
the troops moved in. In 1902, however, when Sharpe 
was now High Commissioner, he sent to the Foreign Office 
an account of the clash with Kazembe in which he said 
that Codrington's demand for troops was based on his 
belief that 'unless Kazembe was dealt with at once, the 
prestige of the Chartered Company ••• would be practically 
ruined'. But said Sharpe, 'I was inclined to think ••• 
105 that the dangers ••• had been somewhat exaggerated'. 
One important African account of the Kazembe 
'war' is that found in the Luunda traditional history 
as recorded in Vol. II of the Central Bantu Historical 
Texts. 'The Europeans came with troops and powerful 
guns', they stated, 'and Mwata Kazembe ran off to 
Kabimbi across the Luapula ••• At this time the Euro-
peans burnt the capital and many people died in it•. 106 
Zambian oral testimony links the defeat of Kazembe in 
1899 with his earlier effective rebuff of Company force, 
some years earlier. 107 The nickname of one of the men 
associated with offensive action against both Mumpolo-
koso and Kazembe, who presumably was Dr Blair Watson of 
Kalungwishi, was Cipanta-Malinga, the one who kicks ddwn 
105. Ibid: 8/13 as footnote 291; and NAZ: BS1/16-18, 
Sharpe to FO, 18/9/02. 
106. Rhodes-Livingstone Institute: Central Bantu 
Historical Texts, II, pp. 110-111. 
107. Roberts, op.cit., p. 281 gives the year of Kazembe's 
rebuff of the BSAC as 1895; while Cunnison I., 
op.cit., p. 155 gives 1897. 
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the stockades, signifying that he dealt crushing blows 
and scored quick victories. Watson appears to have 
been known also, and more frequently, as Kaulang'ombe, 
because of his bovine and angry manner. 'He used to 
108 
kill people' is one firm memory of him. Local 
testimonies confirm Watson's association with both 
actions against Kazembe. The first attack was repulsed 
before the Company men had reached the musumba. On 
the second occasion, word reached the King that a heavi-
ly armed force was approaching and so 'immediately the 
news was heard, people fled', Kazembe and his entourage 
wading into the Luapula river as no boats were avail-
able, but being met by canoes from the other side. 109 
As we shall be noting from various districts 
of northern Zambezia, the local people used nicknames 
for almost all Europeans in the 'pioneer' period of the 
B.S.A. Company. Some District Notebooks, like that of 
K . li t f h . k 110 awambwa, g~ve a s o sue n1c names. Indeed 
missionaries and leading Arab traders appear also to 
have been given nicknames. Because of the memory of 
these nicknames and also because of the difficulty 
108. RI/Simon Kawesha, interviewed by his son, Joseph, 
a senior undergraduate of the University of 
Zambia, 12/5/73; and Mwanawata Chibwe, 21/5/73. 
109. RI/PHL/17, David Ntondo Walima, Mwansabombwe, 
12/9/73, and PHL/26, Jim Chilima and Kataka 
Chebo, Lukwesa, 15/10/73 (by permission of Peter 
Lary). 
110. NAZ: KSG 3/1. 
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found in pronouncing the real names of white agents, 
it is sometimes difficult to ascertain to whom a parti-
cular nickname referred. Blair Watson, who committed 
suicide in 1904 as a result of his addiction to morphine 
drugs, was one of those remembered for his cruelty. 
The consequences of the deep antagonism between him and 
Poulett Weatherley, must have been harsh upon the eo-
mmunities among whom these men made their camps. 
Weatherley seems to have been, at some time at least, 
in the partial employ of the Company. A bitter quarrel 
between him and Watson involved charges by him that 
Watson was 'raising the natives of a district against 
a white man'; while Watson accused him of having 'even 
gone so far as to fire on Kasembwe's people'. Watson 
reacted by arresting some of Weatherley's carriers, but 
Weatherley claimed that his men had been driven to ex-
travagant behaviour 'by the attempt to starve them', 
and accused Watson of flogging his carriers. He be-
lieved that Watson was jealous of his influence with 
the local people; 111 and Roberts confirms that at that 
time, the end of 1896, Mumpolokoso wanted Weatherley 
to mediate i:n his conflict with Watson and 'Chiana' 
. t t K 1 . h" 112 Harr1ng on a a ungw~s 1. 
111. NRJ Vol. IV,.¥o~ 6, 1961, pp. 552-556, Graham 
I.M., 'A Quarrel at Lake Mweru, 1896-97'. 
112. Roberts, op.cit., p. 280. 
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An article by Weatherley in the Geographical 
Journal, dated 1898, describes his visit to the islands 
of Lake Bangweulu and suggests an attitude other than 
that of a man imposing his will on the people by superior 
force. 'The more I saw of the natives of Kirui (sic, 
Chilubi Island) the more I liked them', he wrote. 
'They were quiet, hospitable, exceedingly friendly and 
most inoffensive. The island is low, beautifully 
wooded, well-peopled and cultivated'. Of Chishi 
Island he said: 'Happy little island and happy island-
ers ! ••• May it be centuries before civilization, with 
its innumerable attendant evils, finds out and robs 
little Kisi (sic) of the peace and contentment it now 
enjoys•. 113 Zambian accounts of the defeat of Kazembe 
include a memory of the King being warned by 'friendly 
white men' of the impending attack, and suggest that 
Weatherley may have been regarded as a friend, as there 
is reason to believe that he was in the Lake Mweru 
114 region shortly before the final clash. 
This review of the military operations in the 
Nyasa-Tanganyika region reveals no reference, on the 
part of those who carried them out, to 'treaty' obli-
gations towards local rulers and peoples. Instead the 
evidence points to (a) an initial disposition of good-
will on the part of African rulers towards the white 
113. Geographical Journal Vol. 12, 1898, No. 3, pp. 
241 ff. 
114. RH/PHL/26 op.cit., and NRJ Vol.IV, No. 6, op.cit., 
p. 553. 
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men who are remembered as those who came after Living-
stone, the 'Ngereza' or 'Englishman'; (b) no signifi-
cant requests for 'protection' or the implementation 
of what the 'treaties' claimed to have promised; and 
(c) the determined subduing of the region by British 
military action as part of the unified strategy of the 
B.S.A. Company. The initial friendly disposition is 
evidenced in testimonies from, for instance, Serenje 
115 district and the islands of Lake Bangweulu. 
In the confused situation created by the in-
creasing appearance of armed white men, however, and 
the awareness of local rulers however varying and how-
ever indefinite, of the playing out of European 'big 
power' rivalries on African soil, various chiefs and 
kings sought the favours of the invaders and some 
certainly tried to use such favours against their own 
enemies. A member of an expedition in the Luangwa 
area reported how, in 1896, he came to the country of a 
chief called 'Chitala' (whom Joseph Thomson had called 
Katra), west of the river, and was shown by him a letter, 
dated June 1894, in the hand of one, E.J. Glave, of the 
'Century Magazine', which read thus: 'He is the most 
hospitable and friendly chief I have met in this part 
of the world. He is, as far as I can learn, loyal 
115. E.g. RI/Nansala Manyeta, Chief Mailo, Serenje, 
15/10/73, Kapumfi, Chilubi Island, Bangweulu, 
10/11/74. 
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to the British ••• and most anxious that the British build 
a fort ••• to protect his neighbouring villages against 
the Angoni of Mpeseni and Mombera. With a little assist-
ance from the whites such men as Katara {sic) can hold 
their own against their enemies'. Again, it is notable 
that Glave made no mention of the 'treaty' which Thorn-
son claimed to have signed with Katara or Chitala in 
September 1890. 116 
Northern Zambezia was characterised at this 
period, as we have seen, by a pattern of conflict be-
tween local states, exacerbated by Arab maraudings, a 
confusion now further confounded by the various wide-
spread British thrusts. Their primary object was, of 
course, to secure the Nyasa-Tanganyika region and to 
stop the major Portuguese threat from Mozambique. But 
along the western reaches also the turn of the century 
witnessed the movement of British armed bands; while 
a wide belt of land, in the vicinity of what later 
became the agreed boundary between Angola and North-
western Rhodesia, was the scene of Portuguese military 
movement~ the subjugation of local rulers and the 
establishment of a line of forts, between 1895 and 1897. 
One of these was at the capital of Chief Kakengi of the 
Luvale, another at Mosiko where the Portuguese killed 
116. Geographical Journal Vol. 11 - 1898 No. 6, p. 617 
ff., Cyril Hoste of the expedition assumed leader-
ship on the death of Dr J.A. Moloney, former 
companion of Capt. Stairs. Underlining is mine. 
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the chief in battle, Mosiko was south of the Luena 
river; Kakengi at the junction of the Luena and the 
Zambezi, while two other forts, Kalunga-Kameya and 
Nyakatoro were at the Luena-Lumeji confluence and at 
117 Nana Kandundu, north of Kakengi, respectively. 
(e) 'The White Men came with war' 
In the central region of the Zambezi the 
tremors of the carnage of the Ndebele and Shona wars 
were further heightened by relatively isolated incur-
sions. One such was the appearance in the Zumbo-Feira 
district in 1899 of John Harrison-Clark whose 'pioneer 
work' was to be acknowledged by Codrington in 1902. 118 
Early in 1899, Lawley, who was then the Administrator, 
·had complained of constant reports of ~legalities 
committed by white men ••• Even if taken red-handed', he 
said, 'the criminals cannot be brought to justice owing 
to our officials having no jurisdiction to deal with 
offenders.' There was a real danger that Barotseland 
would become for such •unscrupulous white men' a 'Fili-
busters' Alsatia', and what happened in Stellaland might 
well be repeated north of the Zambezi. 119 
117. NRJ Vol. VI, no. 2, 1965, pp. 167-169, article 
by T.W. Baxter, 'Portuguese Forts'. 
118. PLG-BSA 8/66, R.C. Codrington to Harrison-Clark, 
11/8/02. 
119. PRO: CO 879/57 - African South no. 574: Lawley 
to HC, 1/4/99. Underlining is mine. 
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A few weeks later, Lawley reported that 
Harrison-Clark was 'creating trouble in the Loangwa 
country ••• collecting hut tax ••• and representing that he 
was sent by the Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, to 
obtain native labour ••• directly infringing the rights of 
the British South Africa Company as defined by agree-
ments with Her Majesty's Government ••• The peaceful re-
lations between whites and natives in the Mashukulumbwe 
120 and Longwa (sic) districts were in jeopardy'. 
In support of his complaint, Lawley forwarded 
an affidavit obtained from Chief Chintanda (sic.Chitanda), 
stating that Clark had produced a letter from Salisbury. 
'I signed as such', the chief stated, 'knowing that my 
territories were under British influence'. In addition 
to collecting hut tax, 'he took by force one of my wives 
••• When Clark sees a girl he fancies, he takes her as 
his mistress for a few days and when tired of her sends 
her home'. Therefore 'I resolved to go straight to 
Mzwiti (H.M. Taberer, Chief Native Commissioner) who 
121 was in Salisbury'. 
Presumably it was Taberer who obtained the 
The chief's quandary must have been grim. 
Just over a year earlier the Ngoni kingdom had been 
120. 
121. 
Ibid: Lawley to HC, 4/7/99. Underlining is mine. 
Ibid: affidavit of Castino Francisco Lubino 
Chintanda, 25/4/99, attached to Lawley's letter 
of 4/7/99. 
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crushed by British arms in a conflict one of whose 
causes was believed to be an altercation between Mpezeni 
and invading white men. To have resisted the brutali-
ties of Clark might have brought like 'punishment' upon 
Chitanda, whose southern borders looked across to the 
lands of the vanquished Shona and Ndebele and to the 
seat of the conquerors' power. It was not easy to dis-
tinguish white men from one another and thus all seemed 
bent on seizing power. Hence Chitanda's humble report 
to Taberer, from whom 'Changa Changa' Clark claimed his 
authority. 
The area was not only dangerously close to 
the scene of the savage wars to the south of the Zambezi. 
It had previously experienced the intrusions of armed 
white men. Around 1855 an Italian called Simeons had 
come to the court of Chief Mbuluma of the Feira district 
with gifts and then proceeded to kidnap children and 
demand ivory as ransom. Simeons was eventually killed 
by the joint action of Mbuluma and neighbouring chiefs. 
When David Livingstone arrived in the area in 1856, 
the people assumed he was also an enemy. The memory 
of that time of conflict and of the depredations of a 
brigand called Mphuka, the half-caste son of a Portu-
guese adventurer, is still alive in the area around 
Feira. The collusion of Portuguese marauders, their 
half-caste offspring and Chikunda raiders made the 
Luangwa-Zambezi confluence area very sensitive to the 
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presence of white men with guns. Testimony from Chief 
Mailo's area in Serenje district indicates that Carl 
Wiese roamed over a large area west as well as east of 
the Luangwa and that he 'brought war' •• P~uguese 
involvement in slave-buying on the lower as well as the 
upper reaches of the Zambezi was undoubtedly the cause 
of widespread and lasting confusion and led to deep 
racial bitterness. The thirty years before the coming 
of Rhodes's men were marked py almost continuous war-
fare along the Zambezi between Portuguese forces and the 
Prazzo settlers. 122 
Before the coming of Harrison-Clark, there 
was apparently another white man, nicknamed 'Kapanga•. 
With his base at Nyalukanza village very near to Mbuluma's 
court, Kapanga demanded 'tax' from the people in the 
form of maize. 'Kapanga' was well-armed and very free 
with the sjambok. What prevented Mbuluma from attack-
ing him was, it is said, a warning 'by his spirit', 
that if he took action, he could expect 'more of his men 
from where he came. They will invade your country', 
he was warned, 'like a swarm of locusts'. For the 
people along this stretch of the Zambezi, the south was 
where white men were doing brutal things and African 
kingdoms were being shattered. When he first entered 
122. Livingstone D., 'Missionary Travels in South 
Africa', (John Murray 1857) pp. 578 ff.; RI/Tiki 
Mazyambe, Chief Mbuluma, Feira, 4/9/74; and 
Nansala Manyeta, Serenje, 15/10/73. 
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the country, Harrison-Clark seems to have comported 
himself in such a way that he was spoken of as having 
been relatively 'kind' and 'good'. This may be what 
made it possible for him to claim that, fur from offering 
gifts in return for the 'concession' granted to him, he 
was promised by Chintanda that, should the chief need 
help against his enemies, Clark would 'receive £12 a 
month when on service with him'. Clark communi~ed this 
to the B.S.A. Administrator in August 1897 along with 
his offer to raise 7,000 labourers for work in the south~23 
'Changa Changa' also enclosed copies of a 
'concession' dated 21st August 1896, from 'Caetano 
Anselmo Sant Anna Chapugira' who, he claimed, ruled an 
area bounded on the south by the Zambesi, on the north 
by the Resemfa (sic Lunsemfwa), eastwards by the Luangwa 
and westwards by 'the River Choiar (sic)! Chapugira, 
he said, had allowed him to raise tax in the form of 
corn 'for his own consumption' and •to do as he thinks 
fit with Arab caravans coming ••• with ivory from some-
where near the Congo River'; 'to collect a royalty on 
all ivory' passing through the Chief's domain and to 
obtain up to 500 'boys' at any time for white enter-
prise in the south. Clark told the Administrator, 
however, that he would do nothing about 'the slave 
123. RI/Tiki Mazyambe, 4/9/74; Alberta Chisengelelo 
and others, Ching'ombe Mission, 13/8/74; Simon 
Ngulube, Mbuluma, Feira, 4/9/74; Albino Ngulube 
and others, Zarupango village, Mbuluma, 4/9/74. 
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trade, since the terrible things that happened in 
Mashonaland prove that slavery is best for the blacks•. 124 
The B.S.A. Company thus knew of Clark's activities two 
years before Lawley brought his complaints against him, 
and then only when his presence seemed to be working 
against the Company's interests. In 1899, however, his 
'illegalities' were exposed much as was done in the 
case of Wiese. 
'Changa Changa' was obviously a vigorous per-
sonality, though some Zambian witnesses say that his 
nickname derived from the vact that he was carried every-
where in a machila. 125 In April 1899, he reported his 
visitation of •over 80 chiefs'. 'I am taking boys 
from all parts of the country', he said, 'as I wish the 
news to spread ••• With judicious handling the much-
talked of labour question will be a thing of the past, 
at least as regards Rhodesia'. Once again, he sub-
mitted copies of 'concessions•, this time from 'Chete-
ntaunga or Chekokla', obtained on 25th May 1898 at 
'Cheknombi (sic Ching'ombe); from 'Luvimbie or Sinka-
ronar' on 12th June 1898, at 'Mount Cauda'; from 
'Sinkermeronga or Maundundua, 18th May 1898, at 'Che-
nonga'; and from 'Longo or Marlonguarlau•, 5th June 
124. PRO: CO 879/57, African South no. 574: Clark to 
Administrator, 4/8/97, encl. Chapugir~'s 'con-
cession' of 21/8/96. 
125. RI/Albert Chisengelelo, op.cit. 
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1898, at 'Manestear, Queen's Kraal', whereby he claimed 
126 
mineral rights 'in my country of Batwa and Mashukulumbwe'. 
It was presumably on account of this last 
'claim' that Clark offended the Company. He was now 
threatening to encroach upon what they insisted was part 
of the 'empire' of the Lozi king, Lewanika. From the 
point of view of the local rulers and peoples, however, 
Clark's presence in a large region north-west of the 
Zambezi-Luangwa confluence had created a stir that is 
still widely remembered. He had quarreled with 'the 
Zulu people' (presumably some Ndebele south of the Zam-
bezi) and fled after they killed his wife, probably 
during the first Ndebele war. For a while he had 
stayed with the Chikunga - Portuguese half-caste, 
Mphuka, on the south bank of the Zambezi, and married 
one of his daughters. At one time Mphuka had raided 
127 in the area of the Nsenga of Mbuluma. Clark had 
been briefly imprisoned in Mozambique. On arrival 
north of the Zambezi in 1895, he began to sink a small 
mining shaft near Chakwenga. 'He was not a harsh man 
••• he used to assist people in many ways ••• he had many 
128 wives'. However, 'in order to force people to 
126. PRO: CO 879/57, African South No. 574: Clark to · 
Admin., Salisbury, 12/4/99, encl. 'concessions'. 
The distortion of African names,~ ; in particular 
by the insertion of the 'intrusive R' suggests 
that Clark hailed from southern England. See 
also NRJ Vol. II, no. VI, 1955, PP• 91-94, for 
two letters about Clark. 
127. RI/Albino Ngulube, op.cit. 
128. RI/Tiki Mazyambe, op.cit. 
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accept his authority, he started to apply the sjambok'. 
People feared the magical power of European's white 
skin and 'eyes like owls' and so did not resist when 
flogged in public. Moreover 'Changa Changa', like all 
the white men, always carried a gun. In the Soli 
chiefdom of Shikabeta, the following description of 
Clark's arrival was given by a senior associate of the 
chief: 'When the Europeans first came here, they came 
by sea. The first to arrive was Changa Changa. He 
first settled near Feira where he was imprisoned by 
the Portuguese because they didn't like his presence 
there. After he was released from his cell at Villa 
prison, he escaped and travelled up the river until 
he came to settle near the lands between Lukasashi and 
Lunsefwa, this was around 1900. After settling there, 
he was surrounded by the local inhabitants who were 
suspicious about this strange white creature who looked 
like a kind of fish from the river! Then he realised 
that he was in danger of being killed, so he pulled 
out his big gun and fired a shot in a bit •munyonja• 
tree. The bullet left a large hole in the tree trunk. 
When the people who stood nearby observed this, they 
realised this strange white creature was very danger-
ous and if we dare cause any trouble with him, he will 
completely wipe us outl• 129 
129. RI/Simon Ngulube, op.cit., and Chaponda Khondowe, 
Shikabeta, 5/9/74. 
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The threatened clash between the B.S.A. 
Company and Harrison-Clark did not, in fact, come to a 
head, and three years later, the Administrator's Secre-
tary at Fort Jameson described him as 'fully recognised 
as a native chief', yet exercising 'the influence of a 
white man', thus creating a situation whereby 'when 
steps were taken in 1900 to establish the Administration's 
direct control ••• practically no difficulty was experi-
enced in the vicinity of Mr Harrison Clark's location•. 130 
His claim to chiefly authority was, Clark himself main-
tained, based on the fact that he had 'expelled Chim-
tanda a Portuguese half-caste from the Resunfa (sic 
Lunsemfwa) river ••• for murder and trading in guns and 
powder•. 131 This, however is stoutly denied by senior 
members of the court of Chief Shikabeta of the Soli in 
Rufunsa district nor do they include Chitanda in their 
list of chiefs who were ruling in the region west of 
the Luangwa at that time. As Clark claimed that 'Chim-
tanda' was a half-caste of Portuguese connection, it may 
be that, if and when they clashed, Clark simply began to 
wield authority - as armed white men were doing else-
where- and receive obedience. 132 
130. NAZ - BS 1/52-55, Folio 31, Secretary, F. Jameson 
15/8/02. 
131. Ibid: Folio 25, Clark to BSAC from 'Fort Algoa•, 
11/8/02. 
132. RI/Chaponda Khondowe and Luchele Ng'umbo at the 
Soli Chief Shikabeta's village, 2/9/74. 
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The twisting course of the River Kafue became 
a natural temporary limit to the BSAC movement into the 
region of King Lewanika's domain and the areas inhabited 
by what were allegedly tributary peoples, like the Tonga, 
Toka, Leya and Ila. As agents of the Administrator at 
Chipata (Fort Jameson) pushed westwards, they moved 
towards the other bank of the Kafue. The recognition 
by the Foreign Office in 1895 of the B.S.A.C.'s 'direct 
administration' of the region north of the Victoria 
Falls had pushed back Sir Harry Johnston's field of res-
ponsibility to an undefined line east and north-east of 
the B.S.A.C.'s area of authority. The demarcation of 
the Nyasaland Protectorate in 1891133 and the consequent 
extension of B.S.A.C. control over the vast area from 
the Zambezi to the line of the Anglo-German frontier 
between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, led, as we have 
noted, to the appointment of an Administrator, responsi-
ble to Dr Jameson, for what was soon to be called North-
eastern Rhodesia. In 1900, the Administrator in Chi-
pata sent an agent, Val Gielgud, to reconnoitre the 
area around the Hook of the Kafue. Gielgud's despatches 
provide further evidence of a policy of determined 
subjugation. 134• 
133. PRO: CO 879/40, African South no. 484, FO to CO, 
21/2/95; and see Hertslet E., 'The Map of Africa 
by Treaty' (HMSO 1909), p. 286. 
134. MAZ: BS 1/93, many references. 
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There were persistent movements of Mambari 
slave caravans in Ila country when Gielgud established 
his camp on the Mwenga, a tributary of the Kafue. He 
at once became involved in fighting with those Mambari 
but was, he said, welcomed by the people of Siasonkomona. 
As he moved eastwards, however, in the direction of the 
court of the Lenje chief, Chipepo, he found growing hos-
tility. Chipepo's name had appeared in Joseph Thomson's 
list of •treaties' made in 1890. The people 'absolu-
tely denied the presence of a Collector at Chipepo' 
and 'at Mona's kraal on the Tshibila River the natives 
made hostile demonstrations, some 200 turning out armed 
with bows and guns to oppose my march ••• In nearly every 
case the indunas hid themselves ••• There is no doubt in 
my mind', Gielgud added, 'that the people inhabiting 
the country between Chipepo's and Myyanga's are extremely 
distrustful of the white man and are alarmed at the 
presence of white men accompanied by armed natives'. 
There were visits from time to time to the Ila country 
near the Kafue by Lozi indunas seeking tribute in the 
form of skins, but the people appeared to live in a 
loosely knit society, concerned mainly with cattle-
herding and small-scale cultivation. Gielgud wanted 
'a strong patrol' to be sent to the Hook as soon as 
possible to prove to the people that 'the white officials 
stationed in their midst are ••• representativeof a power-
135 ful government•. 
135. Ibid: Gielgud to Asst. Collector, Chipepo~ 
2/9/00, and to Administrator NER, 25/9/00. 
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Very soon, however, Gielgud was facing prob-
lems other than those caused by 'Mambundu or Mambari' 
slave raids. As Codrington reported from Chipata, to 
the B.S.A.C.'s Secretary, traders were now entering 
many parts of North-Eastern Rhodesia and 'rapidly de-
nuding it of cattle, rubber and ivory'. There was a 
real danger, he believed, that 'every European trave-
lling and trading in the country will maintain, as is 
customary in other parts of Central Africa, ••• a follow-
ing of askari or armed natives who, either on their own 
account or with the concurrence of their employer, raid 
and intimidate the native population'. In the clashes 
that followed, the traders, being better armed than the 
local people, would set fire to whole villages and leave 
a trail of desolation and hatred. 136 Despite what 
Johnston had said about respect for African communities 
and their way of life, Gielgud urged that the Ila must 
be made to grasp the idea that 'the occupation of the 
country by the white man' must 'affect them in their 
tribal life and customs'. Though he had been given 
no authority to 'administer' the area, Gielgud was 
obviously constantly on the move and making his pre-
sence felt, as when he thrashed a runaway labourer -
'not assuming the right to do so as a Government offi-
cial but simply ••• as a white man who had to establish 
136. PLG: BSA 8/20, Codrington to Secretary, 4/4/00, 
and his report of outrage against Kasangu village 
by Dahna Smith, 21/4/00. 
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and sustain the prestige of the white race•. He had 
been taken tomsk for this action by Major Colin Harding, 
Acting Administrator of North-western Rhodesia who had 
visited the area. Harding's visit apparently annoyed 
Gielgud as 'the natives (had} already tendered their 
submission' to him. The local people were undoubtedly 
aware of the fact that Gielgud frequently used the 
Primitive Methodists' statio~ Nkal~ as his base of 
137 operations. 
Telling the people that they were under 
British 'protection•, was, Gielgud said, 'like assuring 
the fishes in a fresh water pond, into which one has 
thrown a pinch of salt, that they were in the sea'. 
But his primary concern was to demonstrate 'the immense 
138 superiority and power of the white race'. He was 
increasingly anxious therefore for 'military police' 
and 'a show of force' rather than 'logical argument or 
assurance'. He confessed that, on hearing of a quarrel 
between two villages, what made him hold his hand was 
'that it would be impossible to utilise and demonstrate 
the tremendous superiority of breechloader fire in a 
country covered with grass about seven feet h~gh'. 
But everywhere he went, he was telling the people that 
they were now under the NER Administration 'whom they 
137. NAZ: BS 1/93, Gielgud to Admin., NER, 21/11/00. 
138. Ibid: Gielgud to Admin., 14/10/00. 
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must support and that in return the White Government 
would support them ••• where they found themselves brought 
into collision with ••• their people, when carrying out 
the ••• commands of the Administration•. The tone of 
his despatches suggest that his activities had the active 
support of Codrington. Meanwhile various proclamations 
to the people announced the coming of 'hut tax•. 139 
When, however, a clash took place between the 
people and white traders, he was ready to dismiss the 
trader's action in burning houses as 'a most trifling 
affair'. A strange ambivalence emerges from Gielgud's 
despatches on such matters. While anxious to distin-
guish the Government official, in the local community's 
eyes, from 'the trader and his pilfering servants', he 
excused 'the savage reprisals on the part of the white 
man' on the ground that 'the traders have to suffer 
much extortion and bad treatment' at the hands of villa-
gers. He was convinced that though traders carried 
out their business 'at their own risk ••• the political 
effect of the murder of white men ••• would assuredly 
entail much loss of prestige'. Gielgud's passionately 
racialist assumptions were apparently endorsed by 
Codrington. 140 Soon after this particular event, 
139. Ibid: Gielgud to Admin., 26/1/01 and 23/2/01. 
140. Ibid: Gielgud to Admin., 18/5/01, reporting 
conflict involving a trader called Fairbank •• 
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Gielgud was asked by Harding for assistance in an ex-
pedition he was undertaking against some 'Batshukulumbwi 
(sic) Chiefs' with '70 of his own police plus 23 armed 
Matabele of my escort, one Maxim gun and some 600 
"friendlies"'• Mgalo was routed and an attack on 
Minenga was then undertaken. 'The effect of this pa-
trol', said Gielgud, 'will greatly increase the prestige 
of the white Government'. Refugees from the conquered 
area fled to Siankwema's area and Gielgud anticipated 
an attack on his camp. He therefore requested more 
military support 'to force their submission'. He was, 
he reiterated, constantly impressing upon the people 
'the supremacy of the white man ••• and ••• that the cause 
of one white man was the cause of all, provided it was 
141 a just one'. 
By dismissing the local people as 'savages', 
agents like Gielgud apparently felt no obligation to 
understand their grievances in the face of brutal in-
trusions by white men. This had been well illustrated, 
early in 1901, when Harding reported the complaint of 
'chiefs Simbola, Kasongomona, Kiaba Moasi and Simarumba' 
against 'a white man whose name they did not know but 
known as Mr Luizi' for taking away all their cattle. 
The Acting Administrator, C.P. Chesnaye,·told Lewanika 
that, since the matter had not been reported through 
the Lozi court and as there was 'some doubt whether 
141. Gielgud to Admin., 5/7/01. Ibid. 
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they form part of the Barotse empire', he did not feel 
142 justified to take action in the matter. But Lewis 
was the name of a manager of the Silver King Mine which 
had recently been opened up in the district. The Mine 
had been the scene of desertion by African workers en ........ 
masse when Lewis and his partner Baragwanath left for 
Bulawayo. Once again Gielgud called for active mea-
sures to 'pacify' the district and establish 'the su-
premacy of the white man once and for all'. Though 
the white miners were supplied with armed guards for 
their protection, it was Gielgud's view that 'the native 
is beginning to find the white man with his numerous 
wants, labour, canoes, to buy cattle and be crossed over 
rivers, etc. a nuisance, as he is always extremely per-
sistent, and, not having been impressed with the power 
of the white race, the native is disposed to resent his 
presence•. He then reported news of the murder of the 
trader, Fairbank, and the flight before pursuing Ila men 
of a prospector called Boijier. This growing hosti-
lity to white men must be smashed by 'the sharpest 
lesson.• A force of 100 men would be adequate to pre-
elude the chance of effective resistance. 'Small ••• 
patrols in new countries', he concluded 'only irritate 
and increase the hostility of the natives•. It did 
not seem to concern him that his own deputy, A.C. Ander-
son,had found that the trouble at the Silver King Mine 
142. Ibid: 414/01. 
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of the Northern Copper Company had been caused by 'the 
conduct of the white miners ••• and the desertion to be 
the result of ill-treatment•. 143 
Prospectors of the Northern Copper Company 
were confident that they would unearth major ore depo-
sits in the area of the Hook of the Kafue. Already, by 
the end of 1901, Lewis was employing 1,000 labourers at 
Silver King and using another 700 men as porters. 
Gielgud's visit to the mine in January 1901 was preceded 
by his military action against the people of a chief 
called Bulibuli who had allegedly committed murder. 
The use of corporate 'punishment' was already apparent-
ly sanctioned for, having forced the surrender of Buli-
buli and his people, Gielgud 'fined him 20 guns and 
detained him and his headmen until they were paid'. 
Immediately after visiting the Mine, Gielgud and 
Anderson ordered a man called Kapandula to come and 
'tender his submission to the white man•. Kapandula 
did not respond and so 'on the third day we marched 
into his kraal in two parties. We found the people 
had fled and removed all their belongings'. Then, 
claiming that 'this was not fright', Gielgud 'burned 
some of the principal huts in the village and some 
144 grain to punish them for their hostility'. 
143. Ibid: 2/11/01 and 21/2/02. 
144. Ibi~ 4/1/02. 
258. 
Thereafter the party moved to Sankomola's 
village where the headman reported the theft of his 
cattle by 'a white man accompanied by "police" ••• I dis-
covered the white man to have been Ziehl and the "po-
lice" his armed natives'. Ziehl had fallen foul of the 
B.S.A. Company by establishing his own despotism,after 
the manner of Harrison Clark, and claiming the autho-
rity of the Company. He and a man called Bolle had 
set up a Boma near Chief Chiwala's court (in the neigh-
bourhood of modern Ndola) and had raided for ivory over 
a wide area, as far as Sere9je to the east and towards 
the Luapula River in the north. The B.S.A.C.'s Secre-
tary for North-eastern Rhodesia spoke of that great 
region as 'the scene of his many outrages'. But Ziehl 
had already been 'punished by the white Government•, 
and so, Gielgud told Sonko~ola, it was not now possible 
'to open up the matter as regards the restitution of 
cattle'. On his own showing, Gielgud's role cannot 
have appeared to the local people as that of 'protector'. 
He was serving the interests of white traders and pros-
pectors, swift to turn his guns upon the local communi-
ties, indiscriminate in his 'pudshments', arrogantly 
assertive of the right of 'the white man' to rule and so 
concerned not with 'argument and assurances' but with 
145 the decisive demonstration of Company's fire-power. 
145. Ibid: and PLG: BSA 8/25, C.P. Chesnaye, Secretary, 
NER, to Administrator, on the arrest of Ziehl 
and Bolle, 20/6/00; and see NRJ Vol. III, No. 2, 
1956, description by Gielgud of his war with 
Mgalo in 1901, pp. 148-151. , 
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In view of Gielgud's repeated references to 
the hostility of the local people and the need to enforce 
their subjugation, his comments on the Hook of the Kafue 
in a letter to the Company's London Office are surprising: 
'In nearly every case a savage race is inclined to accept 
the rule of the white man as a relief from the despot-
ism of their own rulers or the oppression of superior 
or more warlike tribes ••• Men such as Monze looked upon 
the white Government as a protection against white 
traders, others again as a protection against the 
Barotsi or the slave-raiding Bakunde (sic Kaonde}.' 
He went on to speak of the 'peaceful' occupation of the 
country but foresaw growing hostility and the need for 
'a sufficiently armed force ••• to tangibly demonstrate 
the futility of armed resistance•. 146 
The Lamba country in which Ziehl was eventu-
ally run to earth by Chesnaye had within it, near the 
side of the modern city of Ndola, the domain of Chiwala, 
a Swahili ruler who had established himself there at 
the heyday of Swahili intrusions from Zanzibar. He 
had moved into the area of the Copperbelt, Chesnaye 
reported, from the Congo Free State where 'depredations 
committed by officials ••• on his people and property' 
had forced his flight. His subjects were 'Swahili, 
ordinary natives and cross-breeds ••• well-fed and pros-
perous'. When Chesnaye, the Secretary of the N.E.R. 
146. PLG/BSA 8/60, Gielgud to London Secretary, BSAC, 
23/8/02. 
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Administration, went there in pursuit of Ziehl and 
Bolle, he warned Chiwala of severe measures if he did 
not help the Company men to arrest the two white men. 
Chesnaye's party was well armed and Chiwala expressed 
willingness to have a British flag, •a request acceded 
to•. But, once again, there was no report of any re-
ference to the visit there ten years earlier by Joseph 
Thomson as emissary of the Chartered Company. Ches-
naye did however, refer to 'the irresponsible behaviour 
of white traders generally throughout that portion of 
the country'. The most emphatic claim to have brought 
the copper-rich land of the Lamba under B.S.A.C. con-
trol was that of J.E. Stephenson who in his autobio-
graphy wrote as follows: 'We made no treaty, we referred 
to no treaty, we complied with no treaty. We walked 
in and,' ·after announcing the defeat of the Ngoni not 
so far to the east, 'we forthwith began to "administer" 
the country'. Stephenson wrote that he was 'prepared 
to swear that in the instructions issued (in 1900) ••• 
no mention of any such treaty was made; curious, if we 
were being sent to occupy a country so recently occu-
pied by treaty-rights. Further', he said, 'I can 
swear that neither that, nor any other treaty, was ob-
served by me during the first five years of occupation 
of the Copperbelt, though in the course of his journey-
ings Thompson (sic) made many treaties with petty chiefs. 
They were the loosest kind of agreements, not worth the 
paper they were written on - if indeed they were written -
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and the B.S.A. Company no doubt realised this•. 147 
'Chirupula' Stephenson has been the subject 
of glamorous biographer as well as autobiography. The 
biographer presents a picture of, for instance, the 
Lala people as gazing in wonder on Ste~nson and his 
companion, Jones, as reincarnations of heroes of local 
mythology, Kashindika, Shingo and Luchele. The Lala 
chief, Shaibila, to whom reference has been made above, 
is likewise described as 'no petty chief' but 'most 
exalted of Central African rulers, the chief of all 
chiefs, the communer with the gods, a mighty priest-
king'. Jones was alleged to have told Shaibila's people 
that now, because of the defeat of 'their old enemy the 
Angoni', by the white men, there would be 'no more war-
148 no more witchcraft- no more slavery'. But Stephen-
son's biographer also notes that his nickname 'Chiru-
pula' meant 'the flogger'. It is for this that he is 
still vividly remembered over a wide area of central 
Zambia. 
The testimony of senior men at the court of 
Shaibila tells how, when Steph;anson arrived 'the reign-
ing chief was Lwashi'. The name by which Stephenson 
is remembered there, as elsewhere, is 'Selesele', 
meaning 'the rough despiser' or 'humiliator'. 'When 
147. PLG/BSA 8/25, Chesnaye as footnote 145; and 
Stephenson J.E., 'Chirupula's Tale' (Geoffrey 
Bles, 1937) p. 63 and pp. 25-26. 
148. Rukavina K., 'Jungle Pathfinder' (Hutchinson, 
1951), esp. p. 78; and see p.100above, ref. 
Shaibila. 
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Selesele came into the village of Shaibila, he planted 
the flag and went back to Fort Jameson ••• for two years 
••• He came back a second time and settled in the village 
of Shaibila (and) told the people that he knew it was 
the "Mapunde" who had brought war•. The Lala called 
the Ngoni 'Mapunde'. 'Stephenson said there would be 
no more wars ••• and there was great jubilation ••• The 
second thing he said was that there would be no more 
keeping of slaves by chiefs ••• This did not please the 
chief ••• Who will cultivate the fields for us? ••• He fur-
ther·ordered that no one should abuse his fellow man'. 
But Stephenson then ordered the payment of tax, burned 
the houses of those who did not pay and used the sjambok 
freely. 'He was a very cruel man ••• He got the name 
•Chirupula" because of beating people•. 149 Near 
Ching'ombe Mission of the Jesuit Fathers, NNW of the 
confluence of the Lukasashi and Lunsemfwa rivers, 
Stephenson and his companions are remembered as 'very 
harsh people (who) treated people like slaves ••• But 
some people said he was good ••• even though he was cruel, 
he had saved us from the Ngoni'. At the Soli chief 
Shikabeta's court, near Rufunsa, the testimony is that 
'the first European to arrive was Chirupula Selesele (who) 
beat people and used to swear at them. Some people 
even lost their lives because of beating. One of the 
victims was Chief Mbosha who was murdered ••• Chirupula 
149. RI/ at Shaibila's court, Mkushi, 18/8/74; and 
Leo Chikambalala and others, Old Mkushi, 12/8/74. 
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was a lion, a real beast•. In Mboroma's chiefdom 
between the Lukasashi river and old Mkushi, this comment 
was made recently on the people's first contact with 
white men. 'When they heard that the Ngoni had been 
defeated, the people rejoiced. There were not going to 
be any more wars ••• But the white men made us once more 
look like slaves, forcing us to carry their loads on 
our heads, as far as Kabwe. 
ering upon the people•. 150 
They brought great suff-
The B.S.A.C. thrust into what is now called 
the North-western Province, the area of the Luvale, 
Lunda and Kaonde peoples, came a little later, probably 
because of the unsettled frontier between B.S.A.C. 
territory, Portuguese Angola and the Congo Free State. 
We shall look at that area of Zambia later. Our sur-
vey so far has included references to most parts of 
modern Zambia, especially east of the Kafue River, and 
has been concerned with the_years of military occupa-
tion. It remains now, within this survey, to mention 
incidents which illustrate further the relations of the 
armed incursors to the local peoples. One such illus-
tration comes from the Mwanga area around the Boma at 
Ikawa {Fife). The 'collector• was a man named J.M. Bell, 
who, like Gielgud in the Hook of the Kafue, called 
150. RI/John Mwelwa, Ching'ombe, 13/8/74; Chaponda 
Khondowe, Lucheleng'umbo and the Chief at Shika-
beta, 2/9/74; and Kaimfa, near Ching'ombe 
13/8/74. 
264. 
persistently for more effective fire-power to establish 
white authority, and who was involved in numerous attacks 
on Arab and Bemba caravans. Like Gielgud, too, he was 
very concerned by the quantity of guns and powder in 
African hands in the area. In one clash with a caravan 
which included 'one white Arab', Bell captured 1500 lbs. 
of ivory and set 57 slaves free. 151 
Bell's despatches include a report of people 
being 'beaten, blackmailed or threatened' by 'police' 
in the employ of the B.C.A.P. agent at Fort Hill, a man 
called Best. He also reported an incident which brought 
him into conflict with Rev. Alexander Dewar at Mwenzo 
Mission. His version was that the people of Ilendela 
village ignored his demand for labour, and that when he 
and Spencer went there, they found that the people had 
withdrawn into their stockade. He asked Spencer to 
fire his gun into the air 'to scare off any people that 
may be lurking about•. Supported by his Makua messen-
gers, Bell entered the stockade, at which someone fired 
from under cover. A messenger then fired and one man 
of the village was killed. 'As the people had given 
evidence of insubordination, I set the village on fire'. 
Soon afterwards, Dewar wrote to Bell that the people 
were angered by his action, and by the seizure of goats 
by the police. Bell then rebuked the owner of the 
goats for having gone to Dewar and not to himself. 
151. NAZ: BS1/1, Bell to Forbes, 16/1/96, 24/4/96, 
25/6/96. 
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•oewar•, he told Forbes, 'is exactly the type of mission-
ary who pokes his nose into matters outside his province'. 
Bell then said that 'the Wa-Nyamwanga (sic) ••• have re-
fused absolutely to obey me in any way and all along', 
and affirmed his policy of destroying the villages of 
such 'insubordinate' people. 152 
Dewar's first letter spoke of the incident 
as 'one of the most heartrending and pitiful ••• a case 
of pillage, incendiarism and a poor man being shot down 
like a dog ••• If such as has just happened at Ilendera 
(sic) is allowed to go on', he added, 'the lives of the 
Europeans will be endangered•. 153 The last five years 
of the century, in the northern reaches of the territory 
were a time of war, sometimes smouldering, sometimes 
erupting, with the Chartered Company's forces consti-
tuting a new factor in the situation of protracted tur-
bulence, adding in their own more deadly 'nkondo' (war) 
by the use of the latest weapons from Britain's armoury 
and swiftly gaining the upper hand over a huge stretch 
of territory. Violence stalked in the land, as when 
'Bobo' Young reported, in late 1897, to Charles McKinnon, 
his superior, that 'Worringham has been and smashed up 
Chiquwanda (sic) and burnt 4 villages and made Chi-
quwanda prisoner•. 154 
152. Ibid: 11/9/96. 
153. Ibid: 11/9/96, encl. Dewar's letter of ~/9/96. 
154. NAZ: BSt/2 Young to McKinnon, Sept, 1897. 
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In local eyes, the white men appeared as quick 
to resort to violence,turning their fury on whole dis-
tricts without discrimination. When the London Secre-
tary of the Chartered Company asked information from 
Codrington in 1899 about 'the treatment of natives', 
what came to light were the personal animosities exist-
ing between B.S.A.C. officials and employees of the 
African Lakes Company. The impact of the ill-treatment 
upon its victims was not a point at issue in the corres-
pondence. Yet the charges of the A.L.C. included a 
statement that 'Chiefs and headmen have been put in 
chains at Ikawa until their people turned up to carry 
loads for the B.S.A. Company'. The B.S.A.C. was oper-
ating 'a regular "cordon" of officials stationed round 
the best labour districts who are compelling the natives 
to go to Karonga to carry loads for the B.S.A. Company 
only - refusing to allow them to work for the Corpora-
tion {A.L.C.) as they have been in the habit of doing. 
B.S.A. Company Askari, stationed in the villages, have 
been stated to have actually threatened to shoot if the 
155 
natives refuse to work for the B.S.A. Company'. 
Whatever may have been the rights and wrongs 
of the B.S.A.C. - A.L.C. rivalry, local memory appears 
155. NAZ: BS 1/33-34, FO query to Codrington on 
A.L.C.'s allegation 20/5/99, encl. letter of Fred 
Moir of A.L.C. to F) 15/2/99 which referred to 
report of A.L.C. sub-manager Chamberlain. 
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to corroborate the substance of 'Mandala's' charges 
against Rhodes's men. Simon Singoyi of Isoka, along 
with other senior men who recalled the time in question, 
have testified that the first white men to settle in 
Mwanga country were 'Mandala called Tom' and then the 
missionaries at Mwenzo (1894}. 'The first Europeans 
arrived in this country peacefully, first it was Mandala 
and then the Missionaries ••• Things began to change corn-
pletely when other Companies began to arrive. These 
people began to force us to carry their katundu (loads} 
from Karonga. Taking these things to Mbala, to Nachi-
tipa or Mwenzo or Kasama - big boxes called vingongongo -
steel trunks. If you failed to carry this heavy steel 
trunk, then the alternative was sjambok ••• There was no 
road covering the distance between Karonga, through 
Ikawa to Kasama, And how much money did one expect 
as payment for the trip between Karonga to Nachitipa7 
People used to be given a few.yards of material - about 
ten feet. The boxes they carried contained beads, big 
beads. When you put this box over your head, it felt 
extremely heavy. These type of beads were called 
intundulu. When they arrived, Askaris would announce 
to the villagers 7 'Iseni kuno, iseni kuno, come here, 
come here. Then they would place the big steel trunk of 
beads in front of their white boss and he would dip his 
hands into the trunk, scoop some beads and throw them 
into the air, and to his amusement, the people, Africans, 
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would rush each on to snatch his share. As the Africans 
fought each other for their share the European would 
burst into laughter. We began to wonder whether we had 
really been freed from our fetters 1 It did not take 
long before we experienced the introduction of the yoke. 
Th~introduced long chains which they used to chain 
people's necks - and they would chain several people 
together - in a line. Sometimes when they set off they 
could get ropes for tying people round their necks, and 
they would then force people to run about in the bush, 
tied together, and in a line. People began to refuse 
to carry katundu and escaped into the bush, and it was 
terrible to sleep in the bush infested by marauding 
lions. When they discovered that you have dropped 
the heavy steel trunk, then you have to carry this on 
your head right through up to Mwenzo. When one could 
no longer stand this, you just find a tree in the bush 
and just dump the thing there and flee into the bush 
and they begin to hunt for you. 
kind of war•. 156 
This turned into a 
In the British Central Africa Protectorate, 
the Blantyre Mission had commented a few years earlier 
on 'Mr H.H. Johnston' in Africa 'and how the Commissioner 
had reacted when Chief Mitochi had refused to pay gun 
taxes and send his people to hoe the road to Zomba. 
156. RI/Simon Singoyi, Philemon Silwimba and others, 
Chiwanda, Isoka, 26/4/71; and see p.192footnote 39. 
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•People fled to the hills on the rumour of "war" and ••• 
the expedition proceeded to loot and burn several houses 
in it. Four tusks ofNory, several kegs of powder and 
a variety of miscellaneous articles were borne off'. 
Similar treatment was given to the people of Chipalasa. 
'A native chief said to us the other day, "You English 
have come and you have seized our country. Well, we 
give it to you, only we wish to live at peace with you. 
If you burn our houses, we will build again; if you 
seize our property, we will work and get more. But if 
you destroy our food, we must die. Why do you treat 
us in this way? You will only drive us away from the 
157 European altogether"'• 
The situation in what is now Zambia was not 
developing differently from Johnston's 'protectorate•. 
Thus today in many parts of the country, people recall 
how when the B.S.A. Company began its 'effective occu-
pation', 'the white men came with war•. 158 
157. NLS: 7906, Folio 219, 'Life and Work in British 
Central Africa', June 1890(7). 
158. Sundry RI - e.g. Zebron Sambwa, Serenje, and 
Yakobe Lusuma, Muchinka, 16/10/73; Simon Singoyi, 
see footnote 156 above; Tiki Mazyambe, Mbuluma, 
4/9/74; Sam Banda, Chadiza, 8/3/75; William Ka-
wandami, Mbereshi, 9/5/73; Noah Kapika, Lushi-
washi, 17/10/73; Kapumfi, Chilubi Island, 20/11/74; 
Nansala Manyeta, Mailo, 15/10/73; and many others. 
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CHAPTER V 
MAJOR INSTRUMENTS OF SUBJUGATION 
{a) 'Musonko' - Universal Taxation by Sjambok, Fire-
brand and Yoke. 
It is now necessary to consider the signifi-
cance of the imposition of 'hut tax', the coercive re-
cruitment of labour, and the methods employed in general 
by B.S.A.C. agents in northern Zambezia from 1900 on-
wards. Though our review starts with the 'hut tax•, 
musonko, it is clear that the need for cheap labour for 
European enterprises south of the Zambezi cannot be 
separated from the imposition of Taxation. Moreover, 
the taxing of African populations by the colonial 
'administrations' set up by European nations was already 
being widely enforced. Indeed, we can assume that 
when musonko was eventually imposed in the area of 
Zambia, Africans were aware of what had happened else-
where inc:consequence of such taxation. It is there-
fore also vital to note, in the case of territories 
annexed by Britain, that though taxation became at once 
a cause of anger and often of physical resistance, the 
conquerors were everywhere determined to enforce it. 
In praise of the Royal Charter granted to 
the B.S.A. Company in 1889, it had been said that •a 
large and valuable territory will be opened to British 
commerce and enterprise without any burdens being 
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1 placed on the shoulders of the tax-payer'. Even at 
that time, however, it was officially recognised that 
in pursuance of the terms of the Charter, the Company 
would have authority 'to make laws and ordinances and 
to impose and levy taxes•. 2 The Parliament that even-
tually approved the Charter was, however, persuaded by 
the claim of the Colonial Under-Secretary that Britain 
could now hope to 'spread the influence of civilisa-
tion to the barbarous districts of Africa without assum-
ing the grave responsibilities which attack to an ex-
tension of Protectorate•. Moreover 'the native chiefs 
will no longer be exposed to the ••• bad bargains which 
they have made at different periods. The country will 
3 be opened up and control will remain just as before'. 
So persuaded, the House was not likely to anticipate 
what would actually happen in a situation in which 
land, labour and taxation would be together exploited 
in the Company's drive for quick returns from its new 
annexation. 
Within a very short space of time, the Company 
was literally battling for supremacy in Central Africa. 
South of the Zambezi, the 'insurrection' of African 
1. RH:MSS.AFR.70, cutting from 'St. James Gazette', 
27/8/89. 
2. Ibid: MSS.Afr.71, BSAC.Charter of Incorporation, 
Deed of Settlement, Article 3, 312/91. 
3. Ibid: MSS.Afr.70, Hansard, 3/9/89, statement of 
Baron H. de Worms. Underlining is mine. 
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rulers, like Ng'omo and Umtassa in Rhodesia, had been 
answered by drastic acts of communal 'punishment•; and 
though the High Commissioner in Cape Town might express 
disquiet over 'such a lamentable loss of life', the ar-
gument of Dr Jameson that the peoples concerned were 
guilty of 'armed resistance to the law' apparently 
4 carried the day. The 'law' was now virtually a sy-
nonym for the decisions of the directors of the Char-
tered Company, the significance of which becomes clear 
when we note that, at the time of the first Ndebele 
War, the High Commissioner assured the Company that he 
had no desire to oppose the imposition of hut-tax in 
Mashonaland'. Indeed, as we noted earlier, he was 
soon to inform the Colonial Office that the defeat of 
the Ndebele should be a signal for the recognition of 
the Company's fitness to administer the Ndebele and 
5 Shona regions 'as one country'. 
The supremacy of the Company in the fiscal 
field included the prohibition of any direct levies by 
local rulers upon the commercial or other operations of 
white men. This was made explicit in a despatch of 
the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office at the end 
of 1893. 6 But the next two years saw increasing 
4. PRO:CO 879/36, African South no. 426, CO to BSA, 
31/5/92; Jameson's comment, 1/6/92; HC to Jameson, 
4/7/92; letter of Umtassa ref. R.W. Benningfield 
('Dindwan') 30/6/92; HC to eo, 6/7/92, and 2/9/92, 
et.al, with ref. to Ng'omo and Umtassa. 
5. Ibid: 879/39, African South no. 454, HC to eo, 
5/8/93 and 11/12/93; and see p.149 above. 
6. Ibid: HC to eo, 22/11/93. 
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evidence of African resistance to the imposition of hut 
tax. Soon after the decision, taken ostensibly in view 
of a quarrel between King Khama and his brother Raditla-
di, to split the Tswana kingdom into three - placing the 
third part under the direct control of the B.S.A.C. -
the Kwena chiefs of the Molepolole area told the Colo-
nial Secretary that they did 'not wish to be protected 
simply from those who would make war' upon them but 
'from those who would divide up our country into allot-
ments ••• If the Queen will hear us ••• we will render our 
thanks by paying such a tribute as will make manifest 
our gratitude. We are not at present prepared to pay 
a hut tax'. Indeed, so many such petitions were pre-
sented that the High Commissioner felt that the B.S.A. 
Company should be told 'that the policy of Her Majesty's 
Government must necessarily be to a great extent influ-
enced by the views of the Chiefs•. 7 
Instead, however, the Company's policy was 
to lead to the major uprisings of both the Ndebele and 
the Shona peoples. Indeed, the exaction of tax, which 
had begun in 1894-95, was extended and the Company's 
cause now received the support of leaders of both the 
Roman Catholic and Wesleyan Methodist missions in Rho-
desia. To them, tax and labour were bound together. 
'This ••• is the kind of forced labour required', said 
7. Ibid: 879/44 African South no 498, petition to 
Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, 17/9/95; and HC 
to eo, 9/8/95. 
274. 
the head of the Jesuit Mission, while the Methodist 
Superintendent believed that, since there were 'thou-
sands of savages living in sloth ••• the discipline of 
work for a few months in the year would be of the high-
est moral benefit•. 8 The financial yield of the first 
year of the hut tax had clearly benefited the Company's 
exchequer, a total amount of £4,323, raised between 
April and August 1895, being over £4,000 more than the 
hield of the same period in 1894. The overall position 
of B.S.A.C. finances for the period, the Directors told 
their shareholders, gave 'confidence in the future'; 
revenue, including £203,905 from the sale of stands, 
being £322,788 against expenses of administration, 
'direct and indirect•, of £142,423. The rate of tax 
per 'hut' was 10/-, the equivalent of a 200-lb bag of 
grain or a yearling heifer. 9 
In 1899, the Company's Administrative Secre-
tary declared that 'the people must do work on the 
country until they have repaid the expenses actually 
incurred by the Administration on their behalf'. Pre-
sumably this would include the cost of the military 
operations by which the 'pacification• of the Ndebele 
and Shona had been effected. 10 A year later, when 
8. Ibid: 879/53 African South no. 559, HC to eo, 
29/12/97, encl. letters of A.M. Daignault, s.J., 
and Rev. I,Shimmin. 
9. RH:MSS.Afr.s.72, BSA Reports and Accounts, 1894-95. 
10. PRO:CO 879/57, African South no. 574, BSAC Admin. 
Secy. (H.M. Hole) to Imperial Secy., 23/1/99. 
Underlining is mine. 
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urging a four-fold increase in taxation to £2 per 'hut', 
the Administration argued that this was 'absolutely 
necessary in the interests of the natives themselves' 
and spoke of plans to apply 'the whole or part of the 
proceeds ••• of the tax to objects calculated to improve 
the condition of the natives•. 11 As the Anti-Slavery 
and Aborigines Protection Society increasingly criti-
cised the Company's administration, the Resident Commi-
ssioner in Bulawayo took grave exception to the Society's 
claim that the duty to pay tax must be dependent upon 
recognition of the African's 'rights of citizenship'. 
'The natives of Southern Rhodesia', he said, 'are quite 
unfit for such a responsibility•. The picture of 
African inferiority and docility was further supported 
by the Chief Native Commissioner's report on the methods 
of tax collecting now in use. 'It would be impossible 
for the Native Commissioners to go to every kraal ••• nor 
do the natives expect their Chief (for they look upon 
their Native Commissioner in the light of a great chief) 
to go to them for tax; this would be contrary to native 
custom'. Therefore people were ordered 'to appear 
at certain central points in the district' to pay their 
taxes in person. This report came in response to a 
11. Ibid: 879/69, African South no. 659, memo of 
BS£C Admin. Secy., 19/11/00. 
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query from the High Commissioner about death caused by 
the guns of a 'native patrol' of tax hunters in the 
Mazoe district. 12 
In fact the Mazoe district had been the scene 
of action by a far from docile African leader and his 
disciplined followers. Mapondera, a Rozwi chief, had 
left his homeland in 1894 because of the severe impo-
sitions of B.S.A.C. rule, After joining forces with 
Makombe in Mozambique in 1896-97, he came back, only to 
find that his herds had been confiscated. In late 
1900, Commandant Flint of the B.S.A. Police ordered a 
patrol to hunt Mapondera and prove their success by 
bringing back his head. The High Commissioner regar-
ded such means of identification as regretable, but a 
head had been duly brought to Flint. Soon afterwards, 
the Resident Commissioner reported an attack on the ad-
ministrative post at Lomagundi by Mapondera's men. 
'Mapondera is still a fugitive•, he said. The question 
of whose head had been brought in to Flint was not raised 
in official correspondence. Mapondera was eventually 
seized and died in prison. In such situations, tax 
patrols, such as the Mazoe one, were, in the eyes of 
the local communities, not less than war. Rhodes's 
comment on Mapondera's 'insurrection' was that he did 
not 'deem it of much importance. They are the usual 
12. Ibid: 879/76 AfricanSouth no. 694, Res.Comm. to 
HC, 9/7/01; and 879/68, no. 656, CNC Taberer to 
HC, 15/1/00. 
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liabilities of the occupation of a new country'. But 
the Resident Commissioner remarked that 'the B.S.A. 
Police are not in a satisfactory state. They have 
been spoilt and are consequently above themselves•. 13 
The imposition of hut tax in Johnston's do-
main beyond the Zambezi came about somewhat differently. 
There, Johnston was to speak of 'tax treaties.' and to 
present the Foreign Office with an account of free ne-
gotiations on the subject. 'The principle we go on in 
taxing the natives•, he wrote in 1897,'is this: "Will 
you, Chief So-and-So, surrender to us by a Treaty and 
for a quid pro quo your sovereign rights, including the 
right to tax your people? No1 Very well then, govern 
your people properly; do not raid for slaves or pro-
voke civil war; afford reasonable protection for Euro-
peans. We will then establish no officials ••• and shall 
14 not require to tax you"'• Three years earlier, he 
had stated his opinion that it was 'only reasonable that 
the sacrifice should not be all on one side - that the 
natives whom we are defending against the Slave Trade 
should ••• contribute ••• towards this e~penditure ••• At 
the commencement, therefore, of my Administration, I 
began to treat with the chiefs in the more settled dis-
tricts on this subject. In fact the question of 
13. Ranger T.o., 'Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1897-97', 
op.cit., (Heinemann, 1967) pp. 358-9; and PRO:Cm 
879/68, African South no. 656 - correspondence ref. 
Flint and Mapondera, Oct. 1900; Res.Comm. to HC, 
26/10/00; and Rhodes's comment, 25/2/01. 
14. Maugham Report, Appendix Item 35, Johnston's Memo 
of 6/2/97. 
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taxation was first introduced by the natives themselves 
in that Lower Shire district which we took over from 
the Portuguese in ••• 1891. The natives were accustomed 
to pay taxes to the Portuguese and ••• asked us to assess 
the tax which they were to pay'. Tax 'treaties' were 
then signed, he said, throughout most of the Shire re-
gion, whereby the chiefs bound their people to a tax of 
six shillings per year, either as poll tax or as hut 
tax. 15 
In 1891, however, the Scottish missionaries 
had recorded their distress at news of a 12/- tax'on 
all male householders' in the Ruo district. This would 
mean that 'a man would have to work for four and a half 
months every year ••• we regret exceedingly that a policy 
of native taxation - gun tax, poll tax, licence taxes, 
etc. - should inaugurate a British Administration in 
Central Africa. It is decidedly un-English - runs 
counter to all the past in our Central African history 
••• To commence the development of the resources of the 
country by imposing taxes seems a strange reversal of 
the ordinary course of economic science ••• it was not for 
this that the battle of the last two years was fought'. 
A month later, the missionary newssheet was expressing 
fear 'that the collection of the tax will be accomplished 
15. BM/Parl.Papers, 1894, LVII (C.7504) Johnston's 
Report on First Three Years of BCA Administra-
tion, 31/3/94. 
279. 
only by the use of force'. By mid-1892, however, the 
tax was 'being imposed on all over 14, school children 
included 1 Zanzibari police were telling people: "If 
you don't bring in your taxes at once, we'll come and 
burn your houses"; and this tax compared adversely 
with the 10 shillings hut tax in Cape Colony, the Mozam-
bique tax which was equivalent to six shillings and 
eightpence, and that in force in Burma, 'a country con-
quered by British arms and one of the richest and most 
fertile in the world', where tax was not more than 2f% 
of a man's income. Furthermore, said the missionary 
commentator, 'in 1889 when these treaties were being 
signed as a foil against the Portuguese, there was much 
talk on the part of the English Residents ••• comparing 
that country (Portugal) with the Snglish who did not 
impose taxes. The natives ••• accuse us of a breach of 
faith'. The newssheet cited positive assurances of no 
taxation in such •treaties' as that made with Malemya 
near Zomba. As the months went by, however, Johnston's 
agents pressed on with the collection of taxes, whereby, 
said the missionaries, people were 'scared by the sudden 
presence of soldiers in the village and perhaps too by 
the smoke of burning huts, as if they were bees to be 
despoiled of their honey in the old barbarous method 
of smoke and dismay'. In the end of 1893, Captain 
Edwards and his force of Si~hs made a frontal attack on 
Mkanda's village in the Mulanje district to punish tax 
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defaulters, burning the village to the ground as people 
fled in terror. 16 
The first collection of tax was at the rate of 
six shillings a year but, under the pressure of traders, 
planters and missionaries, Johnston reduced it in 1893 
to three shillings. Initially it was planned that 
chiefs should act as collectors and receive 10% of the 
tax revenue in return; but in reality, it was white 
officials who carried out the collections and there is 
. 17 
no evidence of any payment of commission to ch~efs. 
Johnston had ruled that the 'hut' of a tax-defaulter 
must be 'forfeit' to the Administration, and he wanted 
this to be operative on the day after the tax was due. 
The Foreign Office modified this by recommending two 
months' grace. But there was only one way in which a 
house could be effectively 'forfeit' and that was by 
burning. As the Commissioner's wars with Kawinga and 
Zarafi were followed by exploits further north against 
the Ngoni, people were 'in alarm because Chikuse raids 
them for paying taxes and (they) are afraid that their 
h~ will be burned if they do not•. 18 Thus began 
16. LW October, November, 1891, August 1892, November 
1893; and see p.198above. 
17. Pachai B. (ed.) 'The Early History of Malawi' 
(Longrnans 1972), article by C.A. Baker, 'The De-
velopment of the Administration to 1897', p. 337, 
citing E. Smith, Report on Direct Taxation, pp. 
6-7. 
18. Hanna, op.cit., p. 226; LW, March and November 
1895, January 1897. 
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years of vigorous 'punishment' of tax defaulters in 
Nyasaland. As late as 1928 the Nyasaland Government 
was to give formal approval to the arrest of relatives 
of defaulters as hostages until the cash was forth-
coming and to the demolition of the houses of male de-
faulters and "of women whose husbands are in Southern 
Rhodesia and who have not paid the hut tax". 19 Yet 
as early as 1892, the 'Glasgow Herald' had voiced pub-
lic concern at the fact that there could be no respect 
among Africans 'for British justice, if we allow the 
same man to impose taxes and decide appeals against 
them'. Indeed, at a time when Rhodes's tax programme 
had not yet drawn public attention, the Edinburgh 'Scots-
man' urged that 'Mr Rhodes, as well as Lord Salisbury, 
20 should keep an eye on Mr Johnston'. 
In German Tanganyika, taxation was being en-
forced by 1899 and 1900, meeting with sporadic resist-
ance in various districts including those closest to 
Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia. There also it 
was missionaries who drew attention to the excesses of 
'hut-burning,snatching of women, removal of cattle and 
political disregard for local leaders'. In the Maji-
Maji 'rebellion' of 1905, which was suppressed feroci-
ously, the anger of the people was turned in particular 
19. See Introduction by R.I. Rotberg, (ed.) p. xix, in 
Mwase G.s. 'Strike a Blow and Die' (Harvard 1967), 
quoting Chief Secretary's Circular, 24/10/21 and 
CS to C.J. Brackenbury, 16/3/28. 
20. 'Glasgow Herald', 10/8!92 and 'Scotsman' 18/12/91. 
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upon askari who patrolled the countryside for tax. 21 
Meanwhile the notorious situation of exploitation in 
Leopold's Congo had also been aggravated by tax imposi-
tions which, as a critic wrote in 1910, involved all 
adults, both men and women, in the payment of 19 francs 
'expressed in produce of an indefinitely greater intrin-
sic value and requiring for its collection an amount of 
time and labour to which the stated figure bears no re-
lation•.22 In South Africa, to which in so many res-
pects the two Rhodesias appeared to look for a model in 
matters of 'administration', there was a constant mur-
mur of African resentment against taxation,·as expressed 
at an indaba in Pretoria in 1906. 'Taxes are high and 
oppress us ••• You say you have good laws. It is your 
laws that are killing us. The Beers did not tax dogs 
••• You increase our taxes ••• you deprive natives of work 
by means of the Chinese. Where is the money to come 
from to pay all these taxes? ••• Who represents us in 
Parliament?• 23 
As we now begin to review the operation of 
the 'hut tax' in northern Zambezia, we should note that, 
in North-western Rhodesia where the Colonial Office 
21. Wright M., 'German Missions in Tanganyika 1891-
1941' (Oxford 1971), pp. 64, 75-77. 
22. PRO:CO 417/494, Letter to 'Times' by E.D. Morel, 
31/1/10, in answering a glowing picuure of the 
Congo in letter of a missionary, Dugald Campbell, 
18/1/10. 
23. Ibid: 450, Report from papers of a Mr Grant of 
indaba with Sir Godfrey Lugden, 1/3/06. 
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continued to urge restraint in the Chartered Company's 
dealings with Lewanika, the imposition of tax was de-
layed; whereas in North-eastern Rhodesia, tax exactions 
. 
began not long after the various military subjugations 
which we examined above. Indeed Codrington followed, 
as quickly as was possible, the model offered by John-
ston, with whom he had worked, but there was no recorded 
attempt to relate the introduction of hut-tax to any 
'treaty' negotiations. In 1898, Lawley had commended 
to Rhodes a comprehensive plan for labour recruitment 
for the south, submitted by an agent called Smitherman. 
To make it effective, Lawley urged the Company 'to in-
stitute a heavy tax as soon as possible'. In 1899, 
Codrington reported that about 87,000 adults lived in 
the districts of the Tanganyika Plateau. 'The univer-
sal opinion ••• including the missionaries, traders and 
officials, is that some form of taxation should be in-
troduced in order to compel the natives to work for at 
least a few weeks every year. In no place in British 
Central Africa can a native earn money so readily as 
24 on the Nyasa-Tanganyika transport route'. 
By. 1901, 'hut tax' was being thoroughly 
exacted in the district around Ikawa and indeed Dr 
Chisholm of Mwenzo Mission hoped that the Company would 
24. RH:MSS.Afr.s.228, Lawley to BSAC, enclosing Smith-
erman's report, 7/12/98; and NAZ: BS 1/43-44, 
Folio 250, memo of Codrington, 19/9/99. Under-
lining is mine. 
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make the people live in bigger villages, which would aid 
not only tax collection but the establishment of mission 
schools. A census of villages around the L.M.S. field 
south of Lake Tanganyika was followed by the first tax 
collection later in 1901. 'Chiana' Harrington record-
ed the first collection in Mansa (Fort Rosebery) Dis-
trict in 1901, and how the people were put to work on 
the road to Sokontwi, because 'at that time there was 
no work for them to earn money'. He also recalled that 
the 'definition of Hut Tax' listed 'the usual occupants 
of a taxable hut as the owner, wife and a child. The 
usual occupants of an untaxable hut is (sic) an old 
couple with a young nephew or niece or an old woman and 
her daughter who is often the wife of a man in the 
village, or 3 or 4 young boys, or a couple of old women 
with a niece of nephew. The young men scheme to put 
their second wife with these so as not to have two huts'. 
Harrington added that 'whole villages decamped to the 
Belgian Congo to avoid payment ••• Chief Chisunka evacuated 
with all his people'. Musonko thus brought serious 
consequences of both over-crowding and depopulation 
from the start. 25 
25. NLS: 7883, Folio 44, Chisholm to Secretary, Edin-
burgh, 3/4/01; and CCWM, c. Africa Reports, Box 1, 
W.G. Robertson, Kawimbe, 21/1/02; RH:MSS.Afr.s. 
1355, extracts from Nhelenge (sic Nchelenge) 
District Notebook, 1899-1922 (by J. Fowlie) pp. 
2-5, notes by Hubert T. Harrington. 
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The first mention of hut tax in the White 
Fathers' diaries spoke of 'benevolence' on the part of 
collectors in the ingathering of tax, as evidenced by 
'Tambalika' Marshall's encouragement of men to take back 
polygamous wives whom they had sent away for fear of 
having to pay tax for each such wife. However, the 
picture around their Chilubula Mission was different. 
In December, 1902, Cookson and Jones of the B.S.A.C. 
announced that every house must display a tax receipt 
or be demolished. The traditional custom of living 
in temporary grass shelters (mitanda} close to fields, 
to protect crops from animals, was declared illegal, 
as was the movement of villages without 'official' per-
mission. Any walled house erected in a mitanda clus-
ter would be burned and its owner arrested. Moreover, 
all adults were ordered to go to the Boma to pay tax, 
which often involved long journeys. 26 
In the •tract', as the North Charterland's 
f~d of enterprise was called, an attempt to impose 
hut tax had been made by Colonel Warton, as we saw above, 
in 1898. After the military subjugation of the Ngoni, 
the tax was effectively imposed by 1901. Zambian 
testimony in the Eastern Province tells of people 
26, WF: Kayambi, 28/11/02; Chilubula, 6-8/12/02, 
24-25/5/03 and August 1903. Note: H.C. Marsh-
all's nickname, 'Tambalika' or'Mutambalika' may 
(as suggested by NRJ Vol.II, no. V, 1955) have 
referred to his hunting prowess, though in the 
Bemba language it would also suggest a peaceful 
disposition. 
286. 
being taxed as soon as hair appeared under their arm-
pits, youths being lined up and subjected to inspection. 
The money value of the tax went, the people were told 
•to the Queen under whose protection the country fell'. 
Many times, whole villages were deserted, their in-
habitants living for some weeks in the forest, feeding 
on wild honey. When men escaped alone, messengers 
would seize their wives whom they 'forced to commit 
adultery'. This forced the men to come out of hiding. 
Defaulters were imprisoned for up to 'six months in jail 
plus the sjambok'. Though B.S.A.C. men sometimes 
suggested that musonko was merely an extension of the 
traditional offering of tribute to chiefs, this was 
stoutly denied by local testimony, in 'the tract' as 
elsewhere. The use of the chain-gang as punishment for 
tax default was seen rather as a continuation of the 
27 
practices of slavery. 
The year 1901 can be regarded as the beginning 
of musonko throughout North-eastern Rhodesia, though 
there was apparently some delay in the as yet undefined 
border districts between North-western and North-eastern 
Rhodesia. Early documents referred to •tax-labour' to 
express the mode and purpose of the exactions, but the 
27. See p.217above. and RI/Kuyenda Phiri, Katete, 12/3/75; 
Verishoni Ternbo and others, Wanga Village, Mpezeni, 
4/3/75; Mwamba Zulu and Enos Banda, Zizwe Village, 
Mpezeni, 5/3/75; Paramount Chief Mpezeni and Induna 
Nikazio Jere, P.O. Chipata, 5/3/75; and Kalapula 
E.S. (KKF/UNZA/UNESCO 1973) Research Paper on 
BSAC in Namwala District. 
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Foreign Office in London queried this. There was a 
danger of charges of 'forced labour' and so the Company 
was reminded that the N.E. Rhodesia Hut Tax Regulations 
made 'no provision for the acceptance of labour in lieu 
of taxes'. The B.S.A.C. Secretary replied that 'tax-
ation will be in kind or cash for the future'. Pre-
viously the exaction of labour in lieu of tax had been 
practised 'owing to the very limited amounts of cash 
which were then in circulation'. But the Administra-
tion in the field continued to mention •tax-labour' 
and so the Company's London office reminded Codrington 
that 'natives should be encouraged to pay the tax them-
selves'. The Foreign Office continued to be fearful 
lest 'an arrangement under which natives are compelled 
to labour ••• to discharge their hut tax ••• may become in-
distinguishable from mere traffic in forced labour•. 
But there were reassuring reports in their hands of the 
whole country being now 'under control' with 'peace and 
good order' prevailing and 'no longer any danger of a 
war with the natives•. 28 
In 1899, the B.S.A.C.'s Accountant ordered, 
for speedy delivery, 'twelve gang chains with four 
collars on each chain', and there is reason to believe 
that such items were regularly r~quested from London. 29 
28. NAZ: BS 1/16-19, FO to BSAC, 31/5/02; BSAC reply, 
5/7/02; BSAC, London, to Administrator, 9/5/03; 
FO to BSAC, 16/3/03; and BSAC to FO, 21/1/02. 
29. Ibid: BS 1/43-44, letter CT 9/99 of Secretary-
Accountant. 
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Zambian testimonies recorded over very large parts of 
the country corroborate the fact that, when musonko 
was first imposed upon societies which did not practise 
a cash economy, there were constant demonstrations of 
the determination of 'collectors' to exact the tax at 
all costs. After a cursory census of houses had been 
made - sometimes, as in the Namwala district, by adding 
the total of st~cks of thatching grass plucked from each 
house in a village - the collector and his armed askari 
would swoop on the village•. 30 These askari appear to 
have been recruited in general from distant and already 
subjugated areas. Malawi Tonga askari were employed 
in the Mwanga, Mambwe, Bemba, Lungu and other areas. 
Ndebele askari accompanied Gielgud, Anderson and other 
B.S.A.C. agents in the Kafue region. Bemba men were 
used as messengers in the Luangwa region, and after the 
defeat of Mpezeni, some collectors used Ngoni men for 
this work. The appearance of armed foreign Africans 
in a village naturally heightened the atmosphere of 
'war' as tax was being exacted. Indeed 'the white 
man's appearance in a village ••• was regarded as a de-
claration of war. War drums were sounded with that 
tone that makes a Mwila (member of Ila community) deve-
lop a fighting spirit'. Defaulters caught by these 
30. Kalapula, op.cit. 
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askari were bound together in a chain-gang and driven 
off to the nearest Boma. People in the Lenje chiefdom 
of Chipepo vividly recall the departure of chained men, 
marching to the crack of whips, to the Boma at Mwomboshi 
which was built by 'Sheketani' (Shekleton) and 'Chiru-
pula' Stephenson in 1902. 31 
The practice of burning 'huts' of tax default-
ers was not known in the area where 'Changa-changa' 
Harrison had settled before the establishment of B.S.A.C. 
rule. Similar testimony has been received from inform-
ants in the area of Chief Mbuluma of the Nsenga, at the 
court of Chief Shikabeta of the Soli, and from Headman 
Sumbi near Kayambi in the Northern Province. In these 
areas however, witnesses have all confirmed that there 
was much public flogging. At Old Mkushi, people remem-
ber how when an official was encamped near a village, 
anyone who coughed near his camp was liable to be seized, 
thrown on the ground and thrashed with a sjambok. Salt 
was sometimes then rubbed into the skin where it was 
broken by the flogging. The same evidence was given at 
Nanzhila in the Namwala district, just south- of the Kafue. 32 
31. Ibid: and RI/Chief Chipepo and Councillors, 14/10/75. 
The Boma at Kapopo (Chip~po) had been established 
in early 1900 by Francis Jones but Mwomboshi was the 
main B.S.A.C. centre in the area after 1902. 
Phrase in brackets is mine. 
32. RI/Kaimfa, Ching'ombe, 23/8/74; Simon Ngulube and 
others, Mbuluma, 4/9/74; Albino Ngulube and others, 
Zarapango, Mbuluma, 4/9/74; Chaponda Khondowe and 
Lucheleng'umbo, Shikabeta, 2/9/74; Headman Surnbi, 
Kayambi, 31/5/72; Old Mkushi, 12/8/74; and Benja-
min Shankwaya, Chose Ngana, Shadreck Samalomo, 
Nanzhila; 19/4/73. 
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On the islands in Lake Bangweulu, and around 
the Lake, people remember the destruction of both houses 
and grain-stores by fire. This was also the testimony 
of people at Mukupa Katandula on Mweru wa Ntipa (Mweru 
Marsh) in the Northern Province; in the area of Kabwe, 
and in Serenje district, and in the Lala chiefdom of 
Shaibila. But it was not only by fire and by whip 
that the collection of tax became an occasion of terror 
in villages. There were night raids, accompanied by 
floggings, as in Namwala district. In consequence, 
people began to plan a variety of subterfuges to evade 
payment. In some areas, swift runners would move from 
village to village by night to hand on to others, not 
yet visited by the 'collector' or his askari, a supply 
of tax receipts collected among themselves. Meanwhile, 
askari, acting for their masters, were free to demand 
tax in excess of what was stipulated and also to harrass 
women. The testimony of a headman in the Chipata dis-
trict seems to sum up the impact of taxation on the 
various communities of northern Zambezia, in the~ Chewa 
language, thus: Inali nkhortdo, nkhondo yoopsveratu - it 
was war, most terrifying war•. 33 
33. RI/Kapurnfi, Chilubi Island, 20/11/74; Headman 
Mbilima and others, Chilubi Is., 20/11/74; Ba Na-
kasese, Mushamba, Samfya, 19/11/74; Sarnson Maphara 
and Edward Gondwe, Lundazi, 21/6/72; Proceedings 
of Seminar-Workshop on Oral Records of Local History, 
Lundazi, June 1972, esp. pp.117 and 145; RI/Chief 
Chipepo and Councillors 14/10/75; Benjamin Mpande, 
Kalwa, Serenje, 19/10/73; Kalapula, op.cit.; Kawesha 
J. (KKF/UNZA/UNESCO) Research Paper on BSAC rule in 
the Kawambwa District; and Phiri S.H. (KKF/UNZA/ 
UNESCO 1973) Research Paper on 'Some Relationships 
between the Imposition of Musonkho ••• and Some of 
Zambia's Problems with the Rural ReconstructionPro-
gramme• citing testimony of Headman Misirnambo. 
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The accounts of their own activities in respect 
of tax collection by some B.S.A.C. officials provide 
confirmation for the testimonies of Zambian people through-
out the country. 'Chirupula' Stephenson himself re-
counted one tax collecting incident thus: 'I remember 
at Mukonchi's village, one of the princesses proved 
obdurate. She said she saw no reason on earth why she 
should give me money; and I said I would burn her house 
down if she didn't. We were both obstinate: and so 
the firebrand was laid to the thatch and ••• the hut went 
up in flames•. In retrospect, however, Stephenson wrote 
thus about tax: 'I ask you, my philosopher, what would 
you do had the Germans, having won the war, started in 
to administer England and to compel you to pay them an 
enormous tax in marks and pfennigs, obtainable only in 
Germany - a tax which would involve you labouring solid-
ly for at least a month in every year at work so foreign 
to you that you were forced to break up your homelife 
of ease ••• and become a veritable slave? Would you set 
out to get these pfennigs and heave them disdainfully 
at the foreigner's head - the Protector of the Poor, the 
Viceroy of God, the Tax-Collector Omnipotent - and be 
gaoled for your pains? Or would you look out for a 
nice soft billet under the foreigner7 ••• would you throw 
your weight about a bit7 ••• would you rather enjoy order-
ing the mighty-who-are-fallen to eat humble pie - even 
foreign humble pie? And then, wouldn't you sometimes 
292. 
"revert" - in favour of your own flesh and blood7 134 
Fraccis, a 'collector' in the Lake Bangweulu 
region, told the White Fathers on Chilubi Island that 
he had been given authority to burn all defaulters' 
houses, as the Unga people were refusing en masse to pay 
musonko. On his return from a tour of the island, he 
reported to the Fathers that he had 'found one vi1lage 
hidden in the lake and blown it up'. Headman Matipa 
said then that the Unga would now declare war on the 
Company, but the subsequent visitations of West-Sheane, 
a man of notorious severity, and Goodall from Luwingu 
with 'la chaine',eventually quenched the smouldering 
fires of Unga resistance. 35 
One of the notable agents of the B.S.A. 
Company, who had worked in Rhodesia before coming to 
'Barotseland', was Colin Harding. His reminiscences 
appeared in book form in 1933, entitled 'Far Bugles', 
and they present him as a man who took part in numerous 
armed encounters with African rulers and peoples with 
that degree of relish which appears in many of Rhodes's 
agents. In 1906, however, his service with the Barotse 
Native Police was terminated, officially because of the 
necessity to apply 'drastic economy' to the Company's 
34. Stephenson, op.cit., pp. 227-8 and p. 87. Rukavina 
suggests that Stephenson's resignation from the 
BSAC may have been due, to some extent, to the 
severity of the Tax Regulations. 
35. WF: Chilubi, 12/2/05, 16/3/05, 17/5/05, 22/6/06, 
9/5/11. 
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operations. The real reason was a clash with the 
Administration in North-western Rhodesia over the methods 
in use for forcing people to pay tax. 36 The disagree-
ment reached a climax over a patrol to Kaunga, which 
was the subject of a despatch from the Assistant District 
Commissioner, Batoka. That despatch claimed that, 
while destroying the houses of defaulters, the patrols 
were under orders to preserve those of people who had 
paid their tax. But, said MacGregor, 'I regret to find 
that, upon the approach of the patrol, men, women and 
children, with all stock fiee to the hills and will not 
come down to be spoken to. This attitude leaves no 
alternative course open and defaulters• huts are des-
troyed ••• In one case natives gathered on a hill and 
37 shouted out insulting terms to our party as it passed'. 
Among Colonial Office documents on North-
western Rhodesia, there are papers relating to Harding's 
resignation, which include a printed pamphlet. As an 
appendix to this pamphlet is a 'list of huts burnt' 
during the Kahunga (sic) patrol between March and May 
1905, the total of which is 970. This could be taken 
to represent action which rendered not less than 4,500 
people homeless. In addition, 64 cattle were confis-
cated by the patrol. Harding's pamphlet also gave, as 
an appendix, this despatch from Captain Hodson of the 
36. Harding c., op.cit., pp. 140-143. 
37. PRO: CO 879/86 African South 763, ADC, Batoka, 
to DC, 9/4/05. 
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Bartoseland Native Police to his Commandant: 'April 5th 
(1905) - Went to Nkrummai's Kraal 12 miles easterly 
direction generally Mwanakanego District; found the 
people had cleared and taken all their cattle with them. 
Burnt the kraals and did a little damage to the crops 
and collected food for the party. 
'Siamatuli's people (a kraal about tf miles 
further on) came in to the A.D.C. bringing presents, so 
as there are v. few defaulters at this kraal I decided 
to proceed to it, but warned them about the tax having 
to be paid. 
'April 6th - went on about 10 miles to Kasengo's Kraal, 
Momba District. Found here that people had cleared, 
in two of the huts there were receipts, so left them 
standing, burning the remainder. Another of his head-
men's kraals, a mile away was also burnt, and some of 
the lands destroyed. Could hear the people in the hills 
but the showed no signs of coming in. 
'April 7th -Went on to Chumaika's Kraal, about seven 
miles east, one of Kasenga's headmen, en route burnt 
two small kraals, the people having cleared. Burnt 
all the huts in Chumaika's kraal except his own, as on 
the roof of his hut found Hut Tax receipt; did slight 
damage to his lands. Trekked on again 4f miles in a 
south-easterly direction and came to Chibambi's kraal 
where the people had only just cleared, burnt all the 
huts and did slight damage to the crops and collected 
food for the party. 
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'April 8th - Went on in a more southerly direction 7f 
miles and reached Siamkamoni's kraal. He, together 
with a few old men and women came down to meet us, and 
was most civil. But, when asked about the Hut Tax. 
immediately said they had no money; then when told 
that the cattle would be bought, replied that they had 
gone to the Kafue. He was then told that all huts 
which had not been paid for would be burnt next day if 
the money were not forthcoming, and again Mr McGregor 
and myself went to his kraal later in the day and~ •• 
his reply was again, What can I do? ••• This, we consid-
ered nonsense as, of course, hearing of our approach, 
he had sent off his cattle. He sent down food for the 
police that night, all of which was well paid for by 
myself in limbo. 
'April 9th - Went off with the A.D.C. Party and all the 
police except a small guard ••• in an easterly direction 
to visit some of Siamkamoni's headmen. Came to several 
kraals from which the people had only just cleared. 
Burnt all kraals (except those on which receipts were 
found) and did a little damage to the lands, but nothing 
to what shaid have been done, time not allowing for this; 
also this involves a lot of work. Returned to camp 
after sunset; on our way home the people who had evi-
dently fled to the hills shouted insulting remarks to 
the police. This I took as quite natural after burning 
their huts and attach no importance to the matter. 
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'April 10th - Went off again in an easterly direction 
but further into the hills ••• leaving Corpl. Pilkington ••• 
to look after the camp ••• Visited four kraals, burnt all 
the huts time only allowing of very little damage to the 
lands. Food was collected. Tomorrow ••• we shall, 
after destroying the huts that have not been paid for 
in Siamukamoni's kraal, proceed in a westerly direction 
••• Cannot see what other action can be taken where the 
people will not meet us•. 38 
We shall have occasion to look at Zambia's 
North-western Province when we are reviewing the history 
of labour recruitment. A Unique collection, in Rhodes 
House, Oxford, of the personal diaries and letters of 
Theodore Williams, sheds light on tax collection and 
related 'administrative' actions during the twelve years, 
from 1812, when Williams was serving as a B.S.A.C. 
Native Commissioner. He wrote to his parents weekly 
throughout most of his twelve years with the Company. 
Williams worked in the Solwezi, Mwinilunga and Kasempa 
districts, and took part in the hostilities around 
Mbala during the 1914-18 war. Perhaps because his 
home was in Jamaica, Williams talked of 'niggers' and 
his regular use of the word 'savages' certainly indi-
cates that he shared the rough racial insensitivity 
which characterised the whole B.S.A.C. operation in 
Central Africa. When people fell on the ground before 
38. PRO: Co 147/480: Harding Papers, including pamphlet, 
esp. Appendix XIV and XIII. Underlinings are mine. 
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him in Sakupa's village near Kansanshi early in 1913 
and women ululated in his honour he was 'flattered'. 
He was distressed when the 'savages take to the woods 
when a peaceful traveller comes their way'. Soon, 
however, he was commenting on the fact that 'every nigger 
has a gun - they get them from those stinking Belgians 
and Portuguese across the border'. But he was now 
aware of the deep distrust and fear inspired in the 
local community by the Company's presence, and espe-
cially by his superior officer, Pound, who seemed to 
the people to be 'the man who put them in prison for 
hitherto unknown offences and who threatens them with 
prison if they will not work and earn their tax ••• the 
man with whose advent ••• the announcement of tax was 
first heard'. 
Williams recorded an exodus to Angola and 
the Congo from 'the entire district'. 'We hear from 
messengers ••• that not a village has stayed in the 
northern part of the district - they have all fled in 
the night. There is no doubt that it is the 10/- tax 
that they revolt from ••• 10/- seems the deuce of a tax 
to put on men who don't normally own more than a pot 
and a spear and a yard or two of calico ••• sonka is the 
word meaning tax, a N.E.R. word, whence spread taxation. 
The Wandembo connect this - and therefore abhor it -
with a word of theirs, sonkola - a verb meaning "to be 
impaled". And rumours of this ••• will spread against 
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any efforts at negation'. The massive exodus of people 
from a great area around the Boma badly affected Pound, 
'putting him off his grub and sleep and spoiling his 
nerves. He was quite apt to jump for his rifle if 
anything cropped up suddenly'. Pound was 'tyrannical' 
and the effects of the taxation policy were devastating, 
even after an amiable visit from Frank Melland. More-
over, in the neighbouring district of Kasempa, the 
Commissioner was famous for his 'floggings'. So, when 
Williams went on tour around Kaumba and Nyakanshayita 
(sic), he found '2 old men and 2 old women, the rem-
nants of those who have run away 2 months ago - all 4 
will be dead in a year, of starvation. The blessings 
of tax are manifold', he said ••• 'It raises my gorge to 
think of attempting to tax these savages - even the 
young ones. But then, when the rub comes, sacrificing 
every single item of improving administration and stick-
ing to the dirty tax'. In an earlier letter Williams 
had exclaimed: 'If only this infernal tax had never 
been talked of for 20 years 1 
this would have been 1' 
What a happier place 
It worried Williams that, whereas in North-
eastern Rhodesia tax was 3/- but the official monthly 
wage was 4/-, in his district the tax and the monthly 
wage had both been started at 10/-. This meant that 
the Company had to pay a higher wage and consequently 
'a higher price for food of all sorts - but we don't 
get the tax l' 'All that the tax has done', he wrote, 
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'is simply to frighten the people of us, making it harder 
to get them to work for us (for they will work for the 
Portuguese and other traders, etc. in moderation and a 
good many make their money out of expeditions for rubber 
to the Congo - which they sell to the Portuguese) and 
depopulate the district. The D.C. published it as 
his object partly ••• to drive out the worthless who 
would not earn their tax, from the country. In either 
case, if getting the people to stay to work, the tax 
was a failure. If driving the people was the object, 
then the tax was barbaric - cruel morally and materially 
a damned foolish thing, for now we have no villages about 
to bring us food'. When Hazel!, the new District Go-
mmissioner at Kasempa, visited his Boma, Williams comment-
ed thus: 'There is a great deal of powerfulness, if 
very little of principle, in his creed, which is - first, 
have. obedience - and the payment of tax is an outward 
expression of obedience and subjugation•. 39 
As late as mid-1914, Williams was still 
struggling with the problems of depopulation consequent 
upon continuing tax raids. Of the people of Kabasa, 
he wrote that they were 'a stiff-necked lot ••• they will 
have to have their houses burnt before they see that I 
mean business'. Yet four years later, he made a 
39. RH:MSS.Afr.s.776-81 Diaries of Theodore Williams, 
10/1/13. 25/1/13; ~~S.Afr.s.779, Williams' letters, 
folio 89; folio 156, 8/5/13; folio 158; folio 
186, 27/7/13; folio 172, 16/6/13; folio 201, 
23/9/13; fQlt~ 213, 7/10/13. Underlining is 
mine. 
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significant comment on the relationship of tax revenue 
to the welfare of the people. 'I can't tell you•, he 
wrote to his mother, 'how great the deficit is even now 
in running the country; but you can't imagine a country 
run much more cheaply. We make the chiefs and headmen 
do most of the management ••• {But) no schools, no doctor 
and, for example, the Solwezi Division of about six-
thousand square miles and with a population of.about 
10,000 natives, in charge of your first-born and Griff-
iths at £375 and £280 per annum respectively. Local 
revenue is about £1,300 (of which tax is about £1,150) 
and local expenditure about £1,200'. Meanwhile. Borna 
messengers were still engaged in 'catch as catch can' 
on their tax raids and Williams himself told his mother 
how he had 'thrashed' his head messenger 'roundly' for 
becoming drunk in the company of some village headmen. 
His local nickname, Mutelanjambi, connoted his habit of 
looking sideways like a shy girl; and indeed a reading 
of his voluminous letters to his parents gives the im-
pression of a naturally shy man, not at ease in rough 
company. Pound's nickname Kusaloka refers to the fury 
40 of boiling water. 
40. Ibid: folio 365, 27/6/14; and MSS.Afr.s.780, 
Williams's correspondence continued, folio 323, 
5/8/18; and 781, ditto, folio 26, 7/6/19; and 
see NAZ: KSE 4/1, Mwinilunga District Notebook, 
for list of nicknames of BSAC officials between 
1907 and 1919. 
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Williams's full, personal account was written 
week by week without any fear that a senior official 
might see what he was recording. It testifies to the 
fact that the coercive exaction of tax, involving the 
use of sjamboks and burning not only of houses but of 
grain stores, continued for many years after the first 
invasion of northern Zambezia by the B.S.A. Company's 
forces. The White fathers also recorded how, in 1913, 
they saw '20 prisoners, chained by the neck, being taken 
to Changala to build houses for Europeans from Fort Hill'. 
Despite the brutality of penalties which they had seen 
imposed by the Company men for the best part of two 
decades, they were loth to protest however. They 
had, for example, recorded how, in 1905? a cowherd who 
stole about £3 from one of the Fathers was sentenced to 
a year's hard labour in the chain gang. As late as 
1917, they noted that Company agents were still burning 
all mitanda despite the fact that these grass 'tents' 
were essential during the periods when crops required 
to be guarded against monkeys and other animals; the 
reason for forbidding mitanda being that the collectors 
41 found difficulty in gathering people for tax payment. 
In 1908, Robert Wright a L.M.S. missionary at 
Niamkolo told the Society's London secretary that people 
were finding great difficulty in paying tax. 'To obtain 
41. WF: Kayambi, 20/3/13; Cgilubula, 6/1/05; Kayambi, 
24/1/17. 
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money for taxes and force the young men south to work, 
the Administrator told the people at a public indaba 
at which I was present that in future non-tax-payers 
would be put for three months on the chain. But that 
if the young men cared, they could go south, get work 
and pay their taxes as well as those of their relatives'. 
As late as 1911, Chesn~ye, now Magistrate at Mbala, was 
insisting that ' a youth over 14 whose physique and in-
telligence would qualify him to earn 12/- a. month, 
should be held liable to tax whether married or not•. 
Moreover, 'a boy of the above description who system-
atically inhabits the veranda of some relative's hut 
should be treated as an evader•. Hut burning was still 
to be practised. Wright had meanwhile expressed 
pleasure at a change in the behaviour of the local 'eo-
llector'. 'Instead of coming as he did last year ex-
torting taxes from old and starving people, he came re-
mitting taxes and giving food to the old sick and in-
firm ••• Last year the people lived for four months on 
roots and any rubbish they could get to sustain life. 
When in such a condition they were compelled to give 
taxes ••• This year there has been no starvation ••• My 
protests to the Administrator have borne fruit'. 
In 1915, Dr Wareham voiced his distress that 
the tax was to be further increased and 'that men should 
be compelled to go and find work hundreds of miles from 
home in order to pay that tax'. When the increase was 
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applied, the missionaries feared that many of their 
teachers - who were less poor than the average villager -
would be jailed for tax default as 'it is hard for them 
to find the money'. Tax-raiding, however, continued 
all over northern Zambezia, and so two other missionary 
comments on conditions in the latter years of our period 
merit attention. Rev. J. Bouchet of the Paris Mission 
at Sefula protested in 1919 that 'to put into prison 
with chain and all a man who has not paid tax is not 
fair'; while G.R. Suckling of the Christian Mission in 
Many Lands at Kabompo, claimed that 'such arrest is 
effected without white supervision and involves being 
tied with cord or chains ••• and marched through the 
42 villages sometimes for several days'. 
Beyond our period, officials were still well 
aware of the hardships caused by musonko. In 1933, 
the Provincial Commissioner in the Northern Province 
'issued a ukase that Africans were not to be treated 
lightly because they did not pay their tax, in spite 
of the fact that there was no work from which they could 
earn money ••• As a result, most of the gaols in N.R. 
were overflowing. I had 100 quite frequently', said 
42. CCWM, C.Africa, Box 14, Wright, Naimkolo, 8/12/08; 
W,G. Robertson, Kawimbe, 28/11/11; Wright, 12/2/10; 
Box 17, Wareham, Kyengwa, 13/10/15; Box 19, 
Robertson, 3/2/21; and NAZ: KDE 2/39/3, letters 
to Res. Magistrate, Mongu, from Bouchet, 24/1/19 
and Suckling 16/11/18. 
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one District Officer, 'in the Isoka prison which had 
43 been designed to hold twenty'. In 1937, after 
thirteen years of government under the direct control of 
the Colonial Office, the Acting Governor, in a lengthy 
minute on 'Native Taxation•, censured 'the imposition 
of penalties and measures of compulsion such as offend 
against our sense of justice'. He had been 'astonished 
to see prisons in such an unproductive region as Barotse-
land filled with tax defaulters'. There were 7,109 
persons committed to prison in that year (1934) for tax 
default. 44 As the B.S.A. Company prepared to hand over 
Northern Rhodesia to the Colonial Office in 1923, 
criminal conviction in the Livingstone sub-district 
amounted to 2,416, of which 1,640 were for tax default. 
In the Chipata district, in 1917, 5,204 out of a total 
of 5,416 convictions had been pased upon tax defaulters. 
The Commissioner for the Mweru-Luapula Province reported 
45 5,406 tax convictions in 1921-2 and 8,768 in 1922-3. 
Indeed, imprisonment with hard labour had been urged as 
a severer penalty than 'forfeiture' by fire, as early 
as 1905, as people were able to replace a burned house 
quite speedily. 
43. RH.MSS.Afr.r.113 - 'Notes on Northern Rhodesia' 
by S.R. Denny, pp. 20 ff. Isoka 1933-4. Under-
lining is mine. 
44. NAZ: P 3/3/3, Minute by Acting Governor, Charles 
Dundas, 26/4/37. 
45. Ibid: Livingstone District Note-book KSC 4/1, 
pp. 334 and 404; KSJ 4/1, Annual Report, Fort 
Jameson Sub-District to 31/3/17; and KDF 6/1/6 
Mweru-Luapula Reports. 
46. PRO: CO 879/86 African South no. 763, Coryndon 
to HC, 30/5/05. 
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Our survey of 'hut-tax' in northern Zarnbezia 
has so far made little mention of the Lozi kingdom. 
The reason for this may be supported by Lord Hailey's 
observation that 'the policy of the Chartered Company, 
save in respect of the treaty state of Barotseland, was 
one of direct rule•. 47 We have been concerned to re-
cord so far how such 'direct rule', supported by drastic 
punitive measures, enforced 'hut-tax' upon the con-
quered peoples of the territory. The position of the 
Lozi was different because, as we noted above, the 
British Government had exercised distinct restraint upon 
the Company as it moved into Lewanika's domain. More-
over, the Company was anxious to be free to carry out 
maximal exploitation of the territory's mineral wealth 
and so was willing to move more circumspectly in its 
dealings with Lewanika in an attempt to exaggerate the 
extent of his 'empire' and, by corollary, its own field 
of mineral operations. This special treatment of 
the Lozi is illustrated by such facts as these: (a) 
whereas other chiefs were reluctantly and belatedly 
given very small 'subsidies', Lewanika was in receipt 
of an annual subvention, as stipulated by the Concession 
of 1900, of £850; 48 (b) sundry communications from 
47. Lord Hailey 'An African Survey' (Oxford 1958), 
p. 452. Underlining is mine. 
48. For text of 'Lewanika Concession' 17/10/1900, 
see Gann L.H., op.cit., 215-220 Appendix II. 
Note that the sum originally promised by Lochner 
in 1890, under pressure from Coillard of the PMS 
was £2,000 p.a. 
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London urging that the Company comply with the spirit 
of 'protection' as originally promised; 49 (c) the 
Company's attempt to operate a system of 'indirect rule' 
o~er peoples neighbouring the Lozi by the use of indunas 
50 appointed by Lewanika; (d) the Company's agreement, 
however reluctant, to allow a % of the tax revenue in 
his 'empire' to be paid to Lewanika; and (e) the pro-
tracted conflict between the Company and the Lozi royal 
house about minerals in the area originally reserved 
from prospecting. 51 
What happened in respect of taxation in the 
Lozi'empire' appears to have been like this, namely 
that the initial purchase by Rhodes of the Ware Con-
cession, noted above, and the signing soon after of the 
Lochner Concession were not followed up quickly by de-
cisive annexation of the Lozi kingdom to the Company. 
Lewanika's swift reaction against what he regarded 
as perfidy on·Lochner's part was never effectively 
appeased, despite fluctuations in the mood of the king 
and of his court in the following years. Though 
49. E.g. MSA: CO to FO. 3/5/90; FO to Coryndon, 
8/4/97, etc. 
SO. Ibid: e.g. Codrington to BSAC, London, 28/8/07; 
Text of Agreement between Lewanika and BSAC, 11/8/09; 
and note also Magistrate, Mumbwa to SNA opposing 
Lozi authority over Ila, 7/11/18 and SNA's reply, 
21/11/18. 
51. Ibid: ~g. Provincial Commissioner, Mungu, to 
Chief Secretary, 21/3/32, reported how he had 
treatened to withdraw financial assistance to King 
Yeta if the Lozi rejected the BSA Company's plan 
to establish 'Minerals Separation Ltd.' in the re-
served area - eight years after the transfer of 
Northern Rhodesia to Colonial Office rule. 
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Coillard of the Paris Missionary Society could be held 
to have 'sold the pass.• to Rhodes's agents, it can also 
be argued that his often fearful but not the less insis-
tent pleading of Lewanika's cause increased the British 
Government's misgivings over the whole affair. Like 
no other northern Zambezian ruler, Lewanika was able 
to correspond with the High Commissioner in Cape Town 
and, in 1902, to visit Britain in person. Though 
Lewanika's throne was often far from secure, he was un-
doubtedly strengthened by the fact of his relations 
with both the B.S.A. Company and the direct representa-
tives of the Crown in southern Africa. The rumour of 
a rising against Lewanika obliged the Company to handle 
him with care, as the rebels of his court were certainly 
not in a mood to entertain further encroachments on 
their state. Lewanika was essential to the Company 
just as, at times, it appeared as though he needed the 
Company to bolster his power. The Colonial Office, 
nervous about the risk of 'serious native disturbances', 
was meanwhile urging the High Commissioner to put a 
firm rein upon the Company's desire to start taxing 
Lewanika's 'empire' at a higher rate than in Southern 
Rhodesia. The increasing scrutiny of Central African 
affairs by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
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52 Society was further embarassing London. The whole 
story of B.S.A.C.- Lozi relations is distinguished by 
constant reference to contractual obligations and indeed 
this may heLp to explain how the idea grew, albeit 
wrongly, that British action in northern Zambezia was 
based on treaties. 
The matter of taxation, therefore, was delayed 
while a modus operandi was sought. In mid-1902 the 
Company said that it was willing to agree that 'at the 
outset' the tax should 'be collected by Lewanika on 
behalf of the Administration, to whom he will hand it 
over'. But this would only operate 'in those districts 
in which his authority is sufficient to ensure the 
peaceable payment of the tax•. On the one hand it 
would suit the Company to have the unpleasant business 
of visiting the villages to exact the tax done on their 
behalf by the King's indunas; but, on the other hand, 
Lewanika was sufficiently unpopular for such action 
by his agents to provoke open hostility. Moreover, 
he was not likely to be content with such a menial role 
in the extraction of taxes which he must then 'hand 
over' to the Company, even though he replied at first, 
52. See pp •• 71 abpve; Stokes E. and Brown R. 'The 
Zambesian Past' (Manchester, 1966) pp. 261-301, 
article by Stokes, 'Barotseland: the Survival of 
an African State'; PRO: eo 879/68 African South 
no. 656 - Milner, HC to Chamberlain, Colonial 
Secretary, agreeing to oppose N.W. Rhodesia tax, 
14/5/00; RCS: Mss 52, Coillard Papers, Folio II, 
Coillard to HC, 30/5/91; 'Bulawayo Chronicle' on 
rumoured Lozi rising, 6/2/01. 
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'There is no reason why I should not try as I used to 
get tribute from them'. The Colonial Office however 
was now alarmed at the Company's apparent determination 
to fix the North-western Rhodesia tax at £1, or twice 
the Southern Rhodesian rate. At the same time, Coryndon, 
the Administrator, was not persuaded that collection 
of taxes by indunas sent by Lewanika 'would show the 
people that he is still their King'. Rather, he feared 
that 'all loyal natives will strongly object ••• This re-
fusal will mean continual fighting; and in the probable 
case of serious resistance ••• or the murder of native 
collectors, I shall be bound in principle to support 
the recognised authority•. 53 
South of the Zambezi there was pressure from 
the Secretary for Native Affairs for approval of an 
increase of 'hut tax' to £2 despite the fact that 
Company agents still considered themselves obliged, as 
for instance in the case of the Mtoko district, to burn 
both houses and crops of 'defaulters', and, in Milner's 
phrase, to construe non-payment of taxes as 'an act of 
rebellion'. The reason offered by the Company in 
approving the increase in principle was that it would 
'bring our natives in line on taxation with those of 
53. PRO: CO 879/78 African South no. 702, BSAC, London, 
to Col. Harding, Ag. Administrator, NWR, 8/8/02; 
Lewanika to BSA 10/7/02; CO to BSAC, 17/12/02, 
Coryndon to BSAC, 9/1/03. 
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the Transvaal'. Coryndon, meanwhile, told Lewanika 
that, when the Company had collected tax money, 'I will 
send it to you at Lealui so that you shall see it and ••• 
send it back to me intact•. Lewanika's visit to Eng-
land had further delayed action on taxes and increased 
the Company's hesitance in forcing the pace. Coryndon 
therefore began to press for authority to start taxing 
weaker tribes like the Toka who were nominally tribu-
tary to the Lozi, as there would be 'no chance of organ-
ised opposition' from such 'timid' people. The Colonial 
Office was further confused by the danger of a confron-
tation with Portugal over Lewanika's claims to a con-
siderably larger 'empire' that he had claimed in 1891. 
Lewanika's response was that the frontier with Angola 
should be fixed before any taxation was imposed. He 
wanted, as the District Commissioner reported, the 
railway line to reach Livingstone first, so that 'the 
boys would be able to earn money and so pay the hut-
tax•. Though cattle were plentiful in the Barotse 
Valley, they were mainly Lewanika's personal property, 
and so the average Lozi was in fact poorer than it 
54 might appear. 
54. Ibid: SNA to BSAC, telegram in ref. to Bloem-
fontein Conference on Rhodesian matters, 24/2/03; 
and BSAC's reply, 27/2/03; Res.Comm to HC re 
Mtoko district, 22/7/02; Milner, HC's reply, 
26/9/02; Coryndon to BSAC on Toka taxation, 3/3/03; 
Chamberlain to Milner, 3/6/03; Lewanika to DC, 
Lealui, 15/8/03 and DC to Secretary, Kalomo, 
21/8/03. 
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While the Company was facing constant unrest 
south of the Zambezi over taxation, negotiations dragged 
on in the north, further complicated by Lewanika's 
demand - which he had reluctantly reduced from 50% to 
20% - for a share of tax revenue for his own use. 
Marshal! Hole replied, as Acting Administrator, that 
the hut tax was 'the contribution made by your people 
in return for the benefits of British protection' and 
that the King's 'commission' was 'in lieu of the tribute 
you formerly collected and ••• have agreed to abandon'. 
Hole was also not ready to consider more than 5% as 
'commission•. The Company told the Colonial Office 
that Lewanika was 'not capable of handling more'. 
However, with this issue still unresolved, the Secre-
tary of Native Affairs, Frank Worthington - known to 
the Lozi as Nq'ake, the Tortoise - reported that the 
first collection of tax in N.W. Rhodesia had recorded 
8,300 payments with only 5 defaulters. The Colonial 
Office now wanted 10% to go to the King, part of which 
would be applied 'to works of public utility for the 
benefits of the natives'. But the High Commissioner 
wanted Lewanika's share to be fixed at a maximum of 
£1,200 p.a. 
A marked increase in unrest in both Angola 
and German South-west Africa and the continuing evidences 
of resistance to taxation in Southern Rhodesia undoubted-
ly influenced the British Government's thinking; the 
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situation being aggravated by a report of Ila resistance 
to the hut tax serious enough to warrant the swift 
despatch of '40 police and one Maxim gun' against 
Siankamolo's village. 'The lesson will be of the 
greatest value•, wrote the Barotse Native Police Command-
ant who intended 'to inflict some punishment for the 
refusal to pay in the first place•. The fu~ental 
sympathy between the British Government and the Com-
pany was further confirmed at this time by a Colonial 
Office communication giving approval to the fining of 
defaulters as 'forfeiture' by fire did not seem to be 
regarded by the people as a severe enough penalty. 
But London was not sure whether proof of the Kafue 
area's ability to pay tax had yet been established and 
wanted the rate to be held at 10/- for the time being. 
Tax must be exacted from all adults, the term 'wife' 
being interpreted as 'any wife of native custom or con-
cubine'. This rigorous approach was further illustra-
ted by Coryndon's report, in 1907, of fines for default 
amounting to £S or three months imprisonment with hard 
labour•. 55 
SS. Ibid: Minute by Hole, 28/3/04; Hole to Lewanika, 
9/4/04; PLG: BSA 9/108, BSAC Secy. to ao 5/12/04; 
PRO: eo 879/78 African South no 702; SNA's report 
of first NWR collection, 17/11/04; Lyttelton, eo 
to HC, 18/2/05; HC to CO, 3/7/05; British Am-
bassador Lisbon, to FO, 16/2/05; despatch of BNP 
Commandant on Ila unrest, 23/3/05; Lyttelton to 
HC, 15/7/05; and 879/95 African South no. 872, 
Coryndon to HC, 15/3/07. See ~lso NAZ-BS 2/96, 
'Native Unrest in the Kafue AreaS, sundry memo-
randa. 
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Communal punishment was the rule in the 
Company's dealings with local people, and no concern was 
expressed by the Colonial Office at the report of Sir 
Arthur Lawley, the High Commissioner, that, after the 
Kaunga patrol which led to Harding's quarrel with the 
Company, a fine of 100 bags of grain was to be imposed 
on the villages concerned 'as punishment of the refusal 
to pay in the first instance', in addition to the demo~ 
lition of houses. Harding's view, noted above, that 
many of the people did not have 'the means to pay', 
and that the patrols had great difficulty in distinguish-
ing 'with accuracy the defaulters from the non-default-
ers•, had no recorded effect on the Company's practice 
of concluding whole communities together for punishment. 
As such punishment fell on villages on the fringes of 
Lewanika's kingdom, the might of the Company was further 
underlined. The 'collector' at Batoka reported whole 
communities in flight before tax patrols. 'I regret', 
he told his immediate superior, 'having to take the 
active part forced on me but have no alternative if I 
am to prevent the idea becoming rooted in the native 
mind that exemption from punishment and hut tax is to 
be achieved by all able-bodied men absenting themselves, 
merely deputing to a few women and children to present 
••• a small quantity of meal or grain or a fowl in lieu•. 
Coryndon therefore wanted the rigours of gaol to replace 
the burning of houses. 56 
56. Ibid: HC to CO, 8/5/05, Harding to HC, 14/4/05 
and see p. 292.ff,an~; ADC Batoka, to DC, 9/4/05, 
15/4/05, 24/5/05; Coryndon to HC, 30/5/05. 
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The Colonial Office continued to be worried 
lest the districts which the Company was so eager to 
tax at once might genuinely fail to yield what was de-
manded. But the High Commissioner was now championing 
the Company's cause, repeating Coryndon's statement 
that the people had had ample warning since 1902 and no 
excuse for evasion in view of the 'exceptional opportu-
nities of earning money owing to the labour requirements 
of the Northern Copper Company and the Rhodesia Copper 
Company since 1901'. By mid-1905, Cor¥ndon was re-
carding pleasure at the High Commissioner's approval of 
his plan to raise tax in the Sisheke, Mankoya and Kafue 
districts and throughout Ila country. This approval 
was given without the prior assent of the Colonial 
Office and in spite of Lyttelton's relatively strong 
criticism of the burning of crops as 'not only illegal 
57 but barbarous•. Initially the Charter had given the 
Company the power to levy taxes and so the last word 
was with the B.S.A.C. men rather than with the Colonial 
Office - a fact of great significance in considering 
subsequent political history on both sides of the Zambexi. 
Hut Tax was thoroughly in force by 1906, not 
only over the whole of North-Eastern, but also over a 
large part of North-western Rhodesia. It is therefore 
interesting to note what Selborne, the High Commissioner, 
57. Ibid: eo to HC, 6/7/05; HC to eo, 22/7/05; 
Coryndon to HC, 5/6/05. 
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wrote to the Earl of Elgin at the Colonial Office in 
the middle of 1907. Referring to the Lewanika Con-
cession of 1900, he stated that it had given the Company 
'mineral and trading and railway construction rights, 
etc., judicial rights regarding Europeans, and the 
right (subject to the protection of native interests) 
to make grants of land for farming purposes in the 
Batoka and Mashukulumbwe countries, but no right was 
given to tax the natives'. By 1906 it was thus estab-
lished that, wherever the B.S.A. Company claimed the 
right to rule, local communities must respond by paying 
tax or suffer the summary penalties imposed by Company 
officials. In the Lozi kingdom Lewanika was now com-
plaining that traders were refusing to pay cash for the 
cattle they bought and insisting on exchanging trade 
goods instead. Apart from the fact that the trader 
could claim the sole right to assess·the value of such 
goods, the Lozi were finding great difficulty in pro-
curing cash for their hut taxes. Lewanika was now also 
feeling the effects of 'white administration ••• the 
suppression of domestic slavery, the imposition of hut 
tax, the prevention of the promiscuous raiding and 
plundering by which the Barotse obtained and held their 
supremacy, and so on·~ as Coryndon reported. Lozi 
suspicions of the Company's perfidious tactics were not 
lessening. It was at this time that Coryndon was 
battling for the recognition of the Company's land rights 
in the Lozi kingdom and suggested confidentially to the 
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Resident at Lealui that, as a last resort, he might 
offer Lewanika, as a quid pro quo, 10% of the tax revenue 
from the 'territory lately acquired from North-eastern 
Rhodesia'. However since 'Lewanika has no shadow of a 
claim to this new country ••• you should use your best 
endeavours to obtain his signature without reference to 
•t• 58 1 • 
'To the tax itself', writes A.J. Wills, 'the 
reaction appeared ••• to be nowhere unfavourable'. This 
statement cannot stand, however, in the light of the 
detailed correspondence of the Colonial Office with 
reference to the B.S.A. Company's rule to the north~ 
any more than to the south of the Zambezi. 59 As we 
have seen, there was widespread resistance to the Corn-
pany's rule, intensified by the added rigours of 'hut-
tax' exactions both north and south. Despite Harding's 
report in 1901 that all but one of the Ila chiefs had 
•made their submission', the general turbulence of 
Central Africa was certainly not diminishing in the 
first decade of the century. There was open rebellion 
against the Portuguese in the Angolan districts of 
'Bihe, Balundu, Chebokwe, Liumbe and Luchaze• - sparked 
by the brutalities of traders but blamed on missionaries 
by the Portuguese authorities; and from the British 
Central Africa Protectorate, Sharpe reported to the 
58. NAZ: BS 2/277, HC to Elgin, 17/6/07; and PRO: CO 
879/91, African South no. 802, Coryndon to HC on 
uneasy situation in Lozi kingdom, 19/12/05; NAZ: 
BS 2/196, Coryndon to Aitkens, 1/1/06. Under-
lining is mine. 
59. Wills, op.cit., p. 226. 
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Foreign Office that the people 'almost invariably state 
that they have no means of paying a tax'. in consequence 
of which rough labour recruitment led to 'serious riots•. 
In a personal tribute to Codrington's regime in North-
eastern Rhodesia, Leicester Beaufort, Judge to the High 
Court at Fort Jameson, wrote that 'one cannot help corn-
paring this place with B.C.A. That place is chaos. 
The native administration (under Sharpe) is a disgrace 
to the century; burning of huts, immense journeys of 
natives taken to work for hut tax, journeys not paid for; 
justice a derision•. 60 
The state of smouldering resistance in North-
western Rhodesia, in response to both taxation and 
labour recruiting, reached a climax in 1906 and 1907 
when, through the insistence of a white farmer, the 
brutalities of the Native Commissioner in the Gwembe 
district came to the attention of the higher authorities. 61 
Indeed it is hard to understand how Beaufort compared 
the situation westwards from the Luangwa basin so 
favourably with Nyasaland. Harding had reported in 
1900 that, through the depradations of unauthorised 
labour agents, men were 'being driven_ like sheep ••• im-
properly fed - some die en route ••• a far greater number 
60. PRO: CO 879/76 African South no. 694, Harding's 
despatch after Mashukulumbwe patrol, 22/8/01; 
Admin to HC encl. a report on Angolan fighting 'N. 
and N.W. of Lealui', 26/12/02; Sharpe to FO, 12/3/03; 
and PLG: BSA 8/84, Beaufort to Gell, 20/2/03. 
;Phrase in brackets is mine. 
61. 'The MacNamara Case' as revealed by C.B. Venables, 
farmer on the Kafue confluence - for sundry re-
ferences, see below. 
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migrate south of the Zambezi than is generally imagined'. 
Perhaps a clue to B.S.A.C. thinking about northern Zam-
bezia in the first years of the century, can be found 
in their view that, while there seemed to be 'not the 
slightest doubt that our Administration in Southern 
Rhodesia will not last very long (and that was Mr 
Rhodes's conviction) it may be an open question ••• whether 
the Company will be left in possession north of the 
Zambezi'. For, so the thinking wed; 'North-eastern and 
North-western Rhodesia ••• will never be a white man's 
country'. 'The Home Government' were anxious for the 
Company to retain control in the north 'which gives the 
Government a convenient scapegoat if anything goes wrong'. 
Yet the Company's agents acted as though they had a free 
hand. 62 
Before reviewing the case of C.J. McNamara 
in the Gwembe, we therefore note Lewanika's protest to 
the High Commissioner, in 1907 against (a) the forcible 
removal and burning of villages, e.g. Moka and Sekute; 
(b) the sale of Moso-Koloane's burying-place to a 
Dutchman, and the cutting down of the sacred trees there; 
(c) the compelling of all the people 'to salute even 
the wives of officials'; and (d) the arbitrary fixing 
of the King's tax 'commission' at £1,200. 'We some-
times are caused to feel as if we were a conquered 
nation, while we have made an agreement which was said 
62. PLG: BSA 9/6, NWR Report by Harding, 5/3/00; 
9/34, Gell to Duke of Abercorn, 12/7/02. 
319. 
to be just like an alliance between our nation and the 
Imperial Government. When we say so, those of the 
B.S.A. Company ask, "Do you want to be conquered?". 
The King also complained that, without his consent and 
therefore in breach of the Concession, Boer and other 
settlers had occupied land on the Machili River; that 
game were being slaughtered indiscriminately; and that 
Coryndon had personally beaten one of his sons, while 
other white officials had beaten sons of various Lozi 
chiefs. Lewanika was further embittered by 'the 
expU5ion' by B.S.A.C. officials of his representatives 
in the Ila and Toka areas. 'Does the Company intend 
to take the districts out of my power'? Oh! that we 
were granted to pass directly under the Government of 
King Edward1' Lewanika traced this action by the Com-
pany's men to the fact that one of his indunas, Motumo-
soana, was alleged to-have told some Ila people that 
the hut tax was different from the tribute formerly 
offered to Lewanika. "We the ma-Rotse (sic) ••• did not 
force you to pay any money; if anybody had got a tiger's 
(sic) or a wild-cat's skin, a calabash of honey or a 
hoe, he would give it and we were satisfied. Now it 
is hard for you to get money which is not a native pro-
duct. Where can you get that money from? Perhaps 
there will be a war this year". The news that there 
was widespread unrest was confirmed to Lewanika's envoys 
by three B.S.A.C. men: Anderson, the District Commi-
ssioner, Kafue; Hinds, known as Selimatanga, the aloof 
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one; and Nicholls, whom the Ila called Kalapukila, the 
one who strikes out violently. During the disturbance, 
a missionary, William Chapman of the Primitive Method-
ists, who fled from his station at Nambala after a build-
ing had been burned, was accused of 'cowardly and fool-
ish conduct' by the local Collector and refused any 
63 compensation. 
In 1903, Philip Gell, a Director of the B.S.A. 
Cornapny from 1899 to 1925, had expressed the view that 
Codrington's rule in North-eastern Rhodesia compared 
favourably with the situation in North-western Rhodesia 
where the influence of Southern Rhodesia brought 'the 
rigid, official temper' which Gell attributed to 'the 
large Cape Colony element'. Codrington was in charge 
of a huge region in which the greater kings, as we saw 
above, had been subjugated by war. It was therefore 
not surprising, perhaps, that, as the N.E. Rhodesia 
Administrator reported in 1902, 'the stronger tribes 
paid (tax) readily ••• having recognised the inevitability 
of their being called upon, sooner or later, to pay 
tribute to the dominant race'. It was 'the weaker 
tribes' that offered 'passive resistance' to tax eo-
llection. The Company's military prowess can also 
63. PRO: CO 879/95 African South no. 872, report by 
Selborne, HC, on NWR tour, 11/11/07, enclosing 
Lewanika's letter of 1/10/07, and letter from 
Adolphe Jalla of the Paris Missionary Society, 
undated, citing Lewanika's proposal that the Lea-
lui and Sisheke districts should be placed directly 
under the Imperial Government; Kewanika to HC on 
reported Ila unrest, 11/12/07. Also NAZ: BS 2/96, 
report of Collector, Mumbwa, 3/7/07. 
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explain the apparent acquiescence of the conquered 
peoples in the system, described by Codrington, whereby, 
though 'theoretically the native who engages himself 
for work ••• is paid 3/- which he immediately hands over 
to the Boma ••• in practice his employer pays the taxes 
of a large number of men by cheque, the actual cash 
does not therefore pass through the hands of the native'. 
The relative success of Codrington's fiscal system led 
Gell to foresee that N.E. Rhodesia would 'become self-
supporting at far less outlay than elsewhere'. In such 
a situation of •pacification' it is noteworthy that 
Codrington took disciplinary action against an official 
found guilty of persistent assaults and floggings and 
of causing death. Among the assaults which he eo-
mmitted, Harger had struck ShiMwalule, the high priest 
of the burial grove of the Bemba kings. Known as 
'Bwana Kasehmbe', the tsetse fly, Harger clashed with 
other officials including 'Bobo' Young. After the 
enquiry, noted above, into A.L.C. allegations of B.S.A.C. 
brutality, Codrington appears to have maintained some 
measure of contro1. 64 
64. PLG: BSA 8/90, Gell to Codrington, 7/4/03; 8/64, 
NER Report, 31/3/02; PRO! CO 879/79 African South 
no. 717, Admin., NER to BSAC, 6/12/03; PLG: BSA 
8/105, Gell to Grey, 26/1/04; NAZ: BS 1/66, 
folios 82-114 on Hager's case, including written 
accusations by Hugh Marshall, Magistrate, 7/11/04. 
Underlinings are mine. See p~66 above. 
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In the western reaches of Codrington's domain, 
however, around the Hook of the Kafue and in North-
western Rhodesia, such acts of violence, though noted, 
did not receive effective censure. The greater flow 
of traders, prospectors and labour •touts' in Coryndon's 
sphere must have aggravated inter-racial relations, and 
this can be seen, not only in Lewanika'smmplaints, 
but in numerous reports which came to the attention of 
both the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office 
through official channels. There was a man called 
Malevaris, for instance, who flogged an Ila man who 
visited him 'without trousers', an action which provoked 
an attack on his camp. The intervention of Chief 
Mueswa retrieved the situation. Mueswa then 'paid 3 
cows as a fine and returned most of the goods taken' 
when the camp was plundered. There was danger of a 
'b ttl ' t Sh 1 b i t 1 trader. 65 a e a a o a aga ns an unpopu ar The 
correspondence of Anderson, the Native Commissioner, 
Kafue, from 1904 to 1907 contains a number of references 
to cases of assault by white men, in the employ of the 
local Copper Mines and elsewhere, and of the fierce 
reaction of local communities against them. 66 
65. PLG: BSA 8/70, report by Gielgud, 10/9/02. 
66. See NAZ: KDC 1/1/1, 1/1/2, and 1/1/3, Letter Books 
A, B and D. from 1/1/04 to 25/2/07. 
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As mentioned earlier, 'the McNamara Case', 
as the 'Livingstone Mail' called it, was brought to the 
attention of the higher authorities by Charles Venables, 
who had a farm at the confluence of the Kafue and Museya 
rivers near Chirundu. At Kanchindu in the Gwembe valley 
the arrival of B.S.A.C. agents is vividly remembered. 
'Sibwembwe' Williamson, a quiet man who moved about 
with neither gun nor whip, is remembered as the first. 
'Chikoma' Miller, the shifty one, followed almost imme-
diately. Haphazard swoops on villages by messengers 
who beat people are associated with F.w. Mosely, 'the 
weak walker, Mutetemasolo' who joined Miller in 1903. 
The first registration took place in 1904 under Maurice 
'Jarira' Cox, the man who stopped people roughly in their 
tracks. Then came Caldwell, whose name 'Siadunka' 
commemorated his habit of prodding people with a stick. 67 
Though 'the McNamara Case' did not become the subject 
of an official enquiry till 1909, his arrival at Sijoba 
Boma, in 1906 was marked by a report in the 'Livingstone 
Mail', which its proprietor and editor, Leopold Moore, 
had been publishing since the beginning of the year. 
McNamara had brought in £1,560 in taxes, £50 in excess 
of the estimated tax revenue. The 'Mail' then des-
cribed the type of 'general muster' that accompanied 
a Native Commissioner's visit to any given area. 'In 
67. RI/Yohane Shamayiwa and others, Kanchindu, Gwembe, 
6/8/74 and 7/9/74. 
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every kraal there are many boys who have returned from 
work on the mines, there is any amount of native labour 
available in this District ••• The country is very thickly 
populated, is well-watered, and at nearly every kraal 
large flocks of sheep and goats ••• the country is be-
coming prosperous and the natives very willingly pay 
their taxes•. 68 This statement can find parallels in 
the reports of, for example, Harry Johnston or Robert 
Codrington or indeed the Chief Native Commissioner south 
of the Zambezi. 
The local memory of McNamara's operations is, 
however, absolutely at variance with Moore's report. 
In the Gwembe valley, McNamara was called Vununa, be-
cause, in his determination to tax boys who were now 
adolescent, he was not content with inspecting armpits 
but ordered them to remove their loin-cloths in public. 
When tax had been started in the valley, the chiefs had 
been taken to Lewanika's court to be told by him, in 
the presence of Company agents, that the hut tax was a 
modern variant of the traditional mutelo or tribute 
offered from time to time to their powerful Lozi neigh-
69 bour by the Tonga. But from the Buni-Kariba region 
around Sijoba, as well as in the Kafue District, there 
68. 'Livingstone Mail', 27/10/06. Moore became a 
fierce critic of B.S.A.C. rule and an outspoken 
champion of the 'settlers' cause. 
69. RI/Yohane Siamayiwa, as footnote 67 above. 
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were confidential reports of 'native unrest' and in 
mid-1907 Anderson went from Kafue to assist McNamara. 
Together they found 'malcontents' in hiding, around 
fifty of whom chased their Boma messengers with spears 
but were eventually driven off by gun-fire. Anderson 
was obviously nervous as, in the Kafue area, he 'had 
heard the murder of himself freely discussed' and be-
lieved 'that the natives had decided to refuse payment 
of tax this year and to murder all white people'. The 
Administrator, on receipt of these reports, told the 
High Commissioner that 'the condition of native affairs' 
was not 'entirely satisfactory'. 70 
The Rev. G.E. Butt of the Primitive Methodist 
Church was on a visit to North-western Rhodesia at the 
time of the 'reported rising' there. 'I am obliged 
to take the official view', he wrote, '"That the trouble 
did not exist in fact". One of the officials received 
from a native a cock-and-bull story about what was 
taking place a hundred miles away ••• how the natives had 
refused to pay tax and were holding secret meetings', 
in which there was 'not a word of truth'. Yet Butt 
had to admit that there was 'much loose talk about 
coming trouble' in the territory and added that 'in 
most cases the wish is father to the thought. War 
70. PRO: CO 879/95 African South no. 872, Anderson's 
Report on Buni-Kariba and Kafue, 15/6/07; Admin. 
to HC, 7/7/07; and NAZ: BS 2/96 sundry communi-
cations on Kafue area, 1907. 
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brings money and trade into the country and it means 
the hurried and brutal subjugation of the natives; and 
that harmonises with their own desire to kick and hammer 
71 them into shape'. To the B.S.A.C. men in the field, 
no less than to their victims, there was no doubt that 
violence was in the air. The Barotse Native Police 
Commandant, J.E. Carden, ordered an armed patrol to move 
into the Buni-Kariba area •to arrest as many hut-tax 
defaulters as possible'; and 'Kalapukila' Nicholls 
warned the S.N.A. of 'an impending rising•. 'From 
conversations which I have overheard', he wrote, 'the 
natives not only plotted to refuse payment of native 
tax this year but ••• to murder all the white population 
in their beds. I overheard my cook, a native of North-
eastern Rhodesia ••• conversing with the Baila natives ••• 
of the method in which the white people could be killed'. 
He therefore wanted 'a new detachment of police with a 
Maxim gun ••• without delay'. The crisis sharpened when 
Nicholls sent a 'strictly confidential' telegram to the 
s·.:.N.A. reporting 'trustworthy intelligence' that 'Lewani-
ka sent to tell people not to pay tax this year•. The 
B.N.P. officer at Mumbwa expected an attack 'any moment' 
and begged 'immediate large supplies• of Martini-Henry 
ifl d •ti 72 r es an ammun1 on. 
71. Butt G.W. 'My Travels in North-western Rhodesia' 
{Hammond 1909, pp. 272-3. 
72. PRO:CO 879/95 (as footnote 70); Commandant Carden, 
4/7/07; Nicholls to SNA, letter (undated} and 
telegram 9/7/07; BNP, Mumbwa to Commandant, Kalomo, 
10/7/07. 
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Presumably in face of the Company's swift 
military reinforcement, the threatened 'rising' did not 
materialise. The atmosphere of the time was, however, 
the context of McNamara's activities as 'collector' in 
the Gwembe Valley. The High Commissioner was at that 
time secretly urging that the Company should hand over 
the northern territory to the Crown in view of its un-
settled state and the fact that hut tax could not be 
raised to the level required to make North-western Rho-
desia economically viable. Selborne's anxiety was in-
creased by persistent reports of the ascendancy of a 
'reactionary party' in the Lozi kingdom who were overtly 
blaming Lewanika for having 'placed his unconquered 
territory' under British 'protection'. 'Barotseland' 
might soon require military pacification 'to maintain 
73 authority and restore tranquility'. But McNamara 
as one of the Company's 'strong men' was bent on pro-
curing a maximal tax yield as a matter of urgency. 
When eventually Venables's reports on McNamara's be-
haviour appeared in official correspondence in late 
1909, his extravagant conduct had been adversely affect-
ing a wide and relatively populous area for about three 
years. Moreover, he had had as superior officer A.G. 
McGregor whose notorious 'ill-treatment of natives' 
later led the Administration to require his resignation. 
73. Ibid: HC to eo, 11/11/07 and his report on NWR 
of same date. 
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Venables claimed that McGregor and McNamara were collea-
gues 'during the time when his {McNamara's) worst cru-
74 elties took place'. The charges which led to McGregor's 
resignation in 1909 concerned 'violence and injustice 
towards natives of the Balunda district while he was 
holding a magisterial appointment'. McGregor's defence 
was based on a statement which he claimed that the late 
Robert Codrington had made to him, on his appointment, 
to the sub-Boma of Mwinilunga, that he must •treat the 
district as if in rebellion'. McGregor admitted that 
he had 'several times paraded the police and ordered 
them to strip ••• to be inspected for lice, and ••• had told 
them that they were "filthy beasts whose tails had been 
cut off"'• The climax of his outrages had been the 
flogging of a man at Kajavu's village who had refused to 
carry a load. Along with an African policeman, Mac-
Gregor inflicted 'over 110 strokes' of the lash, as 
recorded in the diary of Pound, who was with him. The 
victim was then forced to carry the load, though 'his 
back was in a very bad condition', being 'helped through 
75 the journey by the other prisoners to whom he was tied'. 
74. RH: MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22, G.184: Venables's report 
to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society (20 pages plus enclosures), 23/6/10, 
esp. p. 15. 
75. PRO: eo 879/102, African South no. 932: HC to eo on 
'retirement' of MacGregor, 6/12/09; and see NAZ: 
Mwinilunga District Note-book KSE 4/1; and BS 
2/257, folio 49. Note also reference to Pound on 
P•297 above. 
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Robert Codrington moved from North-eastern 
Rhodesia to be Administrator of the North-western terri-
tory in 1907, and Gann claims that 'excessive punishments 
and other illegal practices were stamped out both by the 
76 energetic Codrington and his successor, Wallace'. 
The High Commissioner reported Codrington's concern 
that 'the Native Affairs Department' was not exercising 
the influence it should over the natives' and 'confined 
its attention too much to the collection of taxes'. 
A similar view was expressed by Charles McKinnon when 
he moved from the North-eastern Rhodesia to be Resident 
at Lealui. McKinnon attributed the failures of the 
77 Department to 'languidness and want of energy'. But 
Venable~ asserted that, in 1905 when certain districts 
were taken over by North-western from North-eastern 
Rhodesia, Mr Worthington ••• at an interview with the 
o~ficials who had then become his subordinates ••• informed 
them that they might make use of the lash in dealing 
with natives ••• and that he would see that they did not 
get into trouble over it. One official who is still 
in the service and bears an excellent reputation asked 
to have this in~writing which Mr Worthington indignantly 
refused ••• Mr McNamara was not present at that particular 
interview but', said Venables, 'I am strongly of the 
opinion that he was shielded by a similar assurance ••• 
(and) that Mr Worthington is directly responsible for a 
76. Gann 'Birth' op.cit., p. 105. 
77. PLG: BSA 9/157: HC to CO, 21/11/07; and PRO: CO 
879/102, African South no. 932, McKinnon's Report, 
September 1908. 
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great deal of the ill-treatment of natives that has 
been going on for years in various parts of the Terri-
tory•.78 
A man who was a B.S.A.C. administrative offi-
cial in the Gwembe some years after McNamara put it on 
record, in the Northern Rhodesia Journal, that Venables's 
allegations were not accepted and that McNamara was 
reinstated. Venables he said was 'a queer customer•, 
who 'used to give every male native between the ages 
of sixteen and eighty one of his work tickets so that 
if the Boma accidentally recruited one of them as a 
carrier or what not, there we were!' The records of 
the Colonial Office, however, do not support this record. 
In mid-1910, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies 
informed the Anti-Slavery Society that, after studying 
the findings of the e~quiry at Buyamunyama (Ibwe Mun-
yama), 'Lord Crewe placed on record his emphatic dis-
approbation of the proceedings of Mr McNarnara generally 
and in regard to his action in compelling natives to 
go to work. I am told', said the Under-Secretary, 
'that Mr McNamara has been suspended ••• with a view to 
removal from the service•. 79 
Six months earlier, however, Wallace, Acting 
Administrator, had summoned headmen in the affected 
78. RH: as footnote 74, G. 184, Venables to A.S. and 
A.P. Society, 23/6/10. 
79. NRJ III, 5, (1958) pp. 419-422, Part 2 of 'Memories 
of Abandoned Bomas, no. 13: Ibwe Munyama•, by Tom 
Chicken; and RH:MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22 G.184: Under-
Secretary, CO, to A-S and A.P. Society, 6/6/10. 
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area and accused them of lies and stubborn disobedience. 
'You have paid tax very unwillingly and concealed your 
people ••• You, Sigongo, are the chief offender ••• in that 
you are a man of influence ••• It is from men like you 
that I expect implicit obedience to my commands, made 
known to you through my Native Commissioners ••• As for 
you Matope, you Kamweamusosa, you Muinga, you Nachidao, 
you Kachemalando and Karenga ••• the statements you made 
at the enquiry are full of lies. I see clearly that 
you have been determined to cause trouble ••• I am sending 
your Native Commissioner (McNamara) back to live amongst 
you ••• listen to his orders only and obey them. I have 
instructed him to write to me each month telling me how 
you behave'. Muinga, incidentally, had been, according 
to Venables, flogged so violently that 'the flesh on 
80 the affected part opened into gaping wounds'. The 
Acting idministrator told Venables that he was 'satis-
fied that McNamara's punishments were not excessive' 
and that 'European settlers should not incite natives 
to mutinous conduct•. Wallace's reaction was endorsed 
by High Commissioner Selborne who held that no brutali-
ty had been proved. In November 1909, Wallace quoted 
to the High Commissioner the statement by Worthington 
that "the educative value of these 24 beatings, spread 
80. 'Livingstone Mail', 11/12/09, report of an indaba 
of Gwembe headmen held at Government House; and 
RHG.183 as footnote 79, Venables to Ag.Admin, 12/12/08. 
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over a period of 13 months, and distributed among a 
population of 22,900, will be fully understood". The 
High Commissioner's reply was that while 'McNamara did 
undoubtedly ••• inflict a number of illegal beatings', 
he was ready to accede to Wallace's plea 'to allow Mr 
McNamara's services to be reatined•. 81 
In summary, the charges against McNamara, 
which were put on record by Venables, included the brutal 
flogging of Headman Muinga; numerous assaults of 
'natives for not saluting'; widespread brutality, flogg-
ing and destruction of crops during tax collections. 
Codrington, said Venables, had arranged an enquiry into 
these matters but the report had not been completed on 
account of his death in October 1908. In a more spe-
cific list, Yenables included verbatim statements by 
Headman Simaamba and by Masempela, a Boma messenger, 
who said: "I do not know how many strokes I used to 
give them ••• If it was one man I had beaten, I should 
know ••• if it is all the world, how can I know how many?" 
Venables's allegations made repeated references to an 
instrument of punishment called a sibaba, and local 
Tonga testimony equates this with a whip, of greater 
power than the hippopotamus - or rhinoceros-hide sjambok. 
The sibaba of chibaba had, according to some local evi-
dence, more than one thong and was fitted with pieces 
81. RH: as footnote 79, G.183, Wallace to Venables, 
25/2/09 and 19/3/09; HC to Venables, 6/12/09; 
PRO: CO 879/102, as footnote 77, Wallace to HC, 
10/11/09; and HC to Wallace, 6/12/09. 
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of metal like nails. The 'Livingstone Mail', which 
came to McNamara's defence, described it as 'a paddle-
shaped weapon fasHoned out of rhinoceros hide'. Wall ace 
claimed that it was 'less brutal than the sjambok (which) 
may cause severe wounds which do not heal for days ••• 
sometimes weeks, and when they have healed, scars often 
remain which the native bears for the rest of his life'. 
Venables disputed this view, after listing victims of 
the sibaba who included Headman Chiunga, flogged because 
he had no money to pay tax for two old widows, and Head-
man Siagambuli who was thrashed by McNamara himself and 
who 'saw many people tied together by the neck as Mr 
82 McNamara passed to Buni'. 
Venables's allegations included a lengthy 
statement about the death of a man whose widow, Nyemba, 
testified that he had been flogged so brutally that 
'there was no skin on his buttocks and for some way down 
the thighs and maggots were coming out of small holes 
all over his buttocks'. This could well have resulted 
from the use of a whip with sharp metal in its thongs. 
Venables indicated that the incarceration of Nyemba in 
'the private compound' of C.F. Molyneux, another Company 
82. Ibid: A-s and &.P. Society note-books summarising 
Venables's correspondence from November 1908 to 
January 1910, including 'List A' and 'List B' of com-
plaints, other than Sigongo's, presented at the 
Buyamunyama enquiry held in1909; RI/Yohane Siama-
yiwa, Amitayi Siamanjela, Albert Siatwinda, 7/9/74 
and verbal comment of Chipo Moonga, 22/10/75, on the 
'sibaba•; and 'Livingstone Mail', 5/2/10. 
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agent, her attempted suicide and then her further iso-
lation under the eye of one of McNamara's concubines, 
all pointed to fear on the part of the B.S.A.C. men that 
the allegations would be proved. 83 But, in the pro-
tracted correspondence between Venables, the Company's 
Administrator at Livingstone, the High Commissioner and 
the Colonial Office, Wallace insisted that 'native e~i-
dence' was unreliable. Venables however, asserted that 
.witnesses were subjected to severe intimidation, despite 
an initial assurance of safety; that Chief Sogongo was 
threatened with the deprivation of his chieftainship 
'which he had inherited from his ancestors'; and that 
serious attempts had been made to prevent the local 
people from communicating with himself. 'Now that the 
Under-Secretary for the Colonies had admitted the truth 
of their complaints, these threats must be withdrawn ••• 
The natives know that the enquiry was held by order of 
the High Commissioner ••• the King's representative, and 




RH: as footnote 79, G.183, Venables to Imperial 
Secretary, Johannesburg, 15/1/10. Note that 
Molyneux ('Chibamubamu', the great hunter with the 
gun} was appointed Native Commissioner, Gwembe, in 
1911 (NAZ: KTE 2/1, Gwembe District Note-book}. 
Molyneu• serve~ in Mwinilunga District during the 
First World War, where he was known as Chipompomo, 
a word used to denote a noisy talkative drinker 
(NAZ: KSE 4/1}. 
PRO: CO 879/102, as footnote 77: Wallace to HC 
10/11/09; RH: as footnote 79, G.184, Venables's 
report to A-S and A.P. Socy., 23/6/10 p. 15. 
Note that the Administrative capital of NWR was 
moved from Kalomo to Livingstone in 1907. 
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It was a matter of further shock to Venables 
that Wallace had gone to such lengths in his defence of 
McNamara. The Administrator had said that in 1906-07 
"The Guimbi (sic) sub-district was practically in a 
state of armed revolt (and) ••• that the alternative to 
Mr McNamara's methods of keeping order ••• might probably 
have been the despatch to the district of a striking 
force, with great expense and some loss of life". 
Venables rejected this view, basing his statement on 
his five years residence in the Valley. He was sure 
that 'it was not until June 1907 after Mr McNamara had 
t' in~icted a series of illegal floggings that a portion 
of the district went into revolt'. 'History has proved', 
he added, 'that the lash tends rather to exasperate 
than to allay incipient rebellion'. By a letter written 
on the same date, 21st February 1910, the High Commi-
ssioner sought to reassure the Colonial Secretary, who 
had recorded his 'grave misgivings with regard to the 
administration of North-western Rhodesia', that the 
Company's rule in the territory was exercised 'according 
to the best British traditions•. 85 
Charles Venables claimed to have friends among 
the Company's agents and testified that, in districts 
where the officials had •nothing to do with the shameful 
85: RH: as footnote 84, p. 10; PRO: eo 879/104 African 
South no. 948: Venables to Imperial Secretary, 
21/2/10; HC to eo, 21/2/10, in response to the 
Colonial Secretary's strictures on the cases of 
MacGregor and McNamara (no. 7). 
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traffic in forced labour', and 'treat the natives in 
their charge with justice, consideration and kindness', 
tax payments were made 'willingly'. Such officials, 
however, were 'a minority' and subjected to 'ridicule' 
by the majority of their colleagues. He therefore made 
a written statement which indicated that brutality was 
a regular feature of B.S.A.C. rule. Collectors and 
others were, he said, 'as a rule most rigid in their 
exaction of homage from the natives who must all fall 
down and clap their hands or thighs at the sight of an 
official. Some appear to think it increases their 
authority to order a Chief's ears to be boxed at a 
general meeting, or if a Headman did not concur with 
what he is told, they consider the application of a 
sjambok as the most convincing argument. Such methods 
can scarcely be called cruel but they are extremely 
galling to the natives and highly injudicious ••• Distinct 
from the above, there is a class of officials who are 
the terror of the natives whom they appear to take a 
delight in torturing and who brag of the cruelties they 
have inflicted ••• one often hears of cases of ill-treat-
ment in different parts of the territory which are not 
enquired into, or are hushed up. The Administration 
of North-western Rhodesia appears to have peculiar ideas 
of justice'. McNamara's swoop on a village in search 
of taxes and the stampede of the people from it, leaving 
the Headman's old mother 'whose decomposed remains' 
Venables personally found ten days later, illustrated 
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the peculiar quality of inhumanity engendered by hut 
tax collections. The fear exercised by the visits of 
Company agents was widely extended by the activities of 
messengers who were continually touring the districts, 
cajoling and threatening, travelling 'in great style 
(when they are out of the official's sight)' and living 
'on the fat of the land•. 86 The role of Boma messengers 
from the inception of colonial rule to the coming of 
national independence is a factor of considerable 
interest and importance. 
Earlier in this review, when we noted the 
personal testimony of Theodore Williams from various 
north-western districts, we were concerned with a period 
later than that of McNamara's oppresive regime in the 
Gwembe Valley. Indiscriminate flogging obviously did 
not end with McNamara's removal from the Company's 
service, not did the persistent coercion by B.S.A.C. 
agents in pursuit of tax, with the result that what was 
in the eyes of the local communities, tantamount to 'war' 
continued for a long time to come. To take only one 
example, in 1916 the Native Commissioner at Lukona near 
the Angola Border, in a tax report, said that it was 
'very difficult to deal with these people without the 
chief's help, as at any sign of a visit from an official 
86. RH: as footnote 84, p. 12; and G.183, Venables to 
Acting Admin. 12/12/08; and G.184, encl. with 
report to A-S and A.P.Socy. Underlining is mine. 
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or even at the sight of a messenger's uniform, the whole 
population runs away, either over the Portuguese border 
or into the inaccessible swamps of the Nyengo River'. 
He urged that defaulters should be 'sent to Ndola for 
double the ottlnary number of journeys and that, on 
their return, they should be made to pay tax for three 
or four years ••• and then made to assist in the clearing 
of the boundary in lieu of their previous taxes'. The 
Native Commissioner for Kalabo on the western side of 
the Zambezi beyond Mungu reported in 1921 that some 
success had attended tax collection 'since the policy 
of remitting some arrears to those who show a desire to 
pay has been adopted ••• Any harshness would drive them 
87 back into their swamps'. 
The severity of taxation was accompanied by 
an element of haphazardness and inequity. The Pim 
Commission of 1938, despite its statement that 'no tax 
is so intimately connected with native welfare and to 
none has such careful consideration been directed', 
recorded how 'from 1914 until 1920 the rate of tax was 
5/- for north-eastern districts and 10/- for north-
western districts. In 1920 the tax in north-eastern 
districts was increased to 10/- notwithstanding the 
87. See pp. 296ff. above; and NAZ: KDE 2/39/2, memos 
by J. Beringer, N.C. Lukona, 24/1/16, and 5/5/19; 
and KDE 8/1/12 Annual Report, Kalabo, (Lozi) Sub-
District, 1920-21 (R.O. Ingram). 
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unanimous protest of the Provincial Administration, but 
in 1923 it was reduced to 7/6d ••• in 1929 (25 years after 
the inception of musonko) the taxation of plural wives 
was abolished as it had been found that it penalised 
natives who accepted responsibility under tribal customs'. 
Equally naively, the Report noted that 'in 1932 the 
natives of the Territory began to find serious diffi-
culty in meeting their cash obligations'. In 1936, 
when the mineral wealth was being successfully exploited, 
musonko was still contributing 13% of the Territory's 
88 total revenue. It is therefore appropriate now to 
review the matter of the yield of musonko throughout 
northern Zambezia during the period under review and 
its importance to the overall undertakings of the 
Chartered Company. 
(b) Musonko and the Finances of Conquest 
If the British South Africa Company's London 
offices had not been destroyed by aerial bombing in 1941, 
it might have been possible to form a clearer picture 
of the financial relationship of the Company to its 
territories in Central Africa. Documents extant in 
the Public Records Office in London and elsewhere re-
veal that, in the beginning, the Directors offered 
their shareholders the prospect of good dividends 
accruing from their enterprises in Central Africa; 
assuring them, in 1894, that with the establishment of 
88. Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Fi-
nancial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia' 
(Pim Report) 1938 (Colonial no. 14~, pp. 214-5. 
Phrase in brackets is mine. 
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'a new source of revenue ••• the Hut Tax' it was 'anti-
cipated that at the end of the current year ••• the gen-
eral revenue of the country will more than cover the 
administrative expenditure'. The Directors therefore 
wanted to 'congratulate the shareholders upon the satis-
factory prospect'. Even after the first Ndebele war, 
Jameson declared, as we noted earlier, that revenue was 
89 'now practically balancing' expenditure. As early 
as 1887, after 'Hut Tax' had been imposed in Bechuana-
land, the Resident Magistrate had seen the tax serving, 
along with the 'compound system', the 'prohibition of 
the sale of liquor to natives', and 'forced' labour, 
as a major source of commercial prosperity as shown in 
the 'good and greatly increased cash business' being 
enjoyed by white traders. 90 Such a process was bound 
to be in the interests of those who were imposing their 
rule on the territory. Moreover, as we observed above 
from various public statements, the 'hut tax• was pre-
sented as a means of enabling the peoples of the annexed 
territories to contribute to the costs of their 'pro-
tection'. 
As the years went by, however, the Company 
claimed with increasing insistence that it was forced, 
89. RH:MSS.Afr.s.72 BSA Reports 1891-97, esp. 31/3/94, 
p. 31! and 18/1/95 (speech by Dr L.S. Jameson, 
p. 22J; and see p.155 above. 
90. BM/Parl. Papers 1888 LXXV (C.5524) P• 57, Report 
of Resident Magistrate Taung, Bechuanaland. 
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by the costs of administration, to bear heavy annual 
deficits. In the earlier years, statements of revenue 
and expenditure placed both 'hut tax' and mining revenue, 
licences, sale of stands, etc. in the one revenue column, 
and so for instance, the Southern Rhodesia Financial 
Statement for 1898-99 revealed that the yields from 'hut 
tax' and from 'stamps and licences (including Mines 
Revenue, £40,000) amounted respectively to £71,000 and 
£79,000. 'Hut Tax' could thus be seen to be contri-
buting 26% of the Company's total revenue of £273,000 
for that year. The same Statement also gave the total 
expenditure on Native Affairs as £39,082; thus revealing 
that 'hut tax' yielded nearly twice what was spent on 
'native administration', which presumably was debited 
with the total of salaries to Native Commissioners. 
The question arises: what use was made of the balance 
of £31,918? 91 A few years later, however, the Company 
was insisting that its commercial and its administra-
tive accounts must be kept separate. 
As early as 1899 the B.S.A. adumbrated its 
practice of withholding from the Colonial Office a full 
picture of its financial activities in Central Africa. 
With regard to land and mineral concessions, 'it would 
be impossible, except at great labour and cost, pro-
ducing little result, to prepare a statement of grants 
91. Ibid: 1899, LXIII, (C.9428) B.S.A.C. Revenue and 
Expenditure as at 31/3/99. 
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made during the last eight years•. But, in 1904, the 
Administrator of North-western Rhodesia told King 
Lewanika that the Company could not consider granting 
him a % of the revenue of land sales because 'it cost 
very much to pay for administration and you do not pay 
anything towards it'; suggesting that administration 
was charged against commercial profits. In 1906 the 
Company raised with the Colonial Office the question of 
mining rights and a proposed Mining Law in northern 
Zambezia. This matter will be considered later. How-
ever, in the correspondence that followed, the Company 
argued vehemently that its mineral rights had been 
'acquired under concessions from native owners ••• £2£ 
valuable considerations' and that it was therefore in 
no way obliged to apply any commercial revenues to the 
cost of administering the territory. Significantly, 
the Company's letter of July 1908 was not answered for 
over six months when, under pressure from the Foreign 
Office, the Colonial Secretary bowed to the Company's 
92 demand. The corollary of this tardy recognition 
of the established practice of the Company, whereby its 
commercial accounts were not to be set alongside its 
administrative accounts, appears to have been that the 
92. NAZ: KDE 2/37/1, Admin. to Lewanika, 23/9/04; 
PRO: CO 879/53, African South no. 559, BSAC to CO, 
p. 93 (undated, but 1898); CO 879/91 African 
South no. 802, BSAC to eo, 18/5/06; 879/88, 
African South 899, BSAC Secy. (D.E. Brodie) to CO 
22/7/08; 879/102 African South no. 932, FO to CO 
16/3/09 and eo to BSAC, 37/3/09. Underlining is 
mine. 
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Colonial Office was increasingly under pressure to take 
responsibility for the deficits published by the Company 
in respect of administration. For 1909-10, for instance, 
the B.S.A.C. told the Secretary of State that its defi-
cits were as follows: 
N.E. Rhodesia £29,195 
n.w. Rhodesia £28,814 
£58,009 
It is worthy of note that the Company made a similar 
claim, in 1911, in respect of income from the sale of 
land, and was apparently uninfluenced by the Colonial 
Secretary's statement that he could not admit 'that land 
revenue could be treated as an asset accruing to the 
Company absolutely irrespective of any provision being 
made for meeting the expenses of administration'. The 
Company maintained its position, and in 1914 Dr Jameson, 
as President, told shareholders that the commercial 
accounts showed an increased surplus of revenue over 
expenditure, with capital, both cash and liquid, amount-
ing to £1,741,370'. 93 
Mineral royalties were obviously a large part 
of the revenue which the B.S.A. Company eventually de-
rived from its territories. At the start of the period 
when both white supremacist ambitions and black nation-
alism would be striving for mastery of the huge region 
93. Ibid: 879/102, BSAC to CO 29/7/09; and 879/107 
African South no 969; CO to BSAC on matters con-
cerning the N.R. Order-in-Council, 20/1/11; and 
MSS:BRIT.Emp.s.22 (G.59) A-S and A.P. Socy. Papers -
Official Statement to BSAC Sharegolders (sgd. 
L.S. Jameson), 12/6/14. 
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north of the Zambezi, the exploitative nature of the 
Company's 'royalties• was attacked, for example, by Roy 
Welensky in 1948. Over a decade later, the Zambian 
case against the Company, led by the United National 
Independence Party, found friendly spokesmen abroad, 
like Fenner Brockway, a Labour Member of the British 
Parliament, who stated publicly that the B.S.A.C. - 'the 
real evil genius of Rhodes8a' - was, as late as 1958, 
collecting over £8,500.000 annually in 'royalties• from 
the mineral resources of Northern Rhodesia. "Even in 
a lean year it is able to pay a dividend of 30%"; and 
it was stated aim of the Directors to build up a for-
tune of not less than £200,000,000. Moreover, the 
Company, which by the agreement then still current, was 
to receive half the proceeds of land sales effected by 
the Northern Rhodesia Government, also owned 99% of the 
shares of the Rhodesia Railway Trust along with mineral 
rights within 16,000 square miles of Nyasaland. In 
1963, a major British newspaper gave the Company's 
94 'royalties' revenue for 1962 as about £11,000,000. 
In 1923, however, when the Company and the 
Crown were negotiating the cession of B.S.A.C. govern-
mental authority to the Colonial Office, and when, of 
94. Macpherson F., op.cit., pp. 363-4, quoting article 
by Brockway in 'Tribune', 1/12/61, which cited 
Welensky in N.R. Leg. Co.; and N.R. Hansard No. 
60 (1948) 366 ff., for Welensky's speech. 
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course, the 'mineral royalties' were yielding very much 
less than they were to yield after the swift develop-
ment of the Copperbelt in the nineteen-thirties, the 
Company managed to obtain from the Crown £3,750,000. 
Welensky's retrospective comment on the 1923 agreement 
was that he found it "difficult to express in decent 
English" how he viewed "the actions of a Government ••• 
(which) should sell, give, barter ••• the mineral wealth 
of a country for which they were trustees, to a private 
company, without ever consulting the people", by which 
presumably he meant the territory's white inhabitants. 95 
Two years earlier, a report to Winston Churchill, as 
Colonial Secretary, had given the administrative defi-
cit as £147,728 for 1921, listing the two previous 
years thus: 1918-19, £68,767; 1919-20, £130,472; and 
claimed that the total of deficits to 31st March 1919, 
was over £1,250,000. In 1913, the deficit had been 
declared at £51,708. 3. 2d. and Revenue returns had 
shown that 'hut tax' had yielded £70,562 of which 
£65,888 had been spent on 'native affairs', including 
the subvention to the Lozi king. 96 
95. MSA Files: Agreement between the Secy. of State 
and the BSAC 'for the Settlement of Outstanding 
Questions relating to Southern and Northern Rho-
desia' (sgd. by Duke of Devonshire) 27/9/23. This 
also included the commuting to a grant of the loan 
of £1,953,826 made to the Company for war purposes, 
1914-18. See also 'The British South Africa 
Company's Claims to Mineral Royalties in Northern 
Rhodesia' (Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1964) p. 2. 
96. Maugham Report, op.cit., Appendix Item 58, (CMD. 
1471) Report to Col. Secy. by a Special Committee 
(Buxton and three others) on 'Certain Matters re-
lating to Rhodesia', 29/4/21; and BM/Parl. Papers, 
1914, LX (Cd, 7352) NB Revenue and Expenditure, 31/3/13. 
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Another factor in the situation was the Corn-
pany's attitude to the rejection of income tax by the 
white population of the territory. The early prophecy 
that northern Zambezia would not become a home for white 
people seemed to be being fulfilled as late as 1921 when 
the High Commissioner gave the following figures:-




North of Kafue - Broken Hill 
Village 396 





giving a total of 3, 185 white inhabitants. 97 Had the 
white population been taxed, the revenue so accrued 
would probably not have been large, but what is inter-
esting is the attitude of both the settlers' spokesmen 
and the officials of the Company to the principle of 
taxation. At the Bloemfontein Conference on Rhodesian 
affairs, held in early 1903, it was asserted that there 
must be no significant increase in customs duties until 
rallway rates and the cost of living for the white popu-
lation were reduced. Since Joseph Chamberlain as 
Secretary of State was not likely to meet such demands, 
'the only alternative' was to 'increase Hut Tax•, which 
the Company was ready to approve. In 1907, the High 
97. PRO: CO 879/120, African no. 1085 - HC {Arthur 
Frederick) to CO, 28/10/21. 
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Commissioner was discouraging white settlement along 
the line of rail. 'Th~will not support the revenue 
either of the Administration or of the Railways', he 
said, • ••• qecause they will not be able to afford to pay 
taxes'. Since the rate of development did not make it 
easy 'for the hut tax of the natives to be raised to 
£1', he argued that the time had come for the Company 
to transfer the territory to the Crown. 98 
In the same year, the 'Livingstone Mail' 
noted that the 'hut tax' revenue was far from insigni-
ficant. 'It might appear that the proportion of reve-
nue contributed by the white inhabitants, by indirect 
taxation through customs and other such fiscal arrange-
ments, did not amount to more than one third of the 
total expenditure. But', wrote the editor, Leopold 
Moore, 'let us state at once that that fact would not 
affect the principle we are contending for; that we 
have an ••• indisputable right to representation propor-
tionate to our taxation ••• (and) an equal voice with the 
Chartered Company's nominees in the control of the ex-
penditure and ••• to half of the profits of the mineral 
concession ••• "No taxation without representation".,,~he 
form of government we are under is a dictatorship'. 
98. Ibid: 879/79 African South no. 717: Milton to 
BSAC, 24/2/03; BSA to Milton, Salisbury, 27/2/03; 
and 879/95 African South no. 872: HC (Selborne) 
Report on NWR Tour, 11/11/07. Underlining is 
Mine. 
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In 1908, the 'Mail' claimed that £20,000 p.a. of the 
£60,000 'circulated' in the territory by the Company, 
came from the indirect taxation of the white population, 
and angrily refuted the description of this contribution 
by Sir Lewis Michell, one of the B.S.A.C. Directors, as 
"a mere bagatelle". 'Our contention is', said Moore, 
'that we get absolutely nothing for our money;;;that 
the exaction of taxation without the consent of the taxed 
••• is an unlawful, unconstitutional and impudent vio-
lation of the acknowledged rights of all British subjects', 
adding that 'with the inconsistencies of the government 
99 of the native we are not, at the moment,concerned'. 
The taxation of the incomes of white people was not 
started in Northern Rhodesia until 1921, and then only 
in face of 'unanimous' resolutions 'not to submit' to 
it, and at the time when, as the 'Livingstone Mail' 
declared, it was 'well known that the present regime was 
rapidly drawing to a close•. From 1921 to 1932 a 
white man was allowed an income of £600 free of tax, 
and his tax-free income was still as much as £380 in 
1940. But musonko had 'always been reckoned as being 
equivalent to a full month's wages'. However, as Gann 
points out, 'The Company wished to attract colonists 
and taxation would merely have kept them out•. For 
this reason European income tax continued to be very 
99. 'Livingstone Mail', 2/3/07. Phrase in brackets 
is mine; 13/2/08, 25/4/08, and 6/9/08. Under-
linings are mine. 
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low right up to the time of Zambian Independence. On 
a salary of £1,700, a white man was paying £85 tax in 
1958. 100 
We now turn to musonko again. Having noted 
something of the methods by which it was collected, 
it is important now to ask what was done with the money 
accruing from it. When it was started, as we noted 
earlier, 'hut tax' could be paid in kind. In Lundazi 
district, for instance,'if you were short of 1/-, they 
demanded a chicken ••• Sometimes ••• as many as four chickens 
for the 1/-'. In Chief Chikuwe's area in Chipata 
District, a man with four wives 'was compelled to sell 
49 chickens at three pence each or to offer four goats' 
to meet the equivalent of four taxes at 3/-. In 1902, 
Coryndon told the London Office of the Company that 
when tax was paid in kind in the Batoka district, an 
extra levy was applied to cover the cost of carriage 
to the Boma. 101 Th C h . kl b e ompany, owever, qu~c y egan 
to demand money, not only because there would be a limit 
to the amount of grain, eggs and livestock that any one 
100. See Gann 'History' op.cit., pp. 180-192 and esp. 
pp. 190 and 101; 'Livingstone Mail', 13/5/20; 
NAZ: ZP 12/1, Evidence of Rev. R.J. Moore before 
the Commission of Inquiry into the 1940 Copperbelt 
Disturbances, p. 406; and Wood A.S. 'Northern 
Rhodesia' (Pall Mall 1961) p. 59. Note: the yield 
of European Income Tax for 1922-3 was £15,418.8.0. 
(NAZ: BS 3/102 - folio 73). 
101. Proceedings of Lundazi Seminar, June 1972, op.cit., 
p. 87, testimony of Yohane Mtonga; and KKF/UNZA/ 
UNESCO Project 1973, paper by S.H. Phiri, op.cit., 
p. 12; RI/William Kawandami, Mbereshi, 9/5/73, 
sundry other Zambian testimonies; and NAZ: BS 
2/227, Coryndon to BSAC, London, 3/3/02. 
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Boma could use, but because of the determination to 
force people to go to work in European employment, 
mainly south of the Zambezi. From the beginning of 
tax collection, 'collectors' and 'native commissioners' 
were required to submit returns of revenue and expendi-
ture for their districts. In preparing material for 
what is now set down here, such returns have been ex-
amined in respect of the great majority of Bomas and 
sub-Bomas in both North-eastern and North-western 
Rhodesia. 
The salaries of the Company agents were not 
included in such returns, but it is important to note 
average rates of salary at various times during our 
period. In the early years of 'effective occupation', 
while Alfred Sharpe was receiving £1,400 p.a. and Robert 
Codrington, as N.E.R. Administrator had a salary of 
£800, the average 'collector' in 1903 was earning about 
£300. The assessment of salaries seems, however to 
have been haphazard, for as early as 1901, Coryndon, 
the Administrator for N.W. Rhodesia, told Rhodes that 
District Commissioners were earning £500 p.a. and Colo-
nel Harding, B.N. Police Commandant, £650. In 1913, 
Theodore Williams, as Native Commissioner was, on his 
own showing, receiving £240 p.a. which had risen to 
102 £375 five years later. 
102. PLG: BSA 8/23, BSA to FO, late 1899; 9/78 NWR 
Estimates 1903-4; PRO: CO 879/66 African South 
no. 694, Coryndon to Rhodes, 27/11/01; RH:MSS. 
Afr.s.779, Williams to parents, 12/8/13; s.780, 
ditto, 5/8/18. 
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The significance of these figures will be 
seen on examining the balance of revenue over expenditure 
which distinguished the financial operations of the great 
majority if not all of the districts from the inception 
of musonko to 1924. As we have seen it was only in 
Lewanika's case that there was any discussion between 
the Company and the local ruler about the revenue from 
tax and the use of it. Elsewhere, as is borne out by 
Zambian testimony, the local people were not offered 
nor could they dare to seek any information as to how 
musonko was used. It would have been inadmissible for 
Company agents to take the local people into consulta-
tion. However many informants have testified that tax 
defaulters were made to give personal service to Boma 
officials while under arrest, which included gardening, 
carrying and chopping logs for firewood and drawing water 
for the Boma houses, and which must have affected the 
cost of living of officials. 103 
The heads of expenditure listed in a Boma's 
annual statement of accounts included such items as: 
Native Establishment, Messengers, Upkeep, Subsidies, 
Roads, Public Works, District Travel, Prisons. No 
mention is made in any such statement of any expend!-
ture related to social welfare. Sources of revenue 
103. RI/ e.g. Ba Nakasese, Mshamba, Samfya, 19/11/74; 
Kapumfi, Chilubi, 20/11/74; Alberta Chisengelelo 
and others, Ching'ombe, 13/8/74; Albino Ngulube 
and others, Zarupango, 4/9/74; Benjamin Mpande, 
Kalwa, 19/10/73; Leo Chikambalala and others, 
Old Mkushi, 12/8/74; et al. 
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in the average rural district were generally limited to 
Licences, Fines and minor miscellaneous items, in addi-
tion to Hut Tax and Tax Arrears. In the districts in 
which white settlers were found, as, for example, Fort 
Jameson (Chipata), Livingstone, Chilanga, Kansanshi and 
elsewhere, the list of revenue items was generally 
slightly larger, as was the total amount ingathered. 
What is most significant is the large excess of revenue 
over expenditure in all the returns examined for the 
whole of our period. It is also notable that Native 
Commissioners regularly recorded an underexpenditure on 
the votes for their districts; the votes always being 
far below the revenue, both as estimated and actua1. 104 
On numerous occasions, particularly in the earlier years, 
returns of expenditure were not submitted, as, for 
instance, in Petauke for the years 1905 and 1906, when 
financial returns were simply given thus: 
At 30th September 1905 Hut Taxes 
Licences 
Fines, etc. 
at 30th March 1906 

















104. NAZ: Annual Reports for all Districts, and note 
also that some financial returns were recorded in 
District Notebooks. 
105. NAZ: KSY 5/2, Petauke Reports 1905-06, submitted 
by H.S. Thornicroft. 
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Typical returns from various districts through-
out our period are as follows, the (+) or (-) after the 
expenditure figure indicating over-expenditure or under-














846. 1. 7. 
1,644. o. o. 
17.10. o. 
1,661.10. o. 
NDOLA Tax 1,361.10. 0.) 
Arrears 302.10. O.) 
Other 352. 1.11. 
BAROTSE Tax 
(Incl. 5 Other 
districts) 
2,016. 1.11. 
13,832. o. o. 
724.14. o. 
14,556.14. o. 
KASEMPA Tax 1,985. 0. 0. 
Other 684. 4.11. 
2,669. 4.11 
Exeenditure Balance of 
Revenue over 
Exeenditure 
183. 9.3(+) 943. 3. 3. 
218. 4.0. 627.17. 7. 
605.16.3!t) 1,055.13. 9. 




























3,960. 8. 5. 
3,992.13. 2. 
3' 778.10. o. 
26.19. o. 
3,805. 9. o. 
1,998. s. o. 
764. 7. o. 
2,762.12. o. 
1,713. 5. 6. 










337.12. 0(-) 3,622.16. 5. 
453.11. 1(-) 3,539. 2. 1. 
470.12.10(-) 3,334.16. 2. 
1,853. 8. 7(-) 909. 3. 5. 
613. o. 2(-) 1,100. 5. 4. 
375. s. 0(-) 8,775.15. 7. 
503. a. 3<+> 
487. o. o. 
623. 7. 2. 
749. 6.11. 
107 
•Including over £100 for ivory sales 
and £217 for Licences 
107. Ibid: BS 2/154, 2/156, 2/157; and KSD 7/1, 
Mpika, KSD 3/1 Lundazi. 
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1913-14 Revenue Exeenditure Balance of 
Revenue over 
Expenditure 
LUNDAZI Tax 1,220.14. o. 
Other 197.14. o. 
1,418. 8. o. 260.13. a. 1,157.14. 4. 
PEATUKA Tax 1,509.15. o. 
Other 113. 6. 6. 
1,623. 1. 6. 418. 4. o. 1,204.17. 6. 
KASEMPA Tax 2,412. 6. o. 
Other 314. 4.11. 
2,726. 4.11 816.13. 2. 1,909.11. 9. 
GWEMBE Tax 4,000. o. o. 
Other 98. 9. 6. 
4,098. 9. 6. 574. 1. 0(-) 3,524. 8. o. 
LEALUI Tax 5,351.10. o. 
Other 48. 7. o. 
5,399.17. o. 213.13. 2(-) 5,186. 3.10. 
KASAMA Tax 1,190. a. o. 
Other 580.11. s. 
1,770.19. s. 423.10. 4(-) 1,247. 9. 1. 





KAWAMBWA Tax, 3,706. 3. 9. 1,290.10.10. 2,415.12.11. 
etc. 
KALABO Tax, 2,818. o. o. 263.11. 1(-) '2,554. 8.11. 
etc. 
SERENJE Tax, 1,491.13. 4. 291.12. 3(-) 1,200. 1. 1. 
etc. 108 
108. Ibid: KDG 8/1/2, Lundazi and Petauke; KDD 5/1, 
Kasernpa; KDB 6/2/1, Gwembe; KDE 8/1/5, Lealui; 
KDH 1/1, Kasama; KSA 6/1,Chilanga; KSG 3/1, 
Kawambwa; KSH 2/1, Kalabo; KSK 6/1/2, Serenje. 
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1919-20 Revenue Exeenditure Balance of 
Revenue over 
Expenditure 
BAROTSE Tax 17,103. 6. 6. 
(incl.6 Other 11195.17.10. 
distri9ts) 18,298.17.10 3,695. 7.10(-)•14,603.10. o. 
KALABO Tax, 3,327. o. o. 711. 3. 2(-) 2,615 .. 16.10. 
etc. 
SERENJE Tax 1,529. s. o. 
Other 24 7. 7. o. 
1,776.12. o. 357. 9.10(-) 1,419. 2. 2. 
GWEMBE Tax, 4,109.12. 2. 644. 4. 6(-) 3,465. 7. 8. 
etc. 
MAGOYE Tax, 5,256.17. 5. 731.13. 5(-) 4,525. 4. o. 
etc. 
KASEMPA Tax, 2,341. 9. 3. 704. 1. 2. 1,637. 8. 1. 
etc. 
KALOMO Tax 2,443.10. o. 
Other 1 1807. o. 3. 
4,240.10. 3. 409.10. 4{-) 3,830.19.11. 
NDOLA Tax 3' 181. o. o. 
(Bwana Other 31687.19. 4. 
Mkubwa Mine 6,868.19. 4. 1,019.11. 3 (-). 5,849. 8. 1. 
FORT Tax 5,688. o. o. 
JAMESON Other 993.14. 9. 
6,681.14. 9.: 1,228. 2. 3(-)* 5,453.12. 6. 
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• Relatively large white population 
The relationship between revenue and expendi-
ture and the ratio of the favourable balance to the total 
annual revenue in the financial returns listed here can, 
on detailed examination, be paralleled for all districts 
and years not listed above. Moreover, the official 
109. Ibid: KDE 10/2, Barotse; KSH 2/1, Kalabo; 
KSK 6/1/3, Serenje; KDB 6/2/1, Gwembe; KDB 6/6/3, 
Magoye; KDD 5/1, Kasempa; KSN 3/1/1, Ndola; 
KDG 8/1/3, Fort Jameson; KSP 3/1, Kalomo. 
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estimates for North-western Rhodesia for 1906-07 had 
forecast a surplus of revenue over expenditure in the 
Native Department of £4,222. It would appear that in 
the first years of taxation, expenditure sometimes ex-
ceeded the approved votes, probably because of the out-
lays incurred in taking census, etc. Very soon there-
after, however, three facts came to light that appear to 
apply to the whole operation north of the Zambezi. 
Firstly the approved votes were far less than the tax 
yield, as, for example, Feira in 1910-11, less than 5%; 
Batoka in 1910-11. about 12%; Lundazi in 1913-14, just 
over 20%; Serenje in 1913-14, about 20%; Kalomo in 
1919-20, less than 10%; Ndola in 1919-20, about 20%. 
Secondly, musonko contributed by far the greater part 
of the revenue drawn from the districts. According 
to the figures listed above for 1908-09 'other' revenue 
items represented the following % of the whole: Baluba, 
0.3%; Chilanga, 14%; Mkushi, just over 1%; Ndola, 
about 17%; Barotse 5%; and Kasempa about 25%. Eleven 
years later, as our 1919-20 figures show, the amounts 
collected from the four districts which listed revenue 
items other than 'hut tax', were as follows: Barotse, 
about 6%; Serenje, about 14%; Ndola, about 54% and 
Kaorno about 42%. But Ndola and Kalomo both had appre-
ciable European populations at the time. Thirdly, the 
sum of salaries of European officials, which were not 
included in district financial returns would not, at any 
one station (from the staffing statistics available), 
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account for the use of more than a portion of the total 
favourable balance. 
Because extant B.S.A.C. accounts are so in-
complete, the question arises how the Company used the 
strikingly favourable balances of cash drawn from the 
districts and largely from 'native taxes'. When the 
taxation of European incomes began, it was reported 
that £1,000 was to be set aside for the European hospi-
tal in Fort Jameson. But hospitals, for white people 
only, had existed in northern Zambezia for some time. 
Kalomo's first hospital was erected in 1903. Living-
stone had a European hospital from at least as early as 
the transfer of the administrative capital of North-
western Rhodesia from Kalomo in 1910. In 1913 the 
senior Medical Officer in Livingstone gave the following 
figures of expenditure: Upkeep of Government Hospitals, 
£7,500; Annual Medical and Sanitary Expenses, £19,492; 
Salaries and Allowances of Medical Officers, £8,700. 
Broken Hill (Kabwe) was a segregated white township 
with improving amenities by 1910 and Lusaka had a 
Village Management Board to serve its white population 
by 1913. In the light of the sample financial returns 
we have reviewed here and of the fact that there were 
many more districts than those listed, it is pertinent 
to ask whether monies accruing from musonko were perhaps 
used for the building, maintaining and staffing of 
110 segregated white hospitals. 
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There was also the matter of European schools. 
There was a small school at 'lusaka's' in 1905 which the 
B.S.A.C. presumably took over. Livingstone had a white 
school from 1912 and during the First World War, schools 
were opened at Kalomo, Broken Hill and Fort Jameson. 
The Codrington School at Mazabuka started in 1919. 
In 1918 the Director of Education in Salisbury proposed 
that white schools north of the Zambezi should come 
under his department. As Northern Rhodesia had a long 
tradition of free education for white children, the 
question again arises where the Company found the funds 
for the running of these schools. Other matters like 
the cost of arresting and maintaining white prisoners 
may not have involved large expenditure, but there is a 
note extant from an official at Kalomo in 1907 asking 
that white prisoners should be moved south of the 
Zambezi and noting that the maintenance of such convicts 
in Southern Rhodesia gaols would cost North-western 
Rhodesia £35 per prisoner per year. The total cost 
of such penal action was, however, increased by the 
110. PLG: BSA 9/138, NWR Estimates 1906-7; NAZ: BS/102, 
Minutes of Advisory Council on Income Tax Pro-
clamation, 19/7/22; BS 3/66: PMO Livingstone to 
Adm.Sec., 5/9/13; and see Gann 'Hmstory' op.cit., 
pp. 138-142 in Chap. 3 part VI 'The beginnings 
of urban life in Northern Rhodesia'. Under-
lining is mine. See NAZ: District Note-books 
for sundry staff statistics. 
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fact that, for example, the Barotse Native Police, 
trained by Colonel Harding since 1901, were not allowed 
111 to apprehend white men. 
Another concealed factor was the insistence 
of officials that African pupils of mission schools and 
of the Barotse National School should be liable to 
musonko on reaching puberty. It had been persistently 
argued, on both sides of the Zambezi, that a 14-year-old 
boy should be liable for tax, despite protests of 
missionary teachers. In 1911 a Committee of Enquiry 
into Native Affairs recommended to the Southern Rhodesia 
Legislative Council that tax should start at 15 as 
'scholars above that age have generally earned suffi-
cient to pay school fees - which in some institutions 
is a very substantial amount - and it is felt that 
they can earn sufficient to pay the tax as well'. 
This specious argumentation obviously carried the day. 
In 1918, the Headmaster of the Barotse National School, 
while supporting taxation of pupils with no exemptions 
for fear of inequity, admitted that 'several boys here 
have been forced to absent themselves ••• for a consider-
able part of the year in order to obtain money for 
their tax'. Thus musonko not only made no contribution 
to African education but in fact became an impediment 
to it, since naturally some boys feared enrolling in 
111. RH:MSS.Afr.s.1314(1) 'European Education in 
Northern Rhodesia', essay by Andrew Thorn; NAZ: 
BS 2/227: Peacock, Kalomo to Secy. BSAC, London 
22/2/07; and see 'Livingstone Mail' 1/9/06. 
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school because the school provided the tax collector 
with a convenient sphere for rigorous exaction. It 
would be wrong, however, to imagine that the indigenous 
peoples and their chiefs were not resentful of the 
Company's lack of concern for the welfare of the people 
whose tax paid the costs of 'administering' the terri-
tory. At an indaba at Mpika in 1913 Chief Luchembe 
called for funds for education, and in 1923 the Lozi King 
Yeta produced a copy of a newspaper from Basutoland 
which quoted Government expenditure there on schools 
and hospitals at £37,000 and £20,443 in that year, and 
asked why the position was different in northern Zam-
bezia. Yet in 1950, twenty-six years after the end of 
our period, expenditure on African education in Northern 
Rhodesia,calculated as 3.2% of revenue from internal 
sources was less than in Nyasaland (6.6%), Tanganyika 
(9%), Kenya(4%) and Uganda (5%). 112 
Musonko was, from all we have seen, a per-
quisite of the greatest importance to the B.S.A. Company. 
112: PLG: BSA 7/227, SR Native Affairs Committee Report, 
1910-11 p. 17; and NAZ: KDE 2/39/2, Headmaster 
B.N. School to Res. Magis., Mongu, 1/5/18; and 
see p. above. Note that the Administrator, NWR, 
told Lewanika in 1904 that the taxable age was 18 
(NAZ: KDE 2/37/1 - letter of 17/8/04). See also 
NAZ: KSD 4/1, Mpika District N/Book, P• 434, Re-
port of Indaba, 1/7/13; KDE 10/2, Barotse Pro-
vince N/Book pp. 102 and 106, report of interview 
at Lealui, 25/9/23; and 'African Education: A 
Study of Educational Policy and Practice in Brit-
ish Tropical Africa' (Nuffield Foundation and the 
Colonial Office, 1953) p. 131. 
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Perhaps the situation might have been different if 
commercial profits had developed more rapidly. Certain-
ly at the end of its period of direct rule, the Company's 
financial condition was widely regarded as parlous. 
The 'Livingstone Mail' claimed in 1919 that the Company 
was 'supposed to lose nearly £50,000 p.a. and we have 
nothing to show for it in 50 years'. The history of 
'native taxation' confirms that there was no sense of 
any obligation to plough back funds into African edu-
cation, health or welfare. On the showing of the 
Colonial Office, as we noted at the outset, there was 
nothing to report in any of those respects at the time 
of the transference of power to the British Government. 
It is thus startling to find a proposal made as early 
as 1908 that, in order to raise the loan needed for ex-
tending the railways, the Company should 'issue a 
£1,000,000 Stock at 4% secured on the Native Tax'. 
As~te as 1922, however, the Administrator announced 
his intention to do everything possible to reduce ex-
penditure to the level of revenue, noting that European 
Income Tax should raise £33,000 in 1922-23, but that 'if 
District Administration is ~icallX cut down, the 
amount received in Native Tax will be decreased. The 
Secretary for Native Affairs made an admission however, 
in the Legislative Council in 1930 which merits attention: 
'The natives of this territory', he said, 'pay for every 
service that Government provides for them, and if there 
is a balance it is rather in favour of the Government'. 
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As late as 1935 when the whole financial condition of 
the territory had been dramatically altered by ten years 
of intensive copper-mining (interrupted by the world 
economic slump), the first of two major African distur-
bances on the Copperbelt was sparked by a further in-
crease in tax. 113 
The Tables in Appendix II at the end of this 
survey summarise the relative contribution of musonko and 
of European taxation to the revenue of northern Zarnbezia, 
giving figures for the years 1911-12, 1919-20 and 1924-
25. The examination of similar figures over the next 
fifteen years reveals that revenue from the taxation of 
Africans exceeded the cost of Provincial and District 
Administration in every year from 1911 to 1940, except 
in 1919-20 and 1933 when that item of expenditure slight-
ly exceeded the yield of musonko. Four years after 
the end of the B.S.A. Company's direct control, the 
Government's determination 'that the sum of native tax 
collections will cover the cost of District Administration' 
was officially reaffirmed. 
113; 'Livingstone Mail', 18/4/19, and seep. 33 above; 
PLG: BSA 10/59: H. Wilson Fox, memo on 'Loan Ord-
inance' for railway development 28/5/08; and 10/54, 
Chaplin to Gell, 18/6/22 and to BSAC, London, 
3/7/22; NR Hansard 18/3/30, p. 123; underlining 
is mine; 'Report of the Commission Appointed to 
Enquire into Disturbances on the Copperbelt' 
(Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1935); NAZ: Sec/Lab/67 
on 1935 Strike; Rotberg, 'Rise•, op.cit., pp. 
161-2; Gann, 'History', op.cit., pp. 300-1; 
Macpherson, op.cit., p. 142; and NAZ: 8.~1/3/35: 
'Memorandum on the Revenue System and Basis of 
Taxation', 21/1/28. 
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In summary, then, it appears that the relent-
less hunt for musonko, which the Company's agents began 
before thorough 'pacification' had been effected and 
continued to the very end of their thirty-four years' 
rule, was not pursued in order to benefit the voiceless 
tax-payers. The purpose was to relieve the Company 
maximally of the costs of 'administering' a territory 
to which they cling in the confidence that its famed 
potential wealth would accrue to their shareholders 
through the exploitation of 'treaties' avowedly spu-
rious in origin and udlateral in exercise. Without 
the traffic in labour for the service of white enter-
prise sou~h of the Zambezi, musonko would have lacked 
something of its sustained impetus and would of course 
have proved even more difficult to exact. 
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Today in any typical Zambian village the word 
chibalo evokes vivid memories in the minds of men who 
have either personally experienced its rigours or have 
lived in the aftermath of the extensive social disinte-
gration that has resulted from it. But it is not easy 
to find people who know the etymology of the word. Yet 
its origin is simple, and a parallel for it is found in 
the name of a large suburb of Kitwe called Chamboli. 
According to the normal accentuation of Zambian lang-
uages, this word is often now called Chamboli. But 
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those who remember what took place in 1952 on the stretch 
of ground which later became the site of a high-density 
housing area, know that the accent originally fell on 
the last syllable, thus, Chamboli; because that place 
had been chosen for a great Boy Scout jamboree. Chi-......... 
~ 
balo, so accented now, has a similar origin. Probably 
because a significant number of white agents of the 
Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau were Scots, the word 
'bureau• would often be heard as either 'bew-row' or 
more often perhaps 'baroo•. The African prefix £hi-
denotes the manner or customs of societies or institu-
tions and so chi-baro - or chibalo, thus accented, ex-
pressed the whole concept of coercive labour recruit-
ment. In modern usage the accent has tended to slip 
back to the penultimate syllable. But the R.N.L.B. 
was clearly the origin of the word. 
114 As we noted at the start of this chapter, 
the extensive drive for cheap labour, carried out, under 
the auspices of the B.S.A. Company, during the whole of 
its period of rule in northern Zambezia, cannot be sepa-
rated from musonko. Furthermore, as with the hut-tax, 
chibalo apparently did not lose its rigours with the 
passage of time. A missionary in the North-western 
Province, protesting reluctantly wrote thus in 1918: 
'It means that a man must leave his wife, children and 
village and journey on foot a distance of 400 miles and 
114. See P•283above. 
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more and then sign on for twelve months' work. In 
most cases the journey is entirely new to him, as many 
of the natives have not been fifty miles from their 
homes before. He has to pass through the country of 
peqple whose language he does not know and to take work 
with people who are entirely unacquainted with the lan-
guage he speaks'. From the start, chibalo, like musonko, 
was subjected to condemnation on humanitarian grounds 
and therefore was defended from the start on moral 
grounds by its promoters. Harry Johnston explained in 
1896 that 'a gentle insistence that the native should 
contribute his fair share to the revenue' was all that 
was needed •to secure his taking that share in life's 
labour which no human being should evade'. Five years 
later, the B.S.A.C. Director, Philip Gell, argued that 
'the moral ruin of the Native Races will rest on the 
Colonial Office unless it recognises frankly that ~ 
conquering Englishman has incurred the responsibility 
of disciplining, directing and educating the Native whose 
tribal discipline we have effaced'. to support his 
argument Gell quoted Scripture thus: "The Law must be 
their schoolmaster to bring them into the status of 
Christian citizenship". This required 'saying to the 
Native simply: "It is your duty to work. Idlers and 
vagabonds will have work found for them"•. 115 
115. NAZ: KDE 2/39/3: G.R. Suckling, CMML, Kabompo 
Mission, to Res. Magis. Mongu, 16/11/18; BM/Parl. 
Papers, 1896, LVIII (C.7925), Johnston to Salis-
bury, 29/4/96; and PLG: BSA 7/133, Gell to Earl 
Grey, 30/11/01, and misquoting Galatians chp. 3 
v. 24. Underlinings are mine. 
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Both Harry Johnston and Cecil Rhodes had con-
ceived of the great region beyond the Zambezi as a source 
of unlimited black labour. Johnston presented thi~ 
programme persuasively in an article in 'The Nineteenth 
Century' of November 1902, 'as if', as Dr Hetherwick of 
the Blantyre Mission said, 'he represented the best in-
terests of British Central Africa and the native peoples 
whom we have taken under our protection'. Hetherwick. 
then recalled that 'when the Cape to Cairo railway 
scheme was first mooted, one inducement for its imme-
diate construction put forward by the late Mr Rhodes 
was the prospect of tapping the immense wealth of native 
labour said to be lying idle ••• and conveying at an easy 
rate to the diamond and gold fields and other labour 
markets'. Surely, however, 'the one hope of British 
Central Africa is in the cultivation of its own soil by 
the hands of its own children whom we have restored to 
freedom and peace. It was for this that the yoke was 
torn from his (the African's) neck and not that he might 
be turned into the serf of the colonist and capitalist•!16 
Hetherwick's plea was an echo of the sentiments of the 
Blantyre Mission's newssheet 'Life and Work' which had 
warned, ten years earlier, against consequences of 
'compulsory labour and oppressive taxation' similar to 
'the melancholy spectacle that we see in the Cape, Free 
State, Transvaal and Natal Colonies'. The menace was 
116. 'Scotsman', Edinburgh, letter by Rev. A. Hether-
wick, 29/12/02. Phrase in brackets is mine. 
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already near, as shown in the newssheet's account of 
the exploits of a local planter who had told a member 
of the Mission that 'in the present dearth of labour he 
had no difficulty in getting workers. He simply ••• 
told the people that if they did not come and work he 
would burn their houses'. Hetherwick's was 'a voice 
crying in the wilderness'. From a fundamentally 
different standpoint the B.S.A.C. Directors had noted 
enthusiastically that the smashing of Arab power meant 
that whereas 'the natives ••• have hitherto been prevented 
by the Arabs from working for white men ••• now, a large 
supply of labour is available', whereby 'cost of trans-
port will be materially lessened'. Meanwhile, in a 
letter stressing the need of labour for Kimberley, 
Johannesburg and Southern Rhodesia, Rhodes had proposed 
to Joseph Chamberlain that the mining companies 'should 
assist financially in railway construction to the north 
with the object of increasing, and thus of cheapening, 
labour•. Men from the north would cost only '2d per 
diem', while de Beers had to pay £1 a week for locally 
recruited labour because the great distance to be cover-
ed on foot by Zambezi men had 'prevented extensive 
employment of their services•. 117 
117. 'Life and Work', Blantyre, March 1892; RH:MSS.Afr. 
s.72, BSAC Directors' Report, March 1897, pp. 26-27; 
and MSS.Afr.s.228, Rhodes's Papers, Rhodes to 
Chamberlain, 28/4/98. 
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Soon after the defeat of Mpezeni's Ngoni and 
before the Lunda and Bemba were conquered, Cecil Rhodes 
received a report from Arthur Lawley of Smitherman's 
plan, which we noted earlier, •to bring labour from the 
Nyasa and Bangweulu to the mines•. 118 Smitherman must 
have travelled e~tensively, not only to be able to assess 
the manpower potential of thirteen Zambian peoples, but 
also to propose a wage rate. 'At a low estimate', he 
said, 'in about two years after the first natives start-
ed to work, over 15,000 native labourers could be pro-
cured ••• They will probably sign on for six months al-
though nine may be agreed to ••• and ••• they will consider 
a sum of 15/- per mensem as ample wages'. His esti-
mates of man-power, including the 'Bagaranganzo' (sic) 
of Katanga, were as follows:-
'The Awemba - a very powerful tribe - could easily supply 
3,000 men a year ••• very fine and big men and good workers. 
The Bausi - very good labourers, but require a lot of 
managing - have more spirit tha~ the ordinary native ••• 
2,000 men p.a. could be obtained. 
The Balamba - very powerful tribe and I do not think 
they will be very much use for work ••• more akin to the 
Mashonas ••• and exhibit their bad traits of character ••• 
They are very timid and live in a state of filth and 
dirt ••• soo good workmen might be procured. 
118. RH:MSS.Afr.s.228, Lawley to Rhodes, 7/12/98; 
and see p.283above. Lawley was then Deputy 
Administrator in Matabeleland. 
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The Ballala (sic) - inhabit the country round Fort Elwes 
••• the finest workers to be found north of the river-
energetic, easily led, and furnish abundant proof that 
they are not idle by the way they cultivate their lands, 
plenty of native food being obtainable ••• could send at 
least 2,000 workers annually down to the Mines. 
The Besa (sicJBisa) - also very good workers - could 
supply about 400 men a year. 
The Chickunda (sic) - good labourers - able to furnish 
quite 300 first class men p.a. 
The Baswacka (sic) - along the banks of the Lusenfwa 
River - akin to the Ballala - good working qualities. 
200 men could be obtained annually. 
The Balengi {sic} - a warlike people ••• well armed and 
thoroughly in touch with the Portuguese slave dealers 
from both the East and West Coasts.~.impertinent and in-
dependent ••• not much good for labour - perhaps 200 men 
a year. 
The Baluana (sic} - timid and lazy - about 300 men a year. 
The Vasenga - very good labourers - 300 men. 
The Bagaranqanzo (sic} - inhabit Katangaland and in the 
course of time, will send good labourers to Bulawayo as 
the chief sent me a message saying that, if I wanted 
any men, he could send them down ••• roughly 1,000 could 
be obtained. 
The Mashukulumbwe - a very fine lot of men and keen for 
work - could supply about 3,000 men a year. 
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The Matutela (sic) - all very good labourers - unless 
prevented by the Chief Levineka (sic), could easily be 
persuaded to go to Bulawayo. 
cured•. 119 
About 2,000 could be pro-
Codrington declared, as we noted earlier, that 
white opinion was unanimous that it was essential 'to 
compel the natives to work', and this implied that, 
without such foreign pressure, the local people were 
idle. Wills's uninformed picture of the European in-
busion supports this view when he says that 'Africans 
did not resent the tax but proved stubbornly reluctant 
to work for longer than was necessary to earn it. The 
first decade of the century was taken up with bitter 
settler recrimination over the "idleness" of the African 
and with resort to questionable methods of inducing men 
120 to work'. The testimonies of disinterested trave-
llers did not support this view as they realised that 
the work that occupied the planning and action of village 
dwellers was the business of growing crops and hunting 
for food. It is certainly true that Africa was not in 
the main stream of industrial and technological change 
at the end of the 19th century. But a village with 
full granaries, nurtured fruit trees and grazing stock 
119. Ibid: Smitherman's Report. 
120. See p.283above - underlining is mine; and Anene 
J. and Brown G., op.cit., Chap 29, 'African 
Politics in Central Africa', by A.J. Wills, esp. 
p. 511. 
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bore testimony to work however it may have differed 
from western· work patterns in terms of the products 
that came from it or the skills employed. This contra-
diction of Wills's inference finds unexpected support 
from the report of the Southern Rhodesian Native Affairs 
Enquiry of 1911, thus: 'It is frequently urged that 
native males lead an idle life at their kraals. This 
is not borne out by the evidence we have received. On 
the contrary they appear to do the bulk of the heavy 
work, and the woman is not the slave which she is so 
frequently alleged to be•. 121 
The real motive of the plan for massive labour 
recruiting was expressed frankly in a letter to the 
Duke of Abercorn by Lionel Decle of the 'Daily Tele-
graph' on his return from Central Africa in 1900. 
Northern Zambezia was, he believed, 'ripe for coloni-
sation', offering 'the immense advantage of an abundance 
of cheap and reliable labour' as '50,000 labourers 
could be found here at a few weeks' notice'. His only 
caveat was 'in the present state of Northern Rhodesia 
••• the men who are today the best and most reliable 
labourers were yesterday the fiercest of the inhabi-
tants', and therefore 'the contact of these men with 
the natives of the south in whose minds the recollection 
121. Harris J. 'The Chartered Millions' (Swathrnore 
Press, 1920), pp. 247-8, quoting N.A. Committee 
of Enquiry, 1909-11, p. 3. 
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of the late rebellion is still vivid' might suggest to 
them 'the possibility of rising against the handful of 
whites who hold them in subjection'. To suggest that 
the European annexation of Central Africa was motivated 
by a philanthropic desire to lead Africans to enjoy the 
fruits of modernity is not merely to be facile. It 
is to obscure the relentless determination of the con-
querors to use the conquered peoples to carry their 
loads and to dig in their mines and their fields. 
Chibalo in Central Africa was different from the system 
associated with the European Slave Trade in its methods. 
In its objectives it was basically similar. Tragically 
the arguments of Rodney's book , 'How Europe underde-
veloped Africa', find innumerable supporting data in 
Central Africa. Just as the British Government and 
the 'Livingstone Mail' apparently found no problem in 
applying to the taxation of black men totally different 
doctrines from those used in reference to metropolitan 
taxation, so the idea of compelling labour was applied 
to Africa with a startling universality at a time when 
the struggle for the emancipation of labour was well 
122 advanced in Europe. 
At the outset, we are faced with a question: 
why did the burgeoning European enterprises south of the 
122. PLG: BSA 8/16, L. Decle to Duke of Abercorn, 
14/2/00; and see Rodney w., (Bogle-L'Ouverture, 
1972). 
374. 
Zambezi require labour from the north? Oliver and 
fage have said that, while south of the Zambezi 'most 
of the African population suffered some disturbance in 
their land use as a result of European immigration, in 
all the territories north of the Zambezi ••• the numbers 
123 affected were a very small proportion of the whole'. 
The material which we are reviewing now suggests that 
this view is simplistic, and that there is reason to 
believe that, not only did definite dislocation and 
depopulation follow the introduction of musonko and 
chibalo, but the societies so affected suffered not just 
trauma but debilitation. The demands of the south 
appeared insatiable and, for example WENELA - the Wit-
watersrand Native Labour Association - was still opera-
ting in 1964 as far north as the Tanzania-Malawi-Zambia 
border area. Sixty-three years earlier, Rhodes had 
said that the current supply of labour was 'only 3,000 
natives per month ••• Every effort had been made to get 
labour in South Africa. Transkei natives when engaged 
decamped, the Portuguese refused to export labour, and 
the supply from north of the Zambezi was poor ••• (But) 
the Government was fully alive to the absolute necessity 
of cheap labour, cheap coal and good railway communica-
tion•.124 But a full answer to why South Africa and 
Rhodesia demanded ~o many thousands of labourers from 
123. Oliver R. and Fage 3.0. 'A Short History of Africa' 
{Penguin 1962) pp. 201-202. 
124. 'Cape Times', 1/6/01, Rhodes on 'Failure of the 
Native Supply'. Underlining is mine. 
375. 
the north and indeed why the importing of Chinese, 
Indian, Malayan, Arab and other labour was undertaken 
simultaneously, cannot be sought here. What matters 
now is how chibalo affected northern Zambezia. 
Once again however we cannot separate northern 
Zambezia from what was happening south of the river, 
nor can we overlook the radical consequences upon that 
situation of the racial wars of 1893 and 1896-7. From 
the Martin Report on 'Native Administration' it became 
clear that even Lord Grey acknowledged that 'the treat-
ment experienced by the natives at the hands of pros-
pectors and others was one, if not the greatest, cause 
of the rebellion'. In procuring labour, Native Commi-
ssioners used Native Police who 'were guilty of many 
acts of cruelty and extortion and', said Martin, 'I 
cannot but think that the Native Commissioners must have 
been aware of the conduct of their men'. Though a 
N.C. told the Enquiry that the people 'did not like 
supplying labour' but 'preferred remaining at the kraals 
doing nothing', a resident of Umzinbwane said: 'A proud 
and hitherto unconquered Matabele cannot ~be turned in 
a month, or a year, into a useful servant by kicks, 
sjambok and blows'. Yet he added that 'as to punishment 
of the rebels on their surrender, it might be suggested 
that they be put to work on the railway for two years 
or till it reaches Bulawayo, without pay, since, accord-
ing to Matabele opinion, it is more degrading and there-
fore a greater punishment to be made to work than to be 
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shot as an enemy'. Nonetheless Martin, who was in 
essential sympathy with the B.S.A.C. policy, acknowledged 
that, when it appeared 'that all heart had been knocked 
out of the natives' and that the Government could now 
'place what exactions they thought fit upon them with-
out fear of retaliation, compulsory labour began'. 
This, Martin said, 'must have seemed nothing less than 
slavery itself', to 'the raw and hitherto independent 
Matabele•. 125 
The quest for labour for Southern Africa 
reached amazing proportions at the turn of the century. 
As proposals for recruiting from China were being studied, 
the 'Chine~Anti-Immigration Committee' in Bulawayo 
warned the Colonial Secretary by telegram that it would 
be •ruinous interest whole inhabitants and subversive 
morality civilisation•. A draft ordinance on the sub-
ject of labour for Southern Rhodesia expressly excluded 
immigration from British dependencies and limited re-
cruitment to Asia; but it was noted that the imporlation 
of labour from China would 'raise a storm of objection 
from all the anti-Chinese Whites of South Africa'. 
Nevertheless, one former resident in Hong Kong urged the 
Colonial Secretary to put such objections aside. For 
the proposed Cape to Cairo railway, he said, 'I am sure 
125. RH:MSS.Afr.s.81: Sir R. Martin's'Report on the 
Native Administration' of the B.S.A. Company (pre-
pared on the instruction of the Colonial Secretary, 
Joseph Chamberlain) Feb. 1897. 
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the Chinese are the best labourers ••• being obedient to 
overseers and able to endure all kinds of hardship' -
a remark that gains in interest in view of the Tanzania-
Zambia railway project of the 1970's which has been 
undertaken by the Peoples' Republic of China. Philip 
Gell, a Company Director, made a romantic proposal, at 
the end of the World War, that 'Kanakas, Burmese, Indians, 
Japanese and Chinese Christians' should be recruited. 
He knew nothing of the Chinese, he said, 'but I suppose 
Chinese Christians would be different and I would like 
to offer them a haven of refuge in the Zambezi Valley'. 
There had also been a suggestion, in 1899, that West 
Indians should be recruited for South Africa, whereby 
the West Indian would 'return to his native soil, after 
the absence of about two hundred years, with this diff-
erence that, whilst he left it in savagery, he returns 
a civilised and able-bodied workman'. The B.S.A. Com-
pany then received a suggestion that Italian labour 
should be sought as 'it would increase a large and 
friendly population to overwhelm ••• the Boers', for 
'Italian women are most prolific ••• as an instance, the 
Province of s. Paulo (Brazil( where after ten years 
the Italian population has reached to over one million•. 
The most serious efforts, under the Company's auspices, 
were, however, the attempts to recruit from Abyssinia 
and Somalia. But these projects foundered because 
Tulloch and Kusel, the agents, took '280 Abyssinians and 
Somalis' from the Somali Coast Protectorate 'under 
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circumstances which it would be difficult to distinguish 
from deliberate fraud'. The local Consul-General was 
highly offended and, in addition, through panic among 
the recruits on board the German vessel 'Herzog', a riot 
occurred in which one recruit was killed and 10 'severely 
wounded' along with some members of the Beira Police. 
The trouble began when 'the crew by way of amusement, 
informed them that it was the intention of their employ-
er to sell them as slaves•. The local Beira paper 
commented that the incident was 'no loss to the Company 
as the crew ••• look about the most useless things on the 
face of the earth and will die like rotten sheep in 
Rhodesia'. This debacle only increased the Company's 
determination to procure labour from Mozambique, des-
pite Portuguese objections, and its request for British 
Government intervention. Though some Arab labour was 
in fact secured, the Foreign Office expressed disapproval 
of attempts to find labour from other Protectorates. 
It became vital, therefore, to draw as much labour as 
possible from:north of the Zarnbezi. 126 
126. PRO: CO 879/68, African South no. 656; Milner to 
Chamberlain, enclosing telegram, 23/7/00; 417/342, 
correspondence on labour for s.Rhodesia, 21/6/01, 
and 370 C.T. Robinson to CO, 4/3/02; PLG: BSA 7/256, 
memo by P.L. Gell (n.d.) after end of World War; and 
PRO: CO 879/68 African South no. 656, W.J. Calder, 
M.O. Bulawayo, to CO, 27/12/99; W. McNaughton to 
BSA, encl. letter from Florence on Italian labour, 
20/8/00; BSAC to CO on Abyssinian recruiting 
scheme, 29/11/00; Consul General, Somali Coast to 
FO, 22/1/01 and BSA to eo, 15/1/01, which cited 
Beira newspaper comment; and 879/76, African South 
no. 694, FO to eo, 2/7/01. 
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The well-known 'sons of Ham' doctrine of 
African inferiority, found a spokesman in Sir Harry 
Johnston. 'The Negro', he wrote in 1899, • ••• has been 
marked out by his mental and physical characteristics 
as the servant of other races ••• He is possessed of great 
physical strength, docility, cheerfulness ••• a short 
memory for sorrows and cruelties, and an easily aroused 
gratitude for kindness ••• As he is usually a strong man 
and a good fighter, he has come into request, not only 
as a labourer, but as a soldier•. 127 Johnston's role 
as apologist for white herrenvolkism was of great service 
to the imperial thrust in Central Africa. A scholarly 
study of African labour, published thirty-four years 
later, offers in contrast this insight. 'Slavery ••• 
demoralised the society in which it existed and those 
tribes which experienced it will usually be found to be 
the most unsatisfactory workers. This, however, is an 
economic view; from the aspect of the establishment of 
any colour bar, the Arab influence had little effect, 
nor does it appear to have made the slaves as a whole 
embittered or dangerous, at any rate to the degree ex-
emplified by the risings of Africans against their 
European masters in Haiti, Jamaica and elsewhere'. Its 
effect was 'immense and disastrous to the African' and 
was exacerbated by the fact that 'Protestantism doubted 
127. Johnston H.H. 'A History of the Colonisation of 
Africa by Alien Races' (Cambridge 1899), pp. 151-2. 
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the negro's possession of a soul'. Thus 'the black man 
was never to be allowed to rise from his servile state, 
education was denied him and inter-marriage was sternly 
discountenanced'. Significantly, and contrary to a 
still common view, this writer added that 'in South Africa 
the Dutch maintained to a considerable degree the Anglo-
Saxon view•. 128 
The use of labour from far away may to a cer-
tain degree have been started in face of the proven re-
sistance of local communities to recruiting. As it de-
veloped, it relieved the employer of any but minimal 
concern for his employees, their means of travel or their 
home conditions. Thus the element of inhumanity was in-
creased and the sanctions upon brutality reduced. As 
Orde-Browne says elsewhere in the book which we have just 
cited, 'The application of pressure to go to work ••• 
tends to reduce the interest of the employer in improving 
condition; in proportion as he can rely upon a certain 
supply of manpower, so does he cease to trouble about the 
welfare or contentment of his people. In the extreme 
cases, the system will become merely a method of extract-
ing the largest possible amount out of the employee in 
return for the irreducible minimum of food and carei con-
sequent exhaustion or illness being repaired by the dis-
charge of the unfit and their replacement by others. 
this stage the position is far worse than under honest 
129 slavery'. 
At ........ 
128. Orde-Brown G. St.J. 'The African Labourer' (Oxford 
1933) pp. 16 and 21. 
129. Ibid: p. 31. Underlinings are mine. 
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Rotberg, in his Introduction to the second 
edition of Merle Davis's 'Modern Industry and the Afri-
can', quotes a comment of an official on the Copperbelt 
situation, well beyond the limit of our period, to the 
effect that 'the Management at Nkana ••• simply wanted 
"to get two shillings' worth of work for one shillin~s 
wage out of the bloody nigger"•. 130 As was suggested 
earlier, it must be observed, with regard to labour in 
the B.S.A.C. territory north of the Zambezi, that though 
the system may perhaps have differed in degree from what 
obtained to the south, it was the same in essence. 
Migration southwards from the Zambezi in 
search of work in the Witwatersrand and elsewhere had 
been going on for some time before the B.S.A. Company 
appeared in the northern territories. For two decades 
or more, a steady trickle of men had been moving, 
especially from the Tonga and Lozi areas, first to the 
Kimberley diamond mines which were opened in 1869 and 
then, after 1884, to the Witwatersrand gold reef. As 
soon as the Company began to cast its eyes northward, 
however, the rate of emigration greatly increased, as 
Rhodes's determination to procure cheap labour took 
effect. Colin Harding reported, as we noted above, 
that in 1900, labour 'touts' were at work in consider-
able numbers and men were 'being driven like sheep ••• 
130. Davis H.M., (Cass 1967, 2nd edition), p.x of Rot-
berg's Introduction, citing NAZ: Sec/Lab/16, 
Dickerson to Cartrnel-Robinson (n.d.). 
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(and) improperly fed'. Far more were involved than was 
generally imagined and the death rate was rising. A 
visiting secretary of the Paris Missionary Society, on 
tour in the Lozi kingdom in 1904, described his meeting 
with 'many natives either coming back from the mines or 
coming up in gangs to work on fresh sections of the 
railway. But', he said, 'we met none hastening south 
to take the places of those returning ••• The latter were 
mostly in very poor condition, some quite starving and 
emaciated with wolfish eyes, others hardly able to walk 
••• they cannot carry supplies enough to last them through 
the long trek ••• Many of them return ill, with chest 
complaints and dy~ntery, the latter from the coarse 
mealie supplied to them ••• Poverty of blood betrayed 
itself in large ulcers. Naturally, their poor distor-
ted minds fly to sinister conclusions. "We are all 
going home to tell our own people not to come and work 
for the white man. The meal the white men give us has 
been ground in grinding machines greased with human fat. 
They want to poison us with it" ••• such was the tale they 
kept telling Uncle F. (Francois Coillard). 131 
The Company's Directors were exercised from 
the outset to find a way of procuring labour other than 
through the operations of 'touts', which had a high 
wa9age rate as well as a scandalous reputation. Even 
Dr Jameson was sensitive to allegations of 'forced 
131. See p.317 above; and PMS: DEFAP Library, 'News 
from Barotseland', No. 22 (1904) p. 26, Hon.Secy. 
on 'Tour ins. Africa'. 
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labour'as shown in his objections to Sir Richard Martin's 
Report in 1897 on 'Native Administration'. Martin 
had stated that Native Commissioners, having failed to 
obtain labour through indunas or headmen, 'procured it 
132 
by force'. In 1901, P.L. Gell made a tentative 
proposal that, while white men should qualify for land 
tenure by offering military service, African tenure 
should be made conditional on giving labour which 'would 
not be unpaid but ••• would only be paid at subsistence 
rates, far below mining wages'. Gell obviously took 
it for granted that the land was now owned by the Corn-
pany. Since the land had not cost the Company anything, 
it would obviously be of considerable financial advant-
age to employers of labour to be able to pay their em-
ployees at mere subsistence rates on the grounds that 
such labourers were thus eligible for a recognition of 
'tenure' of a small piece of their own native soil. 
Nothing, however, appears to have come of Gell's pro-
posal. Instead, the Resident Commissioner in Salisbury 
confirmed, at the same time, that the recruiting and 
distributing of labour in Mashonaland was entirely in 
the hands of Native Commissioners who were required to 
"use their utmost endeavours to induce the natives to 
work and to meet the demands of the various mines". 
132. BM/Parl. Papers 1897, LXII {C.8547) Report by Sir 
R.E.R. Martin, July, folios 561 ff.; PLG: BSA 
7/97: Statement on •compulsory labour' as reported 
by Martin, 24/3/97. 
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But the situation was taxing the resources of the re-
cruiters for, when in 1899 'hut tax' had been •arbitrar-
ily collected in July ••• natives turned out to work in 
thousands' but immediately 'deserted to their homes•. 133 
As with the imposition of musonko the Company 
thus faced a chaotic situation in respect of labour, 
aggravated by its agents' determination to obtain it at 
all costs. The Administrator of North-western Rhodesia 
was quoted as saying that he hoped that 'the tax will 
ultimately be raised to £5, if not £10, if no lower 
charge is sufficient to force the natives into the 
service of the mines'. Yet, at the same period, a 
memorandum from the Company's headquarters in Fort 
Jameson presented a much more gentle picture. 'Over 
2,000 natives ••• have passed through Beira during this 
month (April 1903) ••• These people go down on their own 
initiative but are encouraged and assisted by our Native 
Commissioners. It seems probable that the employment 
of labour agents north of the Zambesi is not so effect-
ive as the quiet encouragement and assistance ••• given ••• 
by the Administration'. However, ~our months later, 
Codrington was advising his Commissioners to insist on 
the payment of tax in cash to circumvent the practice 
whereby 'natives are compelled to labour ••• to discharge 
their tax ••• (which) may become indistinguishable from 
133. PLG: BSA 7/116, PLG to Chester Master, 10/9/01. 
Underlining is mine; 7/121 CO to BSJC citing 
report on labour recruitment by Sir M1 Clarke, 
Res.Comm., Salisbury, 3/10/01. 
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mere traffic in forced labour'. Yet, in the following 
year, 1904, the Native Commissioner, Serenje, remarked 
that, for local work, since '6d amounts to 5 days' work', 
it was better to pay with a length of calico or in the 
case of very small service with only a few beads•. 134 
The picture thus emerges of a many-pronged 
system of duresse which fully justifies the term 'forced 
labour•. Physical force was one element but less di-
rect yet drastic coercion through taxation was at least 
as important. Before taxation was officially imposed, 
however, Harding reported in 1898 that about 500 men 
had recently gone south from Mpezeni's district. Pre-
sumably the activities of 'Changa-changa' and his asso-
ciates had been drawing recruits from the Luangwa-Zam-
bezi confluence area for some time, for as we saw 
earlier he had been collecting 'tax' there since 1897 and 
travelling extensively in search of 'boys' for the 
southern mines. 'Encouragement' to men in the con-
fluence area and the Kafue district to go to Southern 
Rhodesia was officially reported in early 1902, before 
taxation started there. 135 • 
134. Ibid: 7/152 - 'Forced Labour in British South 
Africa' by H. Fox Bourne, Secy., A~S Society, 
March 1903, p. 43; PRO: eo 879/79, African south 
no. 717, Memo by Admin., F. Jameson, 22/4/03; and 
NAZ: KSK 5/1, NC Serenje to Secy., F. Jameson 
31/3/04. 
135. PRO: eo 468, BSAe Reports for 1897-98, p. 399; 
and see p.242above; and eo 879/76, African south 
no. 694, NER Accounts (annotated) 25/3/02. 
Moreover, it was not only for work in the 
south that labour was being urgently sought at that 
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time. On the Tanganyika-Nyasa plateau, the telegraph 
line and the enterprises of the African Lakes Company 
were demanding very large numbers of porters. In 1901, 
31,188 loads were carried through Old Fife (Ikawa) for 
the telegraph project and in 1903-4 '1880 boys' were 
recruited for porterage from Isoka to Fort Jameson 
during the year, the number rapidly increasing till 
1907; though 'the natives of Fife Division ••• are very 
''stay-at-home" people and do not readily come forward'. 
In the aftermath of the B.S.A.C.'s military action in 
the northern region, the threat to a chief that he must 
provide labour 'if he wishes to be friends with the 
white man' was certainly coercive. Yet Codrington 
reported in 1899 that even such pressure was often una-
vailing. A major project like the trans-continental 
telegraph involved forest clearing as well as porterage 
and the White Fathers at Chilonga recorded that, in 
March 1900, 1,000 men were being vigorously recruited. 
For this, 'our neighbour Worringham continues to terror-
ise the country ••• He is a morphinomane'. Right from 
the start the recruiters' task was to seek 'able-bodied 
~', without reference to the local community's need 
of its fittest citizens. The special urgency of re-
cruiting north of the Zambezi was, as the Anti-Slavery 
Society observed, because the gold companies would need 
15,000-20,000 men but 'the number of able-bodied men' 
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south of the Zambezi and not employed elsewhere was 
'only 15,000'. The Society therefore begged Her 
Majesty's Government to be vigilant in this regard. 136 
With the development of mines in the Hook of 
the Kafue, the Benguela railway project and the extension 
of the railway line beyond the Victoria Falls in the 
direction of Katanga, there quickly arose a conflict 
between the demands of such enterprises and those south 
of the Zambezi. Harding reported in 1903 that the Ila 
country would have no 'surplus labour for employment in 
the Transvaal'. Moreover, Harding now realised that 
it was 'just as desirable for a native to remain at his 
kraal and provide, by extensive husbandry, sufficient 
food for the extensive requirements which follow the 
settlement of a white population in his country•. He 
was sure that no government could sanction 'forced labour'; 
that 'a native's labour is his capital and he is allowed 
to take it to the best market'; and that therefore 
dishonest recruitment must be checked. 'For instance•, 
he said, 'the current wage in N.E. Rhodesia is from 5/-
to 10/- per month and they are told that in the Trans-
vaal they can obtain £2 or even more a month', w~thout · 
reference to the much higher cost of living. The sight 
136. NAZ: KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note-book; PRO: CO 
879/57 African South no. 574: Memo on 'Treatment 
of Natives in N.E. Rhodesia', submitted to BSA 
Directors by Codrington 6/12/99; WF,. Chilonga, 
12/3/00; and PRO: CO 879/69 African South no. 659, 
A-S and A.P. Socy., to eo, 26/3/01, quoting SR 
labour report. Underlining is mine. 
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of maimed men returning with 'no food to see them to 
their homes' shocked Harding, who, as he did later in 
regard to tax-raiding, uttered a protest not altogether 
welcome to his employers. Yet the flow south increased, 
'many thousands' going •on their own initiative' in 
addition to those formally recruited, according to 
Resident Commissioner in Salisbury. 137 
As recruiting agents, official and freelance, 
crossed the Zambezi, it seemed right away to the local 
people that indeed 'the white men came with war'. An 
agent of the North Charterland Company, wanting porters 
to carry loads - the work called tengatenqa - was offered 
fewer men than he demanded. Smith and his kapitao, 
Nkhuwa, then burned the village of Kasangu, tied the 
chief up with bark-rope and carried off women whom they 
raped. Paying little heed to 'native witnesses', 
Codrington fined the 18-year-old Smith £25. An 'affray' 
occurred a few months later in November 1900 between 'the 
Batonka' (sic Batoka) of Sinakumpi's village and 'natives 
in the employ of Messrs Acutt and Crewe, Agents ••• working 
for the Southern Rhodesia Labour Bureau•. The re-
cruiting band was armed, but this was explained by the 
statement that, Crewe having been killed in the siege 
of Mafeking, Acutt issued gun permits 'in complete 
137. Ibid: 879/79, African South no. 717, Harding to 
Imperial Secy., Johannesburg 16/5/03; Harding's 
statement to the Labour Commission, 6/8/03; and 
879/84· African South no. 746, Res.Comm, to HC 
12/2/04. 
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ignorance'. Very soon afterwards, Chief Chiawa, living 
on the north side of the Zambezi, was shot dead by a 
'Portuguese native' called Jonas who was acting for a 
Mashonaland Labour Bureau agent. Milner, the gigh 
Commissioner, was concerned over the consequent 'failure 
of justice' due to the fact that the authorities in the 
south could not deal with a crime committed north of 
the river while witnesses from the north refused to go 
either south or to Fort Jameson. The interest of the 
Colonial Office does not appear to have gone beyond re-
ceiving the report with extra information to the effect 
that the agent, Pretorius, was stationed on the Kafukwe 
(sic Kafue) River and had recently thrashed Chief 
Chikobongo there and that his man, Jonas, had quarrelled 
with Chiawa because the chief refused to send one of his 
daughters to Pretorius. However, in a statement sent 
to his superiors in refutation of further allegations 
by the Anti-Slavery Society about 'forced labour', the 
Resident Commissioner wrote thus: 'While undoubtedly 
strong moral pressure is brought to bear on the natives 
to ••• work in the mines and elsewhere, no case of actual 
compulsion has come to my knowledge'. Moreover 'the 
incentive of newly acquired wants has caused a marked 
increase in the numbers offering to work on their own 
initiative•. 138 
138. PLG: BSA 8/21, report on Dahna Smith, 21/4/00, 
and see p.252above; PRO: CO 879/69 African 
South no. 659, Res.Comm, to HC, 16/11/00 and 
15/4/01; and 879/76 no. 694, ditto, 9/7/01. 
Underlining is mine. 
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The impression of a new kind of war in the 
land was further strengthened by the clashes between 
representatives of the 'authorities' and other white 
men also accompanied by armed Africans. We saw above 
the case of Ziehl and Bolle who were pursued by B.S.A.C. 
forces under Chesnaye in mid-1900. 139 A similar battle 
took place in Ila country a year later between Harding 
and Gielgud with a mixed force of Ndebele and local 
'friendlies' and a Maxim gun, on the one hand, and a 
trader called Garlo accompanied by 'chiefs of doubtful 
allegiance', on the other hand. 'Garlo with his people 
and cattle fled across the Kafue River' and once again 
the Company's mastery was confirmed. The fact that 
the Company's men always moved with 'armed askari' and, 
at the outset, furnished recruiting agents with similar 
support, meant that village dwellers had either to flee, 
submit or, as happened on a few occasions, offer resis-
tance. Beaufort, the High Court Judge at Fort Jameson, 
reported considerable confusion caused in .1903 by the 
clash of authority between the B.C.A. Protectorate and 
North-eastern Rhodesia. B.C.A.P. patrols tried to 
seize men who came into the Fort Jameson district where 
work was available with the North Charterland Company 
and witnesses testified that a white recruiting agent 
at Zooli's (sic) had sent armed men to burn the houses 
139. See pp. 258 above. 
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of those who had not displayed tax receipts, presumably 
140 in order to force them into his labour gangs. 
Though Commissioner Sharpe was still reluctant 
to sanction the recruitment of B.C.A.P. men for work 
elsewhere, in view of the demands of the Nyasaland 
planters, Codrington confirmed in 1904 that in the pre-
vious year, 6,126 men from the B.S.A.P. had gone south 
via the Feira ferry over the Zambezi, while only 3,514 
had returned. This exodus went on, said Codrington, 
despite the fact that 'they were robbed and murdered 
passing Portuguese territory, were swindled at the Zam-
bezi ferries and died of thirst and starvation on unknown 
routes'. At the northern end of MaRwi, the impact of 
press-ganged labour was felt over a wide area extending 
across the plateau to Lake Tanganyika. Indeed labour 
was being sought from the Bisa country to carry loads 
from Karonga, and in 1905, it was reported that because 
of the very high death rate on the plateau porterage 
routes, large numbers went to the Boma at Luena to beg 
•to be imprisoned.for six weeks rather than be sent on 
an ulendo (journey) to get tax money'. The pattern 
had now developed of a constant criss-crossing of the 
country by armed traders and labour recruiters which, 
140. PRO: eo 879/76 no. 694, Harding's report of clash 
with Garlo, 2/9/01; and NAZ: BS 1/118 J.W. Mac-
kenzie to Chesnaye on armed askari accompanying 
recruiters (n.d.); and BS 1/97, report by Beaufort, 
22/4/03. 
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when added to the persistence of tax raids, created a 
situation of restlessness, fear and social upheaval. 
For example, in 1911 or 1912, a band of armed Ndebele 
men crossed into the Gwembe valley from the southern 
bank of the Zambezi, under the leadership of Johan 
Colenbrander, who had been the first Chief Native Co-
mmissioner at the end of the second Ndebele war. On 
the foray into the Gwembe, he was ostensibly reclaiming 
the offspring of cattle which he sent over the river 
forsfety in 1896. A small encounter took place be-
tween his band and the askari of the local Native Co-
missioner, Molyneux, who imprisoned some of Colenb~ander's 
associates. 141 
The Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau was estab-
lished in 1903 and gained a virtual monopoly in recruit-
ment north of the Zambezi, especially while the collect-
ion of labour for the Transvaal was suspended. Gann 
points out that this enabled the Bureau •to keep down 
wage rates by keeping competition away•. Despite its 
official standing, the Bureau made no effort to classi-
fy labour, simply directing gangs of recruits to the 
railhead for the journey south. It may be, as Gann 
says, that the R.N.L.B. could look after its recruits 
'better than private touts•. Yet, seven years after 
its inception, as he records, 'even the introduction 
of railway transport• had failed to improve conditions. 
141. Ibid: Codrington to Sharpe, 20/6/04; NAZ: KSZ 
7/1/1,Lu~ingu 1902-13, report by ANC Luena, 
31/3/05; and NRJ III,&, op.cit., PP• 421-2 
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In the words of a B.S.A.C. official who accompanied 
recruits from Kasempa, "The natives who have to sleep 
close to the sides of the boxes must, during the night 
••• catch their death of cold, as they are packed so 
closely that they are unable to move". The high mor-
tality rate of recruits for the Southern Rhodesian mines 
was the subject of correspondence between the Company's 
Board in London and the Administrator at Fort Jameson 
in the beginning of 1907. Some time previously, the 
Chief Native Commissioner in Bulawayo had reported the 
death rate on the mines among North-eastern recruits 
as 'exceptional', though they were 'of excellent physique 
142 and apparently good stamina•. 
The Company took account of 'the change of 
climate and the hardships inseparable from so long a 
journey', but considered that, if the death rate did 
not drop quickly, this 'importation' might have to be 
suspended. Moreover it would now be very difficult 
to accede to the renewed request of the Rand Labour 
Organisation for men from N.E. Rhodesia because of the 
health hazards of 'the high high plateau of the Witwatere-
rand'. Figures in the possession of the Company had 
shown the following comparison for the death rate per 
142. Gann, 'History', op.cit., p. 106, quotinh w. 
Frykberg to F.V. Worthington, 1/7/10; ~RO: CO 
879/95 African South no. 872, memo by CNC, Bula-
wayo, 26/11/06. 
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1,000 recruits in the Kimberley and Witwatersrand mines 
in 1903: 
De Beers. Rand 
Jan. 42.64 61.01 
June 27.72 85.70 
July 29.92 106.70 
A pass system was therefore operated in many areas. 
Sheckleton was reported to have issued over 3,000 such 
passes in a short period in 1903 to men going south on 
their own. McNamara's refusal to issue passes for 
such men had led to various clashes in 1907; McNamara 
claiming that reports had been received 'that several 
hundreds of natives arrived annually in a very emaciated 
condition' • In 1910, Wallace told the High Commiss-
ioner that the system was necessary •to prevent people 
from sleeping sickness areas, lepers and all who are 
physically unfit ••• from wandering uncontrolled ••• into 
the hands of recruiters and touts'. Despite such con-
trols, however, the Colonial Office took note of fig-
ures showing increasing mortality in respect of rec-
ruits from North-western Rhodesia, thus: 
1907-08 51.68 per thousand 
1908-09 56.90 per thousand 
From the Luwingu Sub-District in the northern province, 
the Annual Report for 1912-13 stated as follows: 'The 
percentage of deaths increased every year. Of the 376 
engaged in 1909, 8% died; of 570 in 1910, 12% died 
(and 94 are still unaccounted for); of 557 engaged in 
1911 the number of deaths reported to date is over 13%. 
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The great majority of deaths reported during the year 
143 have been ascribed to pneumonia'. 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, 
despite the publication of sundry statistics in respect 
of labour, the actual position was turbulent and vir-
tually uncontrolled for many years after the B.S.A. 
Company began 'administration•. Moreover the situa-
tion in Nyasaland was no more susceptible of control. 
Sharpe, for instance, told the Colonial Office in 1910 
that the annual total for migrant labour for South 
Africa was 'variously estimated at from 6,000 to 18,000'. 
Government officials all over northern Zambezia had, 
from the outset, been confronted by the flight of very 
large numbers of people hither and thither in face of 
the raids of armed agents of both musonko and chibalo. 
The Native Commissioner for Serenje, J.E. Hughes, had 
told Coxhead, his superior at Fort Jameson, in 1904, 
that he was facing the prospect of having 'a deserted 
country for some SO miles this side of the boundary' 
with the Congo Free State, over which people were fiee-
ing. On the matter of labour recruits, Hughes consi-
dered it 'a long way to expect a native to go to Tete 
or to the Copper Mines to find his three shillings for 
143. NAZ: BS 1/33-34, BSAe Secy., London, to Admin., 
NER, 12/1/07; PMS: 'News from Barotseland', No. 21, 
p. 40, quoting official mine mortality rates; 
PRO: eo 879/79 African South no. 948, Ag. Admin. 
NWR to VO 12/2/10; Admin. NWR to HC, 9/9/10; 
African South no. 947, eo to HC, 31/5/10; and see 
NAZ: KSZ 7/1/1, Luwingu Annual Report, 1912-13. 
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his tax, etc.'. But Coxhead replied that 'His Honour 
directs me to point out that people from the Northern 
Districts march longer distances to find work ••• and 
that the policy should be to insist on the natives of 
your District paying their tax in order to drive them 
to seek work on their own idtiative rather than to ex-
ercise undue energy in finding employment for them'. 
In 1908 in the Lundazi district east of the Luangwa, 
there was open resistance to Company rule and tax de-
faulters were 'far too numerous' to be arrested. 'They 
should be burnt out and shown that they cannot defy the 
144 Administration', was the comment in the Annual Report. 
Worthington reported in 1905 that people were 
leaving the Sisheke district 'in great numbers and 
taking refuge' in the Caprivi Zipfel, in flight from 
the tax; and we have cited above other instances of 
this kind of movement. 'Chiana' Harrington recorded 
heavy migration to Southern Rhodesia from the Luapula 
in 1906 and wrote thus about the attempt to get labour 
for the Madona-Kambove road that Tanganyika Concessions 
Ltd. needed for the transport of their freight: 'Work 
was not popular as the natives did not care to come long 
144. Ibid: 879/104 African South no. 947: Sharpe to 
eo on incidence of phthisis in Nyasa miners in 
SA, 5/3/10; and NAZ: KSK 3/1, Hughes, Serenje, 
to Coxhead, 26/3/04. Underlining is mine; 
KSK 6/1/1, Annual Report for Western Luangwa 
(Serenje) to 31/3/08; and KST 4/1/1, Annual 
Report, Lundazi, to 31/3/08. 
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distances to apply for work and perhaps be rejected and 
all the pay they got was 4/-. 3/- of this went for 
their Hut Tax and the 1/- they must spend to get home. 
The rejecteds must get home as best they could ~hich 
was usually pretty hungry•. Since Boma officials were 
wont to command people to greet them and show deference 
to them, Melland's note from Mpika, that no chief or 
headman had either given him the customary basket of 
flour or chicken or offered any excuse for failure to 
do so, significantly confirms the depth of popular re-
sentment to the Company's regime; especially since 
Melland was, from all reports, much less disliked than 
many of the Company's agents and has shown, in his 
writings, a sympathetic approach to local customs and 
beliefs. In 1909 Wallace urged that the 5/- tax of 
North-eastern Rhodesia should become 10/- as in the 
North-west because 'the younger men are endeavouring to 
migrate into those districts where only 5/- is paid'. 
The older men feared they would soon 'be reduced to a 
state of poverty• and, according to a report by Worth-
ington, 'large communities are fast becoming disinte-
grated and the native social fabric destroyed'. Yet 
Wallace was referring to the Kafue which had been re-
commended for intensive recruiting and in which there 
were copper mines. Moreover his conclusion was that 
the exodus would be stopped by doubling the tax in such 
districts as Kasempa. When, however, musonko was 
doubled in the Kasempa region, large numbers of young 
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and able-bodied men, instead of seeking employment at 
the Sable Antelope Mine as urged by the officials, either 
hid in the forests or left the district. 145 
In 1909 Charles Venables came across a cutting 
from a periodical on tropical agriculture which he then 
sent to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society. It included these words: "Nyasaland natives 
are not anxious to emigrate any more than Asiatics are, 
for they are fond of their homes and family ties like 
other human beings. Government has to devise ways and 
means ••• to secure revenue, as the hut tax cannot be 
paid by a people who have no money, so a system of emi-
gration has been again started ••• The wisdom of this 
policy is disputed by all right-thinking residents who 
have the interest of the country at heart; besides 
the natives themselves object but, being told ••• that 
they must go, of course they obey. Although Govern-
ment men say they are not pressed, all those behind the 
scenes know better ••• A much wiser policy would be to 
educate them and encourage them to grow valuable~ono-
mic products, which they know full well how to do, as 
they are born cultivators". Venables claimed that the 
situation in North-western Rhodesia under the B.S.A. 
145. PLG: BSA 9/130, Worthington to BSAC, 27/8/05; 
RH:MSS.Afr.s.13SS, op.cit., Ncbelenge D/Notebook, 
notes by H.T. Harrington on Luapula; NAZ: KSD 
7/4/1-2, F.H. Melland, Mpika, 19/1/09; PRO: CO 
879/101, Af.S.931, Ag. Admin., NWR, to HC, 19/11/09, 
encl. Worthington's memo of 18/11/09. Underlining 
is mine; and NAZ: BS 2/34, Hazell, Kasempa, to 
SNA, 15/6/10. 
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Company was 'infinitely worse' than in Nyasaland under 
the Imperial Government. 'The official sends for ~ 
the able-bodied men who are collected ••• at the Boma for 
a meeting. It is not the official who tells them they 
must go but before the meeting, his native police and 
messengers ••• impress upon them that ••• when the official 
asks them if they want to do so, they must say that 
they do ••• Everything is stagemanaged'. Venables also 
said that an official of the Native Department had told 
him how Messengers, sent to collect labour, 'would re-
turn with gangs of natives tied in single file with 
ropes round their necks. When they approached the 
settlement the ropes would be taken off and the Mess-
enger would order them to sing and those who did not 
they would encourage with sjamboks, and that he said 
was why the natives used to appear so delighted at the 
prospect of doing the particular work they were brought 
in for•. Moreover, though hard to prove, it was known 
that Company agents 'received a share of their commission 
from recruiting agents and presents from mine manage-
ments and others•. 146 
It was perhaps in the Kasempa District that 
the most concerted resistance to chibalo as a corrolary 
~f musonko was encountered. Undoubtedly it was 
146. RH:MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22 (G.184), Venables to A-S 
and A.P. Socy., 23/6/10, encl. cutting from 
'Supplement to the Tropical Agriculturist' (Nov. 
1909) p. 479; Venables, 21/10/10 (see also PRO: 
eo 417/494); Underlinings are mine. 
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aggravated by the temperament of the Native Commissioner, 
W.H. Hazell, whom Theodore Williams described, as we 
noted earlier, as manifesting 'a great deal of power-
fulness if very little of principle'. Hazell was in 
charge of the Kasempa District from 1910 to 1916, 
having come to Southern Rhodesia in 1893 and been a 
hunter and trader before joining the B.S.A. Company. 
The Kasempa District Notebook described him as 'a man 
who in the knowledge of the native mind had few equals'. 
His nickname, Makomani, seems to have referred to his 
severity. Before he became Native Commissioner there 
had been various troubles in the district. A white 
man called Dubin had caused so much fear and disturbance 
among the Lunda people in 1907 that the missionary at 
Kalene, Dr Fisher, reported him to the Boma. Early in 
1909, the Boma clerk, Philip Jelf •son of the late 
Master of Charterhouse•, was dismissed over his alleged 
ill-treatment of a white prisoner serving a sentence for 
man-slaughter. At the inquest that followed, one wit-
ness was Tumiwa, 'a Kaundi (sic) capitao employed by Mr 
Frykberg', a local trader. At the same time a trader 
called Richardson was murdered on the Shambwila, a tri-
butary of the Western Lunga River, by his Bemba porters 
who 'received considerable assistance from local head-
men in effecting their escape. The reasons alleged 
for the murder were (1) the withholding of wages due, 
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and (2) flogging of the capitao for insisting that their 
wages should be paid•. 147 
The floggings which eventually led to the 
'retirement' of MacGregor, which we recounted above, had 
taken place in the Kasempa district. It was Codrington, 
MacGregor had claimed, who told him to treat the people 
as being in a state of rebellion. In the period of 
violence associated with MacGregor's residence in the 
Kasempa District, Bellis, the N.C., whom the people 
called 'Longwani' the long one or 'Chimukali' the big 
fierce one, was attacked and shot at Kasanza's village. 
The police patrol that combed the district after that 
event "had the misfortune to shoot a woman", according 
to information given to the High Commissioner, who 
added that 'the people were known to be suspicious of 
white control'. After this incident 'the Balunda in 
and around Kalene Hill ••• boasted to the missionaries 
that they had expelled the·Government from their country'. 
Very soon after MacGregor's arrival, the Barotse Native 
Police company_ took flight, escaping prisoners were shot 
and one of them killed. 148 Thus the violence of 1908 
and 1909 may have persuaded the Administrator to send a 
147. See p.299above; NRJ II,5, 1955 pp. 62-70, 'Kasempa 
1901-1951' by P.G.D •• Clarke; PLG:BSA 9/172, 
correspondence concerning Jelf, Feb., 1909; and 
NAZ: KDD 5/1, Kasempa District Notebook. 
148. See p.32Sabove; NAZ: KDD 5/1, as in footnote 147; 
PRO:CO 879/102, Af. S. 932, HC to CO on Kasempa, 
6/12/09; and NAZ: KSE 6/1/1, Annual Report, 
Balunda District, 1908-9, p. 4. 
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tough man, especially since the increased tax of 10/-
was soon to be exacted. Hazell's report on the local 
campaign to prepare for the increase described the 
people's reaction as philosophical. 'They enquired in 
a jocular manner as to where the money was to come from'. 
When reminded of opportunities at the Kansanshi Mine 
which paid ~0/- for a month's work, 'they accepted the 
position in a good humoured way•. 149 
Nine months later, in May 1911, a Swede called 
Ohlund, who was developing a gold bearing property for 
the Kasempa Gold Mining and Development Syndicate on 
the Dingwe River, was murdered at a village called 
Shindamana, thirteen miles from the Boma. The murder-
ers were named as Tumiwa, Tapoka and Kungwa. Accord-
ing to the record in the District Notebook, the trader 
Frykberg, who was also manager of the Kasempa Gold 
Mining Syndicate, had, in 1909 and 1910 "collected some 
400 Bakahondi (sic Kaonde) natives for work at the mines 
in Southern Rhodesia". Nearly 100 of those men had 
died before returning home. The authorities apparently 
regarded this as the cause of Ohlund's murder. The 
three accused were not caught, however, for nine months. 
Hazell therefore began a major operation of collective 
punishment during which 'at one time all chiefs were 
called in and kept under observation at the Boma•. The 
Notebook praised the Native Commissioner for 'his methods 
149. PRO: CO 879/104 Af.S., 948: Hazell to SNA, 18/8/10. 
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of bringing home to the natives ••• that the murder of a 
white man was a matter not lightly to be considered'. 
Villages were raided at night in an attempt 'to round 
up the party which had now grown to about forty men, 
together with a number of women and children'. When 
at last tne three men were caught, and before they were 
publicly hanged, Tumiwa made a •voluntary confession' 
that they had planned to murder Frykberg first 'to 
prevent their being recruited for Southern Rhodesia'. 
'This', said the Notebook, 'was the end of recruiting 
for the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau in the Kasempa 
District'. When a Bureau agent visited the area two 
years after Ohlund's death, 'the attitude of all towards 
work in the~uth convinced him' that further recruitment 
could not be undertaken. 150 
In a lengthy report on what is now Zambia's 
North-western Province, combining Kasempa, Solwezi, 
Mwinilunga, Kabompo and Zambezi (Balovale) Districts, 
the Administrator told the High Commissioner in early 
1912 that Hazell was 'not at all satisfied with the 
attitude of the Bakahondi (sic) and Balunda people' 
who 'seem to interpret our patience as weakness'. The 
Kaonde were 'not only inimical but they, especially the 
younger men, will resent the arrest of any of their 
friends (and) ••• have shown a determination to take 
revenge which the possession of arms enables them to do, 
150. NAZ: KDD 5/1 as in footnote 141. 
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sometimes successfully'. There was a considerable and 
apparently increasing traffic in arms and ammunition 
in the area. Hazell had information that in 1910, 
nearly 1,000 lbs of gunpowder in bulk passed through 
in transit from South Africa to Katanga. The Admini-
strator was worried because Hazell wanted to effect 
disarmament by issuing an order for the immediate sur-
render of all arms. 'If for any cause they did not 
accept immediately, the only alternative would be war•. 
Indeed even to detain all headmen until weapons and 
powder were surrendered could spark a conflict. The 
despatch of a strong armed police force of not less 
than 50 men and their stationing near where Ohlund was 
murdered, a year earlier, would, the Administrator 
thought, force a general exodus to Angola, whereafter 
the police should 'patrol the border as a menace to 
recalcitrant villages that they will not be allowed to 
return•. Perhaps such a show of force would give 'a 
necessary lesson to the border tribes and ••• also to the 
whole country ••• without the shedding of blood'. He 
enclosed a copy of Hazell's report on his action after 
Ohlund's murder in which he described how •to signify 
disapproval of the lawlessness displayed, the villages 
of the murderers were destroyed' on his order. Yet, 
in the first weeks of 1912, there had been 'an attempt 
to murder by shooting, a Government Officer, Mr Dillon, 
at Kansanshi'. Therefore since 'a great deal of deceit 
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••• was used to prevent the capture of murderers, the 
Government could not distinguish their friends from their 
foes•. 151 
Peace in any positive sense which would have 
become manifest in some serious forms of local develop-
ment continued to elude the Kasempa and neighbouring 
areas to the end of our period. The D.C., Mwinilunga, 
considered 1914-15 a good year because his messengers 
had 'met with armed resistance' only once. As late as 
1925 a confidential memorandum was submitted on the use 
of Kasempa as 'the most suitable spot to form a Fort or 
laager for defensive purposes against attack by natives'. 
The highly detailed nature of the memorandum suggests 
that the Boma was aware of a real danger of an armed 
rising in the local community. In such a case the 
Commandant would have to decide whether or not to admit 
'friendly natives' to the laager with the Europeans, 
namely, messengers, mailmen and other Boma employees. 
'Accommodation under the roof of the main fort for them 
would be difficult ••• (and) their women and children 
would probably have to be sent forth to fare as best 
152 
they could in the case of a close siege'. 
Further west, the Luvale people were also 
offering protracted resistance. In August 1911, 
151. PLG: BSA 10/22, Admin. to HC~ 30/3/12, encl. 
Hazell's report of 25/3/12. 
152. NAZ: Kse 6/1/3, Annual Report, Mwinilunga Sub-
District (F.V. Bruce Miller) 1914-15; and KDD 
5/1, notes on defence, 16/4/25. 
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policemen and a Boma messenger 'were set upon by armed 
Balovale, shot at twice, seized and beaten, and their 
belongings smashed'. They were saved by 'the inter-
ference of a Barotse induna. The Balovale stated that 
they had already refused the tax and they were now going 
to stop messengers and police from crossing the river 
at all, and sent many messages to a like effect'. The 
Assistant Native Commissioner for the sub-district 
believed that he could not get near the villagers con-
cerned unless by a surprise attack. 'In that case 
it is quite probable they will make armed resistance'. 
The chieftainess Kutcheka had 'publicly stated she 
would have nothing further to do with the Government'. 
The official believed that 'to show softness ••• can have 
none but bad results', and therefore wanted authority 
from his superior office at Mungu to punish 'the villages 
which assaulted the police'. The N.A. urged caution 
for fear of open and widespread conflict. The situa-
tion was complicated by the fact that the border villages 
were doing business with Mambari traders and 'harbouring 
dangerous Portuguese natives', thus 'setting all law at 
defiance'. The senior chief Ndungu had been banished, 
and the A.N.C now proposed that he should be allowed to 
return, on condition of his acceptance of tax collection 
from his people and in the hope that he might bring 
Kutcheka and the other lesser rulers to submission. 
Thus it is clear that the most north-westerly kingdoms 
which Rhodes had stated to be part of Lewanika's empire, 
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were still far from submissive to the Company's rule 
and to the rigorous exaction of tax, despite over a 
decade of movement through northern Zambezia by armed 
B.S.A.C. agents. Moreover, chibalo had been effectively 
153 stopped among the Kaonde, Lunda and Luvale. J.H. Venn-
ing, who was the first Native Commissioner at Balovale 
in 1907 recounted both the widespread flight of whole 
villages on his approach and the dread in which 'the 
white man's rifle' was held, and how the public humili-
ation of chiefs, like Nyakulenga, was practised by the 
154 Company's men in order to 'pacify' the country. 
Another factor which undoubtedly aggravated 
the turbulent situation in Luvale, Lunda and Kaonde 
country was the Company's persistent attempt to regard 
these peoples as subjects of the Lozi. The story of 
the B.S.A.C.'s attempt to extend Lewanika's domain, in 
order to exploit mineral resources far beyond the actual 
bounds of his effective suzerainty, makes amazing reading. 
As early as 1901, Val Gielgud had described the Hook of 
the Kafue region as knowing only the government of 'the 
older, stronger or more cunning' among the local people, 
and in no way subject to Lozi suzerainty. In 1902 
Gielgud's recall was urged so that the boundaries of 
153. NAZ: KDE 2/32/1, R.H. Palmer, ANC, Balovale to 
Res, Magis. Mungu 30/8/11; NC Mungu to Palmer, 
11/9/11; Palmer to RM, 7/9/11. 
154. RH:MSS.Afr.s.1490, J.H. Venning, 'Memories of my 
life in Southern Africa, 1893-1962' (typescript). 
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North-western Rhodesia might be moved further east and 
north, it being noted that he had originally been sent 
to the Hook on Cecil Rhodes's instructions, Rhodes being 
of the opinion that until the Colonial Office confirmed 
the agreement with Lewanika, that portion of the country 
which contains copper deposits should not be admitted 
to belong to Lewanika'. In 1905 Coryndon and 'Chiru-
pula' Stephenson disagreed sharply about the eastern 
frontiers of the Lozi state, Stephenson protesting that, 
far from having a common boundary with Mpezeni's kingdom 
on the River .Luangwa~ Lozi authority stopped 'far short 
of the Lunga and Kafue catchments'. Even at that date 
Lewanika was sending •collectors' to Kapilimpanga's (sic) 
area in the Kasempa district, demanding tribute, much 
to the annoyance of the local N.C., 'Kankomani' Copeman. 
In 1909, the Administrator told the High Commissioner 
that he was trying to trade a westward extension of 
Lewanika's sphere in exchange for a full grant of land 
outside the Reserved Area, and that his negotiations 
included keeping the Luvale district outside the Reserve 
so that he could then persuade Lewanika to exchange it 
for the Kasempa district which he was still trying to 
claim. Behind all those manoevres lay 'a strictly con-
fidential letter' from the B.S.A.C. Board to Codrington, 
of February 1904, which had urged the eastward extension 
of North-western Rhodesia to include the proposed rail-
way development northwards, since 'the title asserted 
by the Company to mineral rights in North-western 
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Rhodesia is more easily susceptible of strict proof in 
case of need than to similar rights in North-eastern 
Rhodesia'. Though Codrington resented the suspicion 
thus cast on Johnston•s Certificate of Claim in =espect 
of the north-east, the Company •attached great importance' 
to the realigning of the boundary in anticipation of 
the mineral exploitation of what was to become the 
Copperbelt. 155 
From the point of view of the neighbouring 
peoples involved, the Company's sponsorhip of visita-
tions northward by Lozi indunas caused serious unrest, 
and it must have been known that the Native Commission-
ers in the northern Bomas opposed any Lozi infiltrations. 
In 1904, the Secretary for Native Affairs had suggested 
that 'Lewanika's definition of the Lealui and Sesheke 
districts must be taken to mean all the country situ-
ated between the headwaters of the Majili and Kabompo 
rivers', including 'a great part of the still undefined 
Kasempa district•. But, said the S.N.A., the people 
there were 'very lawless' and 'Lewanika from Lealui can 
have no control whatever over them'. The Lozi King had 
sent 'his representative indunas, Luiandombo, Ilomba 
and Kansimba' to the Kasempa area, and should be urged 
155. NAZ: Sec/NG/13, incl. extract from letter of v. 
Gielgud, 21/4/01; PLG: BSA 8/67, memo by Milton 
on Kafue Hook area, 6/9/02; MSA Files, statement 
by J.E. Stephenson, undated (ref. MISC/G/165); 
Copeman to DC Lealui, 25/9/05; Wallace to Sel-
borne, HC, 12/11/09; Richard Goode, Secy., to 
Admin., Salisbury, 26/10~, citing BSAC, London, 
to Codrington, 13/2/04 and Codrington's reply, 
19/4/04. 
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to send an induna to Mankoya (Kaoma), to prepare for 
tax collection there. But Melland of Kasempa, for 
instance, protested that the Kaonde had 'never admitted 
any overlord except Musokantanda, and the Southern Kaonde 
hardly admit him today'. A similar rejection by the 
Lunda of Mwinilunga was reported by the local Native 
Commissioner in 1916. As late as 1924, the District 
Commissioner of Kasempa was warning that •to put any 
of the people living in these areas under the Barotse 
would be much resented ••• and ••• be bad ••• for the country'. 
'Chirupula' told the Governor in 1925 that, while the 
Lenje chief, Chipepo, might possibly have occasionally 
paid Lewanika tribute•, there was no possible justifi-
cation for regarding the people of the Ndola, Chilanga, 
Mkushi and Feira districts as in any way subject to the 
Lozi. Yet 10% of their taxes had been paid to the 
Barotse Fund, thereby misappropriating 'some thousands 
156 of pounds sterling'. 
In the years before the First World War, the 
impact of the Company on northern Zambezia as regards 
labour recruitment must have radically affected the 
life of the territory's various communities. The 
Native Commissioner at Isoka reported in 1908 that 
156. NAZ: BS 2/181/I, SNA t6 Secy., Kalomo, 7/12/04; 
MSA Files: undated statement by F.H. Melland, 
who was in Kasempa from 1911 to 1922; Bruce-
Miller, Mwinilunga, to Admin., 8/2/18; P.E. Hall, 
Kasempa, 9/10/24; NAZ: SEC/NG/13, Stephenson to 
NR Governor, Herbert Stanley, 10/9/25. 
411. 
only 500 out of 7,000 taxable adults had paid musonko. 
The penalty was three months' imprisonment with hard 
labour, but the R.N.L.B. was available, and so 'they 
have no excuse for defaultery'. Official records and 
N.C.'s reports speak of the constant flow southwards as 
well as to Katanga of innumerable men going to seek work 
'on their own initiative' under the relentless duresse 
of musonko and involving 'the great majority of natives'; 
a situation agitated by the recruiters' use of 'runners' 
who used physical coercion freely and were rewarded 
according to the numbers of men thus enrolled. In 
1909, disease among the catiie in the Lozi area, on which 
the people depended as a source of tax money, encouraged 
the Native Commissioner, Nalolo, to look for an increased 
migration to the south. A major crop failure in the 
Gwembe Valley in 1914 had a similar effect. Yet re-
sistance to labour recruitment went on, notably in the 
1 
populous Luangwa districts - where the demand ••• always 
exceeds the supply' - and among the Toka where extensive 
use of fictitious names - 'Matches', 'Porridge' and the 
like - made it difficult for officials and agents to 
identify people. In face of sullen resistance to 
chibalo in the eastern districts, the R.N.L.B. proposed 
to 'let them bring one wife apiece to the mines', to 
extend service to eighteen months, to urge the payment 
of musonko in advance and to provide some compensation 
for rejected reauits. Many districts, like, for instance, 
Mwinilunga, witnessed what was called a 'general exodus' 
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of able-bodied men, accelerated by the low level of 
wages paid by local employers. The weight of evidence 
confirms that, despite formal denials for the benefit 
of the imperial government, the Company's Commissioners 
were heavily involved in the actual work of rounding up 
recruits. Presumably because the practice was so gen-
eral, the S.N.A. sent a circular to all district offi-
cials in 1910 emphasising that they had no function in 
respect of labour other than to give information and 
advice to 'natives desirous of obtaining employment'. 
But Venables claimed in 1910, that such Commissioners 
received financial rewards for their activities in this 
respect. The roping together of press-ganged men was 
not uncommon, while capitaos, acting in excess of their 
instructions, were wont to make false promises of higher 
wages coupled with threats that the government, to which 
their employer was alleged to have paid £100, would 
punish those who refused recruitment severely. A 
strip of calico left at a man's house was, as in the 
Kasempa district in 1914, tantamount to an order to 
157 enter the labour gang. 
157. NAZ: KST 4/1/1, Lundazi, Annual Reports 1908 and 
1909; KSL 3/1 Vol. I, Isoka Dis. N/Book, report 
of indaba 9/9/08; ZA 7/1/1/3, Batoka Annual Report, 
1913-14, Magoye Division Report; KDE 2/39/1, NC, 
Nalolo, Tax Report, 1909; BS 3/411, Gwembe S.D. 
Report, 31/3/14; ZA 7/1/1/7, Luangwa Province 1913-
14, (E.K. Jordan, NC, Mkushi); 7/1/2/3, M. Goslin, 
Ag.Magis. Batoka, 1914-15 Report; 7/1/1/6, NC 
Mwinilunga, 1913-14 Report; PLG: BSA 7/217, RNLB 
Report, 23/6/10; NAZ: 7/1/1/4, E. Sharpe, NC Fort 
Jameson, 1913-14 Report; BS 3/125, SNA to all Dis-
trict Officials, 29/7/10; BS 2/264, HC to Under-
Secy., CO, 25/4/10, citing Venables's complaints; 
BS 2/267, folio 18, letter from NWR 23/6/10; B BS 
3/406, Hazell, Kasempa, to SNA, 23/2/14. 
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The rigours of local porterage work for Boma 
officials were deeply resented. 'Carriers were paid 
half-rates for the time occupied in coming from and re-
turning to their homes ••• {and) sometimes were detained 
in order to wait for the official ••• and often received 
no pay'. The Assistant Magistrate who made this state-
ment was himself blamed for having 'illegally imprisoned' 
headmen for failing to produce the number of carriers 
demanded. However, the Company's men spoke of their 
intention to involve 'all able-bodied men' to meet the 
insatiable demands on both sides of the Zambezi. The 
conditions experienced in the Katanga copper fields were 
meanwhile the subject of persistently adverse reports; 
and the Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission of 1914 
treated its employees so harshly that it was officially 
rebuked. An increasing labour shortage at the Kansanshi 
Mine near Solwezi was officially attributed to poor food, 
compulsory overtime and a seven-day week which gave men 
no time to see friends. The resentment of the victims 
of chibalo was further increased by the system of de-
ferred pay, whereby part of their earnings were made 
available only when the men reached their local Boma. 
The system clearly benefited local traders who were 
virtually all Europeans or, as in the Fort Jameson area, 
Asians; but it was but a further offence to the labour-
ers concenned. Mortality rates continued to be high 
and compensation in case of death or accident was very 
low; the 1907 figures being £3 for partial and £5 for 
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total disablement while employed either in mining or 
in farming. The sudden application of a doubled tax, 
from 5/- to 10/-, upon the people of Mwinilunga in 1913-
14, coupled with 'the constant call for labour', drove 
'most of them to flee to Portuguese and Congo terri-
tories. At this point, it should be noted that the 
statistics provided by the B.S.A.C. and by R.N.L.B. 
cannot be taken as giving a true picture of the scale 
of migrant labour. While, for instance, the Bureau 
reported that it had recruited 10,902 men from northern 
Zambezia for Southern Rhodesia in the year 1913-14, and 
recorded the deaths of 771 of them, the N.C., Nalolo, 
stated that those who left his district on their own 
were considerably more than the number recruited by the 
R.N.L.B. 'There is no check kept on these', he said, 
'and so it is impossible to state figures'. There is 
reason to believe that most other N.C.s could have said 
the same. 158 
The outbreak of war in Europe inevitably had 
a drastic effect on the overseas possessions of the 
158. NAZ: BS 3/68, R.I. Hughes, Ast. Magis., Kaomo, to 
Admin., 4/12/14; c. McKinnon. Ag.Admin. to HC, 
24/2/14; D.E. Stirke, NC, Nalolo to Ag.Res.Magis., 
Mongu, 3/1/14; BS 3/66, Wallace, Admin., to HC 
9/9/13; J. Moffat Thomson to SNA, 22/6/13; BS 3/270, 
Copeman, DC Broken Hill, to SNA, 19/6/14; BS 3/406, 
Imp.Secy., Cape Town, to Major E.N. Steel of Anglo-
Belgian Boundary Commission, 16/3/14; Col. Baring 
to R. Williams on Kansanshi labour, 6/3/14; BS 
3/66, Admin., to HC, 6/9/13; BS 2/246, folio 92, 
compensation rates 1907; BS 3/411, Annual Report, 
Mwinilunga-Kasempa, 31/3/14; BS 3/405, NR Annual 
Report, 31/3/13; and KDE 8/1/5, N.C., Nalolo, 
31/3/14. 
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warring imperial powers, despite the declaration of the 
Berlin Conference of 1885, which we noted earlier, that 
the Congo Basin region of Africa should be a neutral 
zone. 159 For the people of northern Zambezia, the 
years 1914-18 were to bring a further intensification 
of labour recruiting upon rural communities already 
suffering from the effects of a decade of systematic 
depopulation through the various and increasing demands 
for able-bodied men. Nonetheless, tax raids also 
continued, as did the operations of labour agencies and 
private recruiters, like the white farmers of the Chi-
pata district and the farming areas along the line of 
rail. The only fatal casualties of the war as a re-
sult of German military action were three Africans, two 
killed at Abercorn (Mbala) and one at Fife (Ikawa) in 
the first months of the war. No white soldiers on the 
British side died. When however the High Commissioner 
for South Africa declared at Lundazi, in December 1918, 
that 'the Principles of Right and Justice have triumphed 
over the forces of Tyranny and Oppression and our 
160 British Empire now stands stronger than ever before', 
there lay behind that consummation a record of hardship 
borne by black men of the territory for whom the Armi-
stice and the Versailles Treaty did not bring any recog-
nition of their rights as citizens and taxpayers. 
159. See p. 50 above. 
160. Brelsford w.v., 'The Story of the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment' (Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1954) pp. 30-32; 
including statement of the High Commissioner, at 
Lundazi, 30/12/18. 
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During the four war years and in addition to 
tengatenga work related to the transport of military 
supplies, labour continued to be procured under duresse 
while tax collection lost none of its rigours. Indeed 
Colonial Office records show that, every now and then, 
the conduct of a Company official became the subject of 
an enquiry. This happened in 1914 when R.I. Hughes, 
Assistant Magistrate at Kalomo, was alleged to have de-
manded carriers for a journey being made by the former 
Secretary of Native Affairs, Worthington, and when the 
local headmen, Siakakoli and Masope, had not responded, 
arrested them. When carriers were at last provided, 
he forced them to work without pay. McKinnon, in pro-
posing a disciplinary transfer, noted that the rapid 
growth of the European population was making tengatenqa 
work increasingly unpopular. In self defence Hughes 
asserted that 'to send out messengers to themselves 
collect carriers, as was done by the late S.N.A. when 
he was D.C., Batoka, with a message to an induna to ob-
tain them and, when brought in, to call them volunteers, 
is a mere travesty of truth'. Other officials like 
Dillon and Selby had, he claimed, made arrests as he 
had done and so he believed he was merely providing a 
scapegoat. In the Batoka area the Native Commissioner 
was demanding payment by, or on behalf of, a large number 
of deserted and divorced women. At an indaba at Fort 
Jameson at the end of 1915, the Administrator warned 
chiefs that failure to pay the tax increase, from 3/-
417. 
to 5/-, would make defaulters liable to an extra 2/6. 
Moreover, a decision of the N.E.R. Agricultural and 
Commercial Association had been communicated to the 
Magistrate at Fort Jameson that it was 'in the interest 
of all employers of labour, including the Government, to 
cooperate and, in spite of the raising of Hut Tax, keep 
native wages as at present, viz. Dry Season labour 3/- + 
posho, Wet Season labour, 4/- + posho'. 
In the Mankoya district in 1915-16, tax rading 
was carried out so vigorously that the jail guards were 
unable to control the number of defaulters imprisoned. 
The demands for labour were meanwhile such that, as the 
Colonial Office observed, 'the Native Commissioner has 
to recruit it himself while district travelling'. Under 
the exigencies of war, the British Government was ready 
to recognise that this practise had been 'consistently 
maintained and ••• adopted elsewhere than in Rhodesia'. 
Meanwhile small subsidies were being offered to headmen 
of villages from which at least one-third of the able-
bodied men were employed away from home. Yet 'defiance' 
continued to be shown towards the rough intrusions of 
messengers. In the Lozi area in 1916-17, there were 'a 
number of cases ••• of assaulting messengers and obstruct-
ing them in their duty and it was necessary to send 4 or 
5 messengers together now to arrest criminals and tax 
defaulters'. Moreover, conditions in the Katanga mines 
were deteriorating. 'Many of the repatriates have re-
turned in a very emaciated condition owing to sickness 
418. 
and want of food on the way home, and some deaths have 
also been reported'. Their plight was aggravated by 
the fact that the B.S.A.C Administration refused to allow 
labour migrants to be accompanied by their wives for 
fear of losing a considerable number of them. The 
wives were expected to remain at home to look after 
their gardens. Miners therefore •took to the Katanga 
temporary wives who might be passed from boy to boy and 
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would soon become little better than common prostitutes•. 
The use of village dwellers as war carriers 
was based on 'massive, coercive conscription'. The 
Luwingu district alone supplied carriers as follows 
during the five years of hostilities: 1914, 2,751; 
1915, 9,897; 1916, 14,081; 1917, 10,836; 1918, 2,635. 
The total number of war porters taken from the Fort 
Jameson district in the years 1916-18 was 12,241, despite 
the constant high demands of local white farmers and 
the activities of the R.N.L.B. The Eastern Luangwa 
161. PRO: CO 879/114 Af.S.no. 1015, McKinnon's report 
encl. Hughes to Admin., 4/2/14; NAZ BS 3/411, 
report of P.W.M. Jelf, Ag. NC Batoka, for 1914; 
BS 3/77, H~;c. Marshall to Admin., Livingstone, 
23/8/15, and folio 132, Marshall's exhortation 
to Luvale people to go to work if short of cash 
for tax; KDG 1/11/1, Report of Indaba, Fort 
Jameson, 8/11/15; KDG 1/7/1, NE Agric. and Comm-
ercial Assoc., to Magis., 23/2/14; KDE 8/1/7, 
NC Mankoya, 31/3/16; BS 3/413, CO to Buxton, HC, 
24/4/15 and folio 3, Mporokoso report on headmen's 
subsidies; KDE 8/1/8, report of Res.~agis., 
Mongu, 1916-17, and his letter of 9/5/17; BS 
3/430, Res.Comm., to Admin., 6/3/17. Note: 'posho' 











Annual Report for 1918-19 stated that 12,427 men had 
been drafted as war porters for service in Nyasaland, 
of whom 977 had died; while 4,313 had been supplied to 
the Rhodesian Column, of whom 108 had died and 40 were 
missing. From the Peatuke district, 2,448 went as 
military porters, of whom 146 died on service. War 
recruiting in Serenje District was so intensive that the 
R.N.L.B. engaged no one there for work in the south 
during 1914-15, local recruiting accounting for 5,780 
as compared with 2,400 in the previous year. From the 
start of the war until March 1917, the following numbers 
of men were listed as having been employed as war por-
ters in the territory: 
N.E.RHodesia N.W.Rhodesia. Total 
Aug.1914-31/3/15 42,528 42,528 
1/4/15-31/3/16 92,337 15,042 107,381 
1/4/16-31/3/17 138 1 930 24 1 052 162 1 982 
273,795 39,094 312,891 
The Administrator emphasised to the High Commissioner 
that the reason for the much smaller numbers recruited 
in North-western Rhodesia was that they were 'too far 
from the war area' and it was necessary to avoid de-
nuding the farms and mines in the region of labour or 
seriously reducing the flow to Kaanga. For North-
eastern Rhodesia alone, while 138,930 men were engaged 
on war work in the year ending 31/3/17, the number of 
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taxable males was listed officially as 119,506. 162 
The drafting of labour on such an intensive 
scale was bound to involve placing very heavy loads on 
the shoulders of the men recruited. Before the war, 
it had been customary to make each man's load as heavy 
as possible. Local testimony about conditions in the 
Isoka district in the early years of the century has 
stressed this aspect of the rigours of white rule, as 
men struggled to support the weight of big steel boxes 
called vingongongo. In early 1914, the Native Commi-
ssioner for Mwenga in the Kafue region reported gross 
overloading and the impossibility of taking action 
against employers responsible for it. 'Many loads 
though they do not exceed 50 lbs are of so awkward a 
nature that they are worse to carry than if they did'. 
There was however an improvement insofar as 'now most 
natives possess at least a blanket' since formerly 'they 
would sleep by fires in the coldest weather, naked, and 
many probably died indirectly from exposure to wet and 
cold'. Not till over two years after the end of the 
war did a Government Notice regulate maximum loads, 
162. Hunton W.A., Research Historian, Kenneth Kaunda 
Foundation, Lusaka, Second Quarterly Report, May 
1968, p.2. para.5(a); NAZ: KSZ 5/1, Luwingu Dis-
trict Note-Book, labour returns; KDG 8/1/3, Fort 
Jameson Annual Report, 31/3/19; BS 3/448, report 
by Magi&, E. Luangwa, 31/3/19; KDA 8/1/3, Petauke 
Annual Report, 31/3/19; KSK 6/1/2, Serenje Annual 
Reports, 1913-14, 1914-15; BS 3/84, folios 28-29, 
Admin. to HC (M.d.) summarising war recruitments, 
1914-17, and folio 49, return of War Carriers, 
1/4/16-31/3/17. 
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but even then porters were obviously still being over-
loaded especially in view of the rough terrain through 
which they often had to pass and the very long distances 
they were required to cover. The 1921 rates for maxi-
mum loads were as follows, the loads for 2 and 3 carriers 
presumably being shared loads:-
1 carrier - not exceeding 60 lbs 
2 carriers - not exceeding 90 lbs 
3 carriers - not exceeding 120 lbs. 
In 1912, a carrier's daily wage was three pence plus 
food in North-western Rhodesia. 'About one shilling 
for 100 miles (reckoning the return journey) was the 
rate of pay for war porters recorded in the Lundazi 
Annual Report for 1915-16•. 163 
Frank Melland in his book, 'In Witch-bound 
Africa', devoted a section to 'the war record of the 
natives', which was, he said, •a fact about which people 
at home are far too ignorant'. Melland considered the 
figures impressive enough to 'speak for themselves'. 
'In 1915-18 it was estimated that there were 
8,629 taxable males in the district, of whom 7,400 were 
able-bodied adults. 
'In 1915 and up to September, 1916, the 
following did war-work: War transport, 4,163; six 
163. RI/Simon Singoyi and others, Chiwanda, Isoka, 
25/4/71; NAZ: BS 3/413, folio 6, L.C. Heath, NC, 
Mwenga Annual Report, 31/3/14; KDE 10/10 Barotse 
Provincial Notebook, citing Govt. Notice no. 98 
of 1921 on carriers' loads; KDE 8/1/3, schedule 
of wages, 1911-12; Hunton, op.cit., p. 4, para 
5(d). 
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months' work in Katanga {copper production), 932; 
total, 5,095; per centage of strong adults, 68 per cent. 
Meanwhile ordinary (civil) work was being carried on. 
'In four months (to Feb. 28, 1917) 793 more 
worked on war transport, bringing that total to 4959. 
'In the next~elve months the figures were: 
War transport {three months' engagements), 1997; total 
months at work, 5,991; equivalent numbers in constant 
employment, 499.1, besides which 4,167 natives were 
civilly employed. From April to October, 1918, another 
2,000 did three months' work. {In all these cases of 
three month's work an average of five weeks (additional) 
was spent going to and returning from work). The total 
number written on for war work, 1915-18, was 9,888 men. 
'Add to this an average of 4,000 a year 
(16,000 in all) on civil work - one gets a total of 
about 26,000 males employed. Divide by 4 one gets 
6,500 per annum out of 7,400 able-bodied adults•. 164 
Those men were described in various official 
reports as 'volunteers', indeed in the same way as mi-
grant mine workers were often said to go south 'on their 
own initiative'. However, the Administrator, in his 
summary of military porterage, wrote thus to the High 
Commissioner: 'The knowledge that the power of corn-
pulsion was in the Administrator's hands ••• and was occa-
sionally used were the real reasons' for the steady 
164. Melland F.H., op~t., p. 27. 
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supply of tenqatenga men from 1914-1918. A month 
earlier, however, the Fort Jameson half-yearly report 
stated that 'the slackers of the sub-district have been 
well raided and a big proportion of the fit populativn 
has now been or is at the front'. The Serenje report 
mentioned that 12 men had been imprisoned, in 1918, 
for refusal to serve as military porters and recorded 
that 'seven villages and many individuals emigrated 
en.:.masse to the Congo Belge early in 1919, owing to the 
vigorous recruitment of military porters at the end of 
1918'. At an indaba at Mkushi, messengers were ordered 
to 'rope in' the required number of carriers. 165 The 
consequences of such a massive and relentless drive 
were bound to be manifold. 
The Company's official at Lundazi, in a re-
port on the despatch of 2,400 to northern Nyasaland in 
1917-18, described how 'the majority ••• who returned ••• 
were in a pitiable state of emaciation due to starva-
tion or dysentery'. Out of the first 1,000, 37 had 
died while carrying their loads and 15 more on the 
journey home; 77 had been 'discharged unfit', one was 
'left sick', five 'deserted' and three were 'unaccounted 
for'. Moreover, 'many deaths ••• took place within ten 
days of return to the village'. Were these included, 
the mortality would approach 10%. The Lundazi figures 
165. NAZ: BS 3/436, Wallace to HC, 11/10/18. Under 
lining is mine; Hunton, op.cit., p.3, para. 5 
(a,b,c). 
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for 1918-19 were 42 dead, 2 desertions and 28 missing, 
out of a total of 845 porters. When their men were 
away, women had to struggle to maintain life in the 
villages. While agricultural production dropped, wild 
animals closed in on the villages and Cookson reported 
from the Chipata district: '50 killed by lions in the 
areas of (chiefs) Kakumbi and Chuala alone'. Behind 
all these bald figures lay a passionate, if suppressed, 
reaction which now and then found expression. Chief 
Mpezeni was described by the Boma as having 'worked 
particularly hard to supply porters for the military 
forces', and this was noted by his people. An anony-
mous letter to him in 1918, which reached the Native 
Commissioner, warned that 'the blood of these men who 
have died at the war will cry Ha, Ha, Mpezeni, the war 
has finished because of you ••• ¥OU must be cohabiting 
with all the boys' wives there (since) their husbands 
1 d t th ' 166 have a rea y gone o e war • 
The Company's men had already intercepted a 
message to people in the Fort Jameson area from 'the 
White Bird Church' sent by •c.M. Zwimba to R.J. Chilwa' 
which declared that the war was really 'the coming of 
the Afrikan (sic) blessedness for the Lord has handed 
••• a weapon of conquering to the inhabitants of Afrika', 
166. Hunton, op.cit., p.4, para S(c); NAZ: KDG 1/11/1, 
P.C. Cookson to SNA, 21/11/18; H~nton, op.cit., 
p.4, para.S(d); NAZ: KDG 1/1/1, anon. letter to 
Mpezeni, undated. 
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and announced that the White Bird Church counted among 
its saints victims of the Ndebele 'Chimurenga' rising 
of 1896. In November 1914 John Chilembwe, whose 're-
bellion' was to lead to his death, wrote a letter to the 
'Nyasaland Times', in consequence of which the Govern-
ment seized a number of copies of the paper. Chilembwe 
bewailed the fact that'in time of peace everything (is) 
for Europeans only. And instead of honour we suffer 
humiliation with names contemptible. But in time of 
war it has been found that we are needed to share hard-
ships and shed our blood in equality. It is true', 
he said, 'that we have no voice in this Government. 
It is even true that there is a spot of our blood in the 
167 cross of the Nyasaland Government•. It would be 
unrealistic to imagine that there was no similar reaction 
in northern Zambezia. 
The state of tension in the Zambezi-Luangwa 
confluence region was further increased in 1917 by the 
outbreak of armed rebellion in the northern districts 
of Mozambique. There was word of '6,000 natives ••• 
marching on Tete' in March, 'rebels' were mustering at 
Zumbo in April, and in August, armed bands attacked 
Chiwawa's village in the Peatuke district while 'looking 
167. KDG 1/12/1 confid. letter, Zwimba to Chilwa, 8/6/16 
and see Ranger T.o., 'The African Voice in Southern 
Rhodesia', (Heinemann, 1970), pp. 20-25 on 'Matthew 
Zwimba and the Church of the White Bird'; and 
Shepperson G. and Price T., op.cit., PP• 234-5. 
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for their people who ran away ••• into this district for 
refuge, that they might kill them because they refused 
to join them and fight against their masters'. The 
Portuguese authorities were demanding the return of 
'rebels' who had crossed the Zambezi but Cookson, the 
Provincial Commissioner, advised the N.C. at P~uke 
that the Company's administration was not able to order 
the refugees back into Mozambique. One local chief, 
Chiutika, who had thrown in his lot with the Mozambique 
rebels, wrote to 'Doglossi' Thornicroft at Petauke 
begging permission to return. 'I am now sorry because 
I left you, sir. I am in great trouble ••• Sir, the 
people here cannot stand against the whiteman. I saw 
the war, against Mpeseni. The people can do nothing'. 
The war in Mozambique had driven over 4,000 people into 
Southern Rhodesia as well by September 1917 and Sir 
Drummond Chaplin commented to the Colonial Office that 
'a deputation came over from one of the leading chiefs 
I in rebellion to Mloko's, the leader being allowed to 
meet Chaplin. 'He was quite clear as to their wants, 
stating that the treatment they received from the Portu-
guese was intolerable and asking if we could not go in 
168 and occupy the country'. 
168. NAZ: KSY 1/2/1, Cookson to Thornicroft, Petauke, 
30/3/17 and 20/4/17; report by Dama of Chiwowa, 
30/8/17; Cookson to Thornicroft, 19/2/18; Chief 
Chiutica to Thornicroft, 3/5/17; PRO: CO 417/601, 
Chaplin's report on Portuguese 'Native Rebellion 
(Tete area)', 27/9/17. 
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As the World War ended, the R.N.L.B. reported 
that it had recruited in 1918 5,547 men from north of 
the Zambezi, as compared with 1,768 from Mozambique and 
117 from the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and that the~e 
were at that time just under 10,000 men from Northern 
Rhodesia working in Southern Rhodesia who had been re-
cruited by the Bureau. Only 288 had been enlisted by 
the R.N.L.B. for work in Northern Rhodesia. In an 
attempt to induce more men to undertake farm work along 
the railway line north of Livingstone and around Chipata, 
wages were increased from 12/6 to 15/- a month. The 
North-western Rhodesia Farmers' Association complained 
that a high proportion of the labour recruits stayed 
for short periods only, going back to their villages 
169 for the planting season. In the east, farm labour-
ers were still being given 3/- for 30 working days in 
the dry season and 4/- in the wet season with 1/- for 
rations. This led the Resident Commissioner in Salis-
bury to advise the High Commissioner that scarcity of 
labour was due to low wages and not to the permit granted 
to the R.N.L.B. to recruit 2,000 men for the Rhodesian 
mines from the Chipata district. Cookson, the Magis-
trate at Fort Jameson, said that, because of war earn-
ings, there was still 'plenty of money in the villages'. 
169. NAZ: BS 3/138, RNLB Report, 1918; and M.W. Dent, 
NWR Farmers' Assoc., to HC, 4/8/19. 
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At the same time, however, the Anti-Slavery Society in 
London heard from W.A. Sayer of Fort Jameson that the 
B.S.A. Company had 'imposed conditions on the Natives 
in the Eastern Luangwa which, if not actual and complete 
slavery, was not distantly removed from such'. Men 
were being seized by physical force for work on privately 
owned estates as well as by commercial employers and 
there was a 'compulsory levy on native food'. Say er 
wanted 'an immediate enquiry by Parliament' and was pre-
pared to help the Society in any way 'to right these 
wrongs'. Cookson, on hearing of his complaints, re-
torted that they were based on 'spleen and petty spite' 
because of Sayer's imprisonment for six months 'for a 
170 serious assault on a native youth'. 
In 1920 there were further adverse reports on 
conditions on the Katanga mines, and on the reluctance 
of men from Northern Rhodesia to go there as they had 
'not yet forgotten the high mortality rate which occ-
urred in the Congo during 1916'. The 'Barotse' Dis-
trict recorded a marked resistance to recruitment for 
work in the south by the official agencies which made 
deductions from repatriated men for clothing and travel 
expenses. The R.N.L.B.'s statistics for this part of 
the territory were therefore low. In the east, the 
170. Ibid: BS 3/441, Res.Comm. to HC, 13/3/19 and 
Cookson to Secy., NER Admin., 13/11/18; BS 3/445, 
Say er to T. ~.:~0.well Buxton, A-S and A. P. Socy. , 
24/5/19 and Cookson to Secy., Livingstone, 28/5/19. 
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Petauke Native Commissioner recorded 'alarm' consequent 
upon the increase of tax from 5/- to 10/-. 'Money 
earned in the war is now spent, the enormous increase 
in the prices of native trade goods in the local storez 
having made it go more quickly'. In consequence, 'many 
natives are now wearing skins and barkcloth instead of 
calico and print as formerly'. The N.C. confirmed 
this situation a year later, and also reported thus: 
'In addition to the 1,329 natives ••• who have either en-
gaged with the R.N.L.B. or taken out passes to leave the 
province, it is estimated that over 3,000 have either 
crossed Portuguese territory to Southern Rhodesia or 
gone to the railway during the year. Quite 70 per cent 
of the able-bodied male population are absent from the 
sub-district'. In answer to the complaints of mission-
aries about the loss of 'a large number of their adher-
ents', Cartmell-Robinson the N.C. at Fort Jameson re-
marked that 'if a Mission would take up the teaching of 
useful trades it would be a real benefit to the District•. 
The quality of labourers was not improving, he added, 
and 'native employees are becoming more insolent and 
less inclined to work', possibly 'due to the inexperi-
ence in handling natives among the new settlers'. For 
it was now that the impact of the land settlement scheme 
171 
for British ex-servicement began to take effect. 
171. Ibid: KDE 8/1/11, Annual Report 1919-20, by NC, 
Nalolo; KDE 8/1/12, Res.Magis., report for 1920-21; 
Kalabo sub-district Report, 1920-21; Mankoya sub-
district Report, 1920-21; KDG 8/1/3, H.S. Thorni-
croft Petauke Reports for 1919-20 and for 1920-21. 
Note that it w~s laid down in 1906 in respect of 
Chinese labour on the Witwatersrand that a labourer 
who wanted to go home must provide repatriation 
expenses himself ('Livingstone Mail', 5/5/06). 
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By 1922, the two posts of Administrator for 
Southern and for Northern Rhodesia were held by the same 
man, Sir Drummond Chaplin, despite the fact that the 
two territories were soon to take divergent paths in 
terms of their constitutional relations with Britain. 
Inside the northern territory, however, such matters do 
not appear to have affected the continuing situation in 
respect of any of the features of foreign rule which we 
have been reviewing. For instance, official reports 
recorded how, in the Chilanga area, because labour had 
been more plentiful during the 1922-23 rainy season, 
'wages therefore dropped to a very low figure'. For 
their part, men returning from labour in the south and 
elsewhere were evincing no desire to settle tax arrears. 
In a comment on this situation, the Secretary for Native 
Affairs asked whether it might not be advantageous to 
waive a portion of the tax arrears of repatriated work-
ers. 'A labour migrant from the Congo with only 30/-
in his pocket, though in arrear for five years, might 
••• be asked to pay only one arrear and the current tax, 
leaving him with something to show for his work and 
encouraging others to go and do likewise'. With tax 
at 10/- such a returning migrant would have been left 
with 10/- on this suggestion. The S.N.A.'s proposal 
only serves to remind us that, up to the end of B.S.A. 
Company rule, men were being pursued for tax in arrears 
no less than for current tax, and that after nearly 
twenty years of such conditions, the average labour 
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recruit returned with nothing to show for his labour. 
Thus it was generally only the foreign trader in the 
neighbourhood who gained economically from the extended 
operation of chibalo through the system of deferred pay. 
Thus too, tax defaulters were still 'hiding in the bush•. 172 
Penal rigours also continued, as evidenced 
by a report from Balovale in 1923 that 'when prisoners 
are actually working on the station they are not now 
chained together unless they are known to be bad charac-
ters or come from wilder parts of the sub-district•. 
Another ostensibly ameliorative measure was meanwhile 
proposed by the District Commissioner. The taxation of 
plural wives and concubines should be abolished, the 
measure to be offset by increasing tax to 12/- on all 
adult males. The post-war years saw the continuation 
of tax raids as of recruitment which was still being 
done by unauthorised agents, as, for example, in the 
Luano valley in 1921. The R.N.L.B.'s determined po-
licy of deducting the cost of blankets and return travel 
from their recruits was increasing local resentment. 
Meanwhile in the situation of drastic depopulation, 
where moreover 'anunexpectedly large supply of prison 
labour' enabled the local Commissioner to effect savings 
172. Ibid: KDB 6/1/6, Ag.Asst.Magis., Chilanga, Report 
for 1922-23; KDE 8/1/13, Nalolo Annual Report, 
1921-22; KDE 2/39/2, SNA, Livingstone, to Res. 
Magis., Mongu, 6/4/23; KDF 6/18, Mweru-Luapula 
Report, 1924-25; KDE 2/39/2, A.C. Helm, Asst. 
Magis. 17/4/19. 
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on his expenditure, man-eating lions increased their 
activities in Lundazi, villages fell into grave dis-
repair and inflated prices at local stores were driving 
people back to bark-cloth and skins in places as widely 
separated as Petauke and Mwinilunga. Petauke and other 
parts of the eastern region experienced severe famine 
in 1923, people having to walk 60 to 80 miles in search 
of food and many deaths being reported, especially among 
173 the old and the young. 
Zambian testimony concerning chibalo has been 
recorded over a large part of the country. In the 
Lundazi district it was said that, under chibalo, the 
people worked in severe conditions, 'sometimes under con-
stant beating from their masters ••• The reason for forced 
labour was the deliberate refusal by people to volunteer 
themselves for work on the mines ••• It was like sending 
people to jail and after working for six months, one was 
released and returned home', Chiefs 'tried their best' 
to resist the demands of the recruiters but 'they were 
threatened by the settlers and sometimes beaten•. 
Another witness claimed that 'during the time of chibalo 
none of us had the courage to show resistance and so we 
173. Ibid: KDE 2/39/2, Asst.Magis., Balovale, 20/3/23; 
P.E. Hall, Kasempa 6/4/23; KSM 6/3/1, NC Mkushi, 
1921 Tour Report, recounting the unauthorised re-
cruiting operations of s. Broomfield of the Sessie 
D.B. Mine; KDG 8/1/3, Lundazi Annual Report, 1922-
23. sgd. E.H. Lane-Poole; KSF 6/1/4, Mwinilunga 
Annual Report 1920-21; KDG 8/1/3, Petauke Report, 
1922-23. 
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spent our nights in the bush ••• There was not much re-
sistance from our chiefs because on their arrival, they 
(the B.S.A.C. men) brought so much terror and fear among 
us that our chiefs feared the Boma administrators and 
the people feared their chiefs. At any time, word 
would be received: "Chief So-and-so, we want so many 
people from you area for chibalo". The Chief then would 
order his villa9e headmen to find people at once. If 
people refused to go, that was the end of village head-
manship, and the chief also had his power withdrawn ••• 
Because of this, our chiefs became powerless and so 
people suffered such humiliation without resistance. 
~oreover when one did not have the money for tax, he 
ended up in jail ••• And when one attempted to escape, 
they came to arrest his wife and kept her under arrest 
until the husband came out of hiding'. Recruitment for 
war porterage was remembered as being even more v±ient. 
'We saw the coming of the majoni (white soldiers) in 
1914 and 1915. They travelled through the villages 
grabbing chickens. We left our villages and spent 
nights in the bush for fear of them. Each time they 
arrived and found you, perhaps at a beer-party, they 
would bundle you up and force you to go with them. And 
if anyone resisted, this was to invite beating. This 
led to a lot of us fleeing into the forest ••• They then 
burned down the houses'. The Ngoni chief, Pikamalaza, 
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was employed by the R.N.L.B. but the people did not 
resent his role as he stood between them and the Bureau's 
174 white agents. 
In the Kasama district, some witnesses said 
that chibalo recruits sometimes actually received no 
money as their wages were sent back to their Boma and 
applied to tax arrears. In Ila country, 'many men 
hated leaving their families at home while the wives 
hated seeing their husbands taken for forced labour•, 
for there was much beating of those recruited. There 
was particular resentment felt by those who were forced 
to carry not only the district officials but their wives, 
children and pet dogs in machilas. On such work, men 
'travelled long distances, usually on empty stomachs. 
The only food they ate was wild fruits, honey and wild 
animals plus a little mealie-meal which barely lasted 
for two days, while some journeys took more than a week'. 
It was work that 'could be likened to slavery'. There 
as elsewhere, the official would announce how many men 
he required and 'once chosen you had to go ••• It was the 
duty of messengers to make sure you went along. Nor-
mally those who resisted were tied with rope and then 
sjamboked'. In the Namwala district, some witnesses 
stoutly maintained that no payment in cash was made to 
174. Proceedings of Seminar-Workshop on Local History, 
Lundazi, June 1972; Group 4, testimony of Headman 
ChinyUmba, Daila Chilemu; Group 5, Headman Gudua~, 
Chief Pikamalaza. 
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men conscripted, for instance, for work on roads. 
'People had to use their own hoes and axes ••• As for food, 
they received only packets of salt which they could 
exchange for edible foodstuffs with the people in whos~ 
areas they worked'. A University of Zambia student 
researcher has written thus: 'Henry Mushoto Shandambu 
and Bernard Moonda remember very well the links that 
existed between the whites of Southern Rhodesia and 
South Africa with those of Northern Rhodesia. The 
whites in the south paid their colleagues to get labour 
for them ••• some however went south voluntarily, thinking 
that in this way they would evade taxation. Stories 
are told of the "Bachoni", those who never returned. 
The reasons for not returning were the low wages they 
received ••• They were provided with free food and blan-
kets, and very little money at the end of the month. 
They were promised that they would get their money in 
their districts on leaving employment. Those who came 
back didn't get the money. Some were just too poor and 
therefore too ashamed to come home ••• This was the nature 
175 of migrant labour'. 
In the Mkushi district, around the Jesuit 
Mission at Ching'ombe, the harsh methods of messengers 
175. KKF/UNZA/UNESCO Project 1973, paper by G.R. Mwale 
on Kasama district; and papers by J. Chuubi and 
E. Kalapula on taxation and forced labour in the 
Namwala district. 
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have been described by local witnesses. 'If they found 
someone ill, they insisted that he was pretending'. 
Those imprisoned were 'very many' and there was much 
beating. A number of messengers employed at the Mkushi 
Boma were local men who 'were equally slaves. What 
could they do about it? They knew that the same treat-
ment would be meted out to them if they dared to refuse 
to carry out orders. They were doing the work for 
which they were paid'. Chaponda Kondowe at Chief 
Shikabeta's village has given his personal testimony as 
one who carried some of these white men in their machila. 
• ••• we used to face a lot of hardships when the white 
men visited our villages. They would set up a tent 
where the European would sleep, while we spent our 
nights in the cold and wet. He was fast asleep while 
we were drenched in the open. And if the rain put out 
the fire outside the tent, the following morning the 
messengers would ••• beat the men for having neglected 
their duties'. In the area of the Nsenga chief, Mbuluma, 
similar evidence has confirmed that men did not wish to 
go south for work but were intimidated both by musonko 
and by the fear that their wives would be arrested if 
they themselves went into hiding. 'The messengers 
never came in peace ••• If they came to a village and 
could find no man there for labour, they would arrest 
the headman and the Boma punished him'. In Zarupango 
village, near Katondwe Mission, Albino Ngulube and his 
neighbours have said that, though the coming of white 
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men brought certain good things like clothes, they could 
not regard their coming as 'a blessing, for they treated 
us like dogs'. As officials were carried in machilas, 
the porters would sing thus: 
"Ngwa kalubangwe, ee, 
Ngwa kalubangwe, chenjela". 
"Be careful, The hawk is coming who will catch your 
176 
chicks". 
It may well be that conditions of recruited 
labour varied according to the disposition of the re-
cruiting agent. Chief Shaibila of the Lala has re-
counted how, in his area, villages were not denuded, 
the agent always ensuring that some men remained. 'If 
there were twenty men in a chief's village and twenty 
women, they would pick ten and so leave thirty•. 
Nonetheless that meant removing half of the able-bodied 
men. Shaibila also recorded that men, returning with 
'wealth such as suitcases', came to regret that they 
had at first fled from the recruiters and their atti-
tude led others to decide to go to work voluntarily. 
But Nansala Manyeta, who could recall the period before 
white men arrived in Serenje district, told how both 
Chief Serenje and Chief Mailo 'were greatly menaced' by 
the first Boma officials like Kennelly and Willis, and 
176. RI/Ba Chisenga, Ching'ombe, 13/8/74; John Mwelwa, 
13/8/74; Leo Chikambalala and others, Old Mkushi, 
12/8/74; Shikabeta's Court, Rufunsa, 2/9/74; 
Tiki Mazyambe, Mbuluma, 4/9/74; Albino Ngulube 
and others Zarupango, 4/9/74. 
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in consequence chiefs became 'just mere kapitaos' of 
the B.S.A. Company. Though chibalo did not affect his 
area as much as it did elsewhere, recruiting for tenga-
tenga work during the 1914-18 war did. Manyeta's 
testimony also recognised benefits of European action 
such as the ending of the Ngoni wars. 'That was a 
good thing to most of us', he said. 'However, they 
substituted this with a very bad form of slavery, that 
of recruiting people into forced labour'. Not far 
from Manyeta's home, another senior witness has said 
that, as a result of labour recruiting 'very small num-
hers remained in the villages, mainly old men, women 
and children, and this caused perpetual food shortage 
in the land'. Other witnesses in the Serenje district 
have indicated that musonko caused more direct suffering 
than chibalo which provided for some a chance to avoid 
lt . 1 t d t t t• 
177 pena 1es re a e o axa 1on. 
Zambian informants have indicated that many 
men who earned money under chibalo had to pay the taxes 
of numerous relatives. Various testimonies also con-
firm that there was no way in which the people could 
bring their protests to the notice of the white offi-
cials because of the universal fear of their buns and 
their anger. 'Those English guns were terrible. 
Could you challenge them with your African muzzle-loader?' 
177. RI/Chief Shaibila, Mkushi, 14/8/74; Nansala Man-
yeta, Chief Mailo, Serenje, 15/10/73; Zebron 
Sambwa 16/10/73; Noah Nsakulula, 16/10/73; 
Yakobe Lusuma, 16/10/73. 
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The coercive nature of B.S.A.C. operations has been con-
firmed by Boma messengers. A senior headwoman of a 
village in the Petauke area has said that there was 
nothing good done for the people under colonial rule. 
'We were oppressed. Our men were forced to work for 
nothing and we used to cut grass for them without being 
given anything. This was just slavery'. All wit-
nesses have confirmed that people regarded chibalo as 
'forced' labour; Senior Chief Kalindawalo of Petauke 
telling how even a chief would be conscripted for porter-
age and only released when his people who had fled from 
the recruiters gave themselves up. Another senior 
chief of the Petauke district, Nyamphande, has stated 
that the number of men taken by chibalo and tengatenga 
work greatly exceeded that of those who stayed at home, 
thus confirming the Native Commissioner's figure of over 
60% of the district's able-bodied men absent. In some 
areas women did not cut their hair until their men came 
back. In Mpezeni's area, the arrival of labour recruit-
ers, like that of tax collectors, often sent people 
fleeing into the hills. Memories of war porterage 
tell of men carrying huge bags of rice and other heavy 
loads to the war front in the north, of hunger on the 
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way and of some carriers being killed by wild animals. 178 
- People who kept cattle appear to have felt the 
rigours of musonko and chibalo less severely than those 
whose economy was in agriculture only. This is prob-
ably why, in parts of the Lozi kingdom, local memories 
are less bitter, though the special relationship between 
King Lewanika and the B.S.A. Company, at which we have 
glanced earlier, was probably the major factor in less-
ening the severity of Company rule there. In parts of 
Lundazi, on the border with Malawi, cattle-owners could 
sometimes avoid chibalo by selling their beasts. But 
Samson Maphara, for example, recalled that 'a bull would 
sell for as little as £1.10/-' or the equivalent of 
three men's tax for one year in the post-war period. 
The demands of chibalo fell heavily on his area, despite 
the possession of cattle, and so 'very few people re-
mained behind in the villages'. Moreover, there is 
very little evidence, recorded from Zambian witnesses, 
to suggest that chibalo was regarded as a benefit to 
individuals or communities. 'They used to go and work 
for six months and could only bring back one blanket ••• 
178~ RI/Headman Chilembwe, Petauke, 17/3/75; Head Mess-
enger Meki Chisenga, Petauke, 18/3/75; Ex-mess-
enger Mutantika Jamu, Shikabeta, 5/9/74; Head-
woman Chongololo, Petauke, 17/3/75; Senior Chief 
Kalindawalo, Petauke, 15/3/75; Verishoni Tembo 
and others, Wanya Village, Chipata, 4/3/75; Head-
man Kuyenda Phiri, Katete, 12/3/75; Headman Sam 
Banda, Chadiza, 8/3/75; Headman Sangwe Mvula, 
Katete, 13/3/75; Sitambuli and others, Petauke, 
19/3/75; Nkoko Phiri and others, Chadiza, 9/3/75; 
Headman Malata Mwanza, Petauke, 18/3/75; and see 
NAZ: KDG 8/1/3, Petauke Report, 31/3/23, (sgd. 
H.A. Sylvester, NC). 
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The couple would share this at night and the wife would 
use it to wrap round her body by day'. These memories 
of Ba Nakasese near Samfya on Lake Bangweulu gave a 
picture of women hurrying to prepare flour and non-
perishable 'relish' for the husband's hourney to the 
wouth or west and of general disappointment that their 
men came back with so little to show for their hard 
work. Though musonko was applied with great severity 
to villages on the islands in the Lake, the numbers 
recruited there for chibalo were fewer than elsewhere, 
presumably because of the difficulties of travel. But 
on Chilubi Island, people still vividly recall harsh 
conditions on the Katanga Mines and long journeys to 
Harare in Rhodesia. The keenest memories appear to be 
those of the early tax collectors, initial resistance 
crumbling before the white man's gun, whereafter, as 
informants at Mbilima village have said, 'The Europeans 
began herding the people like cattle•. 179 
As we have noted above, the Northern and Lua-
pula Provinces were most affected initially by the 
telegraph project and the intensive operations of the 
African Lakes Company and other traders. The mines 
179. RI/Bo Njamba, Sinanga, 29/7/71; Mundia Siyoto, 
Kalabo, 31/7/71; Samson Maphara, near Emusa, 
Lundazi, 21/6/72; Ba Nakasese, Mushamba, Samfya, 
19/11/74; Headman Kapumfi, Chilubi Island, 20/11/74; 
Headman Mbilima and others, Chilubi Island, 
20/11/74. 
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of Katanga then began recruiting there as well as along 
the Congo border with the North-western Province. In 
1919, a L.M.S. Missionary remarked that 'the call of 
the Congo is increasingly irresistible to both skilled 
and unskilled workers'. During the war, proximity to 
the battle front around Fife, Mbala and the Saise River 
intensified war porterage. In those areas memories of 
harsh language, frequent beating and the constant carry-
ing of guns by white men and their African employees 
are as strong as elsewhere. Around Mweru Marsh, wit-
nesses described long journeys to Rhodesia, with a group 
of men sleeping in a circle round their belongings for 
fear of theft. In the southern mines, men were forced 
'to work like slaves from sunrise to sunset', having 
joined chibalo 'voluntarily' for fear of the penalties 
of tax default. At Chiengi, the northernmost point on 
Lake Mweru, the first appearance of white traders has 
been recalled by various senior people. Their sudden 
arrival in a village, the snatching of hens, the very 
low prices which they paid for local salt and other 
commodities have been recounted with strong feeling. 
Moreover, 'even if a man was attending the funeral of 
his father or mother or child, they would still pick him 
up' if they wanted his services. The same was done by 
tax collectors. Labour recruiting agents sometimes 
seemed to make a point of visiting villages when people 
were drinking and tempting the men with offers of a 
blanket for every 'volunteer'. On the farms and at 
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the mines, men so recruited 'were treated like tools'. 
While European trade replaced traditional barter and 
imported salt was priced much higher than the old local 
product, game reserves were declared and anyone found 
shooting in them for the pot was arrested. As else-
where, people at Chiengi declared that 'the Balungwana 
(Arabs) were better, they simply came for trade'. • •• 
The Europeans brought tax but never cared for the people 
from whom they got this money ••• They did not create 
local opportunities for employment ••• For those lucky 
enough to find work, wages were appallingly low. They 
oppressed us terribly. If you paid a visit to a rela-
tive on the line of rail, they would come and arrest 
you'. Many Zambian testimonies indicate clearly that 
180 such conditions continued well beyond 1924. 
We shall consider later on the effect of B.S.A. 
Company rule upon the ownership and use of land. The 
regulations relating to grouping of villages should, 
however, be noted here in connection with the twin op-
erations of musonko and chibalo. In 1898, a traveller 
had reported that the coming of white men had resulted 
in both the virtual destruction of the authority of 
180. CCWM, C.Af.Letters, Box 18, Turner, Mbereshi, 
2/4/19; RI/Sikapite brothers, Lukashya, Kasama, 
30/5/72; Headman Sumbi, near Kayambi Mission, 
31/5/72; Ba Nakulu Songwe, Kamushini Mponda, Ba 
Mayengo, Daniel Mwape and the Chief, at Mukupa 
Katandula, 24-27/11/74; Kapungwe Semushi, William 
Pyanga, London Mwape, Nsakwa and others, Chief 
Puta's village, Chiengi, 23/11/74. 
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chiefs and the disintegration of villages into numerous 
small settlements. Four years later Codrington co-
mmented that by such dispersion 'the risk of famine is 
minimised, the spread of disease is checked and the 
population increases rapidly'; though 'tribal ties' 
and general ·control suffered. The name chisanka was 
widely used to describe the compulsory movement of 
people into large villages and the prohibition of small 
family settlements. B.S.A.C. men began to interfere 
from the start in the siting of vil~ages. Leyer, a 
Collector in the Kasama district, quarreled with a local 
chief on this issue in 1900. Three years later Cook-
son formally forbade the movement of villages without 
permission of the administration. In 1906 he published 
a plan for village grouping. The reason for such 
action by Company agents was obvious. The collection 
of taxes and the enlisting of labour recruits would be 
facilitated by forcing people to live in larger commu-
nities. As we noted earlier it would appear that be-
fore the Company's annexation of northern Zambezia, 
people were wont to live in small settlements in times 
of peace while naturally congregating together in face 
of hostile neighbours. In 1906, the White Fathers at 
Kayambi noted Codrington's plan for such grouping of 
villages and how Chief Sumbi was 'busy gathering villages 
forcibly round himself'. At the same time, the Fathers 
at Kapatu recorded that the Collector, Miller, had 
effected the grouping of 50 small villages into 14 large 
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ones. In those years some Missions were organising new 
villages at their stations, under the care of headmen 
who conformed with the Church's discipline. Mission-
aries tended to favour the village grouping programme 
in the interests of school building. The policy was 
being applied extensively. In Serenje district, for 
example, at the time when Malcolm Moffat was establishing 
the Chitambo station of the Livingstonia Mission, the 
N.C. was engaged on a major campaign of regrouping. 
The programme, however, evoked considerable hostility 
181 among the people themselves. 
The chisanka programme came somehow to the 
attention of the Colonial Office in 1913 and it fell 
to the High Commissioner to explain it to Whitehall. 
The 'confiscation and removal of unauthorised villages' 
was, he said, undertaken by Native Commissioners on 
the instructions of the Administrator and after con-
sultation with chiefs and headmen. The main purpose 
was 'to check petty crime'. Chiefs and headmen were 
complaining that they now had no power to control 
people's movements 'whereas formerly such disobedience 
would have been severely punished, constant disobedience 
181. See pp. 494 ff. below; Geographical Journal Vol. 13 
no. 6, 1899, p. 584, in article by Capt. F.F.R. 
Boileau on the Nyasa-Tanganyika Plateau; PLG: BSA 
8/64, NER Report, 31/3/02; WF, Chilubula, 18/3/00, 
25/5/03; Kayambi, 23/5/06, Kapatu, 1/10/06; Chi-
lubula, 2/8/06; CCWM C.Af.Letters, Box 1, report 
on Kambole Mission village, 1900; Box 13, Report 
of LMS District Committee on 'mission villages', 
10/7/05; RI/Yakobe Lusuma, Muchinka, Serenje, 
16/10/73; Benjamin Mpande, Kalwa, Serenje, 19/10/73. 
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with death'. Wallace, the Administrator, therefore 
planned to follow the example of North-eastern Rhodesia 
and 'to forbid the indiscriminate spreading out of 
villages without the consent of their chiefs ••• by des-
troying if necessary the temporary ramshac~ shelters 
they erect whenever they live in this manner in the bush'. 
Moffat Thomson meanwhile had reported, from Ndola dis-
trict, that the destruction of such settlements had 
been done 'with chiefs and headmen present who appear 
grateful' and 'family villages will not in future be 
tolerated•. 182 
Two weeks after the High Commissioner had 
written to London, a letter was written to him by Father 
J. Torrend, a Jesuit missionary in charge of a station 
called Kasisi, not far to the east of Lusaka. 'The 
most painful experience I have ever had in my life', 
said Torrend, 'is ••• that of finding myself in conflict 
with a British administration with regard to the law 
stopping Africans moving. The High Commissioner's law 
on the subject is, I suppose, the following: "13. 
District Headmen shall prevent the settlement of fresh 
villages or the removal of existing villages ••• without 
the consent of the Native Commissioner". My contention 
is that this law is misinterpreted when taken to mean, 
as the Northern Rhodesia Administration seem to pretend 
182. PRO: CO 879/113 Af.S.no. 1003 - HC to Col.Secy., 
6/11/13, encl. Moffat Thomsen's Report. 
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it does: (a) that it deprives old men of the right 
they have enjoyed from time immemorial of freely shift-
ing their huts together with those of their natural 
following, within the limits of the ground still belong-
ing to their own tribe ••• (b) that it deprives married 
couples of the right of shifting from one particular 
village to another when life has become impossible for 
them in the first; {c) that the settling "near me" or 
"near a Church" of a married couple of this district is 
henceforth to be conditional upon the goodwill of a 
Native Commissioner'. The local N.C. had spoken of 
"exigencies of the Census Register". 'Can these exi-
gencies be satisfied', Torrend asked, 'without making 
our natives practically the slaves of the Native Comm-
issioner?' Torrend's appeal to the High Commissioner 
had been provoked by an angry reply from V.R. Anley, 
the Assistant Native Commissioner, to his first protest. 
Anley had described the move of Litongola and eight 
companions close to Kasisi Mission as such a 'glaring 
case' that he had sought permission from Livingstone 
to burn their huts down within four weeks time from now'. 
Torrend had told Anley his action would be 'tyranny and 
savagery unheard of in Bantuland' and asked: 'From 
whom did you buy these slaves? Even a slave master 
i . i th h t f h. 1 ' 
183 
th nks tw1ce before burn ng e u s o 1s s aves • 
183. Ibid: 879/114, Af.S.no. 1015 - Torrend to HC, 
20/11/13, encl. Anley to Torrend, 27/9/13 and 
Torrend to Anley, 28/9/13. Underlining is mine. 
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As Acting Administrator, McKinnon informed the 
priest that it was difficult to detect crime when people 
lived 'in small hamlets by themselves'. As the law 
forbade such settlements the N.C. was 'only carrying 
out the laws of the land'. In reply, Torrend described 
Litongola as 'a grey-haired man ••• recognised by every 
native I know as a lawful head of an independent commu-
nity ••• (who) has his own call-them altars. Your Honour 
calls that a case of "breaking away from tribal control". 
Let me reject that ••• as emphatically as I can'. If 
'the law of the land' could be 'so interpreted as to 
make a grey-haired man and his following the bond-slaves 
of the Native Commissioner, that interpretation', said 
Torrend, 'was far away from the mind of the King when he 
gave his consent'. The depth of Torrend's feelings 
was further revealed thus: 'May I be allowed to tell 
Your Honour what I suspect when certain white people 
speak of crime in small hamlets like Litongola's or of 
the necessity of huddling the natives ••• into reserves 
or locations or big kraals? I suspect some of them 
have an eye upon certain springs occupied by small 
hamlets and would like to find "the law" quite favour-
able to replacing these by isolated farms or cattle 
ranches'. Litongola's settlement was beside a good 
spring which also served 'fields for early crops'. 
'It is a fact', said Torrend, 'that several white people 
have an eye on this spring'. In the fierce correspon-
dence that followed the Administrative Secretary censured 
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the missionary's 'discourteous tone', and McKinnon 
dismissed as 'grotesque' Torrend's belief that large 
villages increased the problem of tsetse fly. The 
Resident Commissioner said he could not sanction the 
forcible removal of Litongola from his settlement near 
Kasisi. The High Commissioner had recently received 
word from Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, which may 
well have influenced him in this matter. 'The native 
is naturally gregarious', Harcourt had written, 'and 
does not desert a village without reason; and I should 
wish to be satisfied as to the efforts made to ascertain 
and remove the causes that are driving the natives into 
the bush before I can accept the view that a resort is 
justified to this forcible manner of driving them back 
184 to their villages'. 
Thus overruled, McKinnon recorded his convic-
tion, after twenty-two years' experience, that it was 
essential 'for the protection of the natives themselves 
••• to prevent them becoming mere handfuls of landless 
units and ••• practically homeless'. We shall look later 
at the matter of African land tenure under the Company's 
rule. Here it is worth noting that McKinnon went on to 
attack Torrend on personal grounds. 'His mode of 
184. Ibid: A.Admin. to Torrend, 22/10/13; Torrend to 
A.Admin., 29/10/13; R. Geode, Admin.Secy., to 
Torrend, 13/11/13; McKinnon to HC, 27/12/13; 
Res.Comm. (Burns-Begg), to HC, 9/1/14; and HC to 
McKinnon, 27/2/14; Col.Secy., to HC, 10/1/14. 
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living cannot have an educative influence on the natives'. 
The local District Commissioner was quoted as saying 
that Torrend used his church building as a grain store 
and was "far more of a trader than a missionary". 
Moreover "the portion of the building inhabited by him-
self was in an indescribable state of filth and squalor. 
His only servants were about four or five native boys 
of not more than ten or twelve years ••• clothed in little 
but dirty rags'. Father Moreau of Chikuni Mission then 
dissociated the Jesuit Order from Torrend's 'doings, 
sayings and writings' and four months later the High 
Commissioner agreed that settlements around Kasisi 
should not be encouraged. Once again, as in the case 
of McNamara, which we noted earlier, who became an agent 
of R.N.L.B. on leaving the direct service of the B.S.A.C., 
the conclusion of the matter appeared to favour those 
185 who treated the local communities as conquered people. 
Moreover the ambivalent role which the situation forced 
upon certain senior missionaries demonstrated how diffi-
cult it was for them to be spokesmen of the people they 
had come to serve while at the same time being subject 
to a regime that was primarily based, not on 'protection', 
but on conquest. 
185. Ibid: McKinnon to HC, 28/3/14; quoting DC's report; 
Fr. MoreRu to Admin., 2/2/14; HC to Admin., 6/6/14; 
and see NRJ, III, 5, 1958, p. 419 fo~ef. to McNa-
mara as RNLB's 'well-known' agent at Livingstone. 
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The same dilemma had been illustrated as early 
as 1899 in the L.M.S. field at the south end of Lake 
Tanganyika when a missionary who refused to cooperate 
with Boyd, the local Collector, was suspended and the 
Mission's District Committee noted the ruling from their 
London headquarters that 'if missionaries ••• are working 
in territory under the rule of a Civilised Power, the 
administration of justice should be left entirely to 
the civil authorities'. At that time, the Resident 
Magistrate at Ikawa (Fife) was Charles McKinnon. In 
1907, another missionary at Niamkolo clashed with the 
local Native Commissioner over the compulsory removal 
of the people to the hills on account of the threat of 
sleeping sickness. Canoes had been 'stolen' by the 
Administration, he said, and no compensation had been 
offered for the loss of homes, fields, etc. Moreover, 
he had to pay a fine of 7/-, under protest, to effect 
the release of his 'boy John' whom the N.C. had arrested 
'because he did not report himself at the Boma when 
passing'. John 'while unconvicted of crime' had been 
'fastened to an askari and led about the country in 
that condition as a criminal of the deepest dye'. In 
the ensuing encounter, the Administrator told Wright: 
"You are unsupported by your Committee", while Wright 
expressed shock that 'the members of the Committee stand 
by a hard cruel and adulterous man (Miller, the N.C.) 
and be opposed to an ambassador of Christ in his efforts 
"to relieve the oppressed"'• The correspondence 
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revealed the missionary's opposition to the Company's 
practices in general. 'In 1907 your Kapitao Godfrey 
arrived here', he told the Magistrate at Abercorn, Hugh 
Marshal!, 'and roped together a number of men for non-
payment of taxes. In the gang was a blind man, one 
lame and several so old that I do not see how they could 
have walked to Abercorn. Fortunately I met them on 
the road and promptly cut them free'. Wright accused 
the officials of 'a travesty of justice•. 186 
Sleeping sickness was bad again in 1912 and 
particularly so in the Luangwa basin. The Magistrate 
at Abercorn, on a visit to Kawimbe Mission, privately 
expressed his anger at the news that, despite the epi-
demic, labour recruiting for Southern Rhodesia was being 
intensified in the Fort Jameson and neighbouring dis-
tricts and that the doctor at Abercorn had been with-
drawn so that he could examine recruits going south. 
Meanwhile in the Northern Province, Robertson of Kawimbe 
reported that 'so many hundreds have gone South, North 
and West that the country is being rendered almost des-
titute of labour'. Nutter of Mbereshi Mission wrote 
to London thus: 'Just across the river is the Congo 
and there high wages and iniquity are the order: and 
186. CCWM: A.Afr. Letters, Box 8, correspondence on sus-
pension of Rev. Percy Jones, Niamkolo, 15/5/99; 
Box 14, R.S. Wright, Niamkolo, 8/12/08, 22/12/08, 
22/6/09, encl. his letter to Marshal!. Phrase 
in brackets is mine. 
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a little further away is Southern Rhodesia with very 
much the same kind of attractions'. The missionaries 
noted that 'facts' about the labour situation were being 
'kept secret' not only from them but from the farmers 
and even from the B.S.A. officials. Some recruiters 
were 'crying out about it'. However, since they and 
the Company's men had 'to get their bread and butter 
out of finding labour for the south', they were 'not at 
liberty to divulge what it actually means nor to do 
anything to lead to its suppression'. An artisan 
missionary at Mbereshi made this comment on the end-
less migration towards distant places of employment: 
'The Central African's ideal is at present a very de-
finite one - to wear European clothes. Both trousers 
and hats and coats at one stroke make him feel trans-
ported into a firm civilization. Ah 1 Carlyle' s philo-
sophy of clothes- how true, how irrevokable!• 187 
Missionary and government reports in the last 
decade of the B.S.A.C. rule give a picture of widespread 
hunger and of situations in which adverse weather con-
ditions could bring about famine, against which, however, 
the Administration took virtually no measures. Instead, 
labour recruiting continued relentlessly, reinforced by 
increased musonko rates, the pressures reaching their 
187. Ibid: Box 15, Robertson, Kawimbe, to LMS, London, 
26/2/12, 18/5/12, 23/8/12; Nutter, Mbereshi, 
15/8/12; and Turner, Mbereshi, 30/8/12, referring 
presumably to Thomas Carlyle's 'Sartor Resartus'. 
Underlining is mine. 
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peak during the World War. In 1916, a missionary, at 
the L.M.S. station at Kyengwa, told how he had advised 
the mission teachers to concentrate on cultivation 'until 
the middle of May when they are forced to cease as the 
ground is then hard'. But the N.C. then wrote to him 
to say that, as 2,000 men were required for war porter-
age in less than a week's time, the teachers should stop 
working for the Mission 'as he needed every man and 
youth in the country'. In the post-war period there 
was 'a terrible shortage of cash of all kinds ••• and all 
employers including the government' had to 'resort to 
"chits"', a shortage that would only be lessened by the 
next tax collection. The L.M.S. missionary in charge 
of Kambole station expected to find that many teachers 
were 'in prison ••• as tax defaulters', thus adversely 
affecting the work of education. Fifteen years earlier, 
the White Fathers had spoken of the effects of taxation 
as 'la misere noire' and mentioned the related pheno-
menon of widespread hunger around Kayambi Mission, for 
instance, where recruiters from the Transvaal were 
already hunting for labour not far south of the Tanga-
nyika border. 188 
It is not easy to assess in statistical terms 
the impact of labour migration on northern Zambezia as 
188. Ibid: Box 17, Walter Draper to L.M.S., London, 
8/4/16; W.G. Robertson, 9/11/20 and 3/2/21; and 
WF: Kayambi, 6/12/06 and 25/12/06. 
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a whole, for lack of adequate population census returns. 
It is clear, however, from the data we have set out 
above, that the areas off the line of rail and those 
regarded as unsuitable for European farming were most 
severely affected. Professor Audrey Richards said in 
1935, for instance, that 'the poverty of the soil and 
the absence of railway communications has prevented 
European farming and the Bemba country can therefore be 
classed as a labour reserve for the industrial and 
mining developments of Northern and Southern Rhodesia'. 
She could well have included Katanga for which 54,573 
men from North-eastern Rhodesia and 4,924 from the rest 
of the territory were recruited between 1914 and the 
end of 1925 for the Union Mini~re alone. Two years 
after the end of B.S.A.C. rule, the S.N.A. advised 
managers of mines in Northern Rhodesia to look first 
to the Fort Rosebery (Mansa}, Luwingu, Kasama, Mpika, 
Serenje, Ndola, Kasempa, Solwezi and Mankoya (Kaoma) 
districts for labour, to which Mwinilunga, Balovale 
(Zambezi}, Kalabo and Petauke might be added later-
most of these being among the list of districts which 
Acting Governor Dundas would name in 1937 as 'uneconomic 
areas' in which taxation should be reduced. The Nor-
thern Rhodesia mines were still embarrassed by the 
annual drawing off of around 20,000 men to Southern 
Rhodesia and 10,000 to Katanga in the post-1924 period. 
By 1946, according to Lord Hailey, the Report of the 
Central African Council on Migrant African Labour 
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stated that Northern Rhodesia had 270,000 able-bodied 
males', of whom 180,000 were employed away from their 
villages and in work other than local agriculture; but 
the N.R. Annual Report on African Affairs for the same 
year recorded that 179,633 or 66% of a total of 377,935 
taxable males were engaged on work other than cultivation 
for the feeding of the local population. 189 
The specimen data on labour migration and the 
operation of chibalo, which we have reviewed above, con-
firm the picture provided by our material on musonko, 
namely, that the B.S.A. Company, which directly bene-
fited from the prosperity of the mining and commercial 
enterprises in its territories in southern and central 
Africa, was consistently determined, through the whole 
of its thirty-four years of rule, to exploit northern 
Zambezia maximally as a reserve for cheap labour. In 
doing so, it acted as the unchallenged conqueror of the 
territory and was able to turn aside the misgivings of 
the Colonial Office and the documented memoranda of its 
opponents with confidence. Because it had come to 
subjugate and to exploit, the Company was only minimally 
concerned with the welfare of the local population, as 
189. Richards A.I. 'The Bemba of North-eastern Rhodesia' 
in (Seven Tribes of Northern Rhodesia', ed. Colson 
and Gluckman (Manchester 1951) p. 165; NAZ: 
1/9/18/43/1, R. Williams and Co., to S~A 2/12/25; 
1/0/18/3, correspondence, SNA and Mining Companies' 
Conference, Broken Hill, 16/11/26 and SNA to Cs, 
14/6/29; and Hailey 'Native Administration in 
British African Territories' (HMSO 1950), p. 78. 
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long as the flow of labour recruits continued. Not 
only, therefore, was the land undeveloped except by 
white farmers for their own profit, but from the outset 
other natural resources were vigorously sought by traders 
and hunters without regard for the local economy. In 
1892, the White Fathers at Mambwe recorded that an 
English trader called Crasschay (sic} whom the people 
called Mulozi, the Sorcerer, burned Chelesya village 
when the people did not provide him with a cow and some 
goats and slaughtered all the animals there before moving 
on. In 1900 Robert Codrington recorded that numerous 
traders had moved into the country and were 'rapidly 
denuding it of cattle, Nory and rubber'. Indeed, the 
beginnings of European trade in northern Zambezia were 
marked not by the traders' gestures of goodwill towards 
their potential local customers, but by numerous open 
conflicts and acts of violence. Val Gielgud testified 
to this in 1902: 'Threats of violence on the part of 
the white man, lies and insolence are part of his (the 
kapitao's) stock in trade, and although his white master 
would perhaps not instruct him to use such methods, he 
••• is quite content to shut his eyes ••• so long as trade 
is good'. Yet traders prospered, as in Fort Rosebery 
(Mansa), where most of the £5,000 brought back in 1905 
by a large number of returning miners went to them. 190 
190. WF: Mambwe, 21/11/92; PLG: BSA 8/20, Codrington 
to CS, 4/4/00; NAZ: BS 1/93, Gielgud to Admin., 
NER, 2/4/02; KDF 3/1, Fort Rosebery Report 1905 
(folio 341). Phrase in brackets is mine. 
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As we have seen, some of the Company's agents 
were paternalistic men who, like Theodore Williams and 
Frank Melland, were troubled by the social consequences 
of the conquerors' actions. Colin Harding wrote sadly 
in 1903 that 'the charm of governing natives is gone as 
soon as they in any numbers leave. They leave their 
country as ignorant and tiresome children but return as 
offensive and often rebellious men who disregard the 
word of their own chiefs and ignore the word of the 
authorized authority of their own country, having 
learnt ••• all the vices of civilization without its re-
deeming influences'. King Lewanika was concerned be-
cause 'a large number never return'. Nonetheless, the 
recruiting drive was systematically intensified, the 
N.W.R. Administration confirming in 1907 that tax de-
faulters were sent to Southern Rhodesia and expected to 
pay tax arrears on their return. The death rate among 
recruits to Southern Rhodesia from N.W.R. was 43 per 
1~000 in 1908-09, and Coxhead reported in respect of 
North-eastern Rhodesia that recruitment procedures and 
conditions were 'very unsatisfactory', with 16% of the 
1,814 recruits dying in the first year of direct re-
cruiting by the Southern Rhodesia Government which had 
taken over the work of the R.N.L.B. in his territory. 
While 'plausible scoundrels' were luring men into work 
as carriers for East African hunting expeditions, Coxhead 
admitted that work in the south was 'extremely unpopular'. 
Since tax payment was so essential a part of the admini-
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stration, Native Commissioners thus had to 'strike a 
happy mean' between 'inflicting obvious hardship' and 
'exercising unnecessary leniency of which many natives 
are only too ready to take advantate'. In 1912 the N.C. 
Lundazi offered an abortive plan to compel men to leave 
financial provision for their families and for musonko 
before going away to work; though he noted that '50% 
of the deceased estates' of migrant workers were 'marked 
nil', which made him thin~ that 'the amount of money 
brought back by repatriates was not excessive•. 191 
The 'Livingstone Mail' is an important source 
for information as to European attitudes to the situa-
tion northiof the Zambezi from 1906 onwards. When 
Codrington mooted a plan for basic artisan training of 
Africans in 1907, the 'Mail' raised the question whether 
the country was 'to become entirely a white man's country 
or ••• a native dependency in which the whites will be the 
governing and directing class only, as in India?' 
Since health conditions did 'not admit of sustained 
manual labour on the part of a white man', the 'Mail' 
tended to favour Codrington's idea. This provoked a 
sharp reaction from those who wanted 'to hear no more 
about Black Mechanics', and believed that 'the intro-
duction of skilled native labour' would end the happy 
191. PRO: CO 417/390, statement by Harding on exodus 
from NWR, 6/8/03. Underlining is mine; NAZ: BS 
2/246, Ag.Admin., Kalomo, 25/10/07; P.EG: BSA 
9/191, NWR Report to 31/3/09; NAZ: BS 1/129-133, 
NER Report on Native Affairs (J.c.c. Coxhead) 
31/3/10; KST 4/1/1, Lundazi Report, 1911-12. 
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position whereby the territory was 'free from a native 
problem'. Leopold Moore, the 'Livingstone Mail's' 
proprietor, openly defended musonko as a means of obtain-
ing labour, but objected to the claims of Southern 
Rhodesia and the Transvaal on labour from the north and 
believed that the raising of the hut tax to 10/- was 
'a frightful blunder', as it would mean rasing 'native 
wages'. The 'Mail' welcomed the proclamation estab-
lishing the R.N.L.B. as a check on the activities of 
any 'touts' whose business was merely 'to deliver so 
many natives, like cattle, to the mine manager who 
employs him'. However, a cautionary note was sounded 
about lack of 'respect' for white traders by their 
black customers. 'A legitimate trader is one who does 
not forget that he is a white man', said one correspond-
ent. Moore was further shocked by Winston Churchill's 
suggestion that Indians should be offered 'a compensa-
ting field' in equatorial Africa. 'The Law of Nature 
would postulate the subjugation of the conquered, stern 
repression as occasion demanded and intelligent restrict-
ion of their claims where ••• in conflict with those of 
the ••• conquering race'. The issue of compensation 
was therefore, in his view, ir~elevant where white men 
192 had conquered. 
192. 'Livingstone Mail', 13/3/07, 20/7/07 (letter from 
w. EGdie), 27/7/07, 10/8/07 (letter from 'The 
Colonel'), 12/10/07, 21/12/07, 10/1/08. 
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The people for whom Leopold Moore spoke were 
highly critical of the suspension, in 1908, of the 'pass 
law ••• under which every boy was bound to produce his 
pass and, if found loafing, was promptly dealt with.' 
They were angered by utterances of the General Missionary 
Conference, a body composed of 'foreigners ••• quite un-
influenced by the Imperial Idea'. Though the mission-
aries' plea for a grant from the Company for educational 
work was 'logical', this must not happen until the educ-
ation of white children was financially supported by 
the Administration. Moreover, said Moore, 'the natural 
inferiority of the native cannot be abrogated by appeal 
to altruistic philosophy'. However, a report of star-
vation in the Kalomo-Kafue area following a drought was 
adduced as support for the paper's opposition to the 
increase in musonko which might well 'have caused the 
dearth of food'. Avoiwedly on grounds other than 
humanitarian, the 'Mail' believed it was 'bad policy to 
allow starvation to stalk through the land' since man-
power for labour in European employment was 'one of the 
assets of the country'. Consistently, Moore opposed 
plans to direct all labour recruits from North-eastern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the rail-head. The proposal 
would not end the Railway's operational deficit but 
would merely raise the cost per head of labour above 
the current figure of 10/- Moreover, the 'Livingstone 
Mail' had no compunction about forced labour, for 'to 
leave the native in the veld ••• is to leave him to 
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degenerate into a prolific nuisance. To force him to 
work is only to assimilate his condition to those of 
193 
the white man'. This view echoed that of the Corn-
pany's Director, Philip Lyttelton Gell, who had hotly 
contested the issues of musonko and chibalo with a 
Liberal Member of the British Parliament. To Markham•s 
comment that no civilized government 'forces the inhabi-
tants to labour in mines against their wish for the 
benefit, not of themselves but of a speculative company', 
Gell had retorted that 'the principle of compulsory ser-
vice to the State is disowned only by Anarchists•.
194 
We have noted that the number of labour re-
cruits taken from North-eastern Rhodesia to work south 
of the Zambezi far exceeded the number drawn from the 
North-west. Yet a spokesman of the white farmers in the 
'railway belt' declared in 1911 that 'the Bureau is 
bleeding Northern Rhodesia for the benefit of Southern 
Rhodesia'. By the beginning of 1914 the Administration 
in Livingstone was being encouraged to resist pressure 
for the abrogation of regulations against •touting'. 
But as the World War ended, Bishop May declared: 'In 
all the districts that I know there is hardly a single 
193. Ibid: 25/7/08; 16/5/08 and 5/2/10 comment on the 
Venables-McNamara issue. 
194. PLG: BSA 7/155-6: Gell to A.B. Markham, M.P., 
17/4/03 and Markham to Gell, 21/4/03. 
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native of the younger generation who does not ••• set out 
from his village in search of European employment ••• and 
large numbers return to it again and again'. Forced 
labour, he said, was tantamount to the methods of 'Huns 
and decadents'. The 'Livingstone Mail~ having stated 
that it did not concern itself with 'native affairs', 
gave virtually no place to opinions which purported to 
speak for the African population. In 1919 however 
there appeared a letter, signed 'Freedom Hoper' which 
said that the B.S.A. Company had as its ~sole aim t9 
exploit the natives and to enlarge the pockets of its 
shareholders'. Over a year later, another pseudonymous 
writer advocated a programme of aided education for 
Africans despite the fact that it would 'affect cheap 
labour adversely'. The writer then quoted Sir Lawrence 
Wallace as lamenting that '"the Administrator is less 
well understood and less well loved" by natives today 
than ••• in the early days', adding that action must be 
taken to 'make the native see the benefit of our rule 
by giving him something tangible or we will not escape 
Nemesis•. 195 
In the years following the end of the World War, 
there was a considerable stirring of humanitarian senti-
ment in Britain and Europe and colonial administrations 
195: 'Livingstone Mail', 14/10/11, letter by A.A. Willis; 
27/2/14; 13/12/18, statement by Bishop May; 
11/4/19, 9/9/20 and 21/10/20, letters by 'Vox 
Clamantes'. 
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came under renewed scrutiny. Forced labour in East 
Africa was focussed in particular and the 'Livingstone 
Mail' carried a reference to 'the new slave policy' 
there. An East African Governor revealed the histori-
cal contradiction of British imperial practice by 
pleading the necessity now 'to combine the progress and 
prosperity of the Protectorate with the welfare of the 
natives' - objectives which should have been synonymous -
thus confirming that what had been being 'protected' 
hitherto was something other than the well-being of 
indigenous peoples. In many cases, the critical comments 
of British churchmen were influenced by two cautionary 
notes. Firstly, they believed that conditions in 
British overseas possessions were better than in terri-
tories ruled by other European powers. German Tanga-
nyika, the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese territories 
of Angola and Mozambique, by which Northern Rhodesia 
was bounded, were all regarded as crueller places than 
the B.S.A. Company's domain. Secondly, attention had 
to be paid to the emphasis laid by colonial administra-
tors on labour as a cure for idleness. The Anti-Slavery 
Society was therefore impressed by an extract from a 
report by Sir Frederick Lugard on administration in 
Nigeria which said, inter alia: "Government policy 
being radically opposed to coercion in any form ••• will 
not employ it in order to procure labour for private 
undertakings. Employers must, therefore, make the 
conditions sufficiently attractive to secure the labourers 
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they need. To effect this high wages are not necessary 
and they are to be deprecated ••• (as) an injury to the 
development of the country. Labour will be secured 
only by kind and fair treatment, decent hutments, the 
entire absence of blows and rough usage, and the facili-
ties already described". The weight of evidence avail-
able to missionaries and their British headquarters 
confirmed, however, that forced labour was prevalent 
in British African territories to such an extent as to 
contradict the principles of 'trusteeship' which had 
come into common parlance in the early years of the 
League of Nations. 196 
It was probably true that, as the well-known 
African Christian, Dr J.K. Aggrey of the Gold Coast 
(Ghana), told a British Missionary Conference in 1921, 
he was able to 'preach cooperation in Sierra Leone, in 
Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the Camerouns and in the Bel-
gian Congo,' whereas in Portuguese West Africa 'the 
only thing I could preach was heaven: they had nothing 
to live for but heaven. Sometimes work on the roads 
extends to six months instead of (the officially stated) 
twenty-eight days. They have no pay, they have to 
feed themselves and use their own tools ••• The conditions 
196. 'Livingstone Mail', 21/10/20; USPG, C2, memo by 
H.E. Sir Edward Northey, 21/10/19; At (XXVIII, 
Bishop May's papers) extract from Anti-Slavery 
Society pamphlet 'What is slavery?' by Lord Cromer, 
citing Lugard's Report, p. 44, para. 107; memo on 
'Native Affairs in the East African Protectorates', 
submitted to HMG by the Conference of British 
Missionary Societies, 24/5/21. 
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are awful; the women are not safe and the men are being 
practically crushed and killed•. 197 Novertheless, as 
we noted earlier, critical comment in Northern Rhodesia 
at the end of our period revealed a system of pervasive 
injustice and exploitation; a situation that had con-
tinued unchecked since the net of perfidy was cast over 
the Lozi King and the other major African states of 
northern Zambezia succumbed to the devastating power 
of the Maxim gun and the Martini rifle. As late as 
1919, a High Court Judge, presiding over the trial of 
some members of the Watchtower sect, wrote thus of the 
trial: 'Nearly all were young ••• It was a disquieting 
thing for the future ••• the old words, obedience to 
elders and headmen and chiefs, obedience to the Boma, 
had lost their meaning, one realised the delicate and 
fragile nature of our hold over these people and ••• saw 
the abyss opening'. The Judge, remote from the pass-
ions of the 'common man' as foreign rulers are bound 
to be, believed that British administration had been 
hitherto 'a rule over a willing people, above all over 
a non-critical one'. Now, he feared, it might 'become 
a rule over a highly critical people, sceptical of our 
198 
intentions, distrustful of all we do'. 
197. CBMS: Report of International Committee of 
Edinburgh House, 27/7/21. 
198. See pp. 23 ff. above; NAZ: 1/10, Report of Tour 
to Kasama by Justice P.J. Macdonell, p.12, 5/5/19. 
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At the beginning of the century, the London 
'Westminster Review' had carried a comment on 'the four 
chief colonial powers'. 'Great Britain', it said, 
'leads both in regard to number and area as well as to 
population: the total number of her possessions being 
52, their area 11,187,000 square miles and their popu-
lation 356,781,000'. France, Germany and Holland 
followed in that order. 'The total imports of the 
British colonies amount to £215,000,000 annually. 
Great Britain by supplying 42% of this instead of 15% 
(which she averages in the commerce of other countries) 
makes an additional market for £58,000,000 of her pro-
ducts ••• thus increasing by 25% her total exports and 
creating by her colonial system a market for nearly 
300,000,000 dollars worth of her products and manu-
factures'. The journal went on to comment thus on what 
was popularly called 'the native question', with re-
gard to which there had recently been 'a marked deter-
ioration': 'Owing probably to the increase of specu-
lation, gold mining, diamond mining and the extending 
and strengthening of the purely commercial spirit, the 
native has come to be regarded, not as "an end in himself", 
as Kant would say, but primarily as a means for the pro-
199 duction of wealth or profit for others'. Chibalo 
in northern Zambezia, like musonko, cannot be understood 
otherwise than as the instrument of a vast commercial 
199. MMS: cutting (undated but presumably around 1900) 
from 'Westminster Review', with ref. to a phrase 
used by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. 
468. 
enterprise subtended by subjugation sufficiently de-
cisive to enable its exploitative designs to be fulfilled. 
The comment of Chief Jumbe at an indaba at 
Fort Jameson in late 1923 was thus recorded, without 
contradictory comment by a Company official: •on all 
themrms they are beaten by the white men. 4/- and 1/-
posho is not sufficient•. Moreover, as we have been 
remarking above that the rule of the B.S.A. Company 
north of the Zambezi cannot be distinguished in essence 
from its rule in the south, it is also true that the 
effects of chibalo in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia 
were intrinsically the same. The following notes, 
written in reference to the report of the Committee :set 
up in Nyasaland in 1935 to study emigrant labour are 
therefore pertinent to our review: 'We have become 
more and more aware that this uncontrolled emigration 
brought misery and poverty to hundreds and thousands of 
families and that the waste of life, happiness, health 
and wealth was colossal - a flagrant breach of that 
ideal trusteeship ••• Complete failure of the pass system 
••• No record of exodus'. A senior chief in the Mpika 
district made a passionate plea, ten years after direct 
B.S.A. Company rule ended, which underlines the aptness 
of the above comment to the Zambian situation: 'There 
are many taxes for people to pay. 10/- is the tax for 
all men ••• A man with a gun must pay 3/-. A man with a 
bicycle must pay 3/6. Our people go to the mines to 
look for work ••• and become weak and ill from hunger. 
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On their way home they die of hunger because they have 
no money to find food on the journey ••• To earn money a 
man must stay away for many months. His wife is left 
with no one to cut (trees in preparation) for her garden. 
Then there is hunger in the village too ••• The lives of 
200 the people are spoiled and all our people are unhappy'. 
(d) Intimidation and the 'Rule of Law' 
Early comments by British visitors to northern 
Zambezia varied much more than the casual observer might 
imagine. A number of them, however, which came from 
agents of Rhodes's Company portrayed situations in which 
justice and law were in short supply. The extreme 
measures taken, for instance, by Chitimukulu of the 
Bemba against both his captured enemies and offenders 
within his kingdom were recorded by missionaries, traders 
and B.S.A.C. men alike. The despotic rule of Mpezeni 
of the Ngoni was also adduced in defence of the action 
planned .for the subjugation of his kingdom. Among 
less cohesive or despotic societies, people were con-
ceived of as living in a condition akin to anarchy. 
Val Gielgud said of the Ila communities in the area of 
the Hook of the Kafue that 'in nearly every case a 
savage race is inclined to accept the rule of the white 
man as a relief from the despotism of their own rulers'; 
200. NAZ: KDG 4/211, report of indaba, Fort Jameson, 
25/9/23; RCM-WMA 139: notes on Report of 1935 
Nyasaland Enquiry into Emigrant Labour, 13/6/36; 
and NAZ: KSD 4/1, Mpika District Notebook, p. 484, 
Report of indaba, 26/10/34. Phrase in brackets 
is mine. 
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for he said, among the Ila, government 'which is no 
doubt the same as exists in any troop of baboons', was 
merely the domination of 'the older, stronger or more 
cunning' member of the community. Numerous examples 
could be adduced to show that on both sides of the 
Zambezi, spokesmen of the white conquerors assumed that, 
given sufficient physical superiority to 'keep the native 
in his place', it was not either obligatory or desirable 
to refer to 'civilized' ideas of law. A veterinary 
officer who put on paper his memories of the country 
around the nineteen forties, made this comment on colo-
nial justice: 'During my first months I was told never 
to explain anything to "Jim Fish". Tell-__ the::-.munt what 
to do and see that he does it. If he doesn't, kick 
his backside. It is the only language he understands"'• 
As late as 1952 there was comment in the 'Northern News' 
on the white man's 'right' to 'flog one's nigger•. 201 
The importance for us of such data, in this re-
view, concerns the light they shed on concepts of justice 
201. E.g. NAZ: BS 1/43-44, Codrington on Bemba, 15/6/99; 
Macpherson, op.cdt., p. 34, citing letter of James 
Henderson of Livingstonia to fiancee, 14/5/96 (see 
Balantyne M.M.S. and Shepherd R.H.W. (eds.) 'Fore-
runners of Modern Malawi' (Lovedale 1958), p. 159; 
Maugham Report, op.cit., Appendix Item 28, Warton 
to Forbes, 2/4/96; Item 31, Johnston to FO, 
14/7/96; NAZ: SEC/MG/13, memo on BSAC 'mineral 
rights', quoting letter of v. Gielgud, 21/4/01; 
RH:Mss.a. 1315, Guilbride P., 'Paw~Paw Picnic' 
(undated MS), Chap. I, p. 12, 'by permission of 
the author); NN, 24/4/52; and see also Cairns, 
op.cit., for a major study of such attitudes prior 
to 1900. 
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in the minds of the conquerors and of those over whom 
they took control in such a way that no authority could 
have precedence over theirs in any matter in which they 
saw fit to take action. Joseph Chamberlain's opinion 
in 1903 had been that there should be as little inter-
ference as possible 'with the native dynasties where 
their administration is at all tolerable' for 'the natives 
can work out their own salvation better in the expansion 
of their own institutions than by having ours suddenly 
forced upon them•. This outlook, which was to be 
echoed to a considerable extent twenty years later in 
Lugard's doctrine of indirect rule, implied a minimal 
intrusion upon African political and social structures 
and systems of law. On such a subject, as on others, 
Sir Harry Johnston had written this persuasive passage 
in 1898: 'It was theoretically supposed that justice 
to natives only was administered by native chiefs, but 
in reality the native courts are practically held by 
British magistrates in the name of the local chief or as 
his representative, for over most of the districts ~ 
native chiefs have surrendered to us by treaty their 
justiciary rights'. Johnston had elsewhere commented 
on the 'very clear sense of justice' characteristic of 
'the negro', adding- with reference to the situation 
in the Shire Highlands - that 'Fortunately, now the 
native begins to understand that, if his European em-
ployer does not treat him fairly, he had redress at the 
hands of the nearest official'. In 1904, Cor¥ndon, 
472. 
the Administrator, told Lewanika that 'courts of Justice• 
would soon be established in which the judge would be 
guided by 'native laws and customs' in cases between 
black people. However, 'if your laws are against the 
Laws of England, the Judge ••• would judge by the Law of 
England as if the people before him were Europeans•. 202 
We shall consider later the impact of B.S.A. 
Company rule upon the authority of chiefs. Here what 
concerns us is the administration of justice and the 
dispensing of penalties, and therefore we must note that 
from the outset, as we have seen, flogging was in con-
stant use by Company officials and their messengers and 
askari all over northern Zambezia. In 1915 Beaufort, 
while serving as Judge of the High Court in Livingstone, 
quoted with approbation what Chamberlain had said in 
1897, thus: ''The punishment gives little trouble, it 
is swift and severe, it bears a kind of testimony to the 
personal power and superiority of the official who 
awards it". Chamberlain had noted, however, that "the 
more often it is inflicted, the more ready to disregard 
the pain or the suffering which it involves, becomes 
the man who deals in this species of punishment". 
202. PLG: BSA 9/83, Chamberlain to Gell, 3/4/03 and see 
Lugard F.D. 'The Dual Mandate in British Tropical 
Africa' (Blackwood 1922); Johnston H.H., op.cit., 
p. 114; BM/SP 1896, LVIII (C.7925) Johnston to 
Salisbury on 'General Condition of British Central 
Africa', 29/4/96; PLG: BSA 9/116, Coryndon to 
Lewanika, 10/10/04. Underlinings are mine. 
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Therefore flogging should be used with discretion. 
Beaufort considered that the whip as a penalty had the 
advantage of being 'not costly' and obviating 'the 
probable contamination of prison habitues•. 203 The 
evidence for our period is that it was used extensively, 
but that administrative officers were of the view that 
what was done in northern Zambezia was much less brutal 
than what prevailed in neighbouring territories under 
the rule of other European powers. 
The Ross-Cramer Report on Portuguese Africa, 
issued in 1925, in its discussion of forced labour in 
Angola and Mozambique, stated that it was common prac-
tice for planters, in collusion with government offi-
cials to withhold pay from conscripted labourers. The 
worker who went to the government official was then 
'told to come round in a couple of months'. However, 
'if he has the temerity to do so, he is threatened with 
the calaboose and that ends it. It is all a system of 
bare-faced labour stealing'. Such extremes of depravity 
shocked some of the B.S.A.C. men. The veterinary 
officer we have just quoted was surprised, on his first 
visit to the Belgian Congo in 1939, to find 'chikotis' 
hanging from the roof of the verandah of a house which 
he visited, a bunch of 'leather thongs ••• weighted at 
203. NAZ: BS 3/77, folio 152, L.P. Beaufort on whipping, 
19/11/15, and see BS 3/78, 80, 81 et al for 'Whipp-
ing Returns' for the latter part of our period. 
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the end with large rocks'. He heard there how a 'Rho-
desian boy' had visited the Congo 'without his pass'. 
The man 'received nine lashes ••• on entrance to prison 
and when his fifty days were up he was helped to the 
border with another nine'. The idea that other Euro-
pean colonists were more severe began, however, much 
earlier, as evidenced by the report sent from Ikawa 
in 1906 of the savage treatment of a man accused of 
stealing a cash box at the German Boma at Ikamba in 
Tanganyika. The man, Kerani, had his head shaved and 
was tied to a tree with water dripping on him constantly. 
'The head was fixed between two boards, nailed to the 
side of the tree ••• so that he could not move his head 
in any way'. He had weals from severe beating and 
'natives also took burning faggots and burnt Kerani all 
over the body' during the two months in which he was 
kept tied in the one position. Brutality reached such 
proportions in the Congo (Zaire) that international 
condemnation was evoked by responsible reports of 
beating, plundering, rape and the destruction of vill-
ages by state officers both before and after King 
Leopold ceded his sole authority over his 'domaine 
prive• to the Belgian Government in 1908. In Britain 
a 'Congo Reform Association' was formed to urge the 
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Government to bring pressure to bear on Belgium. 204 
Lord Grey, the B.S.A.C. Administrator in 
Southern Rhodesia, told the Colonial Office in 1897 
that 'Universal experience in South Africa has proved 
that until Kaffirs are convinced by failure it is use-
less for them to try and struggle against the power of 
the white man, they will fret under his yoke'. A 
decade later, the Colonial Office was told that 'the 
prospects of Southern Rhodesia' ·were good, the corres-
pondent noting that 'q~ite kindly, even "negrophile" 
persons tell him of the black man's contempt for people 
who "spoil" him ••• the Kaffirs stand at a point of civi-
lisation at which much we think humane seems to him 
abominably weak ••• The Boer attitude towards the Kaffir 
seems horrible ••• yet the Boer Republic has seldom any 
native trouble. Given the sense that he is being justly 
dealt with, the native does not resent even a severe 
flogging'. The writer considered however that it was 
not possible to give general ppproval to flogging in 
view of a recent incident in which a 'grey-haired 
respectable farmer in Salisbury', called Laidlaw, tied 
a man to a tree and 'flogged him until from exhaustion 
204. Ross-Cramer Report, 1925, para. 9, quoted in Simon 
K. 'Slavery' (Hodder and Stoughton 1929), p. 165; 
Guilbride, op.c~t., p. 143; NAZ: BS 1/96, report 
by McKinnon, Ikawa, on torture of Kerani, 10/2/06; 
see also Legum c. 'Congo Disaster' (Harmondsworth 
1961), Davidson B. 'Africa Awakening' (Cape, 1955) 
esp. pp. 62-82, and note work and writings of 
Edmond Morel and Roger Casement on the 'Congo 
atrocities'. 
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he could flog no more'. The letter to the Colonial 
Office ended with a further misgiving about the image 
of white justice that was being projected in Central 
Africa. "If we offend against a white manu, some Shona 
men had said to Taberer, Chief Native Commissioner, "we 
are hanged or imprisoned or flogged. If a white man 
kills us, nothing happens. Explain to us, our Father, 
how this is". Neither the report of savage flogging 
nor the recording of misgivings about the thrashing of 
adults by white colonists was by any means uncommon 
among the confidential correspondence of the Colonial 
Office. The protests of a missionary in Sierra Leone 
in 1892 had spoken of 'floggings to death' and listed 
the names of some inflictors of brutalities. The High 
Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Milner, voiced his 
disquiet in 1899 about 'the effect on the native mind 
of the apparent inability' of the British Government 
'to protect Her Majesty's subjects', by which he meant 
Zulu victims of brutal floggings. 205 
The incidents of floggings in North-western 
and North-eastern Rhodesia, which we have noted so far, 
205. RH:MSS.Afr.s.81, extracts from BSAC Board Meetings, 
77-page letter from Grey to CO, 21/7/97; PRO: CO 
417/464, memo to eo from c.w. Boyd, 1908; 879/432 
(Africa West) Report on 'Engagement of Labourers 
in the West African Colonies for service in the 
Congo Free State and their Alleged Illtreatment', 
incl. memo by Rev. James Johnson, pp.S ff.; 
879/62 Af.S.no. 628, Milner to Chamberlain 26/9/99. 
Underlining is mine. 
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indicate that the B.S.A. Company's men, their colleagues 
in the labour agencies, traders and prospectors approached 
their enterprises with the disposition of mind reflected 
in what we have just noted. Excuses of the stresses 
of climate, loneliness, frustration and ill-health were 
often offered, as in the case of McGregor, noted above, 
who was said to be suffering from a severe attack of 
haemorrhoids. It is noteworthy that McGregor's mis-
conduct occurred very soon after the acquittal in Battle-
fields, Southern Rhodesia, of four white men accused 
of flogging three Africans to death. The High Commi-
ssioner had then expressed his concern that the incident, 
like the case of Laidlaw, could 'constitute a national 
disgrace and a public danger' but noted the comment of 
the Resident Commissioner about 'the difficulty of 
obtaining a verdict against Europeans on natives' evi-
dence'. The Laidlaw case had also evoked a comment 
from the Attorney General, Tredgold, that, though it 
was clearly culpable homicide, the jury were afraid to 
give such a verdict at a trial involving a white man who 
had killed an African. In response, the High Commi-
ssioner had remarked: 'Though human justice has failed 
to deal with this case, neither the criminal nor the 
perjured jurors will escape Divine Justice'. There 
the case had ended. The general refusal to give 
credence to court testimonies by black men has thus to 
be noted as a major factor prejudicial to justice, as, 
for instance, when the Portuguese authorities in Angola 
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had clashed with the Lunda chief Samagala in 1906 and 
accused a missionary of giving the chief a British flag. 
The D.C. Lealui, reported that, though the charge was 
baseless, Schindler the missionary would find it diffi-
cult to prove his innocence 'since native evidence will 
206 not be accepted'. 
As the first copper mines appeared in northern 
Zambezia in the Hook of the Kafue, the local Company 
officials recorded numerous cases of flogging by white 
miners. In 1900, Colin Harding was informed in writing 
by Lewis, Manager of the Northern Copper Company, that 
he had used the whip from the beginning in face of 
pilfering of properties of the mine and its white staff, 
in one case administering '50 with the sjambok'. This 
was clearly a 'summary penalty' not dependent on any 
form of trial. Heated resort to summary 'justice' 
was the order of the day, as evidenced also when there 
was a wave of anger in early 1903 over 'twelve cases of 
assault by natives on European women'. For this the 
death sentence was demanded, a matter which inevitably 
involved the Colonial Secretary. Chamberlain said that 
he would make no objection, •taking into account the 
206. See pp. 327 ff. above; and PRO: eo 879/98 Af.S.no. 
899, HC to eo, 30/4/08 in correspondence on House 
of Commons question ref. the Battlefields case, 
and citing Res.Comm. to HC, 7/11/08; Attorney-
General's comment on Laidlaw case, July 1908 and 
HC to Res.Comm., 27/7/08; 879/91 Af.s.no.802, 
DC Lealui on Portuguese-Lunda clash, August 1906. 
Underlining is mine. 
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condition of public feeling in the territory and bearing 
in mind that the objections which might be urged against 
such a proposal in a European community are not appli-
cable with the same force in Rhodesia'. He would, on 
the same grounds, not set a limit to the number of 
lashes to be given to an African who was alleged to 
have committed this offence. At the same time, the 
Resident Commissioner in Salisbury commented with re-
ference to the 'Immorality Suppression Ordinance' and 
the mandatory sentence of five years with hard labour 
in a case where the offence was committed with the white 
woman's consent, that 'the much commoner cases of mis-
conduct between white men and black women ••• have not so 
207 far led to any public demonstration of disapproval'. 
There is evidence to support the view that in 
matters of crime, the assessment of guilt and the dis-
pensing of penalties, northern Zambezia under the B.S.A. 
Company featured a lack of equity and justice so marked 
as to allow the Company's agents to use the lash effect-
ively as an instrument of subjugation. The McGregor 
case which we noted earlier, revealed that 'neither he 
nor Pound tried any native cases at all; every offence 
was punished out of hand, without judicial investigation 
of any kind'. McGregor pleaded that he had acted on 
207. PRO: CO 879/68 Af.S.no.656, F.R. Lewis to Harding 
30/4/00; 879/79 Af.S.no.717, Chamberlain to 
Milner, HC, 8/4/03 and 23/5/03; Res.Comm. to HC, 
13/7/03. 
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'the verbal instructions' of Codrington, the Admin~ra-
tor, given 'in Mr Worthington's presence'. Moreover, 
'he several times maintained that ••• he had only followed 
a local precedence of local standing'. Pound's willing-
ness to give evidence against McGregor has to be noted 
along with Theodore Williams's remarks about Pound's 
reputation for similar brutality a few years later. 
McNamara's case was thus by no means unique. Moreover 
it elicited a comment from Wallace to the High Commi-
ssioner about 'unreliable nAtive evidence•, and from 
Worthington that it was 'expedient to have the power to 
flog (since) the native of this Province is not so ad-
vanced along the road to civilisation that all restraint, 
save that imposed by moral obligation, may be removed'. 
'It is not so much the discomfort of physical pain that 
teaches a native ••• as the sting of ridicule', said 
Worthington, thereby justifying public flogging. In 
addition, he said that 'under the Punishments Regulation 
of 1909 in North-eastern Rhodesia, Mr McNamara's actions 
would have been quite regular•. The case drew a mild 
word of censure from the High Commissioner who had reso-
lutely set his face' against 'the illegal flogging of 
natives•. 208 
208. PRO: eo 879/102, Af.S.no.932, HC to eo, 6/12/09; 
RH:MSS.Af.s.779, Williams's letters of 8/5/13, 
12/6/13; PRO: eo 879/102 as above, Wallace to HC, 
10/11/09, encl. Worthington's comment, and HC to 
Ag.Admin (Wallace), 6/12/09. 
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The fully annotated letter-book of A.C. Ander-
son, D.C. for the Kafue District, covers some years 
from the beginning of 1904 and provides evidence of a 
considerable amount of violence on the part of white men 
in the area. A brawl between a man called Tamba and 
two white men who tried to seize his wives, for instance, 
arose over the question of payment for the women. An 
employee of the Northern Copper Company, nicknamed 
'Kasabwa' the one who traps you like a fishing-net, was 
guilty of 'assault under somewhat aggravated circum-
stances of Chief Sibuluma'. The mines had a very high 
incidence of desertion, as noted by Anderson. The 
District Commissioner was apparently asked and agreed 
to attempt to arrest deserters. However, Anderson ex-
pressed disapproval of the action of T.G. Davey of the 
N.C. Company in flogging a deserter, Mwasikwa, ten times. 
He also drew the attention of the Mine Superintendent 
to the violent behaviour of an employee called Maddock 
who had struck an African interpreter and threatened to 
shoot him dead. Administrative action however was 
itself little less summary as when the A.D.C. Nkala, 
responded to a complaint by Lewanika against the sister 
of Chief Sezongo by raiding her village by night and 
seizing cattle. Anderson supported the A.D.C.'s action 
on the ground that 'the matter is undoubtedly one which 
affects the recognition by the natives of the white 
Government in the country'. Thus he also supported 
the A.D.C.'s apprehension of a headman called Maleka 
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who 'gave a point blank refusal to come to Nkala' in 
response to a summons. Not long afterwards, the man 
sent by the A.D.C. to buy grain in Maleka's area in 
Nkoya country was driven out by the villagers. In the 
Hook region, as in Kasempa and elsewhere, there was 
obvious resentment against the Company's attempts to 
have Lozi indunas interfering in local affairs. Yet 
it appears that, despite his determination to demons-
trate 'the painful consequences of opposition to the 
Government', Anderson intervened from time to time on 
behalf of black men in white employ, as when, in late 
1905, he required G. Osborne, a carpenter at Ninga to 
pay wages wrongfully withheld from 4 'boys•. 209 
The situation in the Kafue district was per-
sistently turbulent, and there is evidence to explain 
why, as we noted earlier, there was grave fear of a 
•native rising' in the area in 1907. Anderson called 
upon a white man called Castens, living at Sitanda, to 
answer the allegation that he had 'wrongfully and un-
lawfully' taken the wife of one Chamrwanda (sic). 
Similarly he warned the N.C. Company's Resident Secre-
tary not to allow a repetition of the brutality by which 
his messengers had seized a suspected thief and 'tied 
209. NAZ: KDC 1/1/1, correspondence of A.C. Anderson, 
1/1/04, 9/1/04, 22/1/04, 7/2/04, 7/4/04, 18/7/04, 
21/7/04, 16/8/04, 21/6/05, 2/10/05. 
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him up with hide in such a manner that he is seriously 
injured, his arms being cut so badly that the boy is 
practically helpless'. But whereas a 'deserter' from 
labour conditions of such rigour was sentenced to 30 
days with hard labour, the perpetrators of such excesses, 
of whom there were many, received no more than a warning. 
Even if convicted, it appears that white men guilty of 
brutal flogging were mildly penalised, despite press 
publicity. The 'Livingstone Mail' thus reported how 
Henry McLuskie caused the death of a carrier in October 
1907, the man being 'tied to a long pole lying against 
the camp fire and badly burned on the abdomen, legs and 
arms. Two days later he died from the effects ••• of his 
burning, flogging and kicking•. 210 
The apparent judicial equity shown, as reported 
by the 'Livingstone Mail', in the imposition of a fine 
of £2 each on a 'white man Davis and native Mwaluka' 
for common assault, obviously penalised the European 
less. But the fundamental inequity of the situation 
was demonstrated more sharply when a sentence of 12 
months with hard labour was given to an African who 
struck back at a white man, Harry Greaves, and shouted 
'Europeans are dogs'; the Magistrate commenting severe*y 
210. See pp. 325 ff. above; NAZ: KDC 1/1/3, corresp-
ondence of A.C. Anderson, 9/1/06, 22/3/06 ref. 
torture of Shipopa, 2/7/06 with warning to Warren 
and Bullen of Sable Antelope Mine: 'Livingstone 
Mail' 12/10/07. 
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'upon the growing insolence observable among natives in 
the township' of Livingstone. Some time later, a 
Magistrate rejected a white man's plea of provocation 
for his assault on one Sitambi and then sentenced him 
to £1 or 14 days', with no mention of hard labour. 
The comment of the 'Livingstone Mail' in mid-1909 on 
'the Law, the White Man and the Native' is noteworthy 
here. There were various approaches, the newspaper 
said, in the southern countries, from 'equality' to 
where the native is only theoretically differentiated 
from a slave'. In North-western Rhodesia, it seemed 
that the 'equality' policy was being followed, 'forced 
on us by the Home Government at the bidding of that 
degenerate and mischief-making section known coloquia-
lly as Exeter Hall, which has adopted the policy of 
altruism and endeavours to fit it, in its entirety, to 
all conditions, countries and races without discrimina-
tion. The havoc in this country', said Moore, 'is 
becoming rapidly apparent. Scarcely a week passes but 
some white man is "run" before a magistrate charged 
with some offence against a native'. Moore must have 
been aware of what was actually happening in the Gwembe, 
Kafue, Kasempa and other districts. Yet he claimed 
that 'the native, secure from personal chastisement or 
pecuniary loss, will speedily realise that he has the 
211 white man at his mercy'. 
211. 'Livingstone Mail', 18/1/08, 10/4/09, 21/1/11, 
24/7/09. 
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There was another case of violence on the part 
of a Company official which drew the attention of the 
higher authorities. R.A. Osborne, Native Commissioner 
at Luwingu in 1910, was found to have flogged a man 
called Jeremani and burned his house. In the opinion 
of the Colonial Office, the reason for requiring Os-
borne's resignation was his 'scandalous behaviour with 
native women'. The attack on Jeremani had taken place 
when the N.C. was 'going in search of a woman called 
Kasonde'. When the Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission 
was at work in 1914, the S.N.A. received reports of 
frequent flogging by Belgian officials, in particular 
'Bwana Polipoli'. That 'hard man' would seize a 
carrier, who put down his load so as to relieve himself 
in the forest, and thrash him severely • In most of 
the cases that were noted in official correspondence, 
the men who resorted to such action involved their 
messengers or askari in what they were doing. The 
numerous testimonies of Zambians which we have noted 
above confirm that the black servants of oppressive white 
men, be they administrativeaficials, traders or pros-
pectors, played an important role in extending and sus-
taining the harsh nature of the regime. 'Everything 
was done through sheer force', as witnesses stated in 
the Isoka district. Presumably, messengers and askari 
were coerced into obedience to such orders because they 
themselves were regularly exposed to the lash. 
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Simon Kapwepwe, one of the early leaders of 
the United National Independence Party, has told how his 
father, the Head Messenger at Isok~was involved in 
carrying out drastic action, on the orders of the Com-
pany's officials, in the collection of tax and the 
rounding up of labour and that there was a period of 
exceptional harshnes.s :_·. between 1911 and the end of 
B.S.A.C. rule. The fact that the lash was used as a 
judicial penalty in so many cases judged by Native 
Commissioners, meant that the noise of the chikoti and 
the cries of those so handled were regular features of 
life around the Bomas throughout the territory. Born a 
'whipping records' state that N.C.'s imposed such pun-
ishment for a wide variety of offences. 'Breach of 
prison regulations', 'contravening sleeping sickness 
rules', 'idleness at work', being 'in possession of 
tobacco', and 'witchcraft', received sentences of 6,10, 
6,12 and 10 lashes respectively, in addition to more 
standard offences like rape (24 lashes), larceny (15), 
arson (10, robbery. with violence (10), and assault 
causing bodily harm (10). 212 
212. PRO: CO 879/104 Af.S.no.948, CO to BSAC on Osborne's 
case, 13/5/10; RI/ e.g. Donald Siwale and others, 
Isunda, Isoka, 20/4/71; NAZ: BS 2/21, admission 
by C.J. Heblethwaite, ANC. Nalolo, of having ad-
ministered 50 lashes to two askari, Kadiwere add 
Matongo, 10/10/08; Simon Kapwepwe, 8/11/69; 
NAZ: e.g. BS 3/74, folios 165 (Mweru-Luapula 1914), 
168 (Batoka 1914), 171 (Luangwa 1914), and folio 
163 (Serenje 1914), 165 (Mweru-Luapula), 171 
(Luangwa), 175 (Ndola), and 181 (Solwezi); and 
see also BS 3/102 (e.g.) for the year 1922. 
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Missionary protests have been noted above about 
various cases of brutality, but not all such comments 
were communicated to the Company's senior administrators. 
In 1899, P.w. Jones of the L.M.S. wrote to his London 
directors to say that he 'could find nothing in the 
Society's regulations' to hinder 'one of their agents 
from taking all precautions to see that justice is ad-
ministered to a teacher in their employ. In a country 
of this description•, he said, 'where so-called magis-
trates can carry out any course which seems to suit 
their nature, it behoves missionaries, the only friend 
the helpless native has, to stand up against cruelty, 
adultery, injustice and murder'. Jones continued thus: 
'Take for instance the following actions of 
these magistrates - (1) In a frenzy caused thro' morphia, 
one takes his fowling piece and shoots down women and 
children while harmlessly dancing. (2) Another one who 
keeps a small harem, sends to a village a man with a 
rope to fetch a native's wife to whom he has taken a 
fancy. If she will come freely, well and good. If 
not the man was to bring her by force. {3) Another 
one contracts syphilis from his native concubine. He 
at last discovers a Native who has in his (the magis-
trate's) absence been lying with this woman. The 
Native, finding he is discovered, runs away. The 
Magistrate sends a squad of soldiers to find the man, 
they in some mysterious manner after taking him prisoner 
shoot him. 
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'These and such like are no uncommon occurrence. 
One of the Magistrates here was imprisoned and did time 
for excessive cruelty to a Native whose wife he (the 
white man) had stolen ••• The B.S.A. judged the case. 
After this man's term of imprisonment was up the B.S.A. 
engaged him as a Sub-Collector. This same official 
marched his soldiers into your village at Kambole, beat 
the headman and, it is reported, burnt some huts down. 
He keeps a large number of women and is habitually cruel 
to the Native. 
'Another Magistrate is a morphia-maniac. 
Another is such a liar, his word is believed by no man, 
he got turned out of the African Lakes Corporation for 
drunkenness. Their cruel, unjust and oppressive 
actions make one's blood boil. With such men acting 
as Magistrates, it is surely one's duty to protect the 
Native as far as one is able ••• To try to protect a 
Native from a white man who had a personal resentment 
against him, is this defiance? To attempt to prevent 
a man who was not in his senses, is this defiance? To 
hinder a Magistrate who knows no language but English, 
and is soaked in morphia and whisky from wrongfully 
condemning a Christian lad, is this defiance? I can 
produce evidence to show that this Magistrate was unfit 
to try any case at that time and can prove to you that 
a case he did try was settled in a most~ameful manner, 
so utterly incompatible with humanity. If it is not 
a missionary's duty to protect the helpless, succour 
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the oppressed and stand up for justice, then I am afraid 
my idea of a Missionary is not a correct one•. 213 
The White Fathers recorded severe flogging of 
villagers by Boma messengers who came in 1904 to the 
KaY:ambi area 'beating, chaining and plundering the 
people'. At Chilubi Mission, Raphael the cook stole 
meat in April 1908 which led to his being roughly 
arrested by askari and sentenced by Frank Melland to 
three months with hard labour. It was a severe penalty, 
said the priests, but 'will be a good and lasting lesson 
for our people'. We noted earlier the White Father's 
recording of a sentence of one year in the chain gang 
upon their cowherd who had stolen £3.8.0. Chain gangs 
operated to a great extent under the whip. Zambian 
Christians who witnessed Company rule in action in their 
home districts have clear memories today of the vulgarity 
that accompanied public floggings. For example, in re-
collecting early officials and their nicknames, William 
Kawandami and Aaron Mwenya of Mbereshi have told how 
Rennie, whom the people called 'Wampanta-Kasokolo', 
thrashed and kicked grown men, while Reardon ('Kantu mwi 
fungu' - the little thing underneath) stripped men naked 
before he beat them in the presence of women and childreg!4 
213. CCWM, C.Africa Reports, Box 1, Jones, Fwambo, 
28/5/99. 
214. WF, Kayambi, 17/7/04; Nyassa Diaries III, Chilubi, 
16/1/08; and seep. 301 above. Also WF, Chilubi, 
6/1/05; RI/Kawandami and Mwenya, Mbereshi, 9/5/73. 
Note: the meaning of Wampanta-Kasokolo was 'You've 
kicked me with the back kick of a cock', i.e. 
as a cock ki~ks up dust. 
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The relentless infliction of punishment was 
aggravated by its indiscriminate application to whole 
communities. We have noted this in our review of 
musonko operations as a regular feature of 'government' 
on both sides of the Zambezi and in Nyasaland. In 
1904, a messenger, sent by Anderson of Kafue to call a 
man to give evidence, was assaulted at Malimbeka. The 
D.C.'s reaction was to march on the village with Lieuts. 
Hamilton and Fowler and a detachment of armed police, 
surround it before dawn, seize the headman and arrest 
suspected ringleaders of local resistance. The Head-
man was not released until 'a fine of 1600 lbs of grain 
was paid by the kraal'. Sixteen years later, this 
procedure was still in use. Some trusses of cloth and 
blankets belonging to the African Lakes Corporation in 
Mansa (Fort Rosebery) were stolen but the culprits were 
not readily found. Invoking the Collective Punishment 
Proclamation 1912, Section 2e, Wallace the Administra-
tor imposed fines on the villages of five chiefs and 
four headmen, the largest fine being £45. This form 
of penalty could close an issue, either by the burning 
of the houses of a community, as in earlier instances, 
or by the receipt at the Boma of the stipulated fine. 
It inevitably failed either to accelerate the tracking 
down of the real culprit or to demonstrate the rationale 
of the conqueror's concept of justice. Equally in-
evitably it created a sense of solidarity among the 
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people concluded together as victims of the rulers' 
wrath. Thus, some months after the Colonial Office 
had assumed the governance of the territory, Chief 
Chizera of the Kasempa District asked why the Boma con-
tinued to commandeer elephant tusks which had tradition-
ally been within the prerogative of chiefs and at the 
same time punished chiefs and headmen for offences 
committed within their communities. 215 
The proximity and power of the administration 
in northern Zambezia had a marked effect on the behaviour 
of some missionaries. We have already looked at some 
aspects of this situation. The problems of setting up 
what were tantamount to small 'theocracies' inevitably 
produced a number of confrontations. Sometimes they 
urged leniency upon local rulers, as when in 1891 Francois 
Coillard was instrumental in having the punishment of a 
thief commuted from death by drowning, as ordered by 
Lewanika, to being suspended on a pole in the middle of 
the village for a full day and night and then 'cut down' 
for 'further punishment in the shape of flogging'. 
Similarly Arthur Baldwin, in his woeful diary of the 
early years of the P.rimitive Methodists among the Lozi 
and the Ila, recorded how he had pled with local elders 
not to use the ordeal of boiling water to reveal the 
215. See pp. 293 ff. et al above; and NAZ: KDC 1/1/2, 
Report on Native Affairs by A.C. Anderson, June 
1904; BS 3/92, Admin. to HC, 27/2/20; KDD 5/1, 
Kasempa Dist. Notebook, report of indaba, October 
1924. 
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guilt of a suspected theif. On various occasions, 
however, Baldwin and his colleague Buckenham, who suffered 
constantly from malaria, resorted to flogging recalci-
trant labourers and house servants. Any reaction from 
a black man which was not acquiescent to his wishes, he 
apparently regarded as 'insolence'. In the north, the 
L.M.S. mission recorded in 1899 that the erection of the 
stone church building at Niamkolo had left 'ineffaceable 
marks' on some of the Fipa labourers who had been 
thrashed by the missionary in charge of the work. The 
Hemans case, which came to a head injured the L.M.S. 
community. Though, after investigation by Or Laws of 
Livingstonia, the charges of brutality were pronounced, 
in effect, 'not proven', one missionary, by way of re-
assurance, stated that 'the Administration allows one 
to flog one's own boys•. 216 
In 1924 a circular was addressed from London 
to all Magistrates, Native Commissioners and Justices 
which said: 'The Secretary of State has stated officia-
lly that he considers that the number of cases of cor-
poral punishment in Northern Rhodesia is unduly large 
as compared with the figures given in the returns of 
216. See pp. 194 ff. above; and MMS diary of Arthur 
Baldwin, 23/10/91, 9/9/94, 22/5/95, 10/9/95; 
CCWM, Central Africa, Box 8, May (Secretary) to 
London, 7/12/99, Ernest Clark, Niamkolo, ref. the 
Hemans, Box 13, letter from Or Laws to London Secy., 
LMS, 29/5/05; and Wareham, Kawimbe, quoting comment 
presumably made by Rev. H. Johnson,/tja(o$'. 
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of other African dependencies'. The Colonial Secretary 
obviously did not have access to statistics of flogging 
other than those submitted officially by Native Commi-
ssioners themselves. The actual situation in the terri-
tory was perhaps therefore more accurately indicated 
by a Confidential Circular by the Northern Rhodesia Law 
Department, issued two years later, which stated that 
there had been 'a marked increase in the number of cases 
in which corporal punishment had been inflicted•. 217 
Though the conquest had been effected quarter of a 
century earlier, northern Zambezia was still restive 
under a harsh regime, and it seems not improper to 
suggest that in a situation in which the gun and the 
whip, the rigours of musonko and the unremitting demands 
of chibalo agents continued to afflict the country, the 
people's non-cooperation was a distinct token of their 
wellnigh universal hostility to the rule imposed upon 
them in the interests of the B.S.A. Company's grand plan 
of exploitation. 
217. NAZ: P 3/14/1, correspondence between Governor 
and Judges, 1926-31, incl. Colonial Office Circular 
no. 6 of 1924. Underlining is mine. 
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(e) The Seizure of the Soil 
When we come to consider the objectives and 
actions of the British South Africa Company in respect 
of the use of the land within the huge area of northern 
Zambezia, we are again reminded of what was the actual 
position south of the river. It is important at the 
outset also to realise that the provision for 'Native 
Reserves' did not in any sense recognise the legitimacy 
of African land ownership; for, as was stated in the 
formal promulgation of 'Native Regulations' for Southern 
Rhodesia in 1898: '"Reserve" means land, the property 
of the British South Africa Company ••• set apart for the 
purposes of native settlements'. The Regulations then 
stated that the Company would 'retain the mineral rights 
in all land assigned to natives'. 'Matabili' Thompson, 
to whom we referred earlier, told the Colonial Office 
in 1914 that, as the man who had actually negotiated 
what was called the Rudd Concession with Lobengula of 
the Ndebele, he could vouch for the fact, which Maguire 
had personally endorsed in writing, that under the 
Concession they had 'claimed no land whatever•. It was 
Rhodes who had chosen to assume ownership of the land 
and who did not want the matter raised with Her Majesty's 
Government. The situation was explained to the Com-
pany's shareholders in 1895 so that they could be re-
assured that there would be no legal impediment to the 
Company's exploitation of mineral resources wherever 
they might be located. 'The Land Commission ••• may order 
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the natives to remove from such land'. Misgivings 
about injustice were then set at rest by the assurance 
that the B.S.A.C. Land Commissioners would then 'assign 
to them just and liberal compensation in land elsewhere'. 
When the 'Rhodesian Dilemma' was discussed in communi-
cations of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society with the Colonial Office in the post-1918 
period, the Society pointed out that the 1894 Order in 
Council had 'regularised the dispossession by providing 
for Native Reserves. But it nowhere gives security'. 
Based on 'a so-called land concession and arising from 
a military operation due to the alleged attack upon the 
Agents of the Company by the Matabele', a situation had 
been created whereby 'the entire Native community of 
Southern Rhodesia has been deprived of all land ownership 
rights'. The Society's statement, prompted by a pro-
posal to evict well over 100,000 Africans from their 
homes, was supported by a letter to the Prime Minister 
from the Free Churches of England which said: 'Not a 
single native owns either individually or collectively, 
a foot of land in the country'. The 'Westminster 
Gazette' underlined this comment by pointing out that 
the Rudd Concession was 'now authoritatively adjudged 
by the Judicial Committee to have been a worthless 
document'. The dispossession of the people for the 
benefit of the new owners was, moreover, accompanied by 
'rampant ••• fraud, disease and oppression' as the Com-
pany's agents ensured that Africans should not 'become 
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units in the march of progress'; and the Rev. John 
Harris of Bulawayo told the Anti-Slavery Society, 'I 
have not seen a single native shop, not a single native 
trader, not a single native owning a yard of his own 
218 country'. 
In Bechuanaland in 1899 the people of Molepolole 
uttered a plea against the Riesle-Nichols Concession. 
'We did not know what he (Riesle) was speaking about 
with our Chief Sechele ••• we heard that he had some money 
••• with which he wanted to lease ground ••• the little 
birds told us this ••• we protested before our Chief 
Sechele ••• (who) agreed, so money sent back but Riesle 
wouldn't take it ••• we cannot live without the ground'. 
But the acquisitiomby Rhodes's men were now being made 
fast. Meanwhile in the British Central Africa Protect-
orate, the dispossession of the local communities was 
validated by Harry Johnston in 1898 in these words: 
'As land was of little value before the establishment 
of the Administration and as undoubtedly settlers had 
218. BM/SP, 1899, LXIII (C.9138), Proclamation dated 
25/11/98, Part I, pp. 16 ff. and Part v, p. 15; 
see p.~35 above for 'Matabili' Thompson and PRO: 
CO 417/557, Thompson's letter of 14/3/14; RH:MSS. 
Afr.s.72, BSAC Reports to Shareholders, 4th Annual 
Meeting, p. 42, Part IV, Land Commission, Item 51; 
SRO: GQ 40 - 17/21, p. 455, A-S and A.P. Socy., 
memo 1919(?); PRO: eo 417/656, 'Westminster 
Gazette', 21/1/20, quoting Free Churches' memo; 
RH:MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22 (G159), Harris to Sir Fowell 
Buxton, A-S. Secy., n.d., and PLG: BSA 7/231-2, 
A-S. Socy. to Gell and P. Inskipp to Gell, 9/5/19. 
Underlinings are mine. 
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conferred great benefits on the country by clearing and 
planting, land was not rated at a high value. Three 
pence an acre was the maximum ••• Sometimes the value was 
computed at ••• a halfpenny an acre'. A settler in Nyasa-
land could thus buy 6,000 acres for between £12.10/-
and £75. What actually happened in the British Central 
Africa Protectorate was in fact very different from the 
picture of equity and 'the inalienable occupancy of their 
villages and plantations' by 'the indigenous people, which 
Johnston described in 1898. Before the Livingstonia 
Mission established its training institution at Khondowe 
in the Rumphi District of Malawi in 1894, Alfred Sharpe 
reported to the Colonial Office that the B.S.A. Company 
'owned' approximately '2,767,900 acres' of northern Nyasa-
land and also possessed 'mineral rights over very large 
areas in various districts'. It is right, therefore, 
to assume that the Company did not have a different for-
mula for its dealings with the region now called Zambia. 
It is also very important to remember that the word 'con-
cession' was wholly inappropriate as a description of the 
method by which the B.S.A.C. acquired land, as we saw in 
our review of the 'treaties' related to northern Zambezi~;9 
219. PRO: CO 879/57 Af.s.no. 574, text of Bakwena pe-
tition, Molepolole, Jan. 1899; Johnston 'Brit. 
Central Africa', op.cit., p. 113, and MS Report 
Vol. II, pp. 172-8, Johnston's Memo to FO, 14/10/93; 
PRO: CO 879/101, Af.S.no. 929, ('Native and Coloured 
Races'), memo by Sharpe (n.d.), in confidential 
papers on 'Concessions in British East Africa and 
Nyasaland' ; and see pp 68 ff. above. 
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Here then was another situation in which the 
British Government chose to practise laissez faire, 
as shown in the Colonial Office's summary in 1913 of 
the B.S.A. Company's title to land. Though it was 'not 
necessary nor desirable to go into this extremely compli-
cated question', Whitehall noted that when the Company's 
Directors visited Central Africa in 1907 'their rights 
were openly challenged' by people like Leopold Moore. 
But 'Mr Hawksley asserted that the Company "claimed to 
be owners of the land: they had got their concessions 
plus conquest plus occupation"'• Five years after the 
Berlin Conference and in the year of the Anglo-German 
agreement and of the Lochner Concession, a report on 
rumoured German probings towards the Zambezi from South-
West Africa used these words: 'I mistrust these people 
when the land hunger is on them'. The 'scramble for 
Africa' has to be understood as the devouring of the 
then 'unoccupied' parts of the continent by voracious 
appetites of which the B.S.A. Company's was among the 
keenest. 220 
The land situation in northern Zambezia was 
distinguished throughou~ from the time of the initial 
conquests to the transfer of power in 1924, by the fact 
that any land which a 'native' used must ultimately be 
220. PRO: eo 417/536, eo memo on BSAC land title, 
28/7/13; and RH:MSS.Afr.s.228, Rhodes's Papers 
2A - Res. Magis. Walfish Bay to SNA, Cape Town, 
23/7/90. Underlinings are mine. 
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land 'assigned' to him. The 1924 Order-in-Council made 
this explicit and thus echoed the North-eastern Rhodesia 
Order-in-Council of 1900 and the Northern Rhodesia 
Order-in-Council of 1911, which had both declared: 
'The Company shall from time to time assign to natives 
inhabiting North-Eastern Rhodesia land sufficient for 
their occupation'. By this formula, the right to lease 
land was acquired by the B.S.A.C. and everyone living 
in the territory was thenceforth at best a tenant of 
the Company. Roy Welensky's statement, just before 
the imposition of Federation in 1953, that Africans in 
Northern Rhodesia were fortunate because '90% of the 
land is set aside for them', obscured the fundamental 
difference between the security of ownership and occu-
pancy on sufferance, subject at any time to eviction 
in the interests of powerful foreign speculators. 
Welensky was then arguing that the only racial discri-
mination that existed in the Protectorate was in 'the 
African's' favour. The chronicle of the B.S.A. Corn-
pany's exploits in both Rhodesias and of the drive for 
the amalgamation and, later, the federation of the 
territories in the middle decades of the century cannot, 
it is suggested, be understood without a grasp of the 
pivotal issue of ownership of the land. 221 
221. MSA Files: NR Order-in-Council, 20/2/24, p. 161 -
43(1), and NER Order-in-Council, 1900, Part V, 
Section 40; NN. 2/3/53 reporting Welensky's 
remarks; and see Gray R. 'The Two Nations' 
(Oxford, 1960), esp. pp. 40-42. 
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From the beginning of the British thrust across 
the Zambezi, it was clear that its protagonists knew 
the importance of the land and would not be content 
with half measures. Despite the repeated affirmations 
of Johnston that the assignment of land and other natural 
resources would be made only within the terms of the 
Berlin Conference's prohibition of monopolies, he was 
determined not to allow a lot of independent land-owners 
to parcel out the territory. Rhodes's Company's claim 
to own the land was in keeping with this approach. Thus 
a pro forma 'Condition of Grant North of the Zambesi', 
of mid-1902, stated that pegging and setting of beacons 
was to be done as in Southern Rhodesia, with 50% of in-
terest to the British South Africa Company. Full dis-
cretion over land was with the Administrator and no 
reference whatever was made to African 'land rights'. 
In the controversy concerning the L.M.S. claim, voiced 
by Alfred Swann, to ownership of land in the Lungu king-
dom, which we noted earlier, the important point is 
that, by the action of Johnston and Sharpe in 1904, the 
Lungu chiefs were completely ignored. Nor was there 
any reference to 'treaties' with the Lungu. By 1902, 
the Collector at Ikawa had supervised the grant of land 
to five settlers on the Tanganyika plateau, on the 
following terms: •{a) free of purchase price, at per 
annum quit rent of £300'; (b) free carriage of tf tons 
of equipment on Lake Nyasa and then by porter 'free of 
charge, thirty natives for a period of one month'; 
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(c) seeds of wheat, rye, oats, barley and maize to be 
•supplied in a reasonable quantity to each settler for 
the first year'; and (d) 30 head of cattle on loan to 
each settler for a five-year period. A further plan 
for the settlement of white farmers in the Saisi valley, 
presumably in the western part of the Mambwe country, 
was also launched in the same year. 222 
The Company's ownership of the land was still, 
however, not recognised by the British Government, and 
so L.A. Wallace, as Chief Surveyor, sent a memorandum 
for transmission to the Company's London Secretary in 
1903. In it he claimed that all unalienated land was 
•vested' in the Company which therefore would 'draw all 
revenues of quit-rents, etc•. He then went on to 
argue thus: 'Any scheme of purchase of land from Native 
Chiefs by the Company appears impracticable. The area 
is so vast ••• Take it at 145,000 square miles or 93,000,000 
acres and the purchase price at a fd per acre, and less 
in these days could hardly be offered, and it comes to 
nearly £100,000'. In so arguing, Wallace had before 
him Government Notice no. 10 issued by Codrington from 
Fort Jameson in 1900, entitled 'Lands and Deeds Registry 
Regulations'. The Notice had clearly implied that the 
primary concern of the Administration was to regulate 
222. See p. 49 and p. 206 above; NAZ: BS 1/24, 
folio 64, Pro Forma 'Condition', with accompany-
ing letter, dated 28/7/02, to Matabele Gold Reefs 
and Estates Co., BS 1/52-55, folio 1 ff., corre-
spondence from Fife (Ikawa), 21/8/02 and letter 
of R. Chiappini, Cheresia, NER, 15/7/02. 
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land assignments to white men whereafter 'All land set 
apart or required for the settlement of natives shall, 
when circumstances so require and permit, be surveyed 
and demarcated'. The Notice made no reference to the 
land rights of local communities or individuals. The 
Company was obviously acting decisively in the territory 
while still obliged to answer the misgivings of the 
Colonial Ofiice as transmitted by the B.S.A.C. office in 
London. It is notable that the twin arguments, of the 
impracticability of buying lands from local rulers and 
the large sum that such purchase might require, were 
223 deemed adequate to convince H.M.G. 
We have already examined the so-called 'treaties' 
which the Company used to give legitimacy to the British 
annexation of northern Zambezia. Now, as we consider 
the actualities of the B.S.A.C.'s conduct in relation 
to local communities in respect of the land, it should 
suffice to note that, on the one hand, the British 
Government continued to have misgivings throughout and 
beyond the period under review here; for instance, the 
Pim Commission of 1938 held that, under Johnston's 
Certificates of Claim of 1893, the chiefs with whom 
•treaties' and 'concessions' were allegedly signed were 
'the sole and only rightful owners of the land in 
question'. On the other hand, the situation had so 
223. MSA Report, Vol. II, pp. 211-2, Admin. to BSAC, 
London, 21/1/03, and pp. 183-192, Government 
Notice no. 10, 1/12/00. 
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developed and hardened by 1930, when the Labour Colonial 
Secretary, Lord Passfield, turned his attention to Cen-
tral Africa, that his implied censures upon the terri-
tory's segregationist and exploitative practices greatly 
angered the articulate section of the white community 
and made them look south, even more than before, for 
support. Passfield's disquiet was no doubt increased 
by the fact that the 1928 Order-in-Council, dealing with 
Crown ~ands and Native Reserves, had taken the land 
policies of the B.S.A. Company a stage further and given 
settlers reason to insist that Crown Lands were exclu-
sively for their use. For indeed that Order-in-Council 
had excluded only the 'Barotse Reserve' from the control 
of the Colonial Government which of course had ultimate 
control over all other 'lands set apart for the exclusive 
use of the natives•. 224 
On the issue of 'Crown Land' a warning had 
been sounded as early as 1892 by the Scots Mission in 
224. See Chap. III above, and MS Report Vols. I and II; 
'Report of the Commission to Enquire into the 
Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rho-
desia' -the Pim Report- (Colonial no. 145); 
Gray, op.cit., as in footnote 221; NAZ: ZA 
1/15/N/2, text of Order-in-Council, 1928. 
Note: the exact meaning of the term 'Crown Land' 
appears to have been far from clear in the be-
ginning, but in 1901 the Colonial Office accepted 
a definition which radically altered the earlier 
view that 'ownership of the soil in the Protecto-
rate does not vest in the Crown' (PRO: CO 879/76 
Af.s.no.694, CO to FO, 19/12/01}. 
Blantyre. 
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'On behalf of whom is it claimed?' asked 
'Life and Work'. 'We are forced to ask whether the 
"Crown" may not be a covering, not for Her Najesty, but 
for some less unselfish power ••• whether in this neigh-
bourhood "Crown" spells "Company"! In his Part I, 
entitled 'Averted Eyes 1918-1939', Gray devotes a chapter 
to 'Land Policy' in which he says that, a decade or so 
after the end of direct B.S.A. Company rule, 'the land 
of Northern Rhodesia might be thought of under the three 
heads- African, European and Crown'. 71,000,000 acres 
would then be listed as African, while European land 
accounted for 9,000,000 and Crown Land for over 11,000,000 
acres. 'African land' was either 'Native Reserves' 
or 'Native Trust Land', that is, land 'vested in the 
Secretary of State "to be administered and controlled 
for the use of common benefit, direct or indirect, of 
the natives of the Protectorate"'· Our submission here 
is that in our period and beyond, indeed until Zambia's 
attainment of Independence in 1964, the position was 
that the local communities lived on the soil and tilled 
it only insofar as it was 'assigned' to them by their 
foreign conquerors and rulers. This is why, with reason, 
Chief Kafwimbi of the Iwa in Isoka and his councillors 
were solidly opposed to the possibility of uranium 
mining in their area. 'Whenever wealth is found under 
our soil, the white men come and take everything from us' 
was the gist of their objection. This view was expressed 
not long before the imposition of the Central African 
SOS. 
Federation and revealed what was not realised by many 
Government officials, namely that the local people were 
well aware of the history not only of their land but of 
Southern Rhodesia as well, where, as early as 1903, 
'Native Reserves' were being reduced to provide land for 
white farmers. The memory was fresh there as elsewhere 
of the methods by which white property had been acquired 
in the territory. As Headman Sumbi recalled of the 
arrival of a settler as Nsunzu in his area: 'It was by 
force that he took the land. He actually closed the 
bridge we used to cross when going to Mbala and even 
shot at anyone who trespassed through his land ••• The 
people living on that land were his, they began to work 
for him ••• Whenever he had some work to be done, he would 
summon them ••• they were each paid 5/- until they finished 
cultivating all the farm. 
herdsmen•. 225 
Others were employed as 
It is proposed now to review certain aspects 
of the land situation chronologically. In 1904, as we 
noted elsewhere, the Administrator of North-western 
Rhodesia refused to give a percentage of land sales to 
King Lewanika on the ground that the Lozi were not 
225. • Life and vJork •, Oct. 1892; Gray, op. ci t., pp. 
85 and 79, citing the definition of 'Native Trust 
Land' in the Nyasaland Protectorate Order-in-
Council of 1936; statement made to me by Kafwimbi 
in 1951; RI/Headman Sumbi, near Kayambi Mission, 
31/5/72, with ref. to Smith of Nsunzu; and see 
PRO: CO 879/79 Af.S.no.717, pp. 168-9, on excision 
of land from SR 'Reserves', Dec. 1902. 
506. 
contributing to the cost of administration. Coryndon 
was meanwhile emphasising his power to issue land to 
anyone whom he deemed 'a good and bona fide farmer or 
settler'. In the eastern region around Chipata, farmers 
had started to occupy land allotted to them. 'As their 
cattle increase, their land requirements increase'. 
But, said the Land Commissioner, 'the natives also might 
increase in numbers', therefore it was 'evident that the 
farmer would be crowded out or else that the natives 
must be reduced in numbers ••• The latter', he said, 'is 
preferable for every reason of policy and no injustice 
will be done'. It was necessary now to start moving 
villages out of land required by settlers, giving them 
a month's notice to quit and allowing them to reap their 
crops. 'They should be compensated for their old huts 
••• not more than three shillings a hut and less if the 
hut abandoned were old and should be allowed free wood 
in the reserve for the new hut'. The inference again 
was that the people had no riqht to use wood in the 
forest but should be given a special grant to do so as 
a quid pro guo for their eviction. Those who did not 
move would automatically become tenants of the settler, 
who would have power to allocate sites for their houses 
and receive their labour for sixty days or so. Thus a 
situation was fast developing closely akin to what con-
cerned the Nyasaland judge who commented on 'a growing 
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tendency' there to treat the African individual as 'an 
unfree villein or scriptus qlebae•. 226 
To counter the Colonial Office's concern about 
the infringement of 'native lands, villages, cattle 
posts, gardens and fountains' by European settlements 
in North-western Rhodesia, the High Commissioner sent 
to the Colonial Secretary, Lyttelton, in mid-1905 a Corn-
pany leaflet on the subject. 'It appears to me', he 
said, 'that the interests of natives will be sufficiently 
safeguarded'. The legality of the B.S.A. Company's 
land operations was, however, questioned, early in that 
year by Rangeley, Magistrate in the North-west, who de-
clared that any selling of land by the Company could 
only be done as 'Agents of Lewanika, and the purchase 
money becomes his'. Coryndon countered this by the 
view that 'the only course' was 'to claim confidently' 
that the clause in the 1900 Concession which allowed 
for the issue of land by the Company implied the right 
to sell and keep the proceeds, and that 'the word 
"trading" is to be interpreted in a liberal manner'. 
By 1907 the movement of settlers into the area in and 
around the Lozi domain was obviously increasing but 
there, as in the east, the discussion about compensation 
226. Seep. 342above; PRO: CO 879/84 Afr.S.no.746, 
Coryndon to Lewanika, 19/8/04; Maugham Report, 
op.cit., Appendix Item 43, Land Commissioner, East 
Luangwa, Leicester Beaufort, 29/2/04; Shepperson 
and Price, op.cit., pp. 143-4, citing judgment of 
Mr Justice Nunan, April 1903. 
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was concerned not with the recompensing of African 
communities for the loss of land, but only for their 
'huts' and in a few cases their fields. Thus the sums 
involved were small, such as '£5 to Malimbo and 30/-
to Mukangando', village headmen, by a Mr Riddell for 
his farm on the Chilala stream in the Magoye district. 
The 50,000 acre estate acquired by George Horton near 
Kalomo cost him, on paper £120 in compensation to the 
inhabitants of five large villages, equivalent to a 
year's musonko for only 240 people. In the case of 
Major Gibbon's huge farm of over 60,000 acres, the 
bitter complaints of six headmen about his appropriation 
of the peoples' 'wells, fields and houses' were voiced 
on their behalf by Father Torrend of Kasisi Jesuit 
Mi . 227 ss~on. 
The High Commissioner was probably right when 
he told the Colonial Secretary in 1907 that 'the position 
north of the Zambesi differs from the south in only two 
ways: (1) no active steps yet to set up Native Reserves, 
and (2) the special position of Lewanika'. It was the 
227. PRO: CO 879/86 Afr.S.no.763, CO to HC, 7/1/05 and 
HC to CO, 3/7/05; PLG: BSA 9/119, Rangeley's 
judgment and Coryndon's comment, 18/2/05; NAZ: 
BS 2/197, sundry items under 'land grants to 
settlers', e.g. R.J. Hughes, Collector, Magoye, 
on compensation by Riddell, 10/2/08, G.T. Horton 
to SNA, 26/6/08, Torrend on behalf of Chasha, 
Kacha, Kasonkomona, Chikanjira, Chipyayira and 
Mushara-amuno villages to Admin. 13/10/08. 
509. 
latter feature which specially drew the attention of the 
Colonial Office, to the exclusion indeed of many other 
serious issues in the rest of northern Zambezia. The 
position in North-western Rhodesia was aggravated also 
by the proximity to the line of rail of the territory 
of peoples whom Lewanika claimed as tributaries. The 
High Commissioner then proposed that part of the region 
should be declared 'native territory' and that this 
might include the Barotse valley since it was 'of little 
commercial value'. The B.S.A.C. Directors were insis-
tent that the 1900 Concession gave the Company the right 
to appropriate the proceeds of land sales in 'Barotse-
land - North-western Rhodesia' and informed the Colonial 
Office that they would apply such amounts to their admini-
strative expenses, including the reduction of the accumu-
lated administrative deficit. This concession could 
well be understood as a quid pro quo, by way of ensuring 
the British Government's de ·facto recognition of the 
Company's claim to own the land and appropriate the 
proceeds of all land sales. Moreover, they added that 
5% of such revenue would be employed annually 'for the 
benefit of the natives'. On his side, while more and 
more traders and prospectors moved up and down in his 
territory, Lewanika was increasingly willing to agree 
to the Company selling land in the Toka and Ila countries 
h "t h . 1 228 over which he still claimed aut or~ y, owever nom1na • 
228. PRO: eo 879/95 Af.S.no.872, HC to eo, 17/6/07; 
NAZ: BS 2/250, BSAC Secy., {D.E. Brodie), London, 
to CO, 25/5/08; and BS 2/267 Res.Comm,,Salisbury, 
to HC, Gladstone, ref. Lewanika's attitude to land 
sales, 5/12/10. 
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Whereas the High Commissioner was probably 
anxious to limit the area of Britain's involvement in 
embarrassing situations created by B.S.A.C. exploits, 
~ 
the Company itself was of a different outlook, as it 
looked to the unfolding of its programme. Thus in 1906, 
when the extension of the railway was faced with a signi-
ficant working deficit, Philip Gell, a leading Director, 
offered this suggestion: 'There does not seem to be 
much hope for a Railway traffic out of exported maize 
unless we deliberately fall back on the native cult~ 
vator, choosing districts out of reach of the Salis-
bury and Bulawayo markets. We could do this by giving 
natives Railway land to cultivate ••• on condition that 
they retained a fixed amount of the crop and delivered 
the surplus to the Railway Company at a fixed price ••• 
In this way, the Railway would ensure an output alloca-
ted from the first to export ••• not competing with farmers 
in their home market ••• and yet creating the nucleus of 
an export trade to which the white surplus would be 
welcomed'. However, the idea worried William Milton 
in Salisbury. The scheme, he believed, would be 
'agriculturally difficult and governmentally dangerous' 
as it would 'provide natives with a good living' and thus 
impede the development of industry. 'If the bulk of 
the native population became peasant farmers having 
facilities provided for disposing of their produce at, 
to them, very remunerative prices, and thus providing 
for their very modest wants, the labour-using industries 
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must suffer in proportion•. As one of the Company's 
most influential policy makers in the field, Milton's 
next remark was significant: 'While to a government 
that had to look mainly to the interests of the native, 
this might not be of paramount importance, it cannot 
be disregarded by one whose primary object, in the in-
terests of the whole of South Africa, is to promote and 
foster the settlement of Europeans upon the land'. 
Thus cautionary advice that Gell was given at that time 
was put aside, namely the warning that the Company should 
endeavour to improve the general conditions, welfare 
and industry of the African people 'to avoid the Nabob's 
difficulty of controlling such a large hostile native 
1 t . ' 229 popu a ~on • 
Yet it is noteworthy that the Company still 
felt obliged to rationalise its policies on moral grounds. 
For example, Milton's last word on the railway maize 
scheme was that 'it would not be altogether in the in-
terests of the natives to encourage them to devote 
themselves entirely to agriculture' - which was not 
Gell's proposal - 'and thus become unqualified for other 
forms of work'. In view of the consistent policy of 
preventing Africans from learning skills whereby they 
might compete with the white men, this argument appears 
229. PLG: BSA 5/355, Gell to Inskipp, 10/6/06, 5/365, 
Milton to BSAC, London, 26/8/08, and 3/229, Win-
chester to Gell, 12/9/08. Underlinings are mine. 
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specious. The last sentence, however, was even more 
illogical: 'The suggestion that Native Commissioners 
should purchase grain from natives for export should not 
for a moment be entertained. It would be far more 
objectionable than the recruiting of natives for work on 
the mines and farms which is forbidden by the Imperial 
Government'. Gell's response to this was a mild one. 
He appreciated that white farmers, 'accustomed to secure 
10/- to 15/- a bag' would not favour extending culti-
vation 'to bring down the price', and that 'it would 
be unfortunate if the policy of Rhodesian farmers were 
broken down by stimulating uncontrolled native compe-
tition'. The safeguards he had had in mind for his 
scheme were that the Railway Company would allot the 
land, control the planting, fix the price, handle the 
export of the maize and 'get all the profits' without 
.ddl 230 m~ emen. 
Over the same period, the Company was in corres-
pondence with the Colonial Office about the matter of 
legislation regarding mining in northern Zambezia. 
The attitude of the men in the field had been adumbra-
ted in 1903 in a memorandum from the Administrator of 
North-eastern Rhodesia. In it, he referred to the map 
which was in use to illustrate the scope of Johnston's 
Certificate of Claim, and noted the consequences of 
230. Ibid: 5/365, Milton to BSAC, 26/8/08; 5/366, 
Gell's reply, 4/9/08. 
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Johnston's emendation of the original 'treaties' whereby 
a royalty of 1% should be paid to the chiefs concerned 
in respect of almost the whole of the region (areas 4, 
41 and 5), excluding only the strip on the Tanganyika 
border originally claimed by the African Lakes Company 
(areas 1, 2 and 3). Now, thirteen years after the pro-
duction of the 'treaties', the Administrator observed 
that no action had been taken on Johnston's ruling as 
no mining had yet started. 'It would be difficult in 
these days', he added, 'to determine to whom such royal-
ties should be paid and with shorn agreements to compound 
should be made, and certainly no idea that any such 
payment is due to them exists in the minds of any of 
the native chiefs'. In the meantime, the boundary of 
North-western Rhodesia was adjusted in 1905, so that 
Broken Hill (Kabwe) with its lead and ainc mines fell 
within what the Company claimed was territory covered 
by the Lewanika Concession. In 1906 the Company raised 
the matter with Whitehall and expanded the argument thus: 
'The collection of such a royalty would give rise to 
much dissatisfaction' - to whom? - 'and be incompatible 
with the general commercial principles upon which ••• the 
Company desires to proceed in the development of its 
mineral rights'. Moreover, the Board had 'been in-
formed that there would be considerable difficulty in 
tracing the representatives of the chiefs to whom pay-
ments would be due and in ascertaining their rights'. 
If the chiefs of the region had been generally deposed 
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and replaced by B.S.A.C. appointees, as was done in the 
Ndebele and Shona areas after the 1896-7 war, there might 
have been a germ of truth in this statement. In the 
situation of northern Zambezia, to suggest that the 
people would not know who had been their rulers sixteen 
years earlier merely revealed the Company's confidence 
in its ability to persuade the British Government to 
give legitimacy to its conquest. 
The Company, however, added two further con-
siderations: firstly, that 'the payment of large sums 
of cash to individual natives - as has been pointed out 
in connection with the hut tax in North-western Rhodesia -
is a most undesirable practice'. Secondly, and in 
direct contradiction of Johnston's Certificate of Claim, 
'it is open to question if any individual as distinct 
from tribal ownership ever existed and it is therefore 
the more appropriate that any monies derived from this 
source should be applied to the general benefit of the 
natives concerned'. But our review of the Company's 
expenditure throughout our period makes it clear that no 
funds were allocated to any social welfare or educational 
projects, other than the Barotse Fund which, as we saw, 
existed only because the Company was obliged to allow a 
% of tax revenue to be paid to King Lewanika. The 
B.S.A.C. then proposed 'commuting' the royalty in the 
districts covered by the Certificate of Claim by offering 
•a half share of the claim rents which will be payable 
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when mining properties are worked for a profit'. 2 31 
Nearly a year later, the Colonial Office replied, indi-
eating continued misgiving. The Company then, in mid-
1908, declared emphatically that the British Government 
had already approved the 'concessions' and recognised 
the Company's inalienable 'rights' to all minerals 
without royalty. Furthermore, the Company intended to 
keep its commercial undertakings wholly separate from 
its administrative revenue and expenditure. 232 
Some months later, the significant triumph of 
the Company's argument was confirmed when the Foreign 
Office urged the Colonial Office that the 'exclusive 
mining rights' of the Company in N.E. Rhodesia could be 
paralleled by 'similar claims ••• made by other Powers 
in regard to their territories within the zone• of the 
Congo Basin as defined by the Berlin Conference. It 
was not possible for 'H.M.G •••• to question the exclusive 
mining rights enjoyed by the Union Miniere' in the Congo, 
for instance, and so no other power could interfere in 
231. See Map, Appendix B., and Chap. III above; MS 
Report Vol. II, p. 212, Admin. to BSAC, London, 
21/1/03; 'British South Africa Company's Claim to 
Mineral Royalties in Northern Rhodesia' (Govt. 
Printer, Lusaka), p. 20; PRO: CO 879/91, Af.S.no. 
802, D.E. Brodie, BSAC Secy., to CO, 18/5/06, 
and also MS Report Vol. II, pp. 205-7, Wallace, 
memo on BSAC Land Titles, 21/10/05. Underlinings 
are mine. 
232. PRO: CO 879/95 Af.S.no.872, CO to BSAC, 6/4/07; 
879/98 Af.S.no.899, BSAC to CO, 22/7/08. 
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what the B.S.A. Company was doing. Thus reassured, on 
ground relating to European international relations and 
~ to just dealings with the rulers and peoples of 
northern Zambezia, the Colonial Office withdrew its obj-
ections. The High Commissioner then stated empahtically 
that no royalty payments would be made to chiefs. •All 
that appears to be necessary in the interests of natives', 
he wrote, 'is to embody ••• reservations', unspecified in 
the correspondence, which the Colonial Office had sugges-
ted and which the Company had accepted. As late as 
1927, the disquiet over this issue continued to smoulder, 
however, and so the S.N.A. stated that it was doubtful 
if any chief, then incumbent, could be described as 'the 
chief recognised by Her Brittanic Majesty as the para-
mount chief over such country, "as the Attorney-General 
has suggested"'• 'Neither they nor their successors 
would therefore be entitled to any royalty, except 
possibly Kazembe'. Moreover, no chief had 'ever expre-
ssed any desire that the alleged right to royalties 
should be recognised, nor', said the S.N.A., 'do I be-
lieve that any attempt was made ••• to get their consent 
to any commutation of those rights'. Indeed, 'they 
would be very much surprised to hear that any such right 
existect•. 233 
233. Ibid: 879/102 Af.S.no.932, FO to eo, 16/3/09, and 
eo to BSAC, 27/3/09, and HC to eo, 8/4/09; MS Re-
port Vol. II, pp. 274-7, CO to BSAC, 26/1/11 and 
MS Files, SNA (E.G.B. Taggart) to CS, Livingstone, 
15/10/27. Underlining is mine. 
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The Company was at this period pressing for 
the amalgamation of North-western and North-eastern 
Rhodesia, meeting the misgivings of the Colonial Office 
by proposing 'one Administration with one Administrator ••• 
but under two separate Orders-in-Council'. To Lewanika, 
however, the High Commissioner, Selborne, said that the 
Company had no influence in the matters of Government, 
being merely 'the King's subjects (who) can only act in 
such matters of state as the King gives them leave'. 
The role of the Company as instrument of the British 
King's will, interpreted by His High Commissioner, had 
been granted to it 'because He thinks well of the work 
which the British South Africa Company has done, ••• and 
because He thinks it deserves His confidence and yours 
and that of your people'. The Order-in-Council was 
therefore 'in no sense ••• a document emanating from the 
Board' .of the Company. As we have noted, the special 
position of Lewanika, rather indeed than of the Lozi 
Kingdom, continued unresolved throughout our period. 
But it is important to note two facts. Firstly, in 
1909, the Administrator acknowledged that 'Lewanika and 
his Council have made up their minds for some time that 
••• they exercise no control, almost no influence, out-
side the Barotse Valley'. Secondly, however, the 
Company in 1920 reasserted its claim to 'have full 
rights to land as well as minerals, outside the Barotse 
Reserve, in Lewanika's territories, that is to say, in 
North-western Rhodesia as it existed immediately before 
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the Order-in-Council of 1911' - amalgamating N.E.R. and 
N.W.R. - 'this being the territory covered by the Con-
cession of 1909 and being the territory within which 
10% of Native Tax is paid into the Barotse Trust Fund 
for the benefit of the Barotse•. 234 
The Administrator's statement in 1909, just 
quoted, was made three months after the Company had ex-
tracted from Lewanika an Agreement whereby, in return 
for the recognition of his authority over the area be-
tween the Zambezi's west bank and the Angola border -
as defined by the Arbitration of King Victor Emmanuel 
of Italy in 1905, the King agreed to give the Company 
'for its use - or to dispose of as it thinks fit - all 
the land within the territory over which he is Paramount 
Chief, that is to say, within the boundaries of Barotse-
land- North-western Rhodesia'. The conditions agreed 
were '(1) That native rights to their present lands, 
villages, gardens and fountains shall be observed or 
the holders of such rights compensated; (2) that no 
native villages shall be removed from their present 
sites except by agreement with their owners or by con-
sent of the High Commissioner, but when such villages 
234. MS Files, BSAC, London, to CO, 12/8/09; HC to 
Lewanika, 3/3/08; PRO: CO 417/675, notes for the 
Judicial Committee's enquiry into BSAC Land Claims, 
24/8/21, citing (a) Admin., NWR, 12/11/09 and (b) 
BSAC to CO, 30/11/20 - see MS Report Vol. II, 
pp. 260-4. Underlining is mine. 
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have been moved the sites will become vested in the 
Company; (3) Lewanika retains the right to graze cattle 
in the Batoka and Mashukulumbwe countries ••• '. On 
12th November 1909, after signing the Agreement, Wallace 
told the High Commissioner that now 'the Company would 
own all the land whether granted to settlers or not'. 
The requirement of the Colonial Office, stipulated in 
1897, that land could only be gra.Ced by the Company 
after the signing of an express agreement to that effect 
with the Paramount Chief, had thus, in Wallace's view, 
been met. But he was claiming much more power from 
the Agreement than the Colonial Office had in mind. 
Thus armed, he was able to instruct his District Offi-
cials to destroy the 'huts' of any people who moved 
their'villages, portions of villages or individuals' 
without the permission of the Company's agents; for, 
he said, 'all land in the Territory, with the exception 
of (a) the Barotse Reserve and (b) land in actual occu-
pation by natives, is now the property' of the Company. 
It should be noted, with regard to (b) that, as early 
as 1906, Coryndon had signed a Notice that 'the ground 
open to Prospecting' was 'the whole of North-western 
Rhodesia, excepting only 'European areas', native mines, 
the actual land on which villages and gardens lay and 
'land within 200 yards of any inhabited or occupied 
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house or building•. 235 
The settlers' view, as voiced by Moore of the 
'Livingstone Mail', was that there was 'a logical- if 
not a humane - line of argument which could be right-
fully maintained that (because) the native does not make 
the best use of his land ••• it should be confiscated by 
the stronger and more efficient race ••• and he may be 
made to pay rent for it'. This would provide the 
'economic pressure' to force the local people 'into the 
labour market voluntarily'. Moore added that the third 
alternative to either 'economic pressure' or 'slavery, 
for that is what forced labour comes to', was 'white 
immigration'. The 'Mail' interpreted the 1909 Con-
cession as the purchase of the right to ownership of 
the land designated, for the price of Lewanika's annual 
subsidy of £850. The Company could now sell what had 
been the King's 'property' at two shillings an acre. 
Only 4,250 acres, the size of a small farm, would thus 
have to be sold to enable the Company to start making 
clear profit on land sales. If they had this right as 
a commercial company, said the 'Mail', the territory 
was their private estate. If the Company held this 
right in its administrative capacity, then the position 
was the same as in Southern Rhodesia. Moore was 
235. MS Files: Text of Agreement between Lewanika and 
BSAC, 11/8/09; PRO: CO 879/52, Af.S.no.552, CO to 
FO, 29/9/07; NAZ: BS 2/257, folio 6 on 1909 Con-
cession; BS 3/498, Wallace to DOs, 1/1/11; 
'Livingstone Mail', 7/7/06. Underlinings are 
mine. 
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annoyed by the Company's persistent assertion that its 
various undertakings were made on behalf of 'the Empire, 
the people, the natives, the whole world in fact'; for, 
he said, 'the settlers know that its activities have 
been directed to only one end - the conservation of the 
shareholders' interests•. 236 
The data before us so far indicate that the 
difference between the situations in the two territories 
on either side of the Zambezi River was not one of policy. 
As Selborne, the High Commissioner, said in 1909, the 
d~erence was this: that in the two northern regions, 
'there is a vast population of natives and an infinitesi-
mal population of white people'. The 'rights' allowed 
to the indigenous people of northern Zambezia in respect 
of land were not in any sense based on land ownership, 
but only on the desirability of affirming minimal safe-
guards of 'huts' and 'gardens', to avoid the wholesale 
dispossession of villages by settlers to whom the Corn-
pany granted the use of the soil. Hence Clause 44 of 
the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1911, which set 
out penalties of £100 or 2 years in jail for anyone who 
forcibly evicted 'any native from his kraal' without 
official permission. For 'all questions relating to 
the settlements of natives on lands' in the territory 
were in the hands of the Administrator, subject only 
236. 'Livingstone Mail', 18/11/11, 16/12/11, 18/1/13. 
Word in brackets is mine. 
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to the High Commissioner's review. Moreover, the 
policy of refusing the right to purchase land to Africans 
was reinforced by Lewanika's insistence that African 
land ownership was communal. Also, as we have observed, 
compensation to local villagers was in respect of their 
'huts' and sometimes their gardens. It was in no sense 
in recognition of their status as landowners, either 
237 individually or communally. 
The files of the B.S.A.C. Administration in. 
Northern Rhodesia contain various records of 'the 
surrender of native rights' and the sums of money paid 
in compensation, mainly for the last twelve years of 
Company rule. According to the Resident Commissioner, 
the rates of compensation in 1913 were from £1 to £2 
for 'huts' and 8/- to 10/- per acre of cultivated land. 
A man responsible for a wife and a brother would thus 
pay in one year's tax the amount he would receive in 
compensation for his house and one cultivated acre. 
A summary return for such compensation was issued, for 
the six months to the end of 1914, for the Barotse, 
Kasempa, Kafue, Luangwa and E. Luangwa districts with 
a note to the effect that no agreements had been enter-
ed into in respect of the Livingstone, Kalomo, Serenje, 
Awemba, Tanganyika and Mweru-Luapula districts which 
237. PLG: BSA 10/4, Selborne, 22/12/09; PRO: CO 879/104, 
Af.S.no.948, p. 150, draft memo on N.R. Order, 
1910, and Res.Comm., to HC, 5/12/10. 
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together made up a large part of the country and in 
which there were some European estates by that time. 
251 houses, inhabited by 472 'souls', and 1614 acres 
were involved in the 'surrenders of native rights' made 
in that half year. The total compensation paid was 
£194.8.0. Of the 472 persons involved, 305 entered 
into 'tenancy agreements• in the East Luangwa district, 
the preserve mainly of the North Charterland Company; 
while 16 made such agreements in other districts. In 
the second half of 1915 when severe demands of war 
porterage were being felt, a total of £21.0.0. was re-
corded as paid in compensation for the 91 houses of 264 
people, all in East Luangwa, and their 77 cultivated 
acres. 50 of the 91 remained as tenants. From the 
1914 figures, the average compensation per person was 
thus .43 of £1; while it averaged .075 according to 
the 1915 returns. For six months in 1919, the returns 
showed that 1,002 people, cultivating 601 acres, had 
received a total of £152.3.6. or .15 of £1 per head. 
In 1923, 147 people occupying 67 houses and cultivating 
49 acres were moved, in the Mpika and Mbala sub-dis-· 
tricts of the areas designated Awemba and Tanganyika, 
238 for a total of £34.18.6. or .23 of £1 per person. 
238. NAZ: BS 3/399, Res.Comm. to HC, a9/9/13; BSA 3/127, 
Return of Surrender of Native Rights for half-year 
to 31/12/14, half-year ending 31/12/15, and half-
year ending 30/6/19; BS 3/472 Awemba and Tanga-
nyika returns, to 30/9/23. 
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These figures show that, for sums of money so 
small as to be insignificant, large numbers of people 
were under effective pressure to move from areas ori-
ginally chosen because of water, humus, availability of 
timber and other such vital factors. There is nothing 
in the records to suggest that they were assisted in 
the selection of new sties. Nor indeed, is it recorded 
that the 'surrenders' were witnessed by administrative 
officials or the payments certified. Misgivings about 
the whole operation were voiced in 1914 by Moffat Thorn-
son as Magistrate for the Chilanga and Luangwa Districts, 
who saw the process as shortsighted in view of the likely 
rapid increase of the local population. 'The ever-
increasing population of the villages will require an 
ever-increasing amount of the farmers' land, and it is 
not difficult to conceive of some of the landlords being 
unwilling to grant large areas of their farms for the 
purpose. One wonders also', he added, 'whether the 
present-day population are justified in selling their 
land rights which in a sense belong to the coming gen-
eration as to this, while only the present generation 
receive any benefit from the sale'. But the process 
went on, wherever a white farmer wanted land. 239 Yet, 
as we have seen, it was not a question of selling land 
rights, for no such 'rights' were countenanced. It 
239. NAZ: BS 3/411~ Report by J. Moffat Thomson, 
Chilanga and Luangwa, 31/3/14. 
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was merely a matter of accepting token compensation, 
under duresse, for houses to be demolished and culti-
vated fields to be appropriated by the settler to whom 
a large grant of land had been made by the Company. 
The removal of villages along the 'railway belt' 
must have been a well concerted operation, clearing an 
area extending at least fifty miles on either side of 
the line for European occupation. One grave consequence 
of this, whose entail was to be felt by Zambia after 
1964, was that there was no opportunity for African 
farmers to establish market gardens in the vicinity of 
townships like Choma, Monze, Mazabuka and Kafue, let 
alone Livingstone, Lusaka, Broken Hill and the burgeon-
ing towns of the Copperbelt. The testimony of senior 
local people, for instance at Nanzhila in the Namwala 
district, is emphatic that, when villages were removed, 
no compensation was paid. Instead the operation was 
remembered as a rough one, with guns in evidence, stir-
ring deep resentment in the uprooted communities as they 
attempted to start afresh elsewhere, clearing the forest, 
living in grass shelters and facing a period of hunger. 
It was Chief Chongo, the Nanzhila witnesses said, who 
tried to voice the people's complaints and incurred the 
anger of the B.S.A.C. officials thereby. Those who 
wanted to move back had to become either tenants or 
squatters liable to summary expulsion. 
people resisted eviction, were burned. 
Villages, whose 
Moreover the 
evictions took place at a time when tax collection was 
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being carried on fiercely and was thus but another 
harsh experience at the hands of foreign conquerors. 240 
From the eastern Luangwa region where, since 
1897, the North Charterland Company had made a heavy 
impact on the local communities and where the number 
of settlers was large, Zambian testimonies on evictions 
and on compensation are numerous and significant. 
Barnes, in his scholarly study of the Ngoni of Mpezeni, 
has said that, before their defeat by the British, 'the 
Ngoni were settled at a density in excess of the criti-
cal value ••• and the state was exhausting the wealth of 
its neighbours'. Whereas in many parts of Northern 
Zambezia there were not more than 20 people per square 
mile, in the Fort Jameson area, the figure was an aver-
age of 140. The social consequences of the brief war 
of 1897-8 cannot be assessed here. However we should 
note that, as Gann points out, the Nqoni 'lost much of 
their cattle, a great many more beasts being sold to 
European traders after the campaign was over, and the 
tribesmen were in despair'. All that followed in res-
pect of 'surrender of rights' and evictions has to be 
considered in its relation to this fact of profound dis-
integration and misery. Gann says categorically, 
however, that, despite a plan, in 1904, to set 490 s~u~re 
miles aside as a native reserve in the area, with 
240. RI/Headmen Benjamin Shankwaya and Chose Ngana and 
ex-teacher Shadreck Samalumo, Nanzhila, 19/4/73. 
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compensation at 3/- per 'hut•, the 'overwhelming majority 
of Africans preferred to stay on the European farms, no 
Af . b . j t d •th t h. t' 241 r~can e~ng e ec e w1 ou ~s consen • The 
local memory in various parts of the Eastern Province, 
rejects this and speaks of people being 'driven away', 
and local resistance overwhelmed. 
In the Katete District, for instance, witnesses 
have recalled the activities of 'Kolokota' Sandford, so 
called because he hunted for the last possible man to 
serve as a war carrier as someone will scrape the bottom 
of his snuff-box with a piece of dry grass to extract 
the last drop of tobacco. That official was actively 
involved in moving people from estates within the large 
area belonging to N.c.c. People were told that they 
must move to make room for white farms. 'They would 
tell people: "Do not cultivate your fields this year 
because you are going to be removed. You had better 
begin looking for another place". From that time, they 
would visit the village regularly to make sure that the 
people were preparing to move. As soon as the crops 
were ready, the people would be told to start moving ••• 
In the Charterland areas they were never provided with 
transport ••• And they never paid compensation'. Hard-
ships inevitably followed, 'first of all, the problem 
241. S~pp. 216 ff. above and Gann 'History', op.cit., 
pp. 127 ff., on 'The farmers' frontier in Northern 
Rhodesia'; Barnes, op.cit., pp. 104-5; Gann, 
'History', op.cit., pp. 91 and 135; KKF/UNZA/ 
UNESCO Oral History Project, 1973, paper by S.H. 
Phiri, op.cit., p. 16. 
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of carrying their possessions to new places, some of 
them far away. Secondly, people faced hunger as they 
hadn't sufficient time to attend to their fields be-
cause time had to be spent preparing the new place, 
building new houses, digging a new well and opening new 
fields. Only after living in a new village for two or 
three years were they able to produce enough food to 
feed their families'. Evicted people received no help 
in choosing sites for their new homes, and so eviction 
was most irksome for women whose husbands were away at 
work in the south or elsewhere. From Katumba's area, 
many people moved into Mozambique because 'the Europeans 
here had started to create a lot of problems for us'. 
The evictions forced some people to seek new sites in 
the tsetse areas where 'all their cattle perishect•. 242 
Chief Kalindawalo of Petauke has also declared 
that, in the evictions carried out, for instance, in 
1926, people were paid 'not a single compensation, not.· 
even salt. They simply sent instructions from the Boma, 
telling people to move'. In one case, 'they cheated 
people that there was an outbreak of a certain disease 
and that it was necessary to move people to safe areas'. 
The chief confirmed that notice of eviction was given 
to allow people time to reap a last harvest and that 
Boma messengers regularly inspected the villages to be 
242. RI/Headman Kamphoza Mvula and others, Katete, 
13/3/75; John Moyo Banda and Andreya Banda, 
Katete, 14/3/75. 
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sure that the orders were being obeyed. 'Those who 
tried to resist were forced to move ••• and some people 
even went to prison for trying to show resistance'. 
People were in little doubt about the motives behind 
the evictions. 'Whenever they saw that the land con-
tained good soil, they said it was now the Government's 
land and forced people out. They called it Charterland. 
They snatched all good land ••• And even up to the present 
day, some of this land is still idle'. Transport was 
not provided when the actual removals took place. 'Who 
could have the courage to ask for transport? People 
carried all their possessions on their own heads'. The 
only compensation which Head Messenger Chisenga knew of 
was that paid sometimes when a new road cut through a 
village. 'But not when people were forced out of their 
old villages, they were just ordered to move ••• and even 
chiefs were affected. Chief Chimathe was forced to 
move although he resisted. Messengers were ordered to 
go and arrest him ••• and he was brought to the Boma'. 
In the eyes of the local community this led to the 
243 chief's early death. 
One of the oldest men interviewed in the 
Chadiza area, Headman Mbingwa Banda, confirmed that 
243. RI/Chief Kalindawalo, Petauke, 15/3/75; Head 
Messenger Meki Chisenga, Petauke, 18/3/75; Head-
man Nyathande Chirwa, Petauke, 17/3/75. 
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when officials, like Lane-Poole, announced that villages 
were to be moved to make way for 'Charterland', there 
was no payment of compensation in any form; and that 
people were not given time to arrange their removal. 
However when he and other headmen, like Mukwanda and 
Kulikwa, refused to have their villages moved, they 
were eventually left alone. People at Wanga village 
in Mpezeni's area traced the start of ndale, or polici-
cal organisation among the local people, to anger over 
what they regarded as the unjust distribution of the 
land. 'The white men began to survey and divide the 
land into good farming areas and non-productive soils. 
They drove people out from the productive areas and 
settled them on poor lands'. No compensation was given, 
nor were those who opted to stay on the settlers' farms 
as tenants given conditions conducive to stability or 
contentment. Verishoni Tembo, now in his eighties, 
has testified thus: 'I personally worked as a labourer 
for Mr Erenesti (sic) and was paid twelve pence. We 
were given milk for ration. We were not allowed to 
cultivate private gardens. Where could one find time? 
So our wives would trek to the villages to find food 
and at the weekends, husband and wife would both travel 
home to fetch rations'. Tembo recalled accompanying 
Thomas Fox-Pitt, a Boma officer, to Kawaza's area at 
the time when Mpezeni and his people were to be evicted. 
'we found the country very poor'. While Tembo himself 
as a cook at Mwami Mission was receiving 8/- a month, 
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farm labourers were being paid as little as 2/-, those 
with long service sometimes drawing 7/6d. No employer 
in the district offered anything but 'slave wages'. 
Farm work involved labouring in the sun 'from six to 
six', often with 'the Bwana watching you toiling and 
sometimes wielding his stick ••• If you failed to finish 
your portion, your ticket would not be marked and you 
would have to work then for two days to have it marked'~44 
The consensus of Zambian testimony in those 
eastern districts is that evicted people were not assist-
ed to transport their possessions. 'After all, the 
Europeans had no transport themselves. They were being 
carried in machila'. Moreover, numerous informants have 
said emphatically that tenants on white farms, employed 
as labourers, were not given the time necessary for the 
growing of their own food. Chief Mpezeni has also 
stated that evicted villagers 'were forced to settle in 
areas where there was no good water or good soil or 
grazing ground for their cattle, and that is why there 
were constant famines among the people'. When the 
influenza epidemics developed soon after the World War 
244. RI/Headman Sam M. Banda, Chadiza, 8/3/75; Veri-
shoni Tembo, Nikazio Tembo, Chitamukutwa Soko and 
Wilson Mhlanga, Wanga, Chipata, 4/3/75. Thomas 
Fox-Pitt became a supporter of the Zambian nation-
alist struggle in the nineteen fifties and there-
after an active member of the Anti-Slavery Society 
in Britain. 
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ended and again in 1921-22, people, debilitated by lack 
of food and by endless long journeys in search of it, 
died in large numbers. Those who survived had to live 
'on wild fruits and roots, and a few lived on milk'. 
A peasant farmer called Ndelemani, formerly a teacher 
of the Chitambo Mission in Serenje, has recalled that, 
in 1941, the ~orthern Rhodesia Government began to buy 
back some land from the North Charterland Company so as 
to resettle some people who had been evicted earlier 
d h d h d t t 1 f b . t "1 245 an a a o s rugg e or su s~s ence on poor so~ • 
Zambian testimony also makes it clear that 
local communities, under orders to move, did not regard 
themselves as having any constitutional means of ex-
pressing their attitude to such action or any hope of 
redress. To them, it would seem, the difference be-
tween eviction to let a white farmer occupy their home-
lands and removal ordered by Boma officials to a 'native 
reserve' had no significance. In official records, 
however, whereas individual settlers were advised that 
compensation should be paid and, in some cases at least, 
submitted returns of such payments, it was explicitly 
stated by the Board of the North Charterland Company 
in 1913 that 'Since these reserves are officially 
established, no question of compensation will arise'. 
245. RI/Mwaamba Zulu and Enos Banda, Zizwe, Chipata, 
5/3/75; Chief Mpezeni and Induna Nikazio Jere, 
Chipata, 5/3/75; A.J. Ndelemani, Mpangwe, Katete, 
13/3/75; and see Shepperson and Price, op.cit., 
pp. 227-8 for description of conditions on a 
Nyasaland Estate before the Chilembwe Rising of 
1915. 
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As the Maugham Report showed, there was considerable 
disagreement between the N.c.c. and the Administration 
about the relation of the Charterland Company and its 
settler tenants to the African population. The N.c.c., 
in 1912, described the proposed 490 square miles of 
•native reserve' as containing 'some of the most fertile 
portions of the territory' which Zambian evidence does 
not support. The Charterland Company also took excep-
tion to Wallace's instructions about compensation as 
'very drastic' and doubted whether the Administrator's 
requirement had the sanction of the High Commissioner. 
'The position of the settler ••• is that he has now to pay 
an average of £1 per hut ••• whether the native hut owner 
removes ••• or not and ••• the native hut owner can culti-
vate any portion of the settlers' farm that he may 
select'. Here again the testimony of men who recall 
the period of evictions and of 'tenancy agreements' is 
sharply at variance with the Charterland Company's 
assertion. The situation was obviously complicated 
by the lack of decision on the part of the Administra-
tion and its failure to check the serious social debili-
tation that followed the military defeat of the Ngoni~46 
The reaction of the B.S.A.C. Directors to the 
argument between Wallace and the N.C.C. must have further 
246. Maugham Report, op.cit., p. 12, para 36, letter 
of NCC Board to Manager (McKerron), 1913); 
Appendix Item SO, NCC Memo, Dec. 1912. 
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embarrassed the Administration. The Board believed 
that Charterland had 'a legitimate grievance'. 'It 
is aware of your view', Wallace was told, 'that natives 
should be compensated on being required to move into the 
Reserves; but, having regard to the terms of Section 40 
of the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council it can find 
no justification for this doctrine. Under that section 
it is stated that it is the duty of this Company, in 
Northern Rhodesia as in Southern Rhodesia, to provide 
sufficient land for the requirements of the native popu-
lation ••• The Order-in-Council does not require that the 
consent of the natives should be obtained nor that corn-
pensation shall be paid to them. It has never been 
suggested in Southern Rhodesia that compensation should 
be paid ••• in order to free land for European settlement, 
and it is feared that the recognition of any such right 
might be highly prejudicial to European settlement and 
also lend itself to blackmail'. The Directors wanted 
Wallace 'to make it as easy as possible for the North 
Charterland Company to comply' with the provisions of 
'the law' in the matter of land. 247 It should be re-
membered that one of the purposes of Mr Justice Maugham's 
Enquiry in 1932 was to consider the demand of the North 
Charterland for compensation in respect of land, excised 
from what they regarded as their estate in 'the tract', 
to provide for 'native reserves'. 
247. Ibid: Appendix Item 52, BSAC, London, to Admin., 
16/1/13. 
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From the African point of view the mixing of 
people from one 'tribal' area with another to make a 
'reserve' was most unwelcome and in 1915 \vallace express-
ed his awareness of the people's 'feeling of injustice 
inflicted upon them' by the whole process of European 
settlement. Meanwhile, his officials were busy trying 
to find a criterion for the calculation of how much 
ground the 'reserves' would require. Worthington, the 
Secretary for Native Affairs, suggested 4-5 acres per 
'adult native'. The Assistant Magistrate proposed 3 
acres. Grazing lands in Natal were 9f acres per head, 
in Cape Colony 12 and in Basutoland 17. Wallace there-
fore proposed a minimum of 10 acres in the eastern 
Luangwa region, with 'up to 38 where the country is poor'. 
By 1920, however, Cookson, the District Commissioner, 
was expressing grave concern that, with the rise in 
tobacco prices and the consequent rapid influx of white 
farmers and the Charterland Company's demand for the 
speedy demarcation of 'native reserves', the people of 
Munukwa and Mafuta were about to be moved to an area 
afflicted by tsetse fly, 'want of water and barrenness 
of soil'. Munukwa and Mafuta were meanwhile being 
'harrassed and disturbed by new settlers'. The choice 
before the local people was not a happy one. On the 
one hand, the 'reserves' were known to be poor places 
in which to live; on the other hand, as an official in 
the Chilanga district, near Lusaka, observed in 1917, 
'tenancy agreements between settlers and natives had 
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not been a success. The tenant in time become more or 
less the property, practically, of the settler. He 
works for less wages than he can earn elsewhere, he is 
expected to dispose of his surplus crops to the landlord, 
he is called-out to work to suit the convenience of the 
landlord, often at a time when he should be cultivating 
his own field'. The two other alternatives open to 
the hapless man were then chibalo or voluntary emigration. 
Whatever course he followed, musonko for himself and 
all the adults in his care must be paid. 248 
On the eve of the end of B.S.A. Company rule, 
the lot of African people in the only parts of their 
countries specially designated for them was thus most 
unsatisfactory. No action had been taken in response 
to the comment of the Colonial Secretary, in 1915, that 
'it might perhaps have been preferable to have provided 
areas at the outset of sufficient extent to meet any 
increase in the native population', or to his query as 
to why compensation rates in the East Luangwa district 
were 'materially lower' than elsewhere. There was 
instead consolation for the Company in 1921 when, in 
response to a plea for action by the Anti-Slavery So-
ciety, the Colonial Office said that His Majesty's 
Government did not intend 'to take any steps for the 
248. Ibid: Appendix Item 57, memo by Wallace, 14/8/15; 
Item 53, Admin. to HC, 6/1/15; Item 61, Dep.Admin. 
(R. Goode) to HC, 13/12/21 ecol. letter from Cook-
son, 14/12/20; NAZ: BS 3/293, Asst. Magis., Chi-
langa, to Magis., Broken Hill, 29/9/17. Under-
lining is mine. 
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presentation of the Native Case'. Ye~ early in 1923, 
the Colonial Office was to tell the B.S.A. Company that 
'the grant to the North Charterland Company covering 
rights over an enormous area, does not appear to H.M.G. 
to be one which can be regarded as an ordinary adrnini-
strative act and H.M.G. would feel considerable embarrass-
ment in recognising this concession'. But it was that 
'concession' and the upheavals that followed its ex-
ploitation of the area that had kept the indigenous 
communities in a state of insecurity on their native 
soil throughout the B.S.A.C. period. 249 
This insecurity was sensed by the first Gov-
ernor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Herbert Stanley, who 
therefore set up a Reserves Commission in 1924. 
According to Gann, that Commission, chaired by Mr Justice 
Macdonnell, gave serious attention to the plight of 
Africans, especially in the Fort Jameson district. We 
are now at that point in time to which we referred at 
the start of this review, when we noted the efforts of 
missionaries, led by men like the Anglican Bishop Alston 
May and the Methodist Rev. John Fell, to challenge the 
Administration to alleviate the plight of Africans. 
May was convinced that it was essential to remove their 
universal insecurity. In a note on the plan, later 
249. PRO: eo 879/116 Af.S.no.1034, eo to HC, 30/4/15; 
CO 417/675, CO reply to A-S Socy., memo of 27/8/21; 
Maugham Report, Appendix Item 65, CO to BSAC, 
25/4/23. 
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cancelled, to move the people of the Msoro valley to 
make way for European cotton plantations - he said: 
'If Dicky Goode said that "no such step as removal of 
natives ..£2.!2 take place under present regulations", ••• 
he was simply talking through his hat. Such things 
are going on all over the Territory, wheuever the White 
Man covets the Natives' land. Of course, the Native 
is not "removed" - not forcibly ejected. But he has 
got to go, and he does go, after receiving handsome 
"compensation" l ••• Every official of the Native Depart-
ment in the Territory would agree with me'. May also 
commented significantly thus: 'You are quite right in 
saying ••• that the N.C.s are "on the whole native-siders" 
••• Naturally, it is not always easy to get at their real 
minds ••• they have some hesitation as servants of the 
Chartered Company in quarreling with their bread and 
butter, and in some instances it is quite obvious that 
a sense of loyalty impels them "to make the worse appear 
the better"'· Thus, on the 'agreements' to 'surrender 
native rights' the Bishop added that it was obvious 
that the village dweller, who had 'not the least notion 
what the land is really worth' was likely 'to part with 
it for a mere song, especially when he is urged to do 
so by an official of the Native Department of whom he 
stands in wholesome awe'. The wholesale removal of 
large communities, such as was imposed on Mpezeni's 
people, had put them into a condition of dearth and 
malnutrition because their numbers were too great for 
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the capacity of the poor soil on which they and their 
cattle had been settled. 250 
Bishop May's papers contained an extract from 
a confidential letter which he had received from a Native 
Commissioner. It illustrated, in May's view •the sort 
of thing that happens when Ahab sets his heart on Naboth's 
vineyard'. The N.C. explained that plans for the 
Provisional Reserves in the Fort Jameson district were 
prepared with notable casualness. 'The opinion of 
Marshal! has decided the point as to whether they are 
suitable. As Mar~hall's knowledge of the district was 
very scanty when he offered his opinion, one would suppose 
that he took the advice of someone who knew the district 
thoroughly. As a matter of fact, Willis, who had been 
N.C. for six months, did most of the selecting. P.E. 
Hall who had been in Fort Jameson ••• but 9 or 10 months, 
got together most of the statistics and drew the maps. 
When these reserves were put before H.H. (the Administra-
tor} someone drew his attention to the fact that the 
Chiparamba - called the granary of the Fort J. district -
was not included in a reserve. H.H. remarked that ••• 
the scheme was provisional and nothing was done ••• But 
then Marshal! called in the Angoni of Musholo (sic Msoro) 
from that area and pointed out that ground had been 
250. Gann 'History', op.cit., pp. 218-19; see pp 
above; USPG, A.1 (XXVIII) letters by May, 1/12/22 
and 16/8/22; and see p. 30 above, quoting 
Father Guilleme 19/1/22. ~Dicky Goode' was Rich-
ard Goode (later Sir} who had once been Secretary 
to the NER Administration and was Acting Admini-
strator of N. Rhodesia prior to the transfer of 
authority on 1/4/24. 
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allocated to them west of the Lutembwe; that they need 
not move at once, but if they stayed ••• they would event-
ually probably have to work for the North Charterland 
Exploration Company, being tenants. Musholo's folk 
moved out in large numbers, and their cattle came into 
touch with fly country and died in hundreds ••• The whole 
matter was put through between February and August 1913 ••• 
The wicked part about it all is this. The N.C.E. Co. 
were complaining that they could not find any land free 
of native rights to mark out ••• for European occupation. 
This Company is, as you know, a subsidiary company of 
the Chartered Company. Land set apart for the N.C.E. 
Co. benefits also the Chartered Company but not the 
government of the country after it ceases to be run by 
the Chartered Company. To my mind, the cart has been 
put before the horse. More attention has been paid 
to curtailing the land possession of the natives, who 
are the real inhabitants of the country ••• Further, 
unlike Kenya Colony, the Fort Jameson district is the 
most densely populated corner of the whole of N.E.R. 
and it is Fort Jameson which is being thrown open to 
E t . ' 251 uropean occupa ~on • 
In the section on Northern Rhodesia in his 
'African Survey', Lord Hailey pointed out that 'when 
251. USPG, A.1 (XXVIII) folio 77, extract in May's 
papers from letter of a N.c., 30/6/22. 
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the Charter was in process of termination in 1923, the 
land question was not referred to the Privy Council as 
had been done in the case of Southern Rhodesia, and the 
rights of natives in the land did not come under judicial 
review'. But the British Government endorsed 'the 
B.S.A. Company's title to the areas held by it in North-
eastern Rhodesia under the "Certificate of Claim", and 
also the concession to the North Charterland Company'. 
Moreover, the Company's demand for 'half the proceeds 
of all sales or leases of land in North-western Rhodesia 
up to 1965' was granted, thus allowing the B.S.A.C. to 
retain 'mineral rights over the whole of Northern Rho-
desia except Barotseland'. Incidentally, Sir Herbert 
Stanley remarked privately in 1925 that the Company 
interpreted the word 'minerals' in its 'most general, 
extensive and comprehensive sense' to 'include water and 
also air', and that of course the local chiefs had no 
idea of the scope of the Company's exploitation. It 
is noteworthy that it was Yeta of the Lozi, whose po-
sition had been to some extent safeguarded by the Colo-
nial Office's frequent queries on the Company's activi-
ties in N.W. Rhodesia, who protested strongly at what 
he regarded as its perfidious behaviour from 1890 to the 
termination of its direct rule. The B.S.A.C., he said, 
had entered his kingdom under false pretences, imposed 
'concessions' while concealing their real intent and 
then laid claim to the land which the Lozi were express-
ly determined not to surrender. 'We claim; he concluded, 
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'that all the land and its substances in the Territory 
b 1 t th t . ' 2 5 2 ••• e ong o e na lves • 
In 1921 the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protect-
ion Society considered legal action on behalf of the 
Africans of Northern Rhodesia in the form of an appeal 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for a 
ruling on the matter of ownership of all the Native 
Lands in North-western Rhodesia and large areas in 
North-eastern Rhodesia, excluding only the Barotse 
Reserve'. One of the men who was active in Britain on 
behalf of the African cause was the Rev. Arthur Baldwin 
of the Primitive Methodists, the pioneer missionary 
among the Ila whose tribulations we noted earlier. A 
petition was prepared in the name of King Yeta of the 
Lozi which rejected the B.S.A.C. claim. The Lozi 
asserted that there had been deliberate deceit in the 
way in which the Company's agents had materially altered 
the meaning of the agreements made verbally with Lewanika 
before obtaining his signature and those of his Council 
to such agreements in writing. 'It was the first and 
last wish of King Lewanika and all his Councillors', 
Yeta declared, 'never to sell or give away their land 
to any person, persons, Company or State'. Yeta, 
however, was unable to find the money needed to send a 
252. Hailey w., op.cit., p.739; MS Files, Stanley to 
Sir John Chancellor, Gov. of s. Rhodesia, 'very 
confidential,' 17/3/25; and letter of Yeta III 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
2/7/23. 
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delegation to London, and no assistance was offered 
by the British Government. Moreover, he said: 'We 
are unable to obtain white witnesses as the Bishop or 
the Rev. Fell you mentioned is not near us'. Meanwhile 
the Anti-Slavery Society was informed by its lawyers 
that an appeal to the Judicial Committee would cost 
between £5,000 and £10,000. At the same time, however, 
Sir Drummond Chaplin, the Administrator for the two 
Rhodesias, expressed the view privately that it was 
possible that the Privy Council might rule that all 
unalienated land in Northern Rhodesia belonged 'neither 
to the Crown nor to the British South Africa Company 
but to the natives'. This was why he welcomed the 
British Government's apparent intention not to pursue 
the matter of Native Reserves. This intention, he 
believed, was 'due not to disagreement with a policy now 
well-established in South Africa', but to avoid action 
that 'might prove embarrassing' should the Privy Council 
establish, as the Buxton Commission had suggested, that 
the claim of the Company to land ownership was illegal. 
Indeed, 'in the opinion of the Secretary of State a 
claim by the natives to ownership of the land cannot 
be lightly dismissed•. 253 
253. RH:MSS.Brit.Emp.s.22 (G164) A-S Socy. to Baldwin, 
3/11/21; Yeta's Petition, 31/3/21; Yeta to A-S 
Socy., 27/9/22; A-S Socy. re legal expenses, 
23/8/21; and MSA Files, Chaplin to BSAC, London, 
23/8/22. 
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Nevertheless, Yeta made his 'cry and wail' in 
1923 to no effect and, as the Company handed over control 
to the Crown, no answer came to his sad question: 
since 'the Imperial Government ••• in response to our 
request for Her Majesty's direct protection, had sent 
the British South Africa Company, ••• perhaps the Imperial 
Government gave the British South Africa Company.right 
and power in the Charter to acquire sole ownership of 
land, minerals, etc. and those rights were to be perpe-
tual. If this were so, why should then the Company 
claim to have acquired these rights from the natives, 
and again if it were so, why did not the Imperial Govern-
ment notify us that it had given the Company such powers 
even after the expiration of its period of administration?! 
The Duke of Devonshire, as Colonial Secretary, asked the 
High Commissioner to assure Yeta that, 'under the 
agreement' for the transfer of authority, 'he need not 
fear that his interests will not receive full consider-
ation'. Yeta was, however, still protesting six years 
later, even though the B.S.A. Company had attempted to 
accuse him of asking for a new 'concession' so that he 
could increase his personal wealth. Yeta affirmed 
that the original 'concessions' had been acquired by 
B.S.A.C. men 'accompanied by an armed escort', and 
that Lewanika had been deceived by their claim to be 
making a'treaty or alliance' on behalf of Queen Vic-
toria. Ironically, a contribution to the correspondence 
of 1929 was made by Frank Worthington who had been with 
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Coryndon in 1897 when he established himself in the Lozi 
kingdom 'in a confusing dual capacity as British Resi-
dent and Agent for the British South Africa Company'. 
Worthington now said it had undoubtedly been the promise 
of protection that had originally secured the 'con-
cession' from Lewanika, for the Lozi King had been 'well 
aware ••• of the trouble caused by the concession-hunters 
who overran Swaziland' and was 'merely aiming at the 
exclusion of hordes of white strayers who might molest 
him and disturb the peace of his kingdom'. Indeed, 
as Lewanika himself had said in a letter to Queen Vie-
toria, in which he called Frank Lochner 'a liar', he 
wanted British defence against the danger of his country 
being 'divided into two parts between Portugal and 
Germany', for the B.S.A.C. had warned him from the start 
that that was how 'the scramble' might affect the Lozi 
254 if he rejected the Company's overtures. 
In this part of our review, in which we have 
been concerned with the land and natural resources of 
northern Zambezia, we have not given place to the growth 
of the mines in the earlier part of the period or to 
254. PRO: CO 879/120 Afr.s.no.1096, Yeta to Judicial 
Committee, 2/7/23; NAZ: SEC/MG/13, Col.Secy. to 
HC, 20/10/23; Geode to HC, 15/1/24; MSA Files, 
Record of Questionnaire for Yeta from Attorney-
General on relations with BSAC, 2/11/29 and memo 
by ~orthington, 18/1/29; and Lewanika to Queen 
Victoria, (n.d.), para. 4. 
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the beginnings of what became the Copperbelt. These 
have been carefully recorded by both Hall and Gann. 
From our standpoint, what happened when mining began 
was that the Company put into operation the land policy 
which we have noted here and that involved (a) the claim 
to 'mineral rights' wherever minerals were found, (b) 
the ignoring and indeed annulling of the land ownership 
of the local rulers and communities, and (c) the extens-
ive eviction of villages in the vicinity of the mining 
operations and European townships which inevitably de-
veloped in such areas. In the process of opening up 
mineral deposits, prospectors had the advantage of the 
'phenomenally low cost of native labour', while, in 
order to secure that labour, musonko was raised, as in 
Kasempa in 1909 by 100%. As Gann observes, mining 
work was unpopular on account of 'harsh treatment, 
danger and the many minor abuses inseparable from the 
control of vast numbers of semi-conscripts by a small 
harrassed staff'. The fact that those 'conscripts' 
were men who believed themselves to have been conquered 
by the people whose compatriots controlled the mines, 
meant that mining in the territory was yet another aspect 
. . . . d . . t• 255 of the s~tuat~on of subJugat~on an ~nJUS ~ce. 
255. See Hall, op.cit., pp. 247 ff.; Gann 'History', 
op.cit., pp. 117-124 and 204-11; Wills, op.cit., 
pp.193-206; and also Powdermaker H. 'Copper Town' 
(Harper and Row 1962), for a study of'the Human 
Situation on the Rhodesian Copperbelt'. See also 
'African World' Feb. 1903, article by T.G. Davey, 
and Gann 'Bir .. th', op. ci t., p. 122. 
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Musonko and chibalo, as we have seen, were of 
great use to the Company and contributed substantially 
to its revenue. They were also, no less, major instru-
ments by which the conquest of northern Zambezia was 
consolidated relentlessly. It is suggested that this 
was as true of the Company's land policy which, while 
opening the way for European settlement and exploita-
tion of the wealth of the soil wherever settlers should 
wish to move in, also forced the indigenous peoples into 
the position of subjugation, deprivation, debilitation, 
disintegration and radical insecurity. Thus, as the 
consensus of Zambian testimony shows, the indigenous 
peoples, though conscious of relief at the stopping of 
'tribal war' and the 'slave trade', experienced virtually 
nothing of 'protection' and still less of development 
under the ruthless regime of the Chartered Company. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONQUEST 
(a) The Chiefs as Kapitaos 
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Shortly before the end of the B.S.A.C. rule in 
northern Zambezia, the British Government made a state-
ment in respect of Kenya which was to provide a point of 
contention in the future development of the territory 
that eventually became Zambia. A rapid increase in 
the number of settlers in Kenya after the World War, 
combined with the economic and political influence 
exercised by the country's large Asian population, 
aroused anxiety in London over the dangers of conflict. 
The famous 1923 dictum of the Duke of Devonshire, then 
Colonial Secretary, brought a new factor into the arena 
by declaring 'that it is necessary definitely to record 
••• that the interests of the African natives must be 
paramount' and the Britain regarded herself 'as exer-
cising a trust on behalf of the African population' 
which H.M.G. could not 'delegate or share' and whose 
. 
objective was 'the protection and advancement of the 
native races'. Angered by this statement, the white 
community in Kenya began to look to a closer associa-
tion with the white communities further south with a 
view to being able to assert their claims more effect-
ively. This led, six years later, to the Hilton Young 
Commission's Report on the desirability and feasibility 
of a closer assiciation between the British territories 
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in &ast and Central Africa. The Report rejected the 
idea that it was essential to buttress 'white civili-
zation' by giving power to the settler communities. 
It also affirmed that what mattered most was 'the estab-
lishment of a rule of justice' which would win 'the 
loyalty of the native people'. Implicit in such pro-
nouncements was the doctrine of what the League of 
Nations had called 'a sacred trust' laid upon the colo-
nial powers to guide the progress and advancement of 
'peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world'. This was 
in basic sympathy with the declaration of the Pan-African 
Congress in Paris in 1919, which had resolved that 'the 
natives of Africa must have the right to participate in 
the Government as fast as their development permits, in 
conformity with the principle that the Government exists 
1 for the natives, and not the natives for the Government•. 
By 1930, this 'saered trust' was stated by the 
British Government to be 'an axiom of British policy•. 
As Gray points out, however, the practice of 'delegating 
power to Native Authorities - or "indirect rule" -
based partly on Lugard's experience in Nyasaland, Uganda 
and Nigeria, was developed by Sir Donald Cameron in 
Tanganyika and was only later introduced in Northern 
1. Memorandum on Indians in Kenya (Cmd.1922,1923), p. 10; 
Hilton Young Commission Report, 1929 (Cmd.3234, 1929), 
p. 39; and Legum c. 'Pan-Africanism' (Pall Mall 1962), 
Appendix 1, p. 133, Resolution of the Pan-African 
Congress, 1919. 
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Rhodesia and Nyasaland'. Such pronouncements, as we 
have noted here, must be understood as the reaction to 
the situation created by the end of the World War, 
rather than as the consequence of a struggle in Britain's 
'dependencies' between the rulers and the ruled. Indeed, 
the power struggle being openly enacted closest to 
northern Zambezia at the end of our period was that 
going on south of the river, which led to the according 
of the status of Crown Colony to Southern Rhodesia under 
white settler rule. In this connection, it is interest-
ing to note the statement of a leader of the Responsible 
Government Party there - which could well have been made 
by a Zambian nationalist forty years later - that 
'Liberty in rags is better than well-fed tutelage ••• we 
have souls to be saved as well as bodies to be kicked'. 2 
Our concern now, however, is not with the settler commu-
nities, but with the consequences of B.S.A. Company rule 
in northern Zambezia upon the territory's traditional 
rulers. 
Colonial Office correspondence on this subject 
reveals that, as on other issues relating to Company 
rule, the Colonial Secretary had misgivings from before 
the turn of the century. Chamberlain was worried, in 
1899, when he heard that a Native Commissioner in 
2. Gray, op.cit., pp. 4-5, citing Memo on Native Policy 
in East Africa, 1930 (Cmd.3573); Wills, op.cit., 
p. 244, quoting Sir Charles Coghlan as recorded in 
Wallis J.P. 'One Man's Hand: The Story of Sir Charles 
Coghlan and the Liberation of Southern Rhodesia' 
(1950). 
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Southern Rhodesia had appointed some sub-chiefs and 
that Taberer the Chief Native Commissioner had annulled 
his action and appointed other men. But, said the 
Secretary of State, 'Chiefs are appointed by the Ad-
ministrator in Council ••• and ••• the appointment and removal 
of sub-chiefs does not rest with the Chief Native Comm-
issioner ••• much less with his subordinates'. It was 
high time that a Secretary for Native Affairs should be 
appointed to check such irregularities. Yet the rank 
of the appointing official was of little consequence. 
What mattered was that chieftainship was not now being 
regarded as an office resting upon traditional and sacral 
criteria but upon the will of the conquerors. This 
same attitude to chieftainship was to become a casus 
belli between provincial officials of the Northern 
Rhodesia Government and the African National Congress 
in the 1950's. However, the British attitude had been 
'legalised' in respect of Southern Rhodesia by the 
'Native Regulations' promulgated in 1898 which stated 
explicitly that chiefs 'shall be appointed by the Admin-
istration and shall hold office during pleasure and con-
tingent upon good behaviour and general fitness', their 
responsibilities including 'the prompt supply of men 
when ordered to supply the same ••• through Native Commi-
3 ssioners or Assistant Native Commissioners'. It would 
3. PRO: CO 879/57 Af.S.no.574, Chamberlain to Milner, 
HC, 1/12/99; Macpherson, op.cit., p. 117, 180-1, 
354; BM/SP, 1899, LXIII, (C.9138) Proclamation of 
Native Regulations, 25/11/98, Sect.IV, I. 
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therefore not be an exaggeration to say that the coming 
of the B.S.A. Company destroyed chieftainship in fact 
while retaining the semblance of it as an agency of sub-
jugation. Nor is there reason to assume that the Corn-
pany had a different policy for the region north of the 
Zambia. 
A commentator on the governmental system in 
the Mbala area in 1897 described the rule of the chiefs 
as 'a patriarchal one, the people rendering to them 
certain services which are obligatory and in return for 
which the chief distributes a considerable part of the 
wealth he receives'. A few months later, a member of 
the Anglo-German Boundary Commission, who travelled ex-
tensively in the Tanganyika Plateau region, said this: 
'Since the arrival of the white man, the chiefs in the 
administered country have lost nearly all their power. 
The tribal organisation, practically, does not exist, 
except with the Awemba. The headman or chief of a 
large village is nearly powerless ••• Many villages are 
in process of disintegration'. In 1899, Robert Cod-
rington told the Colonial Office, as we saw earlier, 
that if a chief wanted to be 'friends with the white 
man', he had to obey the orders of the Company's agents 
when they wanted labour or any other form of service. 
·aodrington then told the B.S.A. Company Directors that 
a consequence of the new regime in North-eastern Rho-
desia was that, when an eleph~nt was killed, 'the ground 
tusk must be paid to the Administration' since previously 
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it had been handed over 'to the Chief of the Country -
because he was Chief•. 4 
The early reports of missionaries took note of 
the importance of chiefs, as indeed Livingstone had done. 
When the L.M.S. missionaries were planning 'the opening 
of Mission work among the Babernba', in 1900, a visit 
was paid to Chief Mumpolokoso, 'a man of considerable 
intelligence ••• friendly to the Europeaq while intensely 
interested in everything new'. On that visit, W.R. 
Johnstone, the Company official, was present when the 
missionary outlined to the chief their proposal to start 
schools in his area. In 1904, the missionary at 
Mbereshi reported the death of King Kazembe whereby, he 
said, 'the country has lost one of its greatest chiefs 
and strongest men ••• his death is a great loss to the 
Administration, to us, and to the thousands of people 
who regarded him as King'. Kazembe had not taken 
kindly to 'the invasion of his territory by the Admini-
stration - perhaps that was both natural and justifi-
able - but as he was brought to understand their motives 
and methods, they had no more loyal subject than "Kazembe 
wa Lunda"'• His death was likely to be followed by a 
scattering of the people into small settlements as was 
'the tendency since the advent of the Administration•. 5 
4. C of S Inventory 13, 'Aurora', 1/10/97; Geographical 
Journal Vol. 13, 1899, No. 6, pp. 577 ff., article 
by Capt. FE.R. Boileau on 'The Nyassa-Tanganyika 
Plateau'; Seep. 386 above; and PLG: BSA 8/15, 
Codrington to BSAC, 2/2/00. 
5. CCWM: C.Africa Reports, Box 1, W.G. Robertson to 
London, September 1900; Box 12, Nutter, Mbereshi, 
to London, 24/1/04. 
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Kazembe, like Mpezeni, had had little choice but to make 
his accommodation with the B.S.A. Company on which their 
recognition of him was conditional. The price had been 
his cooperation as an agent, however reluctant, of their 
supremacy. 
It is generally recongised that the B.S.A. 
Company operated 'direct rule'. The extent to which 
this was done and the consequent denigration of chief-
tainship is illustrated by what we saw in Chapter v 
above in our review of musonko and chibalo. At an 
indaba at Abercorn in 1906, an announcement was made by 
the Administrator, which was confirmed two years later, 
that if chiefs cooperated in enforcing chisanka and the 
abandoning of small settlements, forbade the pollarding 
of trees for ash-fertilisation of fields and assisted 
the Native Commissioners in tax collection, 'they might 
seek permission from him on his next visit to kill small 
game such as mpombo (duiker)'. The attitude of chiefs 
to the Company's rule was, therefore, understandably 
reluctant. The Native Commissioner recorded this with 
the comment that 'the inclination ••• of the chiefs' was 
'to accept as little direct responsibility and authority 
as possible'. This meant that the N.c., who was trying 
to use 'the authority and influence of chiefs and head-
men ••• as far as possible', had to undertake 'constant 
visiting throughout the division'. To the White Fathers 
in the Nchelenge area on the shores of Lake Mweru, it 
appeared that, as a result of the arrival of the Company, 
sss. 
the local chief, Kaliminwa, had not 'a shred of autho-
rity except what the Administration allowed to him'.6 
In 1907, the Administration of North-western 
Rhodesia was privately discussing the posdbility of King 
Lewanika's death. On this issue, as on other matters 
relating to the special position of Lewanika, the Com-
pany's action involved an element of diplomacy notably 
lacking in its dealings with other chiefs. Thus the 
s.N.A. advised the District Commissioner, in the event 
of the King's death, 'to instruct the Ngambela to assemble 
the National Council for ••• electing a successor in the 
usual manner. You should inform him that the elected 
Chief will have to be approved and confirmed by King 
Edward's Government'. But, said the S.N.A., 'the 
Council should not be definitely informed that this 
Government nominates Letia and is prepared to support 
his candidature'. However, 'it might well be said that 
the election of Letia will without doubt receive approval 
and confirmation'. It was of great importance to the 
Company to have a successor to Lewanika selected before-
hand so that the relationship that had developed, despite 
hazards and hostility, between the none too popular King 
and themselves might not be upset by the National Council 
choosing a member of the Lozi opposition. 7 
6. NAZ: KTN 1/1 - Abercorn District Notebook, Vol. I, 
reports on indaba, May 1906 and September, 1908; 
and WF, Kapatu, 3/11/05. 
7. PLG: BSA 9/153, SNA to DC, Barotse, 11/10/07. 
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Yet the Directors had reason to urge that 
'direct rule' should be interpreted carefully. Phi lip 
Gell, for instance, warned that, should Company Officials 
'administer the law directly and supersede Lewanika and 
his representatives', they would then 'come face to 
face with slavery. From the moment the British public 
and the Colonial Office realize the fact•, he said, 'we 
shall find o~selves in hot water ••• The country is abso-
lutely unripe for any sudden revolution abolishing the 
custom of slavery. Yet no one can doubt that if our 
Commissioners enforced the rights of the slave-owner or 
failed to treat the slave as a freeman our Charter would 
be in danger'. Then in a revealing sentence, Gell con-
eluded his argument: 'So long as we can keep Lewanika, 
we avoid serious responsibilities of this sort and also 
postpone a heavy increase in our expenditure'. Some 
years earlier, Lord Grey had confided to Gell his belief 
that both the northern Administrators, Coryndon and 
Codrington, should 'go under Milton' in Salisbury for, 
he said, 'That terrible slavery ordinance of Codrington's 
gave me an awful shudder as to the mistakes which may 
occur unless these young men are under some supervision, 
and Codrington is a better man than Coryndon•. Some 
formula of 'indirect rule' should thus serve as a buffer 
between the Company's undertakings in the territory and 
the moral pressure from Britain to set about the healing 
8 of Africa's 'open sore' by surgical means. 
e. Ibid: 9/200, extract from a letter by Gell, addressee 
not named• Undated but in 1910 series; 9/61, 
Grey to Gell, 22/9/02. 
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So much for the distant Directors. For the 
men in the field, the institution of musonko demanded 
that they rule directly in such a way that no local 
community could escape their net, and for this they 
needed to commandeer the services of chiefs and headmen 
and pudsh them decisively if they would not cooperate. 
Every Native Commissioner must have known that 'hut tax' 
was deeply resented. It was therefore necessary to 
offer small subsidies to headmen or, as they were often 
called, indunas by way of inspanning them as tax agents. 
In a circular to all outstation officials in mid-1909, 
the Resident Magistrate at Mungu instructed that such 
subsidies should be disbursed at the end of March and 
December, but only if 'the N.C. reports favourably that 
the induna has given help in tax collecting'. Coopera-
tive headmen each received about £5 for their work as 
tax agents in that year. Nine years later, the N.c., 
Lukona, was able to report how a Lozi induna, Muyumbana, 
had changed his district 'from a nest of defaulters to 
the best paying community in the Sub-District•, for 
which he was rewarded by a subsidy, for 'pay would be 
according to results'. Meanwhile, the Administrators 
were required to call for meticulous returns of tax 
revenue - some figures being submitted to the last half-
penny - and so, according to a report by Melland in 1910, 
office-work 'showed up' more for promotion, relations 
with local rulers were diminishing, chiefs were quietly 
recovering something of their lost status and the N.C. 
558. 
was employed mainly in collecting musonko, compiling 
census returns, and gaoling offenders. 9 
Thoughtful officials were increasingly aware 
of the parlous ambivalence of the role forced upon chiefs 
and headmen by their rule. In the words of one of them: 
'The policy ••• is, I understand, to buttress the position 
of native chiefs and headmen ••• and to strengthen their 
authority ••• In practice, however, it would appear that 
the influence of chiefs and headmen is slowly waning and 
unless some definite steps are taken it will soon dis-
appear altogether. The root of the trouble seems to be 
that chiefs and meadmen are given responsibilities 
without power and work without pay ••• (They are) held 
generally for the preservation of order ••• (and) expected 
to report all cases of crime, cattle disease or anything 
else ••• to the head-quarters of the district; ••• expected 
to notify tax defaulters ••• (and) authorised to settle 
minor disputes, though they have no authority to carry 
out their decisions'. Most of their duties were 'of 
a burdensome character• and though sometimes small 'sub-
sidies' were given to them, 'in the great majority of 
cases, I understand, they receive nothing from the 
Government•. In some cases, 'native advisers' were 
called to sit with the N.C. to hear cases involving 
9. NAZ: KDE 2/37/2, Res.Magis., to all district Offi-
cers, 20/8/09; KDE 2/37/3, NC, Lukona, to Res. 
Magis., Mungu, 4/6/18; and KDS 4/6/2, Mpika Report, 
1908-09, by F.H. Melland. 
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local customs, but 'the decision is always that of the 
Native Commissioner'. At the same time, the Public 
Prosecutor for North-western Rhodesia put on record this 
opinion: 'Taken as a whole the standard of justice in 
this territory is a low one ••• I am by no means satis-
fied that real and substantial justice is habitually 
done ••• particularly in native cases. Yet real and sub-
stantial justice is, I should have imagined, the basis 
of all successful native administration•. 10 
Subsidies were not only erratic but very small. 
From 1906 onwards, Chitimukulu, the Paramount Chief of 
the Bemba, received £1 per month, while his two senior 
subordinates received £6 a year and lesser subordinates 
as little as thirty shillings a year. Yet the Bemba 
kingdom was recognised as being one of the major parts 
of northern Zambezia. Mpezeni received £12 p.a. un-
changed from 1903 and those under him were paid simi-
larly to the Bemba subordinate chiefs. In 1921, Mpe-
zeni's subsidy had risen to just over £14 a year. The 
vast difference between such subsidies and the subvention 
to Lewanika is an earnest of the price the Company had 
to pay for the persistent oversight by the Colonial 
Office of its dealings with the Lozi kingdom. Then, 
from 1914 onwards, chiefs were required to pay tax for 
10. PLG: BSA 10/5, Report on Admin. of NW and MER, by 
w.L. Hichens, 24/1/10; NAZ: G 1/1, confidential 
minute from Public Prosecutor to Admin., Living-
stone, 27/1/10. 
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themselves and since most of them were polygamous, this 
could easily amount to £4 or more a year. 
Whatever may have been the early intention of 
Co~ndon and Codrington, it is not easy to accept with-
out qualification Lord Hailey's statement that the 
Chartered Company, in its policy of direct rule, used 
the chiefs as its agents while 'upholding their privi-
leges as far as these were not incompatible with com-
pany rule', the general effect being 'to preserve the 
outward form of the indigenous systems but to under-
mine the authority of the Chiefs'. For very little of 
the outward form seems to have been preserved in a system 
whereby the chiefs were now in effect foremen or kapitaos 
of the foreign regime, unable to escape from that posi-
tion except by being deposed and incapable of serving 
their people except by cushioning the impact of the 
11 harsher rigours of 'direct rule'. 
The Resident Commissioner in Salisbury appar-
engly scruitinsed administrative reports from north of 
the Zambezi. In 1915, his Secretary remarked that 'the 
influence that chiefs and headmen have over their people 
would appear to depend in large measure on the support 
they receive from their Native Commissioner'. But in 
11. NAZ: KDH 1/1, Kasama Dist. N/Book, vol. 2, p. 136; 
KDG 5/1, Fort Jameson Dist. N/Book, vol. 1, p. 175; 
KSD 4/1, Mpika Dist. N/Book, p. 436, with ref. to 
taxation of chiefs; and Hailey w., op.cit., p. 452. 
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practical terms what did this mean? For their position 
vis-a-vis their people was such that they were bound to 
be conscious of a diminution of respect towards them. 
Therefore those chiefs who reported their people's 
demeanour to the N.C.s would be likely to receive the 
support of the Company agents in encorcing the orders and 
regulations which they were required to transmit to their 
people. The comment of the Native Commissioner for 
Mporokoso was probably much more perceptive, when he 
said: 'The taxation of chiefs tends ••• to lower their 
prestige to an unnecessary extent. It is not so much 
the actual cash spent ••• as the knowledge that they are 
not differentiated from the common herd'. In view of 
the relative small increase in revenue accruing from the 
taxation of chiefs, it is difficult to avoid the con-
elusion that such a humiliating device, introduced over 
a decade after the start of Company rule, has to be 
understood as a coercive if not a penal measure designed 
to bring home to chiefs the power of the Boma. 12 
It is not surprising, therefore, that a number 
of officials regarded chiefs, in the middle years of our 
period, as useless. Theodore Williams of Mwinilunga, 
for instance, was very worried in mid-1914 when he dis-
covered that the transfer of Pound, his dreaded superior, 
was leading the people 'to think that "the rnillenium 
has come" and they can do as they like'. Families 
12. NAZ: BS 3/411, Secy. to Res.Comm., Salisbury, on 
Annual Reports of NCs, 1/2/15; and memo by NC, 
Mporokoso (H.C. Gouldsbury), 31/3/14. 
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began leaving big villages to build their own settle-
ments and this, said Williams, 'busts up your census and 
"Who's who"'. Yet 'administration through the chiefs' 
was 'scarcely existent' and so he had to start personally 
threatening and cajoling people to choose between re-
joining the big villages or being driven over the Congo 
border. A chief, he said, 'occupies in fact very much 
the intermediary position of a prefect at a school, with 
perhaps less in the way of perquisites of office. I 
wouldn't be a prefect again for under £100 a year - and 
if I were Kazumbazumba I wouldn't remain chief at any 
price whatever. For until the people have got used to 
this kind of control ••• they cannot help hating their 
Chief as the tool of the Boma and despising him for his 
dirty intermediary position. In the old days, ••• he 
would at least have their fear and the orders he gave 
would be all his own•. In 1918, when at Solwezi, 
Williams told his parents of the arrival of Marshall, 
the visiting Commissioner, and an auditor. 'It irks 
me', he said, 'and I am ashamed to call in these poor 
old chiefs and headmen just to sit in front of the 
office verandah and be told they are all good boys 
(which by the way is a lie and it puzzles them why ~ 
should always be telling them the opposite) and hummed 
and hawed at when they ask sincere or pointed questions•. 13 
13. RH:MSS.Afr.s.779, letters of Williams, p. 363, 
24/6/14; MSS.Afr.s.780, Williams, P• 217, 10/3/17, 
and p.326, 19/8/18. Underlining is mine. 
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land. 
The gun, whether fired or not, had subdued the 
The constant display of modern firearms wherever 
B.S.A.C. men went had secured what Wills has called 'the 
African submission'. To the official who was required 
to rule his district and make it meet from 'hut tax• 
the costs of 'administration' and more, the sullen non-
cooperation of the people and their rulers was, however, 
a constant irritant and served to increase the harsh-
ness of his 'discipline'. The statement by Bellis of 
Ndola in his 1914-15 Report was representative of the 
reactions of N.C.s throughout the territory: 'With 
scarcely one exception, there is not a chief in the 
District who has any real authority over his people and 
who is of any use to the Administration; and the number 
of Headmen who make the slightest endeavour to assist 
the officials ••• in any active way might be numbe.t .. ed on 
the fingers of one's hand'. Yet, as we have seen, 
throughout our review, B.S.A.C. rule used widespread 
coercion and intimidation. This non-cooperation must 
surely then be understood, not as a biological defici-
ency in the local people as some angry officials would 
have said, but as the sullen, corporate and unanimous 
resistance of communities whom the Company had subju-
gated by weapons vastly superior to any that those 
communities could have hoped to muster. But the chiefs 
had to stay in their impossible middle position and, 
\ 
during the years of the World War, were coerced even 
more insistently to provide the men required for 
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porterage. It could therefore be expected that, as 
reported from Serenje in 1918, people should begin •to 
refuse all recognition of, and customary duty to, chiefs'. 
Elsewhere in the same Report, the N.C. praised those 
chiefs and headmen who had 'done their best' in the 
matter of war recruitment, 'at times risking decided 
14 unpopularity•. 
In view of such statements, it is right to 
note here the interpretation that Meebelo puts upon the 
effects of the rigours of the War on the standing of 
chiefs, especially in relation to the impact of the 
'Administration of Natives Proclamation, No. 8 of 1916'. 
Meebelo's view is that 'the recruitment of labour for 
the war which the chiefs and headmen had to carry out 
on behalf of the Administration under the proclamation, 
afforded them the opportunity of exercising a measure 
of authority over their people which until now they had 
eschewed. The sobering effect of the war, which for 
the most part prevailed over a people who in the past 
had almost invariably shown a defiant attitude towards 
authority, indeed made even more possible the exercise 
of these powers, and in a way restored the sense of 
self-confidence which the traditional rulers seemed to 
have lost during the previous two decades of white rule•. 15 
14. Wills, op.cit., - title of Part 3 of Chap. VII, 
pp. 225-233; NAZ: BS 3/147, folio 77, Bellis, 
Asst.Magis., Bdola, 1914-15 Report; and BS 3/439, 
P.E. Hall, Asst.Magis., Serenje, Annual Report, 
31/3/18. Underlining is mine. 
15. Meebelo, op.cit., p. 186. 
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In contrast to this is the impression given by the 
Lundazi Report for 1916-17 which described chiefs and 
headmen as 'very passive•. 16 
As mentioned earlier, Frank Melland was widely 
regarded as outstanding as a liberal and forward-looking 
man who had a genuine sympathy with the communities over 
whom he ruled. Moreover, he did not hesitate to admit 
to the General Missionary Conference that 'the habit of 
treating the native as a commodity at the disposal of 
the white•, coupled with 'the entire absence of any 
cooperation between us and the people most concenned -
the natives themselves', had led to •stagnation ••• (for} 
Law, order and discipline are not progress'. He also 
remarked that 'all our laws here ••• are either for the 
white, for the relations between white and black, or for 
the government and taxation of the black; not one for 
the blacks themselves•. There appears to have been a 
close understanding between Melland, when he was in 
Kasempa, and Theodore Williams, who recorded that Mell-
and favoured the 'Divisional Headman scheme' that he was 
operating in 1919 and which he in fact had copied from 
Mporokoso. It was a scheme 'analagous to the Jamaca 
"Responsible Persons" apparatus ••• the appointment and 
management of intelligent commoners ••• each with a group 
of from 3 to 10 villages ••• who acts as mouthpiece for 
the Boma and for the Chief and as general tale-teller 
16. NAZ: KDG 8/1/2, Lundazi Report, 1916-17. 
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against his people, ••• liable to be held to account for 
all misdemeanours ••• and paid according to deserts'. 
Even in a district governed with some benevolence, 
however, 'traditional rulers' had to be servants of the 
•conquering Englishman•. In a revealing statement in 
1918, about the Lozi 'litunqa' or King and the scope of 
the Lozi 'empire', the S.N.A. stated that the litunqa's 
'claims would die if the outside natives refused to 
recognise them and we did not support them. This should 
come', he added, 'with the general breaking down of all 
17 Chiefs' power'. 
Elsewhere in the territory, the situation in 
the last few years of B.S.A.C. rule, as pieced together 
from District Reports, was unhappy. We noted earlier 
the comments, in the same year, of the judge at the 
Watchtower trial at Kasama. The continuing element 
of dishonesty in the Company's dealings with the indi-
genous people was illustrated, in 1920, by the comment 
of the Native Commissioner at Namwala that 'where a chief 
received payment for roads, he did not get anything from 
the Subsidy Vote'. He probably realised that the chiefs 
concerned were aware of being defrauded. It was most 
important, he added, 'that the matter should be made 
17. Melland, op.cit., pp. 303-4 and 307, extracts from 
his address to the General Missionary Conference 
at Kafue, July 1922; RH:MSS.Afr.s.781, letters of 
T.R. Williams, p. 23, 31/5/19; MSA Files: SNA 
to Magis., Mumbwa, 21/11/18. 
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plain and straightforward by recognising the subsidy 
and not confusing it with other payments•. The comments 
on the unhappy role of the chiefs made in 1910, which 
we have noted here, were echoed from Lundazi, twelve 
years later, by Lane-Poole. 'The position of Chiefs 
and Headmen is no sinecure', he said, • ••• and is re-
garded as carrying more burdens than privileges'. 
Younger headmen were obliged to leave home in search of 
work, with serious consequences. 'The suggestion made 
many years ago that Headmen of villages containing a 
certain number of huts should be exempt from taxation 
has more weight now than then, and would at least se-
cure the permanent presence in the village of the per-
18 
son responsible for it'. The men ultimately responsi-
ble for the direction of B.S.A.C. policy had, as Lane-
Poole said, been given advice which they had ignored, 
with disastrous results. 
To the Anglican priest at Msoro, the position 
in 1922 was shocking. 'In this territory as in South 
Africa', he wrote to Bishop May, 'the natives have no 
representative ••• Take the case of the 10/- tax, this 
iniquitous robbery ••• {It) has done more than anything 
to break up the tribal system upon which the government 
of the country must depend until something can be pro-
duced which can replace it'. Yet Taggart, the Magistrate 
18. See p. 466 above; NAZ: KSF 2/1, Namwala D.N/Book, 
Vol. I, note by NC, 27/3/20; see p. 558 above; 
and NAZ: KDG 8/1/3, E.H. Lane-Poole, Lundazi, 
Annual Report, 1922-23. 
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for the Mweru-Luapula District, was still contending, 
in 1923, that musonko was a logical development from 
the customary tribute paid by every village dweller to 
his chief before Company rule began. Such tribute he 
said, 'whether it took the form of service or payment 
in kind was the test of his loyalty and of the stability 
of the government for the time being. Our tax takes 
the place of this tribute'. Taggart believed that tax 
default was far from diminishing which meant that there 
was 'a decrease in the observance by the mass of natives 
of one of their most important duties to the state•. 19 
The claim of the B.S.A. Company to the right 
to appoint and depose chiefs wholly ignored the manner 
by which election to chieftaincy was traditionally made. 
Undoubtedly, as elsewhere in the world, the choice of a 
new imfumu, mulena, mwami, mwa(n)ta, themba or nkosi, 
would sometimes provoke factional enmities and even war. 
But all Central African chieftainships evidently required 
sacral rites for their confirmation. Among the Bemba, 
for example, the Chitimukulu is believed to be descended 
from a great ancestress and to inherit the guardian 
spirits or imipashi of the royal line. Taboos surround 
his life and sacred relics (babenye) of the chieftainship 
are preserved by his councillors or bakabilo, as symbols 
19. PRO: CO 417/691, extract from letter to May from 
Ranger; and NAZ: KDF 6/1/6, E.S.B. Taggart, Mweru-
Luapula Annual Report, 1922-23. Msoro, quoted in 
communication from the Universities Mission to 
Central Africa to Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, 
June 1922. 
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of the continuation of the royal line. Special rites 
attend the funeral of a Chitimukulu and the royal burial 
place at Shimwalule in the Chinsali District is forbidden 
to visitors. 20 
Similar sacral rites surround the chieftaincy 
of other Zambian peoples. Like the Bemba, a number of 
such societies trace their cohesion and identity to a 
royal line associated with religious ceremonial and 
taboo. This is the case with the Kazembe line in the 
eastern Lunda as with their cousins, the western Lunda 
of the Mwinilunga area and the Luvale, all of whom have 
royal houses deriving from the imperial family of 
Mwatayamvwa (or Mwantiyanvwa) in the north between the 
Kasai and Boshimaie rivers. Kazembe, in recounting 
Lunda history, uses the first person when talking of 
his predecessors, in token of the continuity of the 
kingship. With the Lozi also the kingship has been 
the object of veneration despite the major dislocation 
of the period when they were conquered by the Kololo of 
Sebitwane (1840-64). Among them, a rich nomenclature 
of royalty survives, with a wide range of symbols and 
20. See Richards A., 'The Bemba of Northern Rhodesia' 
in Colson E. and Gluckman M. (ed.) 'Seven Tribes of 
British Central Africa' (Manchester 1961) pp. 168-171; 
RH:MSS.Afr.s.1214, undated MS by Stephen Bwalya on 
'Customs and Habits of the Bemba'; and Roberts A.D. 
op.cit., pp. xxx-xxxi. The titles for 'chief' 
listed here are as used by the Bemba and related 
peoples; the Lozi; Tonga and related peoples; Lunda 
and related peoples; Tumbuka and related peoples; 
and Ngoni respectively. 
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ceremonies; and the Lozi say 'Mulena ha'ashwa, sicaba 
sashwa- When the King dies, the nation falls into coma'. 
In the east, Ngoni kingship had had a turgid history 
before the coming of the white invaders; but each of 
the modern kingdoms of Ngoni claims direct descent from 
the hero-king Zwangendaba by whom the original Jere were 
led as fugitives from Shaka's despotic rule in 1919 after 
a great battle on the Mhlatuze river in Natal and under 
whose command they crossed the Zambezi in 183s. 21 
This pattern of royalty as the primary cohesive 
force of the community or nation can be extended to many 
more of the peoples of northern Zambezia. Its import-
ance for us here is that, despite the hammering and 
humiliation which local rulers suffered under B.S.A.C. 
rule, the institution survived albeit often in a debi-
litated state. It is therefore suggested that the 
willingness of the incumbents to suffer such hardships 
can be explained by the immemorial roots of chieftaincy 
in their people's consciousness and by their people's 
continuing loyalty to the sacred office of chief or king, 
21. Central Bantu Historical Texts II, (Rhodes-Living-
stone Communications, no. 23 1962) 'Historical Tra-
ditions of the Eastern Lunda' (transl. I.G. Cunison); 
Turner w.v., op.cit., pp. 2-3; RI/Mwata Kazembe 
at his palace, 15/5/73; Gluckman M., 'The Lozi of 
Barotseland', in Colson and Gluc~man, op.cit., esp. 
pp. 1-61; Mainga M. 'The Origin of the Lozi', in 
Stokes and Brown, op.cit., pp. 238-247; Omer-
Cooper, op.cit., esp. PP• 64-85; and Barnes, op. 
odt., esp. p. 17-25. 
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despite its public humiliation. Obviously, it helps 
to explain the impossibly parlous position of chiefs 
south of the Zambezi in the 1970s, many of whom have no 
legitimacy for their office other than their appointment 
by an official of a regime established by foreign con-
quest. 
Zambian testimony from many parts of the country 
makes it clear that people were acutely aware of what 
was being done to their rulers. Headman Guduza in 
Lundazi District has said that for years no one could 
'question or challenge the white man's authority, ••• not 
even our chiefs. For, as soon as you were found ques-
tioning, you were thrown behind bars and beaten ••• If 
a chief tried to question anything, he was met with 
threats of losing his chieftainship and so he had to 
succumb ••• our chiefs just acted as kapitaos for the 
white man'. Chief Zumwanda's personal evidence was 
recorded thus: 'They came and said, "Tomorrow, we want 
20 men to carry our loads". By 8 o'clock the following 
day you reported at the Boma with 20 men. "Good, let 
us have their names. Tomorrow, we want 30 more" ••• 
This was slavery. If you dared to cornplain, ••• they 
said you were no longer a chief'. The Lala chief, 
Shaibila, has confirmed this testimony: 'People rea-
lised that their chiefs had lost their power and autho-
rity to the Europeans and that if a chief offended, he 
would land in trouble like any other person'. Moreover, 
under B.S.A.C. rule, though tribute service to the chief -
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mulasa - was allowed to continue, the judicial autho-
rity of the chief was taken over by the Boma. 22 
Because Chartered Company men employed mess-
engers and askari who often acted beyond their instruct-
ions in order to force people's obedience, it was inevi-
table that chiefs should sometimes be subjected to rough 
handling along with their subjects. In the Soli area 
of Chief Shikabeta, the memory is still fresh of how 'a 
chief called Chikungu was murdered by Selesele's askari', 
a member of the royal house of Mbosha. As we have 
seen earlier, 'Chirupula' or 'Selesele' Stephenson was 
remembered as a fierce and cruel man and his askari may 
well also have been exceptionally rqugh; especially 
since 'when the white men came to the village, they 
never offered any respect to the chief ••• If the mess-
engers found that all the young men had gone, the Co-
llector would order that the headman or chief should be 
arrested and beaten, and even women were treated in that 
manner'. Chief Shikabeta, in recounting how tax raids 
were conducted by Boma messengers, has vouched for the 
fact that 'if someone died without paying tax, the 
messengers would take a sjambok and strike the grave'. 
While this kind of outrage went on, many testimonies 
confirm that the Collectors and Native Commissioners 
demanded servile respect from the people whose villages 
22. Proceedings of Seminar-Workshop on Local History, 
Lundazi, June 1972, pp. 147 and 120; RI/Chief 
Shaibi~, Mkushi, 14/8/74. Underlining is mine. 
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they visited and it fell to headmen and chiefs to lead 
their people in 'songs of praise and ululating and beating 
drums' and to present gifts of flour or chickens. 23 
For some people, the subservience of their 
chiefs to the Company agents suggested that the imposi-
tion of musonko and other regulations had been 'first 
arranged and agreed between the chiefs and the officials'. 
That impression found seeming confirmation when a chief 
sent a messenger to gather people for tax collection. 
Near Lake Mweru one such messenger, Chipambala, has re-
called how he used to summon people with an incantation 
like this: 
~All elders, gather to pay your tax. 
I have been sent by the King. 
This message comes from the Boma 
Gather, all of you. 
Even you mothers, the Boma is here, 
Gather your young ones from all your houses. 
Have you heard, you elders? 
This is the end of the message. 
I am Chipambala'. 
To other people, the degradation of the chiefs was aggra-
vated by the attitude of white agents of both the Boma 
and Missions towards traditional religion, prayer and 
sacrifice in which chiefs played a leading role, which 
led to the condemnation and sometimes the banning of 
certain customs. Also in Chiengi, senior people recall 
how the officials •not only detained chieu but withdrew 
their chieftainships ••• Included in this list were 
23. RI/Chaponda Kondowe at Chief Shikabeta's court, 
Rufunsa, 2/9/74; Simon Ngulube at Chief Mbuluma's 
court, Feira, 4/9/74. 
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Kalembwe, Lambwe Chomba, Chikwama, Chipungu and Munku-
24 
mbwe'. 
Near Mweru Marsh, in the area of Mukupa Katandu-
la, it has been said by older men that whereas the 
Europeans seemed at first to come in peace, they quickly 
changed and began to degrade chiefs and headmen in various 
ways. This testimony accords with the view of Thepdore 
Williams, when at Mwinilunga, that it was the determi-
nation to extract tax at all costs that destroyed the 
hope of good relations and constructive policies. One 
such informant has said that this brought widespread 
fear and precluded the possibility of resistance or even 
discussion. When asked 'Surely the people should have 
resisted such intrusion?', he replied thus: 'My son, 
resist whom? People were fully aware that these men 
with white skins were brutal, carrying guns under their 
arms 9 Could you dare to argue with such a man? When 
they first came, they appeared good and that is why 
people and their chiefs welcomed them'. On Chilubi 
Island in Lake Bangweulu, local memory gives place to a 
peaceable white man called Ngalamika - whose European 
name and time of arrival could not be traced - who 
stayed long enough to establish friendly relations in 
the community. When others came with different manners 
24. RI/Gabriel Chileshe, Mwene Chilufya village, Kasama, 
25/4/73; Ba Chinama and Chipambala, Chiengi, 
23/11/74. 
575. 
and began the oppressive collection of musonko, people's 
resentment was kept in check at first because 'the power 
to order men to fight lay in the hands of the chiefs ••• 
and if the chiefs did not attempt to fight against a 
particular person, the people could never do so on 
their own'. 25 
Zambian evidence is, moreover, unanimous that 
the customary tribute service, called in some parts 
mulasa, was essentially different from musonko. The 
words of one elderly woman on this subject are worth 
recording as being representative of testimonies received 
in widely separated parts of the country. 'Chiefs were 
greatly respected and they also had respect for their 
people. People used to offer free service to their 
chiefs, working freely on the chief's fields. In re-
turn, the chiefs would entertain the volunteers to a 
beer party and a feast. Then another group from another 
village would follow in working on the chief's gardens. 
During the time of weeding, women would also volunteer. 
They would harvest the cassava and pumpkins which they 
were free to eat as they desired. There was no oppo-
sition from any member of the community to offering such 
service to the chief•. 26 In the eyes of the sub-
jugated communities of northern Zambezia, musonko was 
25. RI/Kamushimi Mponda and others, Mukupa Katandula, 
26/11/74; Headman Mbilima, Banakulu Tom, Mapulanga 
and others, Chilubi Island, 20/4/74. 
26. RI/Ba Nakasese, Mushamba village, Samfya, 19/11/74. 
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totally different. It was a symbol of disrespect and 
oppression; it brought nothing in return; there was 
no rejoicing associated with it; but instead its ex-
action brought shame and humiliation upon chiefs and 
commoners alike. 
In a land in which news passed quickly from 
village to village and kingdom to dingdom, the oppression 
of chiefs was regarded from the outset as oppression of 
all the people, as has been testified by the father of 
one of the early leaders of Zambia's United National 
Independence Party: 'It was a real war. Chief Mailo 
was ruling. Bwana Kandeche ordered all chiefs who 
owned cattle and ivory to surrender them. He arrested 
Chief Mailo and chained him. The chief, knowing the 
danger he was in, decided to move us with herds of 
cattle and goats to a safer place. In the event of his 
death, he wanted me to be safe so that I could succeed 
him. He then told his chief councillors, Chiboshi and 
Chibungo, to take care of me. I was then a young man. 
Chief Mailo was really tortured by the white man. In 
the end he sent for some cattle to offer to the white 
27 man in exchange for his release'. 
Zambian chieftainship is distinguished by a 
rich treasury of praise-names. The chief was expected 
27. RI/ Noah Kapika, own village, Serenji, 17/10/73. 
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to embody the wisdom and the wealth of the community. 
Not all African communities had kings or chiefs. But 
where the apex of government had been invested in such 
a person, 'they are•, as Professor Mbiti has said, 'not 
simply political heads. 'They are the mystical and 
religious heads, the divine symbol of their people's 
health and welfare ••• their office is the link between 
human rule and spiritual government. They are there-
fore divine or sacral rulers, the shadow or reflection 
of God's rule in the universe'. It may well be that 
'the office of the traditional monarch is losing its 
sacredness and seems to be degenerating to the unenviable 
point of being a political anachronism and an economic 
debit•.
2S As far as our review is concerned, however, 
there emerge from the data we have gathered together 
two main points: firstly, that the position of chiefs 
made them handy instruments for the effecting of poli-
cies of the B.S.A. Company which required 'pacification' 
and obedience in order to effect the exploitation of the 
territory; but that, secondly, the institution of 
chieftainship, though emaciated, generally survived the 
harsh treatment and public humiliation imposed upon it 
because it was deeply rooted in the whole socio-reli-
gious fabric of the communities on whom the impact of 
the Chartered Company fell. 
28. M5iti J.s. op.cit., esp. pp. 182-197. 
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(b) The totalitarian Colour Bar 
As the twentieth century has progressed, the 
crisis in Africa has been increasingly associated with 
race relations and the 'colour bar', 'fundamental human 
rights' and the movement for 'total liberation'. But 
over fifty years ago, and at the end of the period which 
we are reviewing, such questions were already arousing 
deep emotions. In his review of a book called 'Africa -
Slave or Free?' by J.H. Harris, the Rev. Arthur Cripps, 
a missionary in Southern Rhodesia, quoted this verse: 
"He hangs, the Christ of Ham, 
Worm and no man, these many years. 
And who is there will take Him down 
Of all the crowd He moves to tears? 
Your Christ, Your God, five gaping wounds 
Are in His hands, His feet, His side -
Eclipse of Faith, Stark Cruelty, 
29 Slave-thirst, God Hunger, Japhet's Pride". 
In passing, it should be mentioned that there is still 
need for a scholarly study of the role of 'involved' 
Christians of both races in the great continental 
struggle, for such evidence as has been studied suggests 
a more significant and widespread contribution than has 
been chronicled adequately so far. 
The mental disposition of British people in 
the immediately pre-colonial period has been well docu-
mented by H.A.C. Cairns. Gann has provided an anno-
tated historical picture of northern Zambezia that 
29. USPG - C 2, Item 15, review by A.S. Cripps of 
Harris's book (S.C.M. Press), October 1920; and 
see Ranger T.o., op.cit., sundry refs. to Cripps 
and other missionaries. 
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gives consistent sympathy to the aspirations, endeavours 
and tribulations of 'white settlers'. The 'Northern 
Rhodesia Journal' produced, in its day, a series of 
readable portraits of 'the pioneers' who have been also 
well served by Brelsford and Gelfand. 30 Our concern 
here is with the 'colour bar' in relation to the real 
nature of the Chartered Company's northward thrust and 
its consequent mode of 'government'; to understand the 
'colour bar' as a corrolary of conquest and so, logi-
cally, as a root cause of the movement towards radical 
change that was led by Kenneth Kaunda and his colleagues 
in the middle of the century. 
When Leopold Moore suggested, in the 'Living-
stone Mail' in 1908, that many missionaries were 'quite 
uninfluenced by the Imperial Idea', he may well have 
been right in his diagnosis. For the essence of the 
'Imperial Idea' in practice seems to have been that a 
'civilised nation', which had the energy and the equip-
ment necessary to enable it to annex territories beyond 
its own frontiers, thereby established its 'right' to 
exploit such territories maximally, the consequence being 
that 'native peoples' must be debarred from free access 
to the resources being so exploited and to the wealth 
31 accruing from those exploitative undertakings. 
30. See Cairns, op.cit.; Gann 'History' and 'Birth' 
op.cit.; NRJ, sundry articles; Brelsford w.v., 
'Generation of Men' (Manning 1965), and Gelfand M. 
op.cit. 
31. 'Livingstone Mail 25/7/08; and see, e.g. P• 510-11 
above. 
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Perhaps this debarring is essentially what the 'colour 
bar' is, a system that gained, almost as soon as it 
started, the accretion of historical, ethnic, biological, 
and cultural retionalisations which gave it both res-
pectability and credibility in 'civilised' circles. 
But, if our judgments are to be just, we cannot assume 
that people placed on the other side of the bar could 
view it as it was viewed by those who took the initia-
tive in raising the barriers. 
Domination was a major element in the Chartered 
Company's thrust into northern Zambezia and inevitably 
it gave rise to profound and pervasive mistrust. This 
is surely a feature of all such conquests. The una-
voidable language barrier therefore quickly became, on 
both sides, an instrument of deception. In 1898, for 
example, the Blantyre Mission's newssheet noted that 
labourers on the plantations were using a clever device 
of speech to make sure that the Azungu, as white men 
were called, could not understand what they were saying. 
This was done by interspersing sentences with -china-, 
placed between the two last syllables of certain words, 
and the 'language' so produced was called Chinalimuka. 
Another such code language was produced by simply putting 
the second syllable of a word before the first so that, 
for instance, nyumba (a house) became ~banyu. Much 
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could then be discussed which the white men could not 
understand. 32 
When we recall the instances of violence that 
marked the first white incursions, it is easy to under-
stand not only why black people wanted a code language 
but also that their remarks about.the white men's be-
haviour must often have been bitter and angry. This{ 
is why the songs of the men who carried Boma officials 
and others in machila are of interest, like this one 
from Chief Mbuluma's area in the Feira district: 
'Tabela wee, tabela mante, 
0 tabela aye, tabela mambol 
Tabela wee, tabela mambo, 
Tabela wee, 0 tabela mambo tabela1; 
the gist of which was: 'We have no more peace and are 
in slavery again, for the Europeans are troubling us'. 
Another such ditty from the Soli of Rufunsa ran thus: 
'Mukulula, mukulula; 
Washima moto, washima moto; 
Mukulula, mukulula'. 
'Things are bitter, things are bitter and the fire is 
dead'. We noted earlier the carriers' chorus about 
the swooping hawk, and it appears that such songs were 
in very general use. Another such chorus, in the 
32. 'Life and Work', June 1998; and note that Muzungu 
or Musungu (pl. Azungu or Basungu) has been defined 
by Zambians in the Isoka district as meaning 'th~ 
amazing person' from kuzungusva, to cause wonder; 
while in Feira and Rufunsa, informants say it derives 
from kuzungulila,to go round or encircle, since 
white men seemed to be encompassing a huge area 
when they entered northern Zambezia. 
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Bemba language, had run thus:-
'Ichikoti cha kwa Bwana chill fye chapambana, 
Chileti chabelebeta, no mutima mu nda waya•. 
Literally, it said that the white Bwana's whip was 
active and flashing, but the heart inside him was gone. 
It meant that by his seemingly careless brutality, he 
revealed that he knew revenge might come upon him. 
Such ditties may indeed parallel those plantation songs 
of southern America whose simple, repetitive words had 
33 deep and often 'political' meanings. 
In 1894 Harry Johnston said that Central Africa 
was'not a country where the European of low class or 
bad morals is likely to thrive'. But the B.S.A. Corn-
pany's early Administrators faced 'considerable diffi-
culty' in checking the flow of white men across the 
Zambezi, 'many of whom would be adventurers of the 
lowest class', as was reported early in 1899. Company 
officials had 'no legal power' over such people who 
would certainly not submit to the laws or controls of 
any local ruler. The situation was 'most unsatis-
factory', according to Lawley, who added: 'The prestige 
of the white man is being constantly injured and de-
graded' by the conduct of lawless Europeans. There 
33. RI/Sirnon Ngulube and others, Chief Mbuluma's court, 
Feira, 4/9/74, Chief Shikabeta of the Soli and 
senior men, Rufunsa, 5/9/74; Zarupango village 
group, 4/9/74; and Macpherson collection: Uni-
ted National Independence Party Circular, 4/9/60, 
sgd. K.D. Kaunda and M. Sipalo, quoting Bemba 
carriers' song. 
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was 'a grave danger of such an organisation being set 
afoot as resulted in the Stellaland troubles of 1884-85'. 
Many of this 'most undesirable class of adventurer' 
were coming to get cattle, 'failing fair means, by foul', 
and were accompanied by armed askari. 34 
Three years later, however, Coryndon reported 
that not more than 200 white people were in North-western 
Rhodesia and that 'generally speaking the type of immi-
grants is good'. But in the press cuttings filed by 
Edwin Smith, who was perhaps the best known of the 
earlier Methodist missionaries, there were revealing 
extracts from newspapers of the crucial period. One 
gave the comment of a white man in the south that he had 
no problem in his relations with the 'Matabele and 
Zambesis' in his employ. 'It's not the black labour 
that is wrong, it's the white', he added. But the 
'Rhodesia Herald' took a very different view: 'Blacks, 
as several hundred years' experience has demonstrated, 
are inferior to Whites and ••• will ultimately be treated 
here as elsewhere between Zambesi and the Cape. We 
regret that men should be hanged anywhere for shooting 
natives whether in cold blood or not ••• However the 
Beers treated the blacks, Britain is not fighting them 
34. BM/SP. 1894, LVII, pp. 773 ff., Report by Johnston 
6n 'First Three Years' of Brit.C.Africa, 31/3/94 and 
esp. p. 782; PRO: CO 879/57 Afr.S.no.574, HC 
(Milner) to Chamberlain, 5/4/99; Lawley to BSAC, 
London, 1/4/99; Res.Comm. to HC 9/5/99. 
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on that point'. In 1903, there was, as we saw earlier, 
great anger in Southern Rhodesia over some cases of 
assault on white women by black men; and there was a 
marked increase in explicit statements of white super-
iority. A trader at Kazungula, called Kominsky, had 
his licence revoked and was ordered to leave North-
western Rhodesia because he greeted a Lozi induna by 
squatting on the ground, after the manner of Lozi court-
esy, and clapping his hands. 'A white man who offers 
such a salute to a native•, said the Administrator's 
Secretary, 'not only brings himself into contempt but ••• 
injures the respectful feeling which natives entertain 
for white men generally'. Four years later, the High 
Commissioner, in personal conversation, rejected Le-
wanika's protest against the demands of white people 
that everyone of them should be accorded 'the salute he 
thinks he deserves' - a demand which the people felt 
'sorely'. Selborne instead endorsed Codrington's 
ruling that people should 'take off hats to all white 
men' and that the King should instruct his indunas that 
'scrupulous courtesy and respect' must always be shown 
35 to Europeans. 
35. Ibid: 879/78 Afr.s.no.702, Coryndon to HC, 15/9/02; 
MMS: Smith Papers, Box 4, press cutting on 'Native 
Labour Supply' (n.d.) and article in 'Rhodesia 
Herald' (n.d. but during the Boer War); see pp. 
above; and NAZ: BS 2/172 Secy., Kalomo, to ADC, 
Falls District, Livingstone, 15/8/03; PRO: CO 
879/95 Af.S.no.872, HC's Report on NWR tour, 
11/11/07, and see~ 478-9above. 
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In 1905, a plan was announced to start a 'Rifle 
Association' which would enrol all white people in the 
northwest as members. Its first meeting in Kalomo 'was 
attended by every white resident and mark d b th ••• ••• e y e 
greatest unanimity•. However, the Secretary of Native 
Affairs soon afterwards submitted a lengthy memorandum 
to the Administrator in which he asked for more magis-
terial power for district officials. Recent murder 
cases had involved African witnesses having to be 'de-
tained without pay for sometimes four months' while 
awaiting the sitting of a court. No official had 
authority to do more than hold an enquiry in cases of 
white men versus black and so 'the native if he be the 
injured party must take his case before the Magistrate 
who is possibly stationed two hundred or more miles 
away'. Should the white man involved refuse to go to 
the district headquarters, the local official had to 
escort him in person, since no African policeman was 
allowed to do so, and this involved long periods of 
absence. 'The first white men to enter a young country 
are as a rule', said Worthington, 'of the worst class 
••• we have derelict sub-contractors, unauthorised labour 
touts, migratory Boers, prospectors and mechanics with-
out means of support•. Despite the risk involved in 
giving judicial powers to sub-district officials, the 
graver danger, in the S.N.A.'s opinion, was that 'sooner 
or later the wronged natives will take the law into 
their own hands'. By making such officials 'Special 
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Justices' as in Southern Rhodesia, the situation could 
be safeguarded. 'In this manner only will the native 
receive that protection to which the payment of taxes 
entitles him'. Worthington, when he was Secretary to 
the Administrator in Bulawayo some years earlier, had 
recorded cases involving brutality and violence on the 
part of such white immigrants as he now described. 
as we saw above, he was personally not averse to the 
use of violence by Boma officials. 36 
Yet, 
The rigidity of the bar between the races had 
just been further exemplified when a group of white 
rioters had attacked shops in Livingstone, arousing 
indignation in the rest of the European community and 
presenti~g the authorities with the grave problem of how 
to control such behaviour, 'in consequence of the very 
reasonable prejudice' against using black police 'for 
the arrest of white men'. In consequence of this type 
of thinking Leopold Moore approved the enforcement of 
musonko by armed force in the area around the mines in 
the Hook of the Kafue, rejected taxation of Europeans 
outright and insisted that since "government is ulti-
mately for the benefit of the governed and the governed 
nowadays have votes", the white community must demand 
the franchise. At the same time, the 'Livingstone 
36. PRO: eo 879/86 Afr.s.no.763, report on 'defence of 
North-western Rhodesia', 4/10/05; NAZ: BS 2/181/I-
SNA to Admin., 11/10/06; see also, BS 2/159/I, 
Worthington's report on 'the affair at Mokobela's 
Kraal' in S.R., 22/4/99, and see~ 329 above. 
Underlining is mine. 
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Mail' was reporting the revolution of the Russian pea-
sants, 'seditious movements' in India involving •rustles 
armed with bludgeons' and the danger of a further rising 
in Zululand. Coryndon, however, was now realising that 
his district staff required some knowledge of local 
languages and so proposed that missionaries like Edwin 
Smith of the Methodists and the controversial Jesuit, 
Father Torrend, should be asked to undertake both the 
teaching and the examination of language proficiency. 37 
By 1910, as we saw earlier, Moor was persuaded 
that North-western Rhodesia was 'trying the "equality 
policy"', imposed by the British Government, and wreak-
ing havoc thereby. But the leader of a Magnetic Survey 
team, on a visit to the territory had interpreted the 
situation otherwise. He saw it as potentially 'a white 
man's country from the Zambesi to Tanganyika'. The 
officials, he said, were 'just ordinary English gentle-
men (who) ••• by the way they have obtained the respect 
of the natives and the just and sympathetic manner in 
which they treat the natives, really make one feel proud 
of one's countryrnen ••• doing work here which will for 
generations be remembered to the credit of England'. 
It was this paternalistic view that so riled men like 
37. 'Livingstone Mail', 1/9/06, 13/3/07 and 11/5/07, 
(quoting the philosopher John Stuart Mill), 9/6/06, 
9/3/07 and 11/5/07; PLG: BSA 9/148. 
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Moore whose reactions must be understood as representa-
tive of a powerful force in the territory's affairs 
right up to 1964. 38 
The B.S.A.C. papers, held in the National 
Archives of Zambia, have preserved a statement on white 
superiority whose benevolent language echoed sentiments 
widely held in Britain in her imperial heyday. Because 
that statement by a Portuguese resident in Central 
Africa dates from 1909, during what appears to have 
been a crucial period in northern Zambezia, it merits 
quotation. Claiming that 'Divine Power' demanded that 
whites ~hould rule, the Portuguese, M. Teixeira-de-
Mathos, gave his views thus: 'Every decent white in 
Africa feels a certain responsibility for the natives 
which arises from our conviction of being a superior 
race. The natives recognise this superiority and are 
grateful for our protection and help. The government 
of the native races is a burden which we like to carry 
but one which we cannot shake off as long as they need 
h 1 ' 39 our e p • The history of Southern and Central 
Africa, and indeed of parts of East and West Africa, 
has shown how readily this benevolent view agrees with 
38. See p. 484 above; PLG: BSA 10/3, Prof. Beattie of 
Magnetic Survey, quoted in letter of London Director, 
Lewis Michell, 23/8/09. 
39. NAZ: BS 2/254, M. Teixeira-de-Mathos to V.Consul 
Beall, Camp nr. Kambove, 6/1/09. 
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that of harsh despisers when it comes to deciding how 
to deal with 'insolence' or 'rebellion' on the part of 
local communities and nations. 
It was the opinion of Selborne, the High Comm-
issioner, at that time that northern Zambezia, with its 
'infinitesimal population of white people' required only 
a 'government for natives'. A representative settler 
held that the territory would be 'free from a native 
problem' as long as black people were universally de-
barred from entering the field of 'skilled work'. But 
what some British newspapers had earlier called 'the 
thin red line of railway' was pushing northward and 
increasingly the difference between the territories on 
either side of the Zambezi, in terms of race relations, 
was merely one of degree. \~hen, therefore, King Le-
wanika was called to a meeting in Livingstone in 1910 
to hear plans for the amalgamation of the two northern 
B.S.A.C. territories, Wallace the Administrator stated 
that, under Railway Company regulations, the King and 
his retinue must travel third class on a slow train, 
without access to either 'Refreshment Rooms' or Dining 
40 Car. This colour bar still obtained on the railways 
in Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s, as it did in hotels, 
restaurants, cinemas and all public places. 
40. PLG: BSA 10/4, memo by HC, comparing SR and NR, 
22/12/09· 'Livingstone Mail', 10/8/07; 'St. James 
Gazette•'and 'Bristol Times and Mirror', 12/1/99; 
NAZ: BS 2/265, Admin to HC, 30/9/10. 
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In 1898, twenty-two years after the founding 
of the Blantyre Mission, its newssheet made a statement 
to the effect that it was 'apparent to even the most 
indifferent judge that they {African people} have as 
bountiful share of human nature in its good and bad 
aspects as any European nation ••• Those who have con-
scientiously studied the native must find in him traits 
worthy of our highest admiration ••• but he is above all 
human, and responds to the humane•. This was in har-
mony with the missionary editor's view of seven years 
earlier that the church must belong to white and black 
together and that 'it would be a great blow to the 
Church of Christ should there arise in the future a 
severance'. In 1911, however, some members of the 
Anglican Church in Livingstone sought the opinion of 
Philip Gell, the B.S.A.C. Director, about 'the propri-
ety of admitting natives' into the church building. 
Bishop Hine had spoken a few~eks previously to the 
London headquarters of the Universitie~ Mission to 
Central Africa about the 'every great' impediments to 
church work £aused by 'strong local prejudice to native 
mission work and native Christians'. Earlier, he had 
caused 'a great scandal' by taking his 'boy Stephen' 
with him to carry his service book, etc. At Evensong, 
one Sunday, he told the congregation that 'the Church 
if consecrated must be consecrated without any stipu-
lation as to its use for Europeans only'. After 
assuring them that there. would be little likelihood of 
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any black people appearing when white people were at 
service, Hine 'pointed out how illogical ••• it was to 
use native Christian cooks, clerks, houseboys, etc. and 
yet to forbid the same boys to worship in the Christian 
Church'. The Bishop was angered by the intervention of 
Leopold Moore, 'being an infidel•. 41 
Gell replied to the Livingstone Anglicans thus: 
'It would surely be wrong to forbid natives to enter 
the church under any circumstances. Lewanika always 
attended Church when he was in England ••• and the exis-
tence of any rule excluding civilized and educated 
Christian natives would probably alienate such men from 
the English and drive them under the influence of the 
Paris Mission, etc.' But, he said, 'For reasons of 
health, sanitation, vermin, etc., the Chartered Board 
(on advice) declined to give Mr Jalla' of the Paris 
Mission 'a site for his Church inside the white quarter 
and ••• it would be most undesirable that congregations 
of Raw Natives should alternate with Europeans ••• we are 
bound to believe that the superiority of the Englishman 
to the Raw Native is the result of his Christian civili-
zation ••• It appears to me therefore that your Church 
ought not to be used as a "Mission Church"•. 42 
41. 
42. 
'Life and Work', July 1898 and December 1891; USPG: 
AI(XXVI) Bishop Hine's Report, Jan. 1911; AI(XXV) 
Folder 6 Hine to UMCA Secy., London, 10/6/12 and 
17/6/12; RH:Micr.Afr.392, Logbooks of UMCA station 
Livingstone, 23/4/11. 
PLG: BSA 10/19, Gell to Livingstone Church Council, 
(n.d.) 1911. 
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The last decades of the twentieth century are, 
as was inevitable, recording African rather than 
European comments on African history. It is therefore 
interesting to note what George Padmore, one of the early 
Pan-Africanists, quoted, a decade after B.S.A.C. rule 
ended in Northern Rhodesia, about racial doctrines in 
the Roman Catholic Church. 'The Tablet', a Church 
journal, stated that by the incarnation of 'the Eternal 
Word', not in a black or yellow or red or copper-coloured 
mother' but in a 'White Maid', it was shown that white 
superiority was not 'white arrogance but ••• obedience to 
the course marked out by Divine Providence which requires 
white men to wield the hegemony of Christendom ••• It 
follows that the maintenance and enhancement of the 
White's moral prestige among those who wear other skins 
is of inestimable importance to religion and not only 
to imperial and secular interests•. In a similar vein, 
the 'Osservatore Romane' declared that 'colonization' 
was 'based not upon brutal domination but upon the prin-
ciples of high rnorality ••• love, peace and brotherhood•. 43 
In 1911, the 'Livingstone Mail' was reporting 
continued 'risings' in Southern Africa and commented 
that 'the two forces ••• that of civilisation and that of 
barbarism ••• solve the problem of who is to be master by 
43. Padmore G. 'How Britain rules Africa' (Wishart 
1936), p. 389, quoting 'The Tablet', 23/9/33 and 
'Osservatore Romane•, 24/2/35. 
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force and not otherwise•. In face of rumours of growing 
opposition to Lewanika's rule in the Lozi kingdom, Moore 
wanted stronger armed protection for white people in 
North-western Rhodesia. The reprieve of a black man 
sentenced to death in South Africa for assaulting a white 
woman had aroused anger and the 'Mail' spoke of 'the 
black peril'. The social bar must therefore be streng-
thened. In respect of labour, that meant that no white 
man could be expected to do work which was 'being per-
formed on the next farm by natives', which would be 'a 
degradation, a lowering of the prestige of the white 
race'. The proximity of the Belgian Congo, with its 
'freedom existing between the individual Belgian and 
the native which savours strongly of inexperience', was, 
in Moore's opinion, an irritant to the situation in the 
44 Chartered Company's territory. 
Leopold Moore's strictures upon the Congo were 
to lead to his imprisonment there when on a visit to 
Lubumbashi in 1913. In one offending comment, he re-
marked that 'in a country utterly unsuited to white 
women ••• there is every excuse for a white man who con-
tracts what to him is an "irregular" marriage with a 
native girl, a marriage which is however quite regular 
to the mind of the girl and her relatives ••• we all know', 
he went on, 'that such liasons are entered into by men 
44. 'Livingstone Mail' 25/3/11, 5/8/11, 29/1/11, 23/9/11, 
30/9/11. 
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of our own nationality in this country ••• But the average 
Britain keeps his native "wife" very severely in the 
background ••• The writer has seen a Belgian officer (in 
/ 
full uniform) walk up the Avenue de L'Etoile in Eliza-
bethville arm in arm with his native girl and politely 
raise his disengaged hand in salute to a white woman 
and her husband'. Moore's sentiments may have appeared 
as British humbug to the type of Belgian whom he des-
cribed, but he at least endorsed other contemporary 
comments on the situation in the Rhodesias. A Southern 
Rhodesian Member of Parliament said bluntly that 'the 
conqueror considered ••• that one of the fruits of victory 
was the women of the conquered race•. A British visi-
tor who travelled through both territories before the 
First World War was 'convinced that the crimes of the 
Native against white women are largely influenced by 
the infamous behaviour of a considerable class of white 
men in their relations with Kaffir women. In Northern 
Rhodesia', he said, 'I found a great many of the white 
men living with Kaffir women ••• In Matabeleland the 
number living with Native women is positively appalling•. 45 
B.S.A.C. records indicate that concubinage and 
miscegenation started as soon as white men appeared in 
Central Africa as indeed it had developed further south. 
45. Ibid: 14/12/12; Keatley P., op.cit., pp. 244-6, 
quoting Max Buchan M.P., and Col. Sir Aubrey 
ltlools-Sampson. 
595. 
In 1899 Lewanika complained that 'some white men used to 
meddle with native women'. A comment sent to the Colo-
nial Office in 1908, which we noted earlier, traced the 
irrational violence of the attitudes of 'the Dutch in 
the Old Colonies and in Rhodesia' and of other white 
people to 'a certain admixture in the blood of so many 
of them' which led 'these kindliest of people' to demon-
strate 'a prejudice and cruelty respecting natives which 
is entertained like a religious duty•. 46 In terms of 
social psychology, there are strong grounds for regarding 
the emotional illogic of such behaviour as the direct 
consequence of the deep awareness of the perfidious 
nature of the whole operation of conquest and exploita-
tion. Be that as it may, however, the record of the 
conduct of many Company men, traders and others in 
northern Zambezia shows that there was no difference 
between their behaviour towards black women and that of 
their compatriots further south. 
In 1899, the White Fathers at Chilonga, near 
Mpika, expressed shock at the conduct of Worringham and 
Croad of the B.S.A.C. who 'demanded a woman from Luchembe' 
and when this was refused, 'sent soldiers to take her 
by force'. Those men, they said, took with them 'a 
troupe of women, some in machila'. 
\ 
'Voila de beaux 
' examples de monaqamie pour les negres polygames 1' The 
46. See PP•475-6above; PRO: CO 879/57 Afr.S.no.574, 
Lewanika to HC, 2/1/99; and 417/464, memo by c.w. 
Boyd to CO, (1909), on 'The Prospects of S. Rhodesia'. 
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local people hated and despised such white men, they 
said. Worringham, whose nickname 'Chapalapata• denoted 
his habit of bruising people, was also, the Fathers said, 
a drug addict. In Chief Chikwanda's densely populated 
area, the people, 'having suffered the numerous "frolics" 
of Mr Worringham•, were very anxious to find shelter 
with the Fathers. In 1903, Alfred Sharpe wrote to 
Codrington about 'a half-caste child of Chapalapata ••• 
miserably thin ••• and suffering from what appeared to be 
dropsy', found in the area north of Mweru Marsh where 
Worringham had established the Choma~Bama in 1893. 
In Chief Chipepo's area, west of Kabwe, senior men have 
recorded that the local community felt deep anger at men 
who cursed the people as 'dogs' and 'monkeys• while 
seizing their women and girls. There were, they said, 
many babies born as a result of such conduct but 'a 
number were killed•. 47 
The Imperial authorities began to express 
growing concern about concubinage and miscegenation in 
1910. Undoubtedly the MacNamara case focussed atten-
tion on it. Indeed the reason given for his eventual 
suspension was his 'having habitually practised concu-
binage ••• from December 1906 to September 1909, which 
Gladstone, the High Commissioner, said was 'incompatible 
47. WF, Chilonga, 8/12/99, 18/12/99, 27/1/00 and 12/3/00; 
NAZ: BS 1/97, Sharpe to Codrington, 9/3/03; and 
RI/ Chief Chipepo and councillors, 14/10/75. 
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with the maintenance of the prestige of a British Govern-
ment'. In a report to the Colonial Office, the High 
Commissioner, enclosed a copy of his circular to senior 
Company officials in which he spoke of 'the growing evil' 
of the situation. 'While fully aware of the special 
difficulties inseparable from arduous ••• duties ••• in 
isolated native districts', he especially warned 'the 
younger men' that 'proved misconduct' would have 'very 
serious consequences'. The Acting Administrator, Col. 
John Carden, threatened 'instant dismissal' for an off-
ence 'calculated to degrade the white man in the eyes 
of the native'. This was at the time when the 'Rhodesia 
Herald', in reporting the indignation of the white commu-
nity at the reprieve by the Colonial Secretary of a 
black man sentenced to death for the rape of a white 
woman, declared that in America 'men had found it 
necessary to lynch and burn blacks who dare to molest 
48 women of the white race'. 
Leicester Beaufort, then Acting Administrator 
in North-western Rhodesia, disagreed with the High Comm-
issioner's statement on concubinage. He held the opin-
ion, 'acquired in a long Colonial experience, that the 
concubinage of a European with a single native woman, 
maintained with constancy and decently veiled, stands 
48. NAZ: BS 2/262, HC to Admin. 11/4/10; PRO: CO 
879/104 Afr.S.no.947, HC to CO, mid-1910; Carden 
to NCs, 4/6/10; Keatley, op.cit., p. 247. 
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on a footing so different ••• that it could be of very 
doubtful justice or expediency to condemn it before it 
had given rise to scandal or trouble ••• such a concubin-
age', he said, 'is often defended on many grounds, e.g. 
health, the acquirement of native languages, ideas, mode 
of thought, and the warning of projected crimes and 
risings. It has been of material comfort and advantage 
to many a lonely European; it is not the least degrading 
to the woman of the country•. Beaufort acknowledged, 
however, that there were cases of 'promiscuity, libertin-
age, ••• and abuse of power' which led to 'sickness, 
native trouble, crime and the degradation of all con-
cerned'. 
modify his 
But the High Commissioner was not ready to 
. 49 
v~ew. 
It was at this time also that, as a result of 
the insistence of Charles Venables, the brutalities 
committed by MacNamara had come to light. V enables 
had been particularly incensed by MacNamara's action in 
using his chief concubine as a virtual prison warder to 
incarcerate and intimidate a woman whose husband had 
died as a result of flogging. In informing the Colo-
nial Secretary of MacNarnara's concubinage, the High 
Commissioner said that it had also been learned that 
Venables was 'addicted to similar practices. I am 
therefore informing him', he added, 'that ••• I am not 
prepared to pay further attention to his complaints'. 
49. Ibid: Beaufort to HC, 4/10/10.- PAo ~Go j&cc:rjto4: 
Aj'. s. '141. 
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Lord Crewe at that point, announced that he could not 
'contemplate any possibility of MacNamara's continuance 
in service', but he also told the Anti-Slavery Society 
that he would not correspond with them further on the 
matter. In rebuking Venables, the High Commissioner's 
Secretary, Rodwell, said that 'so far from being en-
titled to criticise the administration of natives', 
Venables was guilty of 'conduct calculated to degrade 
the white man ••• and to impair the prestige of the gov-
erning race'. To this, however, the white farmer re-
plied that he had not concealed his relationship with a 
daughter of Chief Kanyemba of the Chikunda; that his 
charge against MacNamara was based, not on his concu-
binage, but on his use of a concubine to intimidate a 
witness at the Ibwe Munyama enquiry; and that Codrington 
himself had been known for his 'plurality of native 
concubines at the seat of his Government' in both North-
eastern and North-western Rhodesia. Moreover, pro-
miscuous concubinage was widespread and there were 
'scattered throughout these territories half-caste 
children and families of half-caste children, the off-
spring of Magistrates, Native Commissioners and other 
officials entrusted with important government posts'. 
The same was true, he said, in territories like Nyasa-
land, Uganda and West Africa. In reply, the High 
Commissioner withdrew his charge against Venables. 
The B.S.A. Company, however, protested some months 
later at the Colonial Secretary's failure to reject 
so Venables's charges against Codrington. 
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Under Chartered Company rule, legislation 
dealing with 'immorality' in the relation of men and 
women of different race was in effect highly discrimi-
natory. As Keatley records, a chief in Southern Rho-
desia had declared that there could not be 'peace be-
tween the black man and the white' unless black women 
were protected as white women were. But one of those 
who warned that lynching would have to be used against 
black men assaulting white women was Charles Coghlan who 
was to be the first Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia 
in 1923, and whose popularity as spokesman of the white 
community was thus endorsed. The other side of the 
issue was the effect on indigenous communities on both 
sides of the Zambezi when white men seized their women, 
even if, as sometimes happened, they 'paid' for them 
by offering what was tantamount to a bribe to the 
father of a girl already betrothed. From the Zambezi-
Luangwa confluence area, Castino Chintanda protested in 
1899 about how 'Changa-changa' Clark took any girl he 
fancied and sent her back 'when tired of her'. 'But 
I can do nothing', said Chintanda, 'as Clark is a white 
man and professed to be representing the Government'. 
50. See ~p. 323 ff. above; PRO: CO 879/104, Afr.S.no. 
948, HC to Col.Secy., 11/4/10; Col.Secy. to HC and 
to A-S and A.P. Socy., 6/6/10; Imperial Secretary 
(Rodwell) to Venables, 21/4/10; Venables to Imp. 
Secy., 11/5/10; Rodwell to Venables, 21/6/10; 
and BSAC to eo, 16/12/10. 
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The British visitor to Central Africa, cited abov~, 
described how he had 'found that some women had been 
three parts paid for by Kaffirs ••• and then the white 
man came along and offered some payment and the girl's 
father had let them go. Whenever a Kaffir was treated 
in that way ••• he hated the white man'. The fact that 
such white men were armed and probably also ready with 
the whip and that some of them used armed askari to pro-
cure women for them meant that the fathers of these 
girls were not able to resist. Missionary testimonies, 
such as we noted earlier, and the evidence of Zambians, 
who recall the period which we are reviewing, are in 
51 agreement about this. 
Against a background of such illicit behaviour 
on the part of a notable proportion of white men, a 
totalitarian colour bar appeared in northern Zambezia. 
Gann has described conditions of work in the early urban 
communities in this way: 'The Europeans were separated 
from their African hands by a rigid colour bar, culture, 
skill and living standards, even though the European 
in the early days was also very poor. The white fore-
men, faced with the unenviable task of having to handle 
crowds of men whose languages and beliefs they did not 
51. Keatley, op.cit., pp. 246-8, and seep. 242 above; 
PRO: CO 879/57, Afr.S.no.574, affidavit of Castino 
Chitanda to Admin., 25/4/99; RI/Chief Chipepo and 
councillors, 14/10/75, Chapanda Kondowe and Luchele-
ng'umbo, Chief Shikabeta's court, 2/9/74, Leo 
Chikambalala and others, Old Mkushi, 12/8/74. 
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understand and whose incompetence irritated them, con-
sidered that tough treatment of Africans was the only 
thing possible, becoming convinced that there must be 
no "weakness" in dealing with them. Discipline was 
re-enforced by the Masters and Servants legislation, 
passed in 1908, which resembled a code of an army, 
making desertion and various other kinds of misdemeanour 
a criminal offence, as they already were south of the 
Zambezi. The measure was not specifically applicable 
to Africans but to unskilled labourers in general. 
But as there were no white unskilled workers in employ-
ment, the measure constituted an important new legis-
52 lative barrier between the two races'. The situa-
tion which developed in the territory and was to be 
accelerated by the meteoric growth of the Copperbelt, 
was one in which the bar between the races was visible 
everywhere. Far from promoting in black people a 
sense of being 'protected', it gave them a sense of 
being victimised and humiliated wherever they went. 
Moreover, the transfer of authority in 1924 had not 
altered the situation in any sense whatever which might 
have aleviated the universal consciousness of repression 
and deprivation in the minds of the indigenous people. 
Seventy years after the Lochner Concession and 
the Thomson 'treaties', Kenneth Kaunda spoke as follows 
52. Gann 'History', op.cit., p. 144. 
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of what the colour bar in Northern Rhodesia meant, at 
the time when the adjective 'multi-racial' was being 
used to describe the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land: 'EVERY PART Or., OUR "MULTI-RACIAL" SOCIETY IS 
CONDITIONED BY COLOUR', he said. 'When we are sick we 
are taken to separate hospitals in separate ambulances. 
When we sleep on a journey we must go to separate hotels. 
When we eat we must eat in separate cafes; when we want 
to enjoy ourselves we must go to separate cinemas. 
When travelling overseas in Britain, I was treated with 
courtesy everywhere. I was received in homes of the 
highest and the lowest, and suffered no social embarrass-
ment. Back at home I remember going into a cafe in 
Kitwe. It was in April 1957. I went to the counter 
and asked for sandwiches, but was told "Boys are not 
served here". I tried to reason with the assistant, 
that all I wanted was service, but without success. 
The next thing I knew I was being thrown outside by 
fellow customers and "a free for all" followed. And 
this, in the land c£ my birth 1 This kind of incident 
is repeated countless times every day and is a source of 
explosive bitterness in the hearts of my people. If 
this was an economic bar we could overcome it as some 
of our people are fast doing. One could even change 
one's religion. But God has made me black, there is 
nothing I can do about it. This does not mean that I 
am not proud of my colour, but it is something to show 
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that I am being punished for a sin, if sin it is, that 
I never committed.• 53 
From all the evidence available, it is clear 
that 'protection' and 'trusteeship' are most inappro-
priate terms by which to describe 'colonial rule' over 
northern Zambezia in the B.S.A.C. period. Instead, 
the conquest having been emphatically accomplished, a 
system was created, which not only ensured the exploita-
tion of the Territory's human and natural resources, 
but made it impossible for black people to participate 
in its economic and industrial growth at other than a 
menial and subservient level. To be recognised as a 
worker in the eyes of the Company's Administration, a 
man had to be either coerced into Boma service or to be 
ready to serve the wishes of the conquerors by perform-
ing tasks whereby he was, in Shakespeare's phrase, 
54 'dressed in a little brief authority'. The potential 
of the African people for adaptation to the impact of a 
system more complicated and technologically advanced 
than they had hitherto practised was not only untapped 
but seriously inhibited. Pacification was rendered 
synonymous with enforced passivity. Thus debarred from 
free advancement within the modern industries of the 
country, from entering the agricultural markets by which 
53. Kaunda K. and Morris c. 'Black Government' (United 
Society for Christian Literature 1960), pp. 46-7. 
54. Shakespea~w., 'Measure for Measure', Act II, 
Scene 2, line 118. 
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the urban communities were fed and from social and 
cultural interaction with the immigrant European popu-
lation, the indigenous population continued to suffer 
the afflictions of a conquered people at the hands of a 
regime immensely superior, by virtue of its conquest, 
in material power and wealth. 
(c) The Rooting of Zambian Nationalism 
During the period of heightened tension that 
led eventually to the birth of Zambia, sarcastic tributes 
were paid by black spokesmen to Sir Roy Welensky for his 
exposure of the true nature of what was sometimes called 
'white supremacy'. In 1952, in one of the very first 
letters by a black man to be published in the 'Northern 
News', Reuben Kamanga said that Africans were 'proud of 
Mr Welenskyror spreading his political knowledge into 
their political institutions. But,• he said, 'Africans 
have now reached the stage where they no longer require 
his teaching. As Mr Welensky has proved to be such a 
good political teacher for backward countries, he de-
serves a transfer to any of the countries which are 
still backward'. Shortly afterwards a member of the 
African Representative Council, Rev. Paul Mushindo of 
Lubwa, Chinsali, wrote thus about Welensky: 'He sacri-
fices himself for many Europeans in these two countries' -
the two Rhodesias - 'who pretend to be Africans' friends 
Many thanks are due to Mr Roy Welensky for his revelation 
of Europeans to Africans. He has taught them what many 
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Europeans think and plan against Africans'. The 
story of the articulation of African protest against 
foreign domination has been recounted elsewhere; but 
the comment might be made that the above quotations 
suggest a very mild form of protest as late as twenty-
eight years after the end of B.S.A. Company rule. The 
evidence we have collected above makes it clear, however, 
that the British annexation of northern Zambezia was 
not only effected by military conquest in the beginning, 
but was maintained by military power for over thirty 
55 years. 
There were, as we have seen, a number of attempts 
by black people to resist their conquerors, but th~were 
ill-organised and were not in any sense unified. Being 
sporadic, they were dealt with piecemeal. There was 
what appeared as religious protest as well, notably the 
'Ethiopian Movement' which appeared in the Lozi kingdom 
around 1900 and was led by a Suto, Willie Mokalapa, a 
former evangelist of the Paris Missionary Society. The 
information given to Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, 
was that Mokalapa's movement was led by 'men of bad 
character and fugitives from justice' as it was 'quite 
unusual for Southern African natives to wander great 
distances and among alien people on their own account 
and without the countenance and protection of a European•. 
ss. NN 1/2/52; Mushindo Papers (by courtesy of his son, 
Mr Patrick Mumba), letter to SNA, 1/3/52; see 
Macpherson, Hall, Rotberg, op.cit., and Mulford 
op.cit., esp. pp. 1-20. 
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Lewanika wanted to know why Mokalapa was banned by the 
Administrator. 'Now when the French Missionaries told 
you their invious {sic) you are going to stop Willi, 
why1' he asked. Lewanika had told people in England 
that all churches were welcome in his country and 
Mokalapa's group belonged to a well-established Church, 
'erected in 1787 by coloured people belonging to the 
Methodist Society of Philadelphia'. In King Khama's 
country to the south, there was another similar emergence 
of Ethiopianism, one of whose leaders, a man called 
Mokone, wrote of the excitement caused by the visit of 
a Negro preacher named Rideout, 'the first time to hear 
an African preacher in the African language. I believe', 
said Mokone, 'that the whole of Africa will receive 
them' - Rideout and his party - 'Africa is the place of 
hospitality for any man before they were injured by the 
white man'. 56 
Coryndon rebuked Lewanika in paternalistic 
language. 'It is true that your country is open to all 
good churches ••• but ••• the Ethiopian is not a good Church. 
You like them because their Missionaries are black 
people and ••• talk nicely to you and do not tell you when 
you do wrong as Coillard did ••• You know in your heart 
56. Rotberg op.cit., pp. 55 ff.; PLG: BSA 9/115, 
Coryndon to Milner, 3/11/04, Lewanika to Coryndon, 
9/11/04• and PRO: CO 879/79 Afr.S.no.717, memo of 
Cape Prime Minister on Bhiopian Movement in Botswana, 
9/12/02. Underlining is mine. 
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that Mr Coillard and Mr Jalla are good friends of yours 
and that I am a good friend to you - do you think that 
you would be as contented as you are now if the Portu-
guese or the Germans had been seven years in your 
country?' Worthington had put the Company's view 
more bluntly. 'Two churches', he told Lewanika, 'can-
not remain in Lealui without the one interfering with 
the good work of the other. Five years ago when Willie 
was still working for the French, he wrote you a letter 
••• "Do not listen to these white missionaries. They 
do not love you" ••• I see that Willie's Church newspaper 
says: "Whip the British back to the Thames"•. 57 
The branch of the African Methodist Episcopal 
Church among the Lozi appeared to the French missionaries 
as 'treachery' and a grave threat to their work. 'The 
work of twenty years, in one of the hardest parts of 
the field, is threatened with destruction at the very 
time when we expected the harvest'. Mokalapa, by pro-
mising to provide a progressive school and a Church con-
trolled by African leaders, thus made it appear again 
that the Paris Mission and the B.S.A. Company were 
allies against the Lozi. Opposition to white rule, how-
ever, was not overt in that early 'Ethiopian' movement 
which diminished in strength after Mokalapa left the 
country in 1905. 
57. PLG: BSA 9/115, Coryndon to Lewanika, 5/1/05, and 
9/117, Worthington to Lewanika, 31/12/04. 
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A private report on Southern Africa in 1906 
' 
said, with reference to the Zulu 'rebellion', that 
there was unrest throughout South Africa, but the writer 
did not agree with the 'general estimate of the mis-
chievous and pernicious tendency of the teachings' of 
the Ethiopian Movement. He had interviewed Benjamin 
Khumalo, one of the leaders of a sect with over 40,000 
followers, and discussed with him the problems of land, 
educationJindustrial training and 'last, the Franchise'. 
Khumalo maintained that the Commissioner for Natives did 
nothing at all 'in the interests of natives' and that 
white officials were concerned only with enforcing tax 
payments while Europeans were determined to check African 
advancement as far as possible and keep them in a ser-
vile condition. It was, as we saw earlier, the brutal 
enforcement of taxation. in the Gwembe valley that 
brought 'the MacNamara Case' to light in 1909, and signi-
ficantly it was a mung'anga or religious leader and 
healer, Malumo {whom the Europeans called a 'witch-
doctor'), who inspired the Tonga to rise against Mac-
Namara. Calling on them to fight through the wet months 
of the year, when presumably white-led troops would be 
impeded in their movements, Malumo declared that 'the 
black people must drive all the white people out of the 
country', for 'the tax must not be paid'. 




was however overwhelmed by the Company's troops. 58 
Elsewhere we noted the abortive overtures of 
the White Bird Church to Mpezeni's people. John 
Chilembwe's movement in Malawi was probably the most 
significant expression of religious protest north of 
the Zambezi during the period under review. But the 
Watch Tower drama in the Lala country in 1925, led by 
Tomo Nyirenda - known as 'Mwana Lesa - Son of God' -
and resulting very quickly in a series of murders of 
'witches' for which Nyirenda and the current Chief 
Shaibila were executed, merits note primarily perhaps 
as an i~rument for the extension of the religious hori-
zons of the Lala people to encompass the turmoil and 
dispersion that Company rule had set in motion. Tomo 
Nyirenda, a former student of the Livingstonia Mission 
in Malawi, carried with him a copy of Foxe's 'Book of 
Martyrs' and included in his millenarian utterances, a 
prophecy of the end of 'Chirupula' Stephenson's autho-
rity in the area where the ex-Collector had established 
his domain in the Mkushi district. 
would be reduced to one shilling. 59 
Tax, he promised, 
58. Rotberg op.cit., pp. 58-59, incl 9 quotation from 
letter of Coillard to J. Bruce, 26/11/04; PRO: CO 
417/464, memo by a Mr Grant on Zulu 'rebellion', 
1906; and NAZ: A .. 2/1/3, record of Rex. v. Maluma. 
Mung'anqa is the Tonga form of the better known 
word inq'anga. 
59. Seep. 424 above; Shepperson and Price, op.cit., 
for the definitive study of the Chilembwe movement; 
Rotbert, op.cmt., pp. 142-146 on the Mwana Lesa Move-
ment· Rukavina, op.cit., pp. 183 ff.; and NAZ: KSM 
311/~, statement by Stephenson, 3/4/26i 
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Not long after the Colonial Office assumed 
control of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, 'Wel-
fare Associations' began to appear in the territory. 
It is noteworthy that a number of their leaders were men 
who had come westwards from Lake Malawi, having received 
their early education under the auspices of the Living-
stenia Mission of the Free Church of Scotland. Later 
they were in touch with the thinking and writing of the 
Pan-Africanist, Marcus Garvey. There is good reason 
to believe, however, that the first of such Welfare 
Associations to be formed in Zambia was in fact organis-
ed before the first World War; its founders being 
Donald Siwale and Peter Sinkala of Mwenzo, David Julizya 
Kaunda the pioneer Protestant missionary in the Chinsali 
district, and Hezekiah Kawosa Nkonjera, a Malawian, who 
had come into the Isoka district some years before from 
Livingstonia. Through the work of the Livingstonia 
Mission and its westward extension, in 1894 under Alex-
ander Dewar to Mwenzo on the Tanganyika-Nyasa plateau 
near Fife and in 1904 under Kaunda to Chinsali, there 
was a strong contact between the better educated men in 
northern Nyasaland and their colleagues west of the 
Luangwa. 
1912 was the year when Welfare Associations 
were formed in Chinteche, Karonga and Mzimba. Donald 
Siwale has confirmed that the Mwenzo Association was 
formed at a Teachers' Refresher Course conducted by 
Dr James Chisholm and attended also by Isoka and Chinsali 
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teachers, the latter group led by David Kaunda. As 
Lubwa Mission began its own such teachers' courses after 
1913 when a Scots missionary took up residence there, it 
seems probable that Siwale, Sinkala, Kaunda and Nkonjera 
formed their organisation as an extension of the movement 
in northern Malawi. The significant comment of Dr 
Chisholm that its formation might 'bring British guns' 
revealed that, even at its inception and despite the 
muted language of its constitution, it was significant 
as the stirring of a conquered people. Siwale has 
recalled that Chisholm arranged for the Mwenzo Associ-
ationation to meet 'Bobo' Young and West-Sheane when, 
he said, 'We told them point blank all we had to tell 
them, without mincing a word'. 
answer anything•. 60 
But 'they would not 
As we have seen, Company men and others in 
Central Africa were well aware that the people whom they 
had subjugated might resist or 'rebel'. But the de-
duction from this drawn, for instance, by Val Gielgud, 
was that any such reaction should be dealt with by a 
further demonstration of physical superiority by the 
white rulers. Gielgud spoke of 'the difficulty that 
all civilised forms of government have ••• in dealing 
60. Macpherson op.cit., pp. 38-39 and 84-85; Meebelo, 
op.cit., pp. 236-7; Rotberg, op.cit., pp. 124-134; 
and RI/Donald Siwale and others, Isunda, Isoka, 
20/4/71. 
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with natives•, whose 'whole life and way of thinking 
must be changed ••• by means of superior power'. Be-
cause of 'ignorance and stupidity•, he said, the people 
'having accepted ••• the benefits of our rule, have already 
forgotten their old troubles and oppressions and can 
only feel the irksomeness of the restraint put upon them 
by civilisation, which ••• looms bigger in their savage 
minds than their previous disabilities. The result is 
••• hostility to the white man and his government'. 
Success therefore depended on whether 'a sufficient 
respect for the prowess of the white race had been in-
stilled into the minds of the natives' and whether there 
was 'a sufficiently armed force present to tangibly 
demonstrate the futility of armed resistance'. Then, 
equating the armed occupation of the country with the 
peaceful submission of the people to foreign rule, 
Gielgud remarked that there was 'always more chance of 
trouble' in such a situation after a few years than in 
the beginning. Thus the settler community, in Living-
stone, vividly recalling the Ndebele and Shona wars of 
a decade earlier, demanded in 1906 that they should be 
armed against any possible rising by the Lozi or their 
61 neighbours. 
61. PLG: BSA 8/60, Gielgud on Kafue region, 23/8/02; 
Gann and Duignan, op.cit., p. 310, quotation from 
'Livingstone Pioneer and Advertiser' in section 
by Ranger T.O. on'African Reactions in East and 
Central Africa', pp. 294 ff. 
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However, the comment by Norman Leys on Kenya 
applies equally well to Central Africa: 'Tribal risings 
ceased ••• because they were always hopeless failures. 
Naked spearmen fell ••• before machine guns, without in-
flicting a single casualty in return. Meanwhile the 
troops burn all the huts and collect all the livestock 
within reach ••• Resistance once at an end, the leaders 
••• are surrendered for imprisonment and of the rest ••• 
some return to build their homes again, while others go 
to work for the conqueror in order to find the money to 
pay tax on these homes ••• A period of calm followed. 
And when unrest again appeared, it was with other leaders 
••• and other motives'. After the interlude of apparent 
submission and even acquiescence, it then fell, as 
Robinson and Gallagher rightly note, to 'different 
nationalisms' to resume the struggle 'in the idiom of 
the Westernisers'. The mode of resistance had to 
change. The new phenomenon of African poetry in 
English, however, epitomised the deep, consistent and 
pervasive reaction of Africa thus: 
'The white man killed my father. 
My father was proud. 
The white man seduced my mother. 
My mother was beautiful. 
The white man burnt my brother 
beneath the noonday sun. 
My brother was strong. 
His hands red with black blood 
The white man turned to me, 
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And in the Conqueror's voice said 
"Hey, boy ! a chair, a napkin, a drink" ' • 62 
Meanwhile another view of the situation in 
Central Africa, less stark than Gielgud'~ found ex-
pression in the writing of H. Marshall Hole and would 
have been echoed by those who wanted apartheid while 
paying homage to the idea of trusteeship. Hole admitted 
that the 'appropriation' of 'the country of the Bantu' 
by white men had been done in self-interest. The colo-
nialists, therefore, were, he said, 'bound in common 
honesty to regard their welfare as a trust'. But that 
trust would be best discharged, he suggested, 'if we 
disencumber ourselves of the ideal of raising them ••• 
to the European level', for 'the white man and the 
black man belong to essentially different species which 
may exist side by side in harmony but can never be 
welded'. This type of attitude led some settlers and 
many overseas commentators to look for a response of 
gratitude for benefits conferred upon the indigenous 
peoples by white rule. Indeed we noted early in this 
review that the African Lakes Company agent wrote in a 
reference to such 'benefits' in the text of the 'treaty' 
with Mambwe in 1885; and the B.S.A. Company protested 
62. Leys N. 'Kenya', (Hogarth Press 1925), p. 326; 
and Robinson R.E., and Gallagher J., 'The Partition 
of Africa' in 'The New Cambridge Modern History' 
(Cambridge 1962) Vol. XI, Chap. 22, p. 640; poem 
of David Diop from 'Le Temps du Martyr', qboted in 
article by Colin Legum on 'The Roots of Pan-African-
ism' in Legum c. 'Africa Handbook' (Penguin 1961) 
p. 546. 
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angrily in 1908 that it was under no obligation to give 
Lewanika any percentage of its profits from land sales 
or leases around the Victoria Falls as it was 'already 
incurring a heavy annual expenditure for the benefit 
of the natives•. 63 
The forming of an accurate assessment of the 
Central African situation must take note of the view, 
expressed by Oliver and Fage, that the imperial govern-
ments left the responsibility for colonial administration 
with 'mere handfuls of men' such as Johnston, Sharpe, 
Codrington and Coryndon had at their disposal. There-
fore, 'the Marxiststereotype, of brutal imperialists 
riding to power over the machine-gunned corpses of de-
fenceless Africans, is far further from the truth than 
its opposite, which would maintain that colonial occupa-
tion was a bloodless process'. Oliver and Fage then 
note that 'the first~sk of every colonial government 
was to establish authority over its own subjects•, the 
power to tax being 'the touchstone of such authority'. 
This interpretation, however, fails to give weight to 
the reactions of the conquered peoples who had no poss-
ible reason for accepting the status of 'subjects' ex-
cept their awareness of the strength of the military 
63. Hole H.M. 'The Passing of the Black Kings' (Philip 
Allan, 1932), p. 309; seep. 81 aqove; PRO: CO 
879/98 Afr.S.no.899, BSAC to eo, 25/5/08, and see 
pp. 339 above on 'the finances of conquest'. 
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odds against them. Moreover, in view of the data which 
we have been examining, it is not possible to regard 
the 'first task' of an organisation like Rhodes's 
Chartered Company as being the establishment of autho-
rity. Pacification and the consolidation of conquest 
were essentially instruments of the primary purpose of 
using northern Zambezia as a source of cheap labour and 
64 seizing control of its mineral and other resources. 
It is therefore submitted that, while pursuing 
the policy of constantly harrying village communities 
for labour and for tax throughout the years of its 
direct control, the Company, with equal consistency, 
withheld funds from the social welfare, education and 
health services, the need of which was increased, and 
not lessened, by the nature of B.S.A.C. rule. The 
argument that administrative revenue was inadequate 
cannot be accepted in explanation of this grave dere-
liction of responsibility. 65 The tardiness of an arti-
culate and coordinated indigenous riposte can, however, 
be explained by the disintegrative consequences of the 
Company's constant pressures upon small communities, 
coupled with its consistent use of intimidation. 
64. 
65. 
Oliver R. and Fage J.B., 'A Short History of 
Africa' (Penguin 1962), pp. 197-8. 
See Hailey w. op.cit., p. 
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From the standpoint of people like Leopold 
Moore, the move towards Crown Government in 1923 was 
anticipated without pleasure, despite the 'Livingstone 
Mail's' long-standing criticism of the B.S.A.C. He 
expected that the Colonial Office would 'probably treat 
the country with its customary neglect, contempt and 
parsimony' which the white community would perhaps de-
serve 'for persisting in their constitutional behaviour 
and the unappreciated loyalty•. Certainly the Company 
was not unaware, on either side of the Zambezi, of the 
deep antipathy of a considerable number of its white 
subjects. Yet its restrictive policies towards 'natives' 
continued, unmodified. Thus when in 1917 the Native 
Schools Proclamation was in preparation, the Administra-
tion began to circumscribe more closely the service of 
African teachers in an educational network built up by 
Christian missions and entirely unaided by territorial 
funds. A L.M.S. missionary at Kambole noted that now 
no teacher was to be appointed without the approval in 
writing of the Native Commissioner who of course would 
not be an educationist. Moreover, a teacher might not 
cultivate the ground without the approval of the head-
man and then only enough for his household needs; and 
if a village was removed, the Mission and the teacher 
would have no right to compensation 'for any huts or 
buildings erected by them'. Another L.M.S. mission-
ary protested against the demand that teachers must hold 
'certificates of proficiency', which would disqualify 
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at least 50% of the young men then serving in the 
schools. The General Missionary Conference expressed 
distress at the 'spirit of intolerance' in the Procla-
mation as finally issued. The only grant to African 
education made before 1925 was £185: the cost of the 
Barotse National School coming, as we saw earlier, from 
the percentage of musonko allowed to the Lozi King. 
In the year 1924-5, the direct grant was £348, and by 
1931 £14,448 was granted as compared with the spending 
of £27,000 on the education of 774 white children. 66 
In conditions in which nothing was being done 
to ameliorate the situation of social disintegration 
throughout the land, it was inevitable that marital 
infidelity, secret associations and a variety of illi-
cit activities should develop. We noted at the outset 
the grave observations of missionaries on this at the 
meeting of the General Missionary Conference of 1922. 
One such manifestation of disintegration was the secret 
dance called 'Chipe' in the Fort Jameson area which 
66. 'Livingstone Mail', 18/1/23; CCWM, Central Africa 
letters, Box 18, Robertson, Kambole, 18/1/17, with 
ref. to Dist. Circular of 15/1/17; and see Snelson 
P.D. 'Educational Development in Northern Rhodesia, 
1883-1945' (Neczam, Lusaka, 1970) for a scholarly 
survey of his subject and note esp. pp. 130 ff.; 
CCWM as above, Freshwater, Mporokoso, 8/9/18; 
NAz:'Minutes of General Missionary Conference, 
Livingstone July 1919; Native Education Department 
Reports 1925 to 1931, and European Education 
Departm~nt Report 1931; and see Appendix C. 
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Coxhead as Secretary for Native Affairs had reported in 
1916 to the headquarters of the Dutch Reformed Mission 
in Bloemfontein. A song sung at such dances had a 
millenarian flavour and the S.N.A. thought that the 
Mission should know that a number of its teachers and 
pupils were participating along with the wives of men 
who were on the mines in the south. For 'the dance of 
God' might have sinister political significance. Yet 
in 1922 the Administrator for the two Rhodesias told 
his Deputy in Livingstone not to be perturbed by the 
Missionary Conference's call for the spending of 'a 
fair proportion of the proceeds of native tax, direct 
and indirect' for the 'immediate benefit of the native 
population'. The missionaries should remember that hut 
tax produced only £90,000 of the £99,000 required in 
that year for district administration. 67 
Missionary and other commentators often spoke 
of the fascination that European goods held for the 
indigenous people of northern Zambezia. Clothes, 
blankets, tools and later on bicycles and other articles 
were eagerly desired by the men and women who began to 
move into a money economy in the early years of the 
century. Yet this did not automatically beget pros-
perity. It was true, as a Paris missionary recorded 
67. NAZ: BS 3/80, Coxhead to Rev. P. van der Merwe, 
27/1/16; and BS 3/118, folio 45, Chaplin to 
Deputy Admin., Livingstone, 18/8/22. 
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in 1907, that copper mines had been opened, the railway 
brought north across the Victoria Falls, the town of 
Livingstone developed, and that new foodstuffs, like 
pawpaw, banana, rice and wheat, had come into use. 
But the conclusion that 'the foundations of prosperity' 
had been laid and 'the victories of peace' secured was 
somewhat naive. For, as Frank Worthington observed in 
retrospect, 'As soon as the trader had introduced blan-
kets, print and coloured calices, the cultivation of 
cotton by the natives ceased and their primitive looms 
were put away'. In the Luapula province, according to 
Cunnison, the industry in iron-smelting which had flour-
ished on the Ng'ona and Kapweshi Rivers 'died out in 
accordance with the treaty which reserved mineral rights, 
among other things, to the British South Africa Company'. 
Zambian testimonies from many parts of the country tell 
of the ending of local smelting, the guilds of iron-
smiths and the trade in such articles as woven fabrics, 
skins, hunting knives, copperware, salt, etc. The 
powerful westward thrust of the African Lakes Company 
from northern Malawi radically altered the situation 
found in 1890 by the Scots missionary, Kerr-Cross, in 
which every Nyika village "boasts of two or three looms". 
Thus, as has been said, 'if the arrival of the Arabs 
stifled local entrepreneurship, the entry of the Euro-
peans dealt the death-blow to local production'. Yet 
another powerful force was in such ways contributing 
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to the general demoralisation of rural life. 68 
To have any authentic meaning, the word 'pro-
tection' would require to connote a system whereby the 
social and economic life of the indigenous peoples of 
a 'colonial' territory would be fostered in such a way 
that prosperity would increase and social services, 
like health and education, would be developed so that 
the territory as a whole would progress. Obviously 
'protection• would not genuinely be equated with main-
taining the status quo antea. If it were to signify 
how the situation would be organised, by those acting 
as 'trustees', so that the indigenous peoples could be 
enabled 'to stand on their own feet in the arduous con-
ditions of the modern world', social and economic 
development was a duty of the exploiting European 
power. Without it, political development towards self-
government must be gravely impeded. This is, it seems 
certain, what happened in northern Zambezia. The only 
process that might be called a 'social' development was 
the intermingling of men of different 'tribes' in the 
mines on both sides of the Zambezi. Though the solida-
rity that began to make 'the African voice' articulate 
68. PEMS: DEFAP Library, 'News from Barotseland', no. 
31, May 1907, p. 4; MSA Files, Mem~ by F.W. Worth-
ington, 18/7/29; Cunnison I., op.c~t., p. 19; 
RI/Zarupango Village, 4/9/74, Chief Shikabeta's 
court, 2/9/74, Simon Ngulube and others, Mbuluma, 
4/9/74 Albert Chisengelelo and others, Ching'ombe, 
13/8/74 Oral History Seminar, Lundazi,op.cit., pp. 
33, 63-G8; and Gray R. and Birmingham D. (ed.) 
op.cit., Chaps. 10, pp. 202-230, 11, pp. 231-242, 
and esp. p. 227. 
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in the middle decades of the century undoubtedly drew 
strength from the urban welter, this was clearly not 
why people were encouraged to live in 'detribalised' 
conditions. 
In 1953, on his appointment as Secretary-
General of the Northern Rhodesia African National Con-
gress and while attempting to organise a 'Pan-African' 
conference in Lusaka, Kenneth Kaunda hoped that 'our 
uniform suffering under the jack boots of our capitalist 
and imperialist oppressors should bring us together•. 69 
But this sense of solidarity in suffering developed in 
spite of colonial 'native' policies which were certainly 
not designed to promote relations between the various 
subject peoples. Moreover it developed under the im-
petus of the acceleration of 'settler' demands for a 
sovereign white-ruled state in Central Africa. The 
educational equipment of the majority of proto-nation-
alists was very inadequate and this undoubtedly increased 
an apprehensive reluctance in many black people to 
challenge foreign rule. While in 1930, Northern Rho-
desia spent £32,095 on the education of 79,131 black 
pupils against £33,110 on 879 white pupils, comparative 
figures for 1952 - on the eve of the imposition of Feder-
ation - show that the Protectorate was spending 
69. Macpherson op.cit., p. 134, quoting Kaunda's ANC 
circular D/6-21 of 26/8/53 to secretaries of nation-
alist organisations in South Africa, Namibia, Le-
sotho Botswana, Swaziland, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, ' . Tanzania, Malawi and Rhodes1a. 
624. 
proportionately far less than the British East African 
territories were spending on African education. 70 
It had undoubtedly been the dream of the pro-
tagonists of European imperialism in Africa that white 
rule should continue for a long time and should ensure 
a steadily increasing flow of wealth to the metropoli-
tan exchequers. In 1898, Henry Morton Stanley put such 
a forecast in writing under the title 'Africa in 1998'. 
For British East Africa, he prophesied great prosperity, 
'similar to what Natal is at present', and a much 
brighter future than that of the German territories 
where 'military control permits no radical change among 
natives and does not conduce to moral and intellectual 
improvement'. There would, of course, be 'sectional 
revolts of blacks versus whites' throughout colonial 
Africa but, he said, 'any combination of negroes in the 
various states is impossible'. In addition to his 
forecast that the Cape to Cairo railway would be 'an 
accomplished fact b~fore 1925', he prophesied manifold 
increases in Britain's trade as a result of her firm 
. . 71 hold on her Afr~can possess~ons. 
Cecil Rhodes and his successors were dedicated 
to such a vision. It had appeared to Lord Milner in 
70. 
71. 
Macpherson, op.cit., pp. 97 and 193 for comparative 
educational statistics for 1930, 1947 and 1952; 
and Appendix C below. 
MMS: Stanley's article in a cutting from a London 
newspaper for 30/7/98, with the title line removed. 
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1897 that Rhodesia was 'in a pretty horrible mess' and 
his fear was that Rhodes would press on regardless, 
'quite untaught by disaster•. 72 Our review of the 
thirty-four years of Chartered Company rule in northern 
Zambezia gives no reason to believe that Rhodes's master-
plan was abandoned or even modified. Yet to maintain 
it, the Company's agents had to refuse to take note of 
the known and documented facts of the situation. Social 
and moral disintegration and distress and economic coll-
apse had befallen the rural communities of the land. 
The wholesale uprooting of able-bodied men from their 
family and community responsibilities and the process 
whereby money, hardly earned, came back to be spent on 
taxes and trade goods largely alien to the traditional 
economy, brought widespread poverty. The prosperity 
that followed what Gann calls the 'birth of a new 
d f f . 73 economy' was reserve or ore~gners. Moreover, the 
B.S.A.C. policy of forcing the territory, at all costs, 
to pay for its 'administration' by means of musonko 
committed the Company to maintain to the end 'government' 
by intimidation through what must rightly be described 
as military power. 
It is not the conclusion of our review that 
the contact of very different cultures was per se bad. 
72. Headlam c. {ed.) op.cit., p. 131. Milner's letters 
of 2/11/97 and 7/11/97. 
73. Gann 'History', op.cit., title of Chapter Three 
p. 100 ff. 
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Nor is there reason to argue that it would have been 
better if the symbols of western European development 
had not been brought to Central Africa. The appraisal 
of the history of Central Africa in the later twentieth 
century must take note of Ndabaningi Sithole's summary 
of 'the positive role of colonialism' in his essay on 
nationalism in AfricaJwhich he concludes by declaring 
that 'colonialism has fertilized, stimulated, invigo-
rated and shaped African nationalism•. 74 Our con-
elusion is rather that the British South Africa Corn-
pany's mode of annexation and control was such as to 
bring to northern Zambezia relentless exploitation and 
its inevitable fruits: not protection and general pros-
perity but disintegration and depression. In such a 
situation the notable endeavours of Christian missions 
were accomplished in spite of the regime rather than 
with its support. Such a policy, however, was short-
sighted and could not but hasten the stirring of the 
conquered peoples and result in their determined drive, 
much sooner than could have been expected, to rid them-
selves of foreign rule and take control of their own 
destiny. Thus, eighty years after the Berlin Conference 
and within the bounds of the arbitrary frontiers drawn 
by the 'scramblers', once disparate African communities 
would be welded into the sovereign nation of Zambia. 
74. Sithole N. 'African Nationalism' {Oxford 1959) 
pp. 65-74. 
Scale: 1:8,000,000 
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Map showing the areas covered by 
Sir Harry Johnston's Certificate 
of Claim, 25th September 1893 










































APPENDIX C - B.S.A.C. FINANCES 
NORTHERN RHODESIA 1911-1925 
These tables are compiled from the following sources: 
B.S.A.C. Annual Reports and Accounts; N.R.G. Blue Books; 
Pim Report, Appendix IX and x. 
TABLE I ~ REVENUE 
Total African Personal Income Tax 
Ordinary Tax Number Assessment Revenue Revenue Paying Amount 
£116,946 £69,543 nil nil 
169,625 80,732 119 £7,687 
309,795 101,448 154 7,262 
TABLE II - EXPENDITURE 
Total African European 



















£188,806 No information given on allocation of expenditure 
274,581 nil £7,645 £38,783 
325,778 £348 7,772 47,713( 1 ) 
(1) Of which £32,144 recorded as Personal Emoluments 
(2) Of which £79,857 recorded as Personal Emoluments 
£87,340 







SUMMARY OF SOURCE MATERIAL 
I. ARCHIVAL SOURCES WITHIN ZAMBIA: 
(listed in order of first citation within the 
text). 
(a) Banda H.K. and Nkumbula H.M. - 'Federation in 
Central Africa', May 1949, duplicated 
memorandum {by courtesy of Mr Malama Sokoni). 
(b) ANC - (files of the former African National Con-
gress, founded in 1948 under the title 
Northern Rhodesia African Congress). 
These files were examined by permission 
of Mr Harry Nkumbula, M.P., then A.N.C. 
President, while they were still in the 
offices of the A.N.C. Numerous documents 
in this collection were unreferenced. 
(c) NAZ - (National Archives of Zambia). The majority 
of documents cited are to be found in: 
i. the BS (British South Africa Company) 
Series 1, 2 and 3; 
ii. Secretariat files (e.g. SEC/NAT for 
•native Affairs'; SEC/NG for 'Mining'; 
SEC/LAB for 'Labour~; 
iii. District Notebooks, e.g. 
KSG 3/1 - Kawambwa 
KSE 4/1 - Mwinilunga 
KSC 4/1 - Livingstone 
KTE 2/1 - Gwembe 
KSL 3/1 - Isoka 
KDD 5/1 - Kasempa 
KSZ 5/1 - Luwingu 
KSD 4/1 - Mpika 
KTN 1/1 - Abercorn 
KDH 1/1 - Kasama 
KDG 5/1 - Fort Jameson 
KSF 2/1 - Namwala 
KSK 3/1 - Serenje 
KDE 10/10 - Barotse Province 
etc., etc. 
iv. District Reports e.g. 
KSJ 4/1 - Fort Jameson 1916-17 
KDF 6/1/6 - Mweru-Luapula, 1922-23 
KSY 5/2 - Petauke 1905-06 
KSD 7/1 - Mpika 1910-11 
KSD 3/1 - Lundazi 1910-11 
KDD 5/1 - Kasempa 1913-14 
KDG 6/2/1 - Gwembe 1913-14 
KDE 8/1/5 - Lealui 1913-14 
KDH 1/1 - Kasama 1913-14 
KSA 6/1 - Chilanga 1913-14 
KSG 3/1 - Kawambwa 1913-14 
K.S.H 2/1 - Kalabo 1913-14 
KSK 6/1/2 - Serenje 1913-14 
KDE 10/2 - Barotse 1919-20 
KSH 2/1 - Kalabo 1919-20 
KSK 6/1/3 - Serenje 1919-20 
KDB 6/2/1 - Gwembe 1919-20 
KDB 6/6/3 - Magoye 1919-20 
KDD 5/1 - Kasempa 1919-20 
KSN 3/1/1 - Ndola 1919-20 
KDG 8/1/3 - Fort Jameson 1919-20 
KSP 3/1 - Kalomo 1919-20 
KST 4/1/1 - Lundazi 1907-08 
KSE 6/1/1 - Balunda 1908-09 
KSE 6/1/3 - Mwinilunga 1914-15 
KDG 8/1/3 - Fort Jameson 1918-19 
KDA 8/1/3 - Petauke 1918-19 
KDE 8/1/11 - Nalolo 1919-20 
KDB 6/1/6 - Chilanga 1922-23 
KSM 6/3/1 - Mkush~ - 1920-21 
KDF 3/1 - Fort Rosebery 1905 
etc., etc. 
v. Sundry, including: 
631. 
(1) Numerous files of correspondence 
etc. by districts, using refs. as 
in iii.and i~ above, e.g. 
KDE - Mongu 
KSK - Serenje 
KSD - Mpika 
KDG - Fort Jameson 
KST - Lundazi 
etc., etc. 
(2) Documents in ZA series, P series, 
A series, ZP series, G series, 
and MISC. 
(3) Minutes, Gen. Missionary Conference, 
Livingstone, 1919. 
(4) Northern Rhodesia Legislative 
Council Hansard. 
(d) I1ACPHERSON - Personal Collection: 
i. Proceedings of Serninar-Workshopson 
Oral Records of Local History: 
Mungwi, Kasama and Lundazi, June 1972; 
632. 
ii. KKF/UNZA/UNESCO: Research Papers of the Joint 
Oral History Project, May 1973, organised by 
the Kenneth Kaunda Foundation and the History 
Department of the University of Zambia, and 
funded by the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation. 
iii. KKF, Quarterly Reports of the Research 
Historian ( Dr. W.A. Hunton), 1968-69. 
iv. Papers of the late Rev. Paul B. Mushindo, 
(by courtesy of his son, Mr Patrick Mumba). 
(e) Official Reports, e.g. 
1. Report of the Commission Appointed to 
Enquire into the Disturbances on the 
Copperbelt (Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1935). 
ii. 'The British South Africa Company's Claims 
to Mineral Royalties in Northern Rhodesia' 
(Govt. Printer, Lusaka 1964). 
(f) Archives of Roan Copper Mines (RCM), by 














II. RECORDED INTERVIEWS (RI)-
personal collection of transcriptions from tape! 
recorded interviews conducted in the language of 
the Informants (listed according to chapters in 
which they are first cited). 
Name of Informant(s) Age/Sex 
Nansala Manyeta 110.:!:/M 
Chief Nsokolo so!;M 
Richard Mutarnbo 60!/M 
Chief Shaibila 60,!/M 
Status Address 
Member of Mwenda P.O. 
family of Lala Kanona 
sub-chieftainship 
Senior Chief of P.o. 
Mambwe Mbala 
Court President P.O. 
of Chief Mweni Isoka 
Wisi, Isoka 




Recorded visit of 
Moir of African 
Lakes Company to 
Lushibashi area of 
Serenje District. 
Chief interviewed 
along with members 
of his court, Simeo 
Sinyangwe, Stephen 
Simfukwe, Krispin 
Zombe and others. 
Recounted local 
memory of visit by 
(presumably) Sir 
Harry Johnston to 
Tambo area. 
With senior mem-
berr. of court, 
Ba Chetulo. Denied 
existence of 'treaty'. 








































Chief of Lenje 
Chief of Soli 
Senior elder of 




United Church of 
Zambia 
Senior citizen 
of court of Chief 

















With councillors Kapopo, 
Lombe and others 
Wit~ Chaponda Khondowe 
(72-), Luchele Ng'umbo 
<so!>, six group headmen 
and an ex-Messenger 
Mutantika Jamu. 
Widely travelled; 
1914-18 War carrier. 
Long service with the Chi-
tambo Mission of the Living-
stenia Mission (originally 
Free Church of Scotland 
Clear memory of first Euro-
peans in area 
Zarupango With other senior villagers, 
P.O. Albezyo Nyawa, Michael 






Taee Ref- Names of Age( Sex Status Addre~ Other Data 
erence and Informants 
om 
M/NP/6 - Kamushini 70/M Senior member of Mukupa With wife. Memory of 
26/11/74 Mponda Mweru Marsh fish- Katandula first bomas in Tabwa 
ing community P.O. country. 
Mununga 
M/NP/7 - Patson 71/M Chief-elect, P.O. Account of pre-colonial 
27/11/74 Chipili Mukupa Katandu- Mununga period and first B.S.A.C. 
la agents. 
M/NP/9 - Nayengo 79/M Headman P.O. Detailed account of pre-
27/11/74 Mununga colonial period, Arab in-
trusions, first Europeans, 
etc. 
M/NP/8 - Daniel 75+/M Senior citizen Kapama, As M/NP/9 above. 
27/11/74 Mwape P.O. 
Mununga 
T/EP/1 - Verishoni 85-/M Peasant farmer Wanga, With Nikazio Tembo, Chi-
4/3/75 Tembo P.O. tamukutwa Soko, Wilson 
Mpezeni Mhlanga. 
B/EP/3 - Sam Banda 90+/M Headman Mbingwa Memory of Ngoni wars, defeat 
8/3/75 Village of Mpezeni, local customs, 
















































list of United 



















Very well informed. 
Had worked in Rhodesian 
mines. 
Pre-colonial period, local 
industry, trade, tradition-
al worship, aspects of 
B.S.A.C. rule. 
Ex-carpentry instructor of 
London Missionary Society, 
son of member of pioneer 
missionary party at Mbere-
shi. Interviewed with 
Aaron Mwenya. 
With Philemon Silwimba and 
other senior people. Very 
clear memory of first 
Europeans. 
Remembered arrival of Rev. 
Alexander Dewar, 1894. 





































Status Address Other Data 
Paramount Chief Mpezeni 
of Ngoni in Zambia P.O. 
With Induna Nikazio Jere. 












P.O. Retired house servant of 
Kalwa pioneer missionary at Chi-
tambo, Rev. Malcolm Moffat. 
P.O. Detailed comments on early 
Kazembe European rule. 
P.O. Pre-colonial and earlier 
Kawambwa colonial periods. 
P.O. Account of European defeat 
Kazembe of Kazembe 1898. Inter-
viewed by Peter Lary and 
cited with his permission. 
Lukwesa With Katako Chebo at court 
P.B. of Chief Lukwesa. Account 
Lukwesa of Kazembe's defeat 1898. 




























Tiki Mazya- 60+/M 
mbe Ngulube 
































Detailed account of coming 
of Europeans and B.S.A.C. 
rule. 
Recalled David Livingstone 
as 'Mppundu-we-Lala (the 
mupundu tree in Lala coun-
try). Detailed account of 
early colonial period. 
Pre-colonial local history; 
'Changa-Changa' Clark and 
other early Europeans. 
With Mwakaira and Chipeta, 
who came to Ching'ombe long 
ago from Malawi. 
Interviewed at Old Mkushi, 
with Knife Lutato, Staaslas 
Kapita, Mukana Bulaya and 
others, en early colonial 




















































With Anthony Kaimfa. Gen-
eral comments on local 
history and B.S.A.C. rule. 
Vivid account of early 
B.S.A.C. period. 
Mpezeni, With Enos Banda, ex-service-
P.c. Chi- man of 1939-45 war and court 







ditions on European farms. 
Comments on European appro-
priation of land. 
With Headman Chose Ngana and 
ex-teacher Shadreck Sama-
lumo. Account of early 
Methodist missionaries and 
















































With Christopher Chisungu, 
Paul Mukwangwa and Banakulu 
Tom. Described pre-colo-




With Paul Mukango, on Euro-





With Edward Gondwe and 
Yekonia Nyirenda, on Ngoni 
history, early missionaries, 
B.S.A.C~ rule. 
Kanchindu Vivid memory of early miss-
P.B. ionaries and B.S.A.C. In-







With Lwizi Kapalaza. Memo-
ries of life in stockaded 
villages and of early Euro-


















































Senior Chief of 
Nsenga 
Headman~.~~ 
Address Other Data 
P.o. Comments on colonial rule 
Kanona and struggle for Zambian 
Independence. 
P.O. ire-colonial period; B.S.A.C. 
Petauke rule, including removal of 
villages (chisanka). 
P.o. Comments on Arabs, pre-colo-
Petauke nial period, B.S.A.C. rule. 
Shika- Personal reminiscences of 
beta, tax collection. 
P.O. Ru-
funsa 





Aspects of B.S.A.C. rule. 
Chiko- With Jabes Mvula (83), Kali-
kola P.O. kumanja Banda, Eliya Phiri 
Chadiza and others. Experiences 




































































Accounts of early colonial 
period, musonko, etc. 
Favourable view of B.S.A.C. 
rule. 
Served as carrier for Lozi 
royalty in youth. Loyal 
to Lozi royal house. Not 
opposed to racial segre-
gation. 
Originally from Chitipa 
(Fort Hill) in Malawi. One 
served as carrier for early 
Europeans. 
With William Nyamba, Nsakwa, 
Chinamo, London Mwape at 
court of Tabwa chief Puta. 
Detailed reminiscences of 
land appropriation, removal 





























































With Andreya Banda, fellow 
Messenger. Colonial land 
appropriation, etc. 
Ex-teacher of Chitambo 
Mission, Serenje. Comment 
on land acquisition, farm 
labour, tax, etc. 
Keeper of Luunda royal 
history. 
Pre-colonial system of 
government. 
Recorded a song with which 
























Man of great authority in 
local community. Early 
student of Overtoun Insti-
tution, Livingstonia, Ma-
lawi. One time Boma clerk. 
Widely travelled. 
NOTE: The above transcriptions have been selected for citation from a collection of over 
160 such interviews recorded in all districts of Zambia except Zambezi (Balovale), 
Kasempa, Mwinilunga, Kabornpo and Solwezi. Oral material collected at Seminar-
Workshops at Mungu {August 1971), Mungwi, Kasama and Lundazi (June 1972) has also been 
studied. The testimonies of informants throughout the country, in respect of the 
hardships of B.S.A.C. rule, reveal a notable uniformity. The interviews recorded 
and the Seminar-Workshops represent the participation of approximately 1,000 persons 





III. ARCHIVAL SOURCES OUTSIDE ZAMBIA 
1. In the United Kingdom 
(a} RHODES HOUSE, Oxford (RH}: 
(i) 103/1 and 103/2; 
( ii) s M S.Afr.s.70, 71, 72, 76, 81, 84, 113,228, 
350, 707, 776-81, 833, 1214, 1314, 1315, 
1355, 1490; 
(iii} MSS.Brit.Emp.s. 22 (G.S9, 159, 164,,183, 
184} - Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society papers; 
(iv) Micr. Af. 392. 
(b) BRITISH MUSE~1 (BM): State Papers (SP)- alter-
natively called Parliamentary Papers (Parl. 
Papers}, citing documents for period 1885-1922; 
and Reports (Hilton Young, Cmd.3234, 1929 and 
Pim, Colonial no. 145, 1938). 
(c) PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, Chancery Lane and 
Portugal Street, London, WC 2, (PRO): 
(i) Foreign Office (FO) - 2/54, 2/55, 2/127, 
SS/56, 84/1702, 84/1846, 84/2113. 
(ii) Colonial Office (CO) - Series 417: 
nos. 342, 390, 450, 464, 480, 494, 536, 
557, 601, 656, 675, 691. 
Series 879: nos. 29/358, 372, 392; 35/414; 
36/426; 39/454; 40/461, 468, 484; 44/498; 
47/517; 52/552; 53/559; 57/574; 62/628; 
68/656; 69/659; 76/694; 78/702; 79/717; 
84/746; 86/763; 91/802; 95/872; 98/899; 
101/931; 102/932; 104/947; 107/969; 
113/1003; 114/1015; 116/1034; 120/1085; 
1096 and 
879/432 - Africa West. 
(d) GELL COLLECTION (PLG: BSA) - papers of Philip 
Lyttelton Gell, B.S.A.C. Director from 1899-
1925, Chairman of the Board in 1922 (seen at 
Hopton Hall, Wirksworth, Derbyshire, by court-
esy of Mrs A.E. Gell):- files 3/8, 43, 171, 
229; 5/355, 365, 366; 7/97, 116, 121, 133, 
152, 155-6, 217, 227, 231-2, 256; 8/13, 14, 












70, 84, 90, 105; 9/6, 34, 61, 78, 83, 115, 
116, 119, 130, 138, 148, 153, 157, 172, 191, 
200; 10/3, 4, 5, 19, 22, 54, 59. 
MAXWELL STAMP ASSOCIATES (MSA) - ( by courtesy 
of the Managing Director, 55-63 Goswell Road, 
London EC1V 7PT) - being working papers used 
by Maxwell Stamp Associates in preparation of 
their 'History of the Mineral Rights of North-
ern Rhodesia' (January 1967). 
ROYAL COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY - Northumberland 
Avenue, London, WC2 - (RCS) Mss.S2. 
NATIONAL LIBRARY OF SCOTLAND - George IV Bridge, 
Edinburgh - (NLS) 7876; 7878, Folios 30, 134, 
281; 7879, Folios 16, 76; 7883, Folio 44; 
7906, Folios 150, 219. 
SCOTTISH RECORDS OFFICE - Register House, 
Edinburgh - (SRO) GQ 40. 
CONFERENCE OF BRITISH MISSIONARY SOCIETIES -
2 Eaton Gate, London, SW1 - (CBMS) - Report of 
27/7/21 and File 1211, Minutes of N.R. General 
Missionary Conference, (Kafue), 1922. 
CONGREGATIONAL COUNCIL FOR WORLD MISSION -
11 Cataret Street, London, SW1 - formerly the 
London Missionary Society - (CCWM) - Central 
African Reports and Letters, Boxes 1-20, 
covering period 1886-1923. 
METHODIST MISSIONARY SOCIETY - 25 Marylebone 
Road, London, NW1 - (MMS) -
(i) Diaries of Arthur Baldwin, 3/1/90 - 3/2/97; 
(ii) Papers of Rev. Edwin Smith, Box 4. 
LIVINGSTONIA PAPERS - by courtesy of Professor 
Shepperson, University of Edinburgh - sundry 
items of correspondence. 
CHURCH OF SCOTLAND (C. of S.) OVERSEAS COUNCIL -
121, George Street, Edinburgh - by courtesy of 
the Rev. N.C. Bernard - Inventory 13. 
UNITED SOCIETY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL ~ 
15 Tufton Street, London SW1, (USPG) - papers 
of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa, 
especially files A1 and C2. 
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2. IN ITALY: 
GENERALATE OF THE WHITE FATHERS - Padri Bianchi, 
Via Aurelia 269, Rome (WF) -
(i) Nyasa Diaries, 1891-1894, 1895-1906, 
1906-1912; 
(ii) Mambwe Diary, 1891-1896; 
(iii) Kayambi Diary, 1896-1905, 1915-1937; 
(iv) Chilubula Diary, 1899-1907; 
(v) Chilonga Diary, 1899-1914; 
(vi) Lwapula Diary, 1900-1929; 
(vii) Kapatu Diary, 1905-1929. 
3. IN FRANCE: 
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES OF THE PARIS EVANGELICAL 
MISSIONARY SOCIETY - 102, Boulevard Arago, 
Paris (PEMS) -
{i) Journal des Mission Evangeligues - for 
period 1885-1927; 
(ii) News from Barotseland - for period 
1897-1916. 
IV. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 




Northern Rhodesia Journal, Vol.I (1952) -
Vol.VI (1965) 
African Social Research (University of 
Zambia) - especially No. 8, Dec. 1969, 
article by B.S. Krishnamurthy 'The Thomson 
Treaties and Johnston's Certificate of 
Claim'. 
(ii) In Malawi (Nyasaland): 
Life and Work (Blantyre Mission of the 
Church of Scotland) - for period 1888-1898. 
(iii) In Southern Africa: 
Cape Times 
Cape Argus 
Standard and Diggers' News (Johannesburg) 
Rhodesian Review 
Bulawayo Chronicle 
Occasional Papers of the Archives of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, especially 
i. 1963 - article by T.W. Baxter, 'The 
Concessions of Northern Rhodesia'. 
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